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Abstract :-
The Palestinian territories have been under foreign
military occupation since 1967 and this research is set to
examine the implication that this situation has had on the
built environment in the historic city of Nablus.
Nablus like many other towns and villages in the occupied
West Bank has been subject to strict planning policies and
regulations controlling development. These policies and
regulations restricted its ability to improve its built
environment, inodernise and expand its service networks,
roads and infrastructure, and to accommodate the additional
needs arising from the pressure for growth and increase in
its population.
The purpose of the study therefore, is to examine the built
environment in Nablus and identify the indicators for its
decline particularly in the city centre. It also aims to
establish the main factors that have contributed to the
deterioration of its physical condition and the major
obstacles to its development.
The difficult political conditions and frequent military
clashes have had an adverse effect on the built environment
and prospects for development. The study findings show that
the Israeli occupation authorities have imposed major
changes on the institutional structures and legislation
that prevailed on the eve of the occupation. The Israeli
administration of the occupied Palestinian territories was
characterised by the centralisation of power, weakening of
local authorities and absence of any form of Palestinian
participation in decisions related to development.
The study concludes that the planning and regulatory
policies imposed by the Israeli Administration during the
occupation of Palestine have been a major cause of the
deterioration in the built environment in Nablus and
suggests that it has had a similar impact on other towns in
occupied Palestine.
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(1) Background and Existing Situation:
1.1 Background: The problems facing urban development in
Palestinian towns might at first look familiar in a Third
World context. However, after a close examination of the
problems and constraints that restricted their development,
it becomes evident that these exceed those expected, and
somehow accepted in other Third World cities. Furthermore,
it is also evident that the circumstances and reasons that
led to these problems are very different from those in
other countries.
Planning and building laws and development control
regulations normally have the aim of satisfying the urgent
needs of the population, catering for and encouraging
development, albeit in theory. Many would argue that in the
case of Palestinian towns, in the 1967-1994 period, these
policies and regulations were planned to stop development,
or to severely restrict it, to a level suitable for
achieving the political aims of the occupation authority.
The increase in population in Palestinian towns, and
subsequent demand and pressure for development, paralleled
with the change in the nature of people's needs in modern
times was restricted by the planning policy of containment
enforced by the Israeli authorities and the extensive land
confiscation programmes implemented by various methods.
Statistics available from United Nations reports estimate
that over 68% of Palestinian private land has been
confiscated until 1993. Additionally, the Municipal
boundaries were restricted to those defined during the
British Mandate of Palestine'
Following the victory of the Allied forces in World War
I, the former Ottoman Empire was divided into mandates.
In 1920, the San Remo Conference awarded the
administration of Syria and Lebanon to the French while
Palestine, Trans-Jordan and Iraq came under the British
Mandate. The British Mandate of Palestine lasted
between 1920 and 1947 when UN Resolution 181
partitioned Palestine into an Arab State and a Jewish
State.
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(Kendal Master Plan 1942-1944) and building permits within
and outside the Municipal boundaries were extremely
difficult to obtain.
Military Orders dealing with every aspect of civilian life
have been issued during the occupation. These included
planning and regulatory laws, control of land use and
zoning, building permits, service provision, and fiscal
policies. The orders had far reaching consequences on the
lives of the indigenous population and the development of
their towns and villages. The most significant and serious
consequence was the extent of change it imposed on the
planning, institutional structures and procedures which
prevailed under Jordanian rule 2•
The main result of this change was that the Israeli
military authorities, and later their "Civilian
Administration" took over all responsibilities of the
former Higher Planning Council, abolished district
councils, and marginalized the authority of local councils.
All planning, at all levels, came under the military
authorities or officers appointed by them, with virtually
no local Palestinian representatives at any level. The new
Israeli council focused, in its planning policies, on the
security, military and political needs of the occupation
such as those for building Jewish colonies.
Consequently, there was no mechanism through which the
local community could be represented and its needs and
priorities established and fulfilled.
Under military occupation, municipal and local councils
were either dissolved, replaced by Israeli military
councils, or as was the case in Nablus between 1988 and
2 In 1950, the remaining Palestinian land was divided
between Jordan and Egypt. The West Bank of the River
Jordan became part of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,
and the Gaza Strip came under Egyptian Administration.
In 1967, both Palestinian territories were occupied by
military force by Israel.
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1994, were forced to resign. All issues related to
planning, building permits, land use, development and
financial policies came under the jurisdiction of the
military authorities. The powers of municipal and local
councils, or municipal caretakers were severely reduced
even within the municipal boundaries which were not allowed
to expand regardless of the pressure of population growth.
Thus municipal and local councils were deprived of any
power to make decisions, or to contribute any significant
improvement to the life of their residents
	
and the
development of their towns and villages.
Local councils in all cities, towns and villages, were also
deprived of funds, technical staff, and any form of
government support. Furthermore, the occupation authorities
imposed restrictions on their ability to receive outside
funding from donors and external investors.
Moreover, Arab and non-Arab Banks were closed after the
occupation, leaving no financial institutions in the
occupied Palestinian territories. Consequently, there were
no institutions able to give financial assistance or to
offer investment guidance, or saving and credit facilities
to local Palestinian residents. High taxes, severe import
and export restrictions also discouraged the local
residents from investment.
The work of local and International NGO's was also subject
to Israeli military approval. These have been frustrated
on many occasions when the occupation authority interfered
in the nature of projects they were planning to carry out
in the West Bank.
Building laws and regulations which prevailed under the
occupation were outdated and unsuitable for the new and
changing needs of society in terms of health, environment
and safety standards.
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These comprised a mixture of Ottoman, British, and
Jordanian laws modified by Israeli military enactments.
The 1966 Jordanian laws were not updated during the
occupation and therefore did not have the safety and health
codes required for modern life and new development. The
planning laws imposed by Military Orders focused almost
exclusively on the security and the political objectives of
the occupation. The absence of any national legal system
and jurisdiction meant that the only enforceable laws were
those either passed or selected by the authorities
As a result, the built environment in cities and villages
continued to deteriorate, plans for development were
denied, or obstructed, and the built environment could not
fulfil its function or cater for the increasing and
changing needs of the residents. With lack of funds for
maintenance or upgrading, the infrastructure and public
services declined as population growth and pressure for
expansion could not be met.
In conclusion, cities and villages in the West Bank had
little government support in terms of planning ,
development or funding. Their weakened councils had limited
power to enable them to help their communities.
1.2 The Condition of the Physical Environment in Nablus:
General Description: The centre of Nablus city is a busy
commercial centre serving towns and villages within Nablus
and other Palestinian districts. The main centre in Nablus
District is the city's central area, with secondary centres
in the nearby towns of Jenin, Tulkarm, Qaiqilia and Tubas.
The city central area comprises two parts; the old historic
core , and the new centre. The two parts are adjacent to
each other, and still function as one, sharing many similar
activities.
(1) Like many Islamic historic centres, the old city
includes the traditional residential quarters, palaces,
mosques, public baths, small factories and handicrafts
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and light industries. The old city suqs and khans, still
provide basic retail services. Its fabric remains intact,
in spite of the need for repair and maintenance of almost
all buildings. The age of buildings varies from one hundred
to one thousand years. Some buildings were destroyed by
earthquakes and wars over the centuries and later restored
or rebuilt. Although there was evidence of recent "illegal"
additions or demolitions to some buildings, the majority
remained unchanged, albeit derelict and in bad state of
decay.
(2) The new centre is known as the central business
district and provides retail facilities, office space and
public services (municipality, police station! Israeli
Civil Administration, post office, bank! money changers'
facilities, clinics). It is a mixture of shops and offices
mainly built in the fifties and sixties. This part was
originally extended from the old city and grew gradually
over the years. Part of the centre expanded in the late
seventies and early eighties, when higher buildings were
constructed. There were very few empty plots left in the
city centre and most of them were privately owned . There
had been little building activity in the centre between
1987 and 1992 , as a result of the Intifada .
This increased the pressure on the city centre and the
existing built up area and resulted in:
a- higher values of land which was mostly privately
owned, particularly in the city centre;
Total area of empty plots within Nablus municipal
boundaries was 1,864 donums in 1985, of which only 4.6%
was owned by the municipality (Nablus Master Plan
Proposals, 1990).
There was evidence that this was changing as a result
of the ongoing "Peace Talks". Some people were already
encouraged to build or extend their buildings (Author,
January, 1995).
The Palestinian Intifada (Arabic for popular uprising)
against the occupation erupted in December 1987.
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b- an increase in the number of multi-story buildings
built in the centre to ensure maximum use of land and
return on investment, regardless of its effect on the
existing fabric of the city in terms of light,
ventilation, traffic and parking problems.
The change in the use of some buildings in the old city
to accommodate current needs created the added problem of
adjusting the old fabric to the new functions with limited
resources and services and without professional advice or
supervision. This had adverse effects on health, safety and
environmental conditions.
The absence of an elected mayor and council resulted in the
lack of constitutional means or channels to identify needs
and priorities. The remaining technical staff at the
Municipality did not have the legislative powers, technical
abilities, financial resources or a national local/central
government backing to play a useful role and fulfil the
duties expected of them. Consequently it was very difficult
to ensure that the limited available land in the city was
used for new developments to cater for the existing and
long term needs of the city in terms of clinics, schools,
training centres, roads, car parks, playgrounds as opposed
to commercial developments only.
This also resulted in the absence of any available
mechanism locally or centrally that could legislate or
enforce any legislation in Nablus or the West Bank other
than the Israeli authorities.
Permission procedures for the development of new business
and industry were lengthy. Additionally, fees were
expensive, not refundable and often rejected by the Israeli
planning authorities which discouraged potential investors
from applying.
There was very limited improvement, upgrading, maintenance
or expansion to the infrastructure and services that
existed before 1967 relative to the increase in the
population and the built up area.
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Therefore, the existing roads were congested, parking
facilities almost non existent, and all main services and
public utilities such as water supply, drainage, sewerage,
electric power, communication were old and overloaded.
(2) Purpose of the Study:
2.1 Research problem: After more than 26 years of Israeli
administration of the OPT, the physical condition of
existing buildings and new developments in Palestinian
towns, such as Nablus, did not allow the town to fulfil its
functions or to cater for the increasing and changing needs
of the community. Services, roads, and infrastructure in
the city, were generally old and overloaded, with very
little maintenance, repair or improvement carried out.
This restricted the ability of towns to accommodate modern
facilities and uses in their buildings, attract new users
and customers, generate higher income and employment
opportunities, or encourage new investment. The planning
and regulatory policies of the occupation authorities
contributed to this condition.
The planning laws and regulations in most cities are
usually a varied and complex issue (variables such as: land
use, permit procedures, control of development, security of
tenure, rent control, building codes, tax and fiscal
policies). Their effects are also manifested on a variety
of levels, and on many aspects of the development of the
city and the lives of its community (variables such as
services and public utilities, quality of design and
construction , level of maintenance and upgrading, roads,
traffic, transport, ability to improve and expand)
A number of studies and reports have been carried out after
1967, by international and local bodies, to examine the
impact of the occupation on the lives of Palestinian
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residents. Some of these studies examined prevailing laws,
regulations, planning and land use policies imposed by the
military authorities.
However, there were no studies available examining the
effect of this prolonged occupation on the built
environment and the ability of Palestinian local
authorities, institutions and population to develop their
towns and improve their living conditions. This research,
therefore, attempts to provide such needed information by
exploring these issues. It will also examine the condition
of the built environment in Palestinian towns, with focus
on Nablus, after 26 years of occupation, to determine the
nature and extent of the existing problems, and the
Palestinians' views on these problems and their causes.
Moreover it aims to establish if there was a link between
the policies and practices of the Israeli Administration
and the deterioration in the built environment in Nablus
and prospects for urban development in Palestine.
2.2 Research Objectives: The study has the following two
principal objectives:
1. to determine to what extent has the physical/built
environment changed or deteriorated in the old and new
parts of Nablus city centre over the study period 1967-
1994.
2. to examine the policies and practices of the Israeli
Administration in the occupied territories which had a
direct impact on urban development in Palestinian towns
from the political, legal and financial aspects.
The study therefore explores two main topics:
1. The condition of the built environment in Nablus city
centre (historic core and new centre), old and new
buildings, services, traffic, roads, infrastructure,
and environmental issues.
2. The planning laws and regulatory policies that
prevailed during the Israeli rule, how they evolved, to
what extent they were implemented and who was involved
in their implementation. The study will investigate the
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powers and responsibilities of the local councils and
how these were related to the "central" government. It
will attempt to determine the main constraints for
development and whether these policies have affected
the ability of local authorities to plan and implement
local policies for development.
The research also examines the residents views, their need
to maintain and upgrade their properties, improve or expand
their businesses, and what they considered to be the main
obstacles to achieving their aims.
(3) Scope of the Study:
In the absence of similar or relevant studies carried out
in this particular field, this was an exploratory research
to examine the nature and extent of the deterioration in
the physical environment in Nablus as representative of
other Palestinian towns. It is hoped that the findings of
the research will stimulate further work in this field.
The research also examines the implication of the planning
and regulatory policies on the development of the city and
to what extent they were responsible for the condition of
the physical environment.
The study focuses on the city centre of Nablus and examines
the condition of the buildings and services. Three sample
areas were selected for the survey, one in the historic
core of the city, the second in the main city square and
the third in the "new" centre. A total of 60 questionnaires
were completed which included a social survey of building
users and a physical inspection of the unit he/she
occupied, (CH-III,App.A & B below) .The units included shops,
businesses and residences. The area, where the unit was
located, was also inspected, (ibid).
Research Methodology : Due to the difficulty that was
anticipated in obtaining all the required data through one
or two sources under the prevailing circumstances, the
25
methodology involved multiple data collection techniques.
This also ensured that the findings would be more accurate
as they were based on data obtained from several different
sources which could be corroborated. The techniques used
were:
- collecting, reviewing and analyzing available studies,
reports and documents in respect of the prevailing
planning and regulatory policies and laws directly
affecting urban development in the occupied Palestinian
territories (OPT). The ways these evolved and developed
and the extent and implication of their implementation,
were also examined. This established the foundation for
subsequent stages of the research.
- Studying available reports and archival records at
the municipality, university, local and international
NGO's with regard to public utilities including
services, roads, traffic, infrastructure.
Completing a questionnaire survey with building users
to identify what they considered to be the main
problems with their buildings, area and city, and to
obtain their views on the obstacles that prevented the
improvement of their buildings/businesses.
- Conducting a physical survey of buildings and their
immediate environment in the three sample areas in an
attempt to determine the nature, extent and cause of
their problems.
- Conducting semi-structured interviews with key figures,
officials, professionals and business owners. This was
planned to determine their views on what they
considered to be the factors causing the deterioration
of the city's environment and restricting its
development, (Chapter III, Sec 4).
(4) Limitations:
The field of research was limited to the areas described in
the previous sections. It is therefore important to clarify
the following:
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4.1 scope of investigation: It was not the study's
intention to get involved in the legality of the
prevailing political situation in the OPT. International
Laws and Organizations are clear about the legal status of
the occupied Palestinian territories, and about what an
occupying power should or should not practice whilstin
control of occupied territories 6 . A number of studies and
reports (including UN Reports), dealing with this aspect of
the situation have been published, some of which were used
for reference in this study.
It also was not possible within the scope of this research
to study and analyze thoroughly the political objectives of
the Israeli authority's planning policies and the military
orders issued to deal with planning and development issues
in the OPT. Although some of these objectives will be
discussed in general, it is not the study's intention to
cover them in depth.
The implication of the situation, prevailing during the
study period, on the economy is also not part of the
research topic except where fiscal policies and economic
regulations were considered to have a direct effect on the
subject matter. A number of studies and reports by
academics and professionals (ie economists and lawyers) are
available. Some are reviewed and used for reference in this
study.
4.2 Reliability of data: It was difficult to obtain
accurate, detailed and up to date data related to the
research topic. This will inevitably restrict the
reliability of the study findings, particularly the
following:
6 refer to:
- Security Council resolutions particularly Nos. 237,
242, 1967, 338, 1973 and UN General Assembly
resolutions No. 3236 XXIX, 1974.
- Fourth Geneva Convention 1949 signed by Israel (Part
I, Article 4, Part III, Section I, Articles 27, 29,
31, 32, 33 & Section II, Article 27. Also Section III
Article 47).
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i. Secondary Sources: There was a limited amount of
secondary source data available in this field of research,
and a lack of reliable data and statistics particularly on
services, built areas, and permits. The research, therefore
relied on primary source data in respect of variables
considered to have contributed to the deterioration of the
built environment.
ii. Demographic Data:- No population census was conducted
in the OPT during 1967-1994. Therefore available statistics
and demographic information vary wildly from one source to
another and was often based on estimated official Israeli
statistics. These statistics are controversial in terms of
what the Israeli authorities consider to be the "legal"
population. The West Bank population estimates (excluding
Jerusalem) was 1,067,000 and the Gaza Strip was 633,000 in
1988 according to the West Bank Data Base Project (WBDP),
while the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS)
estimates were 868,100 and 565,600 persons respectively,
(PRC, 1993). The Palestinian Centre for Engineering and
Planning (CEP) estimates for 1990 were 1,482,000 for the WB
(including Jerusalem), and 773,000, (CEP, 1992).
Furthermore, there is always the added complication of the
population in Arab East Jerusalem which was illegally
annexed by Israel. The ICBS Palestinian population
estimates always exclude those living in Jerusalem and its
surrounding Arab villages and towns. The expansion of
Jerusalem boundaries over the years and the progressive
inclusion of more Arab land and villages resulted in
further confusion over the real definition of what Israel
considers to be the Palestinian population. Omission of
such definition from ICBS estimates renders it unreliable
and according to Palestinian sources "highly suspect",
(Planning and Research Centre PRC, 1993).
The ICBS publishes estimates of population structure and
growth annually. Researchers found that these lack the
necessary details, (PRC,1993).In 1987, ICBS has published
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a set of five population projections for the OPT population
using certain assumptions on mortality, fertility and net
migration balance according to the PRC. The projections
differed by 4.6% in the GS and 3.4% in the WB in the 1991
estimates. Other sources, such as the WBDP, HABITAT and
other local NGO's estimates varied considerably from the
ICBS estimates, (Ibid).
The CEP based its population estimates on both, the last
Jordanian census for the West Bank, which was carried out
in 1961 and the only census carried out by the Israeli
authority in 1967. Its final estimate was based on assuming
an average population growth rate of 3% for the WB and 3.5%
for the GS, (Table 1 below, CEP, 1992, p.21). However,
various population estimates are used in this research
according to their sources and referred directly to these
sources.
The un-reliability of demographic data created difficulties
for researchers in planning and forecasting population
needs. The knowledge of age and sex distribution, median
age, rate of fertility, morbidity and mortality are pre-
requisites for estimating the dependency ration in
society, assess level of deficiency and availability of
services in the areas of housing, health, education and
employment. Absence of such knowledge restricted
researchers ability in obtaining reliable data for their
work in Palestine, (CEP, 1992)
Deficiencies and limitations of ICBS and other Israeli
official statistics was noted by Palestinian, Israeli and
International researchers, (CEP, l992,p. 18 & 19, PRC,
1993, Chapters I& II, WBDP, 1988, Introduction). It was
therefore difficult to obtain accurate data related to
available services and spaces relative to the population.
iii. City Boundaries:- 	 City boundaries were also a
controversial issue as the Israeli authorities only
acknowledged 1942 municipal boundaries envisaged by Kendal
in his Master Plan for Palestinian towns during
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the British Mandate, (Chapt.II, p.63). The occupation
authorities were not very clear about what they considered
to be the boundaries of Nablus district. Although a
proposal to increase Nablus city boundaries was approved in
1986, the Master Plan submitted based on the new expansion,
continued to be rejected by the CPD until the completion of
the survey. Therefore the new boundaries could not be
effected. However, the term used in this study will refer
to the old boundaries.
4.3 Access to data: In addition to the scarcity of accurate
data and information and lack of hard evidence, it became
clear during the pilot visit to Nablus in 1992 and the data
gathering stage, that even some of available information,
would be difficult to obtain. Because of the circumstances
at the time the survey was conducted, fear, mistrust, and
uncertainty, some Palestinian officials and residents were
discouraged from giving their views openly.
Some of the information obtained during informal interviews
and observation, although helpful in providing a better
understanding of certain problems under investigation, was
deliberately left out of the data analysis and as valuable
evidence in order to protect its sources.
Access to Israeli military officials and planners or
civilians working under their supervision proved to be
difficult during the pilot and the field visits. Requests
to meet with officials in the Higher Planning Council or
the Planning Department within the Civil Administration
were refused. Previous researchers also recorded
difficulties in obtaining access to, or information from,
Israeli planners with regard to the authorities' official
plans for the development of Palestinian towns .
See, The Formulation of Planning Policies, S. Abed
1986, the West Bank and Gaza Atlas, Benvenisti 1984,
Limitations on Building of Residences B'Tselem, 1990,
and Town Planning Under Military Occupation, Coon,
1992.
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An aim of the study is to provide objective views of the
facts. Absence of official Israeli views as a result of
their refusal to assist, comment or cooperate could only be
considered supportive of the research proposition.
4.4 Occupied Palestinian Territories: This term, used
throughout the study, refers to the West Bank and Gaza
Strip. The West Bank was under Jordanian rule and
legislation until 1967, while the Gaza Strip was under
Egyptian administration. Although the Israeli planning,
regulatory policies and administrative structures in both
were similar, laws that prevailed before the occupation
were different and therefore the changes were not
identical. While there is reference to Israeli policies and
practices in the OPT in general terms, analysis of these
policies and their implication in this study, is confined
to those implemented in the West Bank.
4.5 The Impact of the Peace Accord: The survey was
completed at the end of July 1993, weeks before signing of
the Peace Accord between Israel and the PLO. The
information included and analyzed in this study refer to
the condition of Palestinian towns according to the data
collected during the survey and information available until
September 1994. A year after signing Accord, Nablus was
still under military occupation although there was partial
army withdrawal from the municipal boundaries of Gaza and
Jericho. As the final outcome of the peace negotiations
will take years to achieve (DOP, September 1993), the study
does not consider any changes in the political situation or
physical condition of the built environment beyond 1994.
(5) Definition of Terms:
The Built Environment: As the dependent variable; this
refers to the existing old and modern buildings, new
developments in both the historic core and the new centre
of the city (shops, offices, businesses, residences,
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factories) as well as urban spaces (open areas and
amenities), and infrastructure (including; services, roads
and transport facilities).
The Deterioration of: The indicators of the deterioration
in the built environment include:
1. Shortages in the provision of public services, retail
and office space, recreation facilities relative to the
increase in population, and pressure for growth and
development.
2. Inadequate capacity of the service networks, including
water, electricity, drainage, and communications in
relation to the increase in demand (ie increase in the
number of subscribers).
3. Congested roads, insufficient parking capacity, and
inadequate public transport facilities which could not
cater for the increasing demand.
4. Lack of maintenance, improvement, or upgrading of the
existing buildings in the study area and of public
utilities.
5. Poor quality design and construction of the new
buildings which were built without conforming to building
regulations, safety and health codes and without
supervision from professional and official authorities.
City
 Centre: This refers to the study area which includes
both parts of the city centre, the historic core which
comprises: khans and shopping streets, small factories
mosques and residential quarters, and the "modern" centre
which comprises: shopping streets and precincts, offices,
banks, clinics and public facilities.
Israeli Administration: As the independent/explanatory
variable which refers to Israeli policies and practices
during the occupation of the OPT. It was difficult
sometimes to disentangle the strict implementation of these
policies from the practices of the Israeli army and
officials dealing with what should be considered civilian
administrative issues including; methods used to collect
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tax, refusing building permits without sufficient
explanation, arbitrary decisions to seal property or close
business. The fact that most of these practices were
"legally" based on the laws (military orders) passed by the
Israeli authority, gave the Israeli administrators the
flexibility to carry them out as they saw fit. Such
practices were carried out more severely during
disturbances and particularly during the Intifada as a form
of collective punishment.
However, for the purpose of this research, an attempt was
made to distinguish between the policies and practices
measured as independent variables which created obstacles
to development. These were defined as follows:
Policies: Changes superimposed over original Jordanian laws
which included;
- Acquisition and control of land and natural resources.
- Planning laws and Building Permits; procedures and
constraints
- Land Ownership/registration requirements, (Chapter VI,
Sec. 1)
-	 Fiscal policies, (Chapter VI, Sec.2).
- Administrative and legislative authorities (central and
local), including the powers of Palestinian local
authorities and institutions.
Practices: Most of these are related to and justified as,
security measures. Although some of the practices were
based on new policies imposed by the Israeli
administration, the methods used for their implementation
could not be distinguished from severe security measures,
(Chapter VIII below). The independent variables selected as
indicators are:
- House demolition and sealing of property.
- Curfews, area closure and control of circulation.
- Tax collection procedures.
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Jewish Settlements: This refers to the settlements built
by the Israeli authorities on confiscated Palestinian land,
which are considered illegal under international law.
Although the term Jewish does not appear on the Military
Orders by which settlement buildings were granted, the term
is used by Israeli officials, international and local
professionals and various researchers on the subject
matter. According to Coon, the qualification to live in a
settlement is to be Jewish, not an Israeli. This is clearly
demonstrated by the fact that although over 17% of the
population in Israel are non-Jews, they were barred from
living in settlements, (Coon, 1992, p. 172, and Khamayseh,
1993). The basic Law of Israel (article 1) guarantees
implicitly that the land of Israel will remain in Jewish
hands and may not be transferred to non-Jews as it states:
"The ownership of Israeli lands, being the lands of
Israel the State, the Development Authority or the
Jewish National Fund, shall not be transferred either
by sale or by any other manner."
The Jewish National Fund lease requires that the
leaseholder must be a Jew, that he must not employ non-
Jews, that the lease must not be inherited by a non-Jew,
and that any sub-lessee must be a Jew (Coon, 1992).
(6) Organisation of the Dissertation:
After the Introduction in Chapter I, Chapter II presents a
review of the available literature related to the planning
and regulatory policies and methods used by the Israeli
military authorities and its civil administration to
control development in the Palestinian territories.
The first section looks at the planning and administrative
structures and policies including; land use, ownership and
confiscation methods and building permit procedures. The
second section reviews the literature dealing with
development constraints imposed by the Administration such
as the fiscal policies, and the deterioration of the
Infrastructure.
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Chapter III deals with the research methodology in terms of
data collection and analysis. It comprises four sections.
Section 1 presents the methodology background which
includes review of literature covering similar research
problems and constraints. The scope of investigation,
research questions and hypothesis, together with variable
definition are presented in section 2. Methods used to
collect data and details of the questionnaire design and
survey stages are included in Section 3. Section 4
describes the methods used to analyze both the quantitative
and qualitative data. The analysis of the results are
included in Appendices A & B.
Chapter IV presents a description and analysis of the
physical condition of the built environment in Nablus
centre based on the social and physical surveys.
Section 1 provides a description of the urban design and
architectural styles in the city centre together with the
description of activities and changing trends. Section 2
looks at the scope of the building surveys and the physical
condition of buildings in the three sample areas based on
the results of the physical survey. It also includes a
description of the physical condition and characteristics
of urban spaces and amenities.
Chapter V includes a description of the physical condition
of public services and infrastructure in Palestine. Section
1 describes the public utilities, services and
infrastructure in the OPT in general and in Nablus in
particular. The environmental conditions in the OPT are
described in Section 4.
The Israeli Administration of the Occupied Palestinian
territories (1967-1994) is described in Chapter VI. The
chapter presents an interpretation of data and analysis of
the Israeli planning and regulatory policies and
restrictions imposed on urban development during the
occupation. Section 1 examines the changes imposed on
Jordanian laws and reviews the Military Orders issued with
regard to land, planning policies, procedures and
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structures. Section 2 looks at the changes imposed on the
financial sector in the OPT during the occupation and their
implication for urban development.
The impact of the Israeli policies on local authorities,
professional structures and institutions and voluntary
organisations and laws regulating development are discussed
in Chapter VII. Section 1 describes the role of Palestinian
local authorities, academic and professional institutions,
private formal and informal sectors under the occupation.
While Section 2 provides a brief description of the
building regulations, codes for construction quality
control, health and safety codes, environmental and
conservation policies under the occupation.
Chapter VIII describes the implication of Israeli military
practices and security measures for the built environment
and people's ability to develop their towns and improve
their living conditions.
The final chapter, Chapter IX, includes a summary of the
main elements of the research and draws conclusions based
on its findings.
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CHAPTER II
political and Administrative context
Review of the available literature related to the
planning and regulatory policies and methods used by the
Israeli military authorities and its civil administration
to control development in the Palestinian territories.
38
Introduction: -
The aim of this chapter is to examine and analyze the
literature available on the effect of military occupation
on urban development in Palestinian towns.
The political conditions that prevailed in the OPT during
the study period (1967-1994), were unique at the time the
research was carried out. Consequently, the absence of
comparative studies, on similar conditions in other
countries, had limited the literature search to that
available on the Israeli military occupation of the
Palestinian territories.
The literature that has been reviewed in this chapter is
focused on the policies and regulations that were enforced
by the Israeli authorities during their administration of
the OPT and their implication on urban development. The
literature, that was available during this research, was
limited and revolved around the planning and land use
issues in the OPT from the legal and political point of
view. Other studies examine the economic situation and
fiscal policies and the effect of the military occupation
on the economy. A number of reports and studies were
carried out by local and international organizations
particularly U.N. bodies examining health and educational
facilities, employment, agriculture, trade and industry in
Palestine during the occupation.
During the initial stage of searching for documentary
references, it was difficult to find data related to the
physical condition of Palestinian towns 8 , or existing
policies dealing with their development. Although some
reports and studies had been carried out which identified
problems of traffic, services and public utilities, and
One of the few studies available at the time this
research was carried out, is a PhD thesis on the
physical condition of the Qaysaria Quarter in the old
city of Nablus, (Save the Old City of Nablus,
Qamhiyeh, 1992).
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put forward proposals for their improvement, the accuracy
of most of their findings were qualified due to the
shortage of reliable data.
As a result of the peculiar political conditions in
Palestine, and the evidence of deterioration in the
physical condition of the built environment in towns and
urban centres, it was important to examine the prevailing
policies and regulations related to urban development
during the Israeli administration. This aimed to assess the
suitability of these policies to create the right
environment for urban development, encourage investment and
improve living conditions. A major part of the search for
documentary evidence, therefore, focused on the available
data related to the Israeli policies for planning, land use
and development and their evolution, application and
consequences. It also concentrated on the methods and
extent of development controls in the West Bank in general
and Nablus in particular and the composition and powers of
the administrative structures.
Thus, the review helped in providing the political and
ddministrative context of urban development in Palestinian
towns between 1967 and 1994. It attempts to establish if
the Israeli administration and its subsequent policies and
controls had played a major role in restricting urban
development in Palestinian towns, such as Nablus, and
contributed to the deterioration in their built
environment, which subsequently initiated the basis of this
research proposition.
The literature points out that the Israeli policies had
limited the local councils' ability to develop, expand, or
even maintain the buildings and services in their towns.
Furthermore, it argues that the administration did not
create the right environment for investment which
discouraged local Palestinians from improving, upgrading or
maintaining their properties and businesses. With limited
available material it was difficult to make a critical
review of the literature. Some of the reviewed documents
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were presented in article form, small reports and books.
The shortage of new data and research,resulted in
overlapped and often duplicated work. Additionally, the
unavailability of documentary evidence of Israeli official
development policies or contradicting work, by official or
independent sources, related to the published data meant
that all the work reviewed below covered work which is
mainly critical of the Israeli policies.
This review, therefore aims to establish the political and
administrative context relative to urban development based
on avialable literature.
Review of avaialble literature related to control of
development in the West Bank:
The available literature covers issues related to the
changes imposed by the Israeli authorities on the use of
land and natural resources, planning and regulatory
policies and administrative structures. Apart from a few
limited studies on the condition of services and
infrastructure, no studies were found to have examined the
condition of the built environment in Palestinian urban
centres.
This review, will describe and analyze some available
reports and studies, which covered the relevant aspects of
the Israeli administration of the West Bank, particularly
planning, administrative structures and procedures. In
addition to the limited number of such studies, limited
sources of information and inability to obtain new
material, many of these studies were found to be similar
and only duplicate information.
The review therefore involves a selection of these studies,
which were considered to be more comprehensive in each
particular field. It also covers two other major topics
that are considered to have restricted development namely;
fiscal policies and the condition of the infrastructure.
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A more thorough analysis of the Israeli policies and
military orders, relevant to urban development, based on
data interpretation and the survey findings, is presented
in Chapters VI, VII and VIII below.
SECTION 1: Planning Administrative Structures and the
Planning Process
1.1 General :
The change in the planning administrative structures and
procedures in the West Bank after 1967, was well covered in
a number of documents. This was of particular importance to
the research topic as this change had the most profound
implication on development in the occupied territories.
Benvinisti demonstrates his views about this subject in
his book "A survey of Israel's Policies", 1984. He argues
that the official planning for land use and the permit
procedures in the West Bank were the main tools used by
Israeli authorities to takeover land in the OPT.
In a review of these policies and of the Military Orders
issued on this subject, he points out that the Israeli
authorities started to exercise their control over
buildings and development in the West Bank by issuing M.0.
no.393 in 1970. This order gave the military governor the
right to prohibit, halt or impose restrictions on
buildings. By 1971, the authorities issued M.O. No.418
which modified the Jordanian planning laws for towns and
villages of 1966.
As a result of this order, the Arab planning committees
(local, district, and regionl) were abolished and all
responsibilities for planning were given to the Israeli
Higher Planning Council, appointed by the military
governor, and formed of Israeli officials under his
command.
Benvinisti, Dr. Neron, is an Israeli expert on the
subject of Israeli planning and land use policies in
the OPT. He is also the director of the West Bank Data
Base project which involved conducting and publishing
a number of studies in this field.
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Benvenisti is one of the few people who could have had
access to official Israeli documents dealing with the
government's planning policies. However, in another of his
West Bank Data project studies, "The West Bank and Gaza
Atlas", also related to the Israeli planning policies in
the West Bank, he refers to the "less than satisfactory
cooperation rendered by the authorities.", (Benvinisti and
Khayat, 1988). In the process of collecting data for the
project, the planning team encountered insurmountable
obstacles according toBenvinisti and his co-author Khayat
10, the team discovered that;
"basic facts and figures, without which no planning
project is feasible, are non-existent at best,
misleading and biased at worst." (Introduction, ibid,
1988).
The difficulty in obtaining basic data is also reported by
B'Tselem (Israeli Human rights organisation) as it notes
that;
"It is difficult to avoid the impression that a
purposeful attempt is being made to avoid passing any
information characteristic of the West Bank planning
and building authorities' policy towards other
interested parties" (Limitations on Buildings for
Residences on the West Bank, B'Tselem, 1990).
Benvinisti argues that, the declared objectives of the
Master Plan of the World Zionist Organization (WZO 1983-
1986) are;
"to disperse maximally large Jewish population in
areas of high settlement priority, using small
national inputs and in a relatively short period by
using the settlement potential of the West Bank and to
achieve the incorporation of (the West Bank) into the
(Israeli) national system.", (Benvinisti, 1988).
10 Shlomo Khayat is an Israeli architect and planner and
was the head o the Central Planning Department of the
Israeli militjry administration between 1970- 1980.
43
To achieve this ambitious political objective, it seems to
him obvious, that the government needed to acquire land in
ths territories to develop these settlements, land that it
did not own. Consequently land had to be confiscated by a
variety of methods, namely zoning, restrictions imposed on
land use, and finding "legal" excuses for confiscation and
expropriation of land from its original Palestinian owners.
Thus depriving the residents of their main asset for
expansion and development, (ibid).
In his book, "Occupiers Law", Raja Shehadeh looks at a
variety of aspects and implications of the occupation from
a legal point of view, including international law.
In Chapter Two of the revised edition of his book, he
examines the restrictions imposed on the use of land which
had not yet been seized by the military authority. He also
examines the plans prepared by the authorities and their
implication on the Palestinians ability to use their land.
Under "Town Planning", he argues that not only did the
Israeli regional and road plans restrict land use outside
the towns and villages boundaries, but also within their
boundaries (Shehadeh, 1988, p.50-61).
The replacement of the military administration of the OPT
by a "Civilian Administration" in 1982 (M.O. 947),
according to Shehadeh, might have led to misunderstanding
the role of the military. The establishment of such a body
gave the impression that a lot of the civil issues in the
West Bank would be handled by civilians. The reality was
that all these "civilians" were appointed and supervised by
the military.
This is well covered in Chapter three of Shehadeh's book,
where he examines the effect of M.O. 947 on the planning
structure in the West Bank under "Administrative
Structures" (p.69-74). He demonstrates that the issue of
this order did not change anything, since the "Civilian
Administration" was established by the Military authority
and in fact its creation was issued by a military order.
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Shehadeh states that the West Bank military commander
appointed the head of the Civil Administration, delegated
to him any powers or authorities he chose and, increased
these powers or reduced them as he saw fit (Ibid).
This was further contirmed in M.O. no 950, 1982, where the
order states that the Israeli Military Command remained the
direct and ultimate authority in the West Bank. The
Civilian Administration offices were located in the
military command Head Quarters in Betem village, where
entry was severely restricted as far as the Palestinians
were concerned.
In his book, "Town Planning under Military Occupation",
Coon examines the implications of the planning policy
enforced in the West Bank between 1967 and 1992. The book
is based on a report he carried out to investigate the law
and town planning policies in the West Bank". He argues
that the statutory planning system emphasized by the
military government through the mechanism of town planning
had influenced the social and economic development,
transport and environment in the West Bank, (Coon, 1992)
1.2 Planning Structures before and after the Occupation:
Soon after 1967, the Israeli authorities began to revise
and change the Jordanian laws that existed on the eve of
the occupation. Military orders were issued amending
planning and regulatory authorities and laws. The legal and
administrative basis for planning in the West Bank are
examined in chapter three of Coon's book. He then describes
the implication of M.O. 418 and other planning and
political decisions taken by the Israeli authority which
transformed the basis for planning in the West Bank (Ibid,
p.55).
Coon was commissioned to investigate the Israeli
planning policies in the OPT by A1-Haq, a Palestinian
human rights qrganisation and an affiliate of the
International commission of Jurists.
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In this chapter, Coon reviews the Jordanian Planning Law
which prevailed before the occupation, and demonstrates how
the military government took liberty in using and abusing
that Law to achieve its own political aims of colonization.
This, he found, was characterized by the expropriation of
land and the restriction of development, and by depriving
the Palestinians of any representation. It was also
demonstrated in denying them permits for development and
demolishing houses built without permits while their land
was systematically and gradually confiscated and used for
the development of Jewish settlements.
During his research for this book, Coon found that almost
all agencies responsible for planning were appointed by the
Military authority. The Central Planning Department was
responsible for all planning outside municipalities which
denied the local residents any representation at any
planning level, (Ibid). It also meant that with weak or
dissolved local councils, the indigenous population had no
channels to express their needs or any authority to cater
for their priorities and requirements for development.
Although municipalities retained some of their powers, such
as preparing plans and granting permits, most councils were
Israeli appointed, short staffed, and short funded. Their
boundaries had not been expanded in spite of population
increase, nor had any new municipality been created during
the occupation except Jewish settlements councils (Ibid,
chapter 3, p.62).
In his paper "Land Use Planning in the Occupied Palestinian
Territories", Abduihadi describes the Israeli planning
authorities policies, procedures, and practices in the OPT
after 1967, and assesses their role and impact on what he
considers to be a process of colonization, (Abdul Hadi,
1990). In the section entitled "Master Plans and Planning
Laws" he reviews the Israeli planning strategies following
the occupation. He also includes a description and quotes
from the "Guidelines for regional and physical planning for
Judea and Samaria" of 1970, "Allon's Plan" of the same
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year, and the World Zionist Organization master settlement
plan finalized in 1981, and later updated by Drobless in
1983. According to Abdul Hadi, these plans were mainly
strategic and although they did not spell out the means to
achieve them, the methods of achieving them were however
included in the military orders which amended the planning
laws that were in force before 1967.
Abdul Hadi states that under Jordanian Law, planning
followed widely accepted international practices whereby
town plans were prepared on the basis of up-to-date
physical and demographic surveys. This allowed them to take
into account the anticipated social and economic needs of
the population. He explains that the Jordanian planning law
of 1966, defined the planning structure and the functional
relationships between the local, the district, and national
planning levels. In addition it provided for the
participation and input from non- official organizations,
and from local communities, (Ibid).
Benvinisti points out that the available demographic data
was unreliable and varies substantially from one source to
the other. He explains that the only census, for
Palestinians in the OPT was carried out immediately after
the occupation in September, 1967, while two full censuses
were conducted in Israel, in 1972 and 1983 . He adds that
by 1972, three different figures were published for the
West Bank population, (Benvinisti, 1988, p.27).
Benvinisti demonstrates the contradiction within Israeli
estimates and draws attention to the fact that in 1980,
three different official population estimates were
published: the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics
estimate of 704,000, the ministry of Interior estimate of
871,000, while the staff officer in the Military Government
published his own figure of 750,000 (Ihid).
Most researchers found that municipal boundaries and the
extent of the councils jurisdiction also varied as each
side looked at it from his own political point of view.
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The absence of reasonably accurate data, many argue, meant
that there could be no realistic assessment of peoples
needs and demand for development and expansion.
Furthermore, the status and weakness of local authorities
had deprived the population of any local representation,
right of objection or appeal against decisions taken by the
occupation authority.
Abduihadi, in agreement with other authors, considers that
the most significant results of the Israeli military
orders, which amended the Jordanian planning law (over 10
M.O. ․), were the extreme centralization of the planning
process and the widening of the planning powers of the
occupation authorities. This, he found was demonstrated in
the following orders:
- M.O. 393 issued 1970, which authorized the military
commander to forbid, halt, or set conditions for
construction.
- M.O. No.418, issued in March 1971, which had vested
all planning authorities in the Higher Planning
Council (HPC). The HPC was given extensive powers to
suspend any plan or license anywhere in the West Bank,
including the municipalities which in principle
retained the authority to grant permits. While
ultimate authority rested with the HPC, the Central
Planning Department (its executive arm), was directly
involved on a day to day basis in every aspect
relating to planning and construction activities which
included issue of permits and carrying out
deinolitions.
Abdul-Hadi points out that, the second crucial result of
the above orders was the removal of all local participation
from the planning process. Military Order 418 formally
eliminated the input of all non-official institutions at
all levels and abolished both the district planning
committees whose powers were assumed by the HPC.
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He argues that th council, composed solely of Israeli
officials, also controlled local committees and the village
committees which replaced the original village councils
with no local participation. The above committees, he
explains, were composed of representatives of various
departments of the Civil Administration who, in his view,
did not represent the local interests in any way.
Abdulhadi notes that although some token Palestinian
representation existed in the Regional Local Committees
from the six major regions in the West Bank, the
representatives were employees of the Civilian
Administration anc3 had no real power. Their main function,
he states, was to receive permit applications and other
requests from local residents and direct these to the Local
Committee for Planning and Construction (Ibid).
Abduihadi and other authors all considered the situation
created by the Israelis as a case of extreme centralization
of power solely controlled by a military occupation
authority. Centralization may be a way to describe the fact
that all indigenous civil legislative authorities that
existed before the occupation were replaced by the military
occupation authorities or their subordinates. More
significantly, he argues, was the fact that the military
authorities had political interests that conflicted with
the indigenous population's own interests.
UNCTAD found such claims were clearly demonstrated in the
restrictions imposed on development, expansion and finance
available for the Palestinian local residents. Moreover,
Israeli settlers in the West Bank were provided with
generous funds, services and government support, and were
encouraged to expand on confiscated Arab land, (UNCTAD,
1987)
The amendment of the Jordanian Planning Law of 1966 and how
it was amended by M.O. 418 is also discussed in detail, in
a paper by Muna Rishmawi entitled "Planning in Whose
Interest?". Rishmawi explains that Jordanian planning law
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is based on a multi-level hierarchy, with each level having
its participants, jurisdiction, powers, and goals clearly
defined by law (Law No. 79, Section II, Articles 4-12,
1966). She states that the Israeli military orders
cancelled the middle planning levels replacing them with
special committees without specifying these committees'
goals, jurisdiction or participants.The Jordanian law, also
assures the participation of the local population and
indigenous institutions in each level of the structure
(Table 11 below).
Rishmawi maintains that the Israeli military orders changed
this structure which denied the local population and
indigenous institutions any role at all at the top level,
and any significant role at the bottom level (Rishmawi,
1986). In a brief outline of the "Planning Structure", she
describes how the military authorities changed the decision
making roles by appointing a military official. The
official took over the responsibilities of the Jordanian
Minister for Interior as the head of the Higher Planning
Council until 1985. Later, this post was filled by an
Israeli appointee from the "Infrastructure branch" of the
Civilian Administration in the West Bank. According to
Rishmawi, this official was also responsible for the
confiscation of Palestinian land, and the establishment of
Israeli settlements on these lands (Ibid).
Rishivawi argues, that appointing a person with such
responsibilities as a head of planning in the West Bank, is
an indication that the authorities were planning in their
own interests. It also indicates that they were not
planning in the interest of the indigenous Palestinian
population as the International law requires an occupying
power to do.
She adds that the Central Planning Department (CPD) which
used to be under the jurisdiction of the Minister for
Interior before the occupation also came under the
"infrastructure branch" of the Israeli Civilian
Administration. This department was responsible for
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preparing regional and outline schemes for towns where
these plans did not exist, and to serve as a consultant for
planning committees, amongst other things.
Rishmawi explains that the (HPC) acted under the Jordanian
law,	 as	 the main planning	 body with varied
responsibilities. These included: zoning, approving
planning schemes for the West Bank and amending or
cancelling building licenses granted by the lower planning
levels. The Council also served as an appeal committee for
decisions made by the District Planning Committees (Ibid).
Under Jordanian law, the HPC must include representatives
of the Engineers Association, the Attorney General, the
Head of the Housing Corporation and a number of individuals
representing local interests (Article 5.1 of Law No. 79,
1966) .
Rishmawi demonstrates how Military Order 418 gave the Area
Military Commander, the authority to appoint this council,
without specifying its composition (Article la, 4a & b of
the order). She points out that this council was composed
of Israelis. Military Order 418 also granted the HPC
authority to assume jurisdiction over the other committees,
and was also given greater authority in amending,
suspending and cancelling a license. Article 7 of the order
gave the Council further rights to appoint sub-committees
and to define the authority and jurisdiction of these
committees. Item 2, Article 2 of the order abolished the
District Planning Committees were consequently, and
transferred their jurisdiction to the HPC (Ibid).
Rishmawi reviews Military Order 604 which amended M.O. 418
and allowed the military commander to;
"appoint special planning committees as well as secondary
committees subject to the authority of the higher planning
council, in areas outside the Jurisdiction of the municipal
or village councils."
She argues that the committees that were abolished had
guaranteed in the past, while under Jordanian law, that
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the local population played a crucial role in the planning
process, their responsibilities included:
1. Approving detailed plans in the areas
2. Serving as an appeal committee to look into
objections submitted against the regional, outline
and detailed plans in the area of their jurisdiction
and making recommendations to the Higher Council.
3. Serving as local committees in the area of their
jurisdiction such as in villages and zones where no
local committees existed (ibid).
Rishmawi demonstrates, that most of the West Bank towns and
villages before 1967 enjoyed the role of the Local Planning
Committees.Their responsibilities included; the preparation
of outline and detailed plans, organizing construction and
issuing building licenses and violation notices. She adds
that in addition to marginalising the role of the remaining
councils, most of the local elected municipal councils were
dismissed in 1982 and were replaced by Israeli appointed
mayors/officials.
Rishmawi concludes that by changing the structure of the
planning hierarchy in the West Bank through amendment of
the Jordanian laws, Israel had denied the local Palestinian
population the right to participate in the planning
process. According to her, this had been done, while at the
same time the Israeli settlers were granted representation.
Thus Israel, had been able to plan for the West Bank in a
way that serves its own exclusive interests, (ibid).
In the Introduction of "The Legal Status for Planning in
the West Bank", a study by Dr. Awni Bader, Faculty of Law,
Al-Najah University, Nablus, Bader reviews the history of
the laws related to land use and planning issues since the
Ottoman rule of Palestine, the British Mandate and the
Jordanian rule until 1967.
He points out that Jordanian laws of 1953 included Land
Ownership and Use Act, later replaced by Town and Village
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Planning Act 1955, Municipalities Act and the Road building
and Maintenance Act in 1957 (Bader, 1990).
The Town Planning Act was reviewed, updated and replaced by
the new 1966 Act. Bader notes that during that year a
number of regional and Local plans were prepared. In line
with other researchers' views on the subject matter, he
confirms that after the occupation the Israeli authorities
reviewed and revised the Jordanian laws. He argues that the
authorities cancelled part of these laws and reintroduced
some of the British laws related to control of development
and expansion of cities and other subjects related to
planning.
Bader finds that this practice is best demonstrated in the
revival of "Kendal Master Plans" prepared in the 1940's by
Kendal, a British Architect, for Palestinian towns. The
plans were modified and adopted in a new Master Plan in
1982 by Israeli planners (ibid). In the study, Bader
reviews the main Israeli planning policies and revisions of
planning laws. He also focuses on the Military Orders which
revised the 1966 Jordanian Building and Planning Laws, and
describes the Israeli Master Plan for the cities and towns
in the Middle of the West Bank, and the proposed Israeli
road plans, (ibid).
Bader examines the Military Order restricting construction
and building works by Palestinians in the West Bank while
permissions for the building of Israeli settlements were
swiftly granted. He then describes the revisions to
legislation and planning policies.In his view, the
dissolution of previous planning bodies and its replacement
by Israeli Higher Planning Council, and the added powers of
the new council further limited the freedom of residents to
develop their land (M.O. No. 418, Article 7).
In his view dissolution of previous planning bodies and its
replacement by Israeli Higher Planning Council, and the
added powers of the new council further limited freedom of
residents to develop their land (M.O. No. 418, Article 7).
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The aims and consequences of issuing both M.O. 392 and 418
cannot be overestimated. Many authors academics and
professionals have thoroughly analyzed and reviewed them
over the years (Abdul Hadi, Bader, Benvinisti, Coon,
Khamayseh, Rishmawi and others).
One can only conclude that these two orders and their
subsequent amendments had caused the most significant
changes that affected the development of Palestinian towns
during the years of the occupation.
The above studies demonstrate how the changes imposed on
planning administrative structure and procedures, had
adverse effects on the lives of the local residents and
their towns and cities. These changes deprived them of
virtually any local representation, professional expertise
and legal guidance, and of participating in decisions which
affected their lives and future. Consequently, local
Palestinians, uncertain of their future prospects under the
control of their occupier, were discouraged from investment
to improve their environment and living conditions.
1.3 Land Use and Permit Procedures:
The imposed land use and zoning regulations added more
pressure on Palestinian towns and villages. The different
methods used to confiscate land or to stop the owners from
its development resulted in less land available for
expansion. Consequently, the concentration of the
population in contained areas added more pressure on its
already overloaded and dilapidated services and roads.
Centres of towns and villages, in particular, suffered as
permits for housing were still relatively easier to obtain
as long as they were built within the municipal boundaries.
Therefore most of the construction activities were
concentrated in the centre. This was one of the main
factors which affected the physical environment urban
centres, such as Nablus, which was confirmed by
municipality officials, academics and professionals,
(Nablus Municipality Annual Report, p., 1987, Field Survey,
1993).
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Land Ownership: According to Benvinisti, the confusion
over the issue of land ownership in the West Bank, which
prevailed during the occupation, gave the authorities a
very effective tool to help it achieve its objective in
controlling the Palestinian land (Benvinisti, 1984).
Benvinisti found it impossible to describe land ownership
in the occupied territories in terms of deeds, registered
land and land dispute (Benvinisti, 1984, p.99 Arabic
translation). He found it equally impossible to find the
legal framework that was governing land ownership. He
argues that the Israeli authorities had tried to use every
legal or illegal means to take over land in the occupied
territories (Ibid).
According to Benvinisti, a number of terms were used to
describe the meaning of land under Israeli domination. He
found no agreement as to how to describe the real meaning
of the measures taken by the Israeli authority regarding
land ownership. Some measures were described as "take
over", "confiscate", "closed areas","state land", and
"absentees land". He argues that some observers saw even
the measures taken to control land use as also means to
take over land (Ibid).
Benvinisti analyzes these measures thoroughly and gives the
(flowing) definition;
"The areas taken over by Israel directly as areas
where owners or custodians do not enjoy their
ownership rights. This is a result of the legal, semi
legal or repressive measures imposed by the military
authority, or the Israeli official or semi-official
institutions" (Ibid, p.100-116).
According to Coon, the Israeli refusal to recognize most
Palestinian ownership rights, was a further impediment to
Palestinian development (Coon, 1992). The land ownership
law in the West Bank was still following the Ottoman Land
Code of 1858. Most of the land in the West Bank, at the
time of the occupation in 1967, was either not registered
or not registered under one name. To overcome the
complexity of land laws and lack of registration, the
Jordanian government began to survey and formally register
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all land. However by 1967 only 38% of land registration in
the West Bank was completed (Ibid). The Jordanian law also
did not require that the applicant for a building permit,
should be the owner of the land. It also did not consider
the lack of registration as a bar to issuing a permit
(Jordanian Law No.79, article 2(26), 1966).
After the occupation, the Israeli authorities stopped the
process of land registration. Furthermore, it did not
recognize the owners right to land which was not
registered. Consequently, it did not allow the subdivision
of land and refused development permits for any plot which
was not registered (Ibid).
Until 1986, any application for subdivision of land within
municipal boundaries was decided by the municipalities.
This was mainly based on the need to divide large plots
into smaller ones and to reorganise the shape of some plots
into buildable units. Although any proposal for subdivision
must be approved by the CPD, the Survey Department of the
Civil Administration, together with the municipal councils,
adopted a relaxed attitude to that need (Coon, p.119,
1992)
This attitude changed, following the Intifada, and the CPD
instructed the Survey Department not to approve such
subdivision until a detailed plan had been submitted by the
relevant municipality and approved by the CPD. Since no
such plans were approved for most towns, the net result of
the new instructions was that no subdivision of land would
be allowed, which further restricted the municipalities'
ability to develop land (Ibid). This was a major factor
which discouraged Palestinians from developing their
properties.
A large number of the original West Bank population were
either denied residency permits in their own home town
after the occupation or were not allowed to return. Many
properties and land plots were shared between families who
did not enjoy the same residency status. In effect, the
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majority of owners with this kind of problem could not
apply for permits as they had absentee partners and they
feared that the authorities might claim it as absentees'
properties, (Abduihadi, 1990).
The methods that the Israeli authorities used to take over
Palestinian land were complex and varied. These included:
unregistered land, land registered in more than one name,
land incorrectly registered and absentees' land (Coon, p.
117, 1992, and Chapter V below).
Land seizure:
Land seized by the Israeli authorities could fall under any
of the following categories:
1. land seized for military purposes.
2. areas closed for training purposes.
3. land confiscated for public purposes
4. land seized by declaring it "State Land"
(Benvinisti, 1984).
Confiscation of land is discussed in an ILO Report, under
"The Israeli colonization policy and its repercussions".
The Report found that during the period 1967 to 1985, the
total surface area of land seized by the Israeli occupation
authorities in various areas of the West Bank amounted to
2,508,248 donums representing 56% of total surface area of
the occupied West Bank. This seizure of land was in line
with the Israeli policy to colonize these regions according
to the report (ILO, Appendix III page 43-44, 1985).The
report points out that the occupation authorities
confiscated land in the occupied Arab territories by virtue
of the following legislation:
(a) the regulation of 1943 concerning the expropriation of
land in the public interest, promulgated by the
British Mandate administration;
(b) the Defense (Emergency Regulation) promulgated by the
British Mandate administration in 1945, under which
military governors could evict residents and
confiscate their land and real estate;
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(C) the Emergency Regulation (Cultivation of Waste Lands)
of October 1948. Under this Act, the Ministry of
Agriculture could confiscate land of its choosing,
after its green patrol previously made it barren. This
was carried out by spraying the crops with substances
capable of transforming fertile land into barren land
in a short period of time. After this step was taken,
the Ministry issued orders to confiscate this land in
order to set up colonies;
(d) the Emergency Regulations(Security Zones) of 1949 on
the confiscation of property, under which any
governmental body could seize a property for reasons
of national security;
(e) the Absentees' Property Law adopted by the Israeli
Parliament in March 1950 to replace the Emergency
Regulations on Absentees Property of December 1948.
The proportion of Palestinian land confiscated by the
Israelis had been updated over the years by various sources
a more land was systematically and gradually brought under
their control. A report by UNCTAD estimates that, by 1993,
as high as 68% of Palestinian land was under the control of
the Israelis (UNCTAD, 1993).
Land Use: Under Regional and Road Plans, Abduihadi
describes how the occupation authorities proceeded with
integrating the territories into the Israeli system after
altering the existing planning laws. He reviews the 1982
Jerusalem plan which was the only regional plan made public
and believed to be the regional master plan for the
northern part of the West Bank. The plan was referred to by
officials in the Central Planning Department as a guide to
the local town plans or building permit considerations. The
plan divides the area into six major zones including; Arab
Dcvelopment, Special Use and Future Planning, Nature
Reserve, Agricultural, and Roads (Abduihadi, 1990).
He demonstrates how the authorities used these zones to
exercise the most stringent controls especially Special Use
and Future Planning zone and Nature Reserve Zone, which in
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effect removed these areas permanently from Arab hands. He
quotes Benvinisti's description of the policy as;
"nature reserve areas is considered by the authorities
as an integral part of the land seizure programme
while special use areas are designated implicitly for
Jewish settlements".
Another important component of Israel's land use planning
in the West Bank, in his view, was the road network. This
network did not only aim to link Israeli settlements and
integrate them within the Israeli system, but most
significantly, to bypass Palestinian communities while
isolating and fragmenting them and restricting their
potential for growth and development (Ibid).
In his review of the Local Plans, Abdul Hadi points out
that they were prepared by the Israeli architect Shamshoni
who was commissioned by the Central Planning Department.
Shainshoni used the same guidelines as the Jerusalem plans
for another 103 towns and villages in the northern part of
the West Bank including Nablus, Jenin, and Tulkarem
districts. They followed the same zoning pattern which in
effect allowed a very small area for Arab construction and
effectively halved the area of land which the Palestinians
had access to (Ibid).
According to Abdul Hadi, no surveys were conducted prior to
formulating the plans and no consultations were held with
elected councils or members of the community. The projected
population on which the plan was based, he adds, was less
than half of the actual residing population (Ibid).
The regional and local land use planning schemes and the
regional road master plan met with very strong Palestinian
opposition including municipal councils and professional
organizations. As a result of local and international
pressure, the Israeli authorities allowed some of the towns
and villages to submit alternative plans. When these plans
were presented, as was often the case, they were rejected
by the authorities and not one single plan was approved
(Ibid).
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Abduilladi points out that, although none of the Israeli
land use proposals passed into law, they were in fact put
to effect by the Central Planning Department. He adds that
building permits were and (at the time of his report),
continued to be granted (or more frequently denied) on the
basis of its regulations and restrictions.
Restrictions imposed on the use of land and prohibition of
construction are described by Benvinisti and Khayat in "The
West Bank and Gaza Atlas". They show that, M.O. 393, 1970
gave the Area Commander the power to prohibit construction
or order a halt in construction or impose conditions if he
believed it necessary for the security of the Israeli army
in the area or to ensure public order (Benvinisti and
Khayat, p. 60, 1988).
They explain that construction was also prohibited in areas
around the IDF camps and installations, around Israeli
settlements, and in a 200-meter strip along both sides of
main roads. Margins of 100-150 meters on either side of
planned roads in statutory plans were imposed to prohibit
construction. Until 1988, a total area of 580,000 donums
were affected by such regulations including 293,500 donums
around Israeli sites (ibid).
Benvinisti and Khayat add that indirect prohibition of land
use and construction was effected in areas declared as
combat zones. The combat zones or "fire zones" were areas
where the authorities had no responsibility for damage
resulting from military actions. They explain that M.O.
271, 1968 limits the liability to Israelis or those
"working for or coordinating with the IDF". On the other
hand, Section 2c of the Order states that;
"No claim may be made, and none will be considered,
and no compensation will be paid for damage incurred
in an area declared a combat zone."
The combat zone extended over an area over about a million
donums in the West Bank (Ibid). Benvinisti points out that
while no change was made in private property rights in
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combat zones, clearly no one would consider remaining in a
fire zone and consequently no use could be made of the
land.
Benvinisti considers that the declaration of areas as
nature reserves to have been an integral part of the
authorities land-seizure programme. Severe restrictions
were imposed on construction and land uses in these areas
(MO 363, 1969) which were indicated by a "warning notice"
on maps in the land registry with no provision for
compensation. By mid-1985, the authorities declared 250,000
donums of Palestinian land as nature reserves (Ibid).
Khamayseh, an Arab Israeli planner, argues that the
restriction on the use of land, particularly outside
municipal boundaries, and the difficulty in obtaining
building permits forced many Palestinians to build without,
or in violation of, an obtained permit (Khamayseh, 1989).
He explains that in order to impose more restrictions on
the Palestinians' ability to construct on their own land,
the Israeli authorities issued M.O. 814 in 1979 which
changed articles 38 and 39 of the Jordanian planning law
concerning violations (Khamayseh, p.19,1989).
He found that the Order increased the fine set out by the
Jordanian law from 20 JD to 100-1000 JD (5-5 0 times). It
dlo increased the fine of continued violation from 5 JD
under Jordanian law to 25 JD. Additional punitive measures
were later issued in Articles 2-9 of M.O. 1043 which
declares:
"If a person is convicted of a violation of this law,
the court may, if asked, impose on him in addition to
every penalty the following fines."
The order specified that the fine for construction without
permit was two times the value of the building and in case
the construction did not abide with the conditions of the
permit, the fine was set at twice the difference between
the value of the building as constructed and that if it was
constructed according to the permit.
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Land use planning is discussed in Chapter 2 of a report
prepared by Jerusalem Media & Communication Centre GMCC in
November 1992 entitled "Israeli Obstacles to Economic
Development in the Occupied Palestinian Territories".
The authors of this report argue that land use and planning
policies became an increasingly important instrument as the
Israeli authorities progressively exhausted the legal means
devised to acquire land. Legal conditions for development
and land use were restricted by Israeli laws and
implemented by the military orders to ensure that no
development would take place without approved outline and
detailed parcellation plan. The JMCC report considers this
"absurd and unrealistic" in view of the fact that the
Israeli authorities did not approve any development or land
use plans for Palestinians after the occupation (Ibid,
Section 2, P. 24). The process of land use planning in the
West Bank evolved so that all Israeli planning
authorities, including rgional and local settlements
councils were represented, while Palestinians were deprived
of any representation, (ibid). The JMCC report examines the
rule of International law for the administration of
occupied lands, and argues that an occupier is mandated to
respect and uphold existing laws, and administer the
occupied territories with already existing institutions,
separate from those of his own. The occupier, according to
the JNCC, is obliged to implement policies and objectives
which promote the social and economic interests of the
local population, (ibid).
The Jordanian planning Law No. 79 of 1966 and the British
Planning Ordinance of 1936 provide the legal basis for
planning law in the West Bank according to the report. It
points out that the Jordanian law defines the planning
authorities responsible for preparing development and land
use plans and monitoring development in the interest of the
local population. Under Jordanian law, every stage of the
planning process involves active participation of the local
population and related institutions (ibid).
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The report reviews the two plans that are considered as the
base for Israeli regional planning and land use policies.
The Samaria Regional Plan (S15) covering the north of the
WB (Nablus,Tulkarim and Jenin districts), and Regional
Jerusalem Plan (RJ5) covering the rest of the WB. According
to Coon, the origin of plan S15 came to light when the
minutes of an Israeli HPC meeting were leaked; as, the head
of the CPD, explained;
"I would rather not make reference to the other
permits because at the time we did not know of the
existence of S15 ,,12
The plans were drawn up under the British Mandate more than
half a century before they were discovered by the CPD,
although neither was approved by the British Mandate
authorities. There are three versions of the plans; the
first two issued and approved in 1942 had disappeared
without a trace. The third is the so-called Kendal plan,
(ibid). There are many other problems with the above two
plans, most importantly that they were drawn up under quite
different circumstances from those prevailing at the time
the Israeli authorities chose to implement them. The
population had increased four fold since, and the economic
conditions and land use practices changed significantly.
The plans were not applicable in the most important area,
namely the local municipalities, they were neither
translated to Arabic nor published, (ibid).
All the above authors argue that the Israeli authorities
used and interpreted these plans selectively to provide
spurious justification to prevent almost any Palestinian
development outside existing towns and villages (which were
themselves subject to further restrictions). As Coon
demonstrates;
"However, the respect shown by the Israeli authorities
to these plans has been selective. The massive
programme of Jewish settlements is of course contrary
to regional plans both in land use (no new settlements
were shown on the plans), and in racial
12 Moskowich, Head of the CPD, in Minutes of meeting of
the HPC held on 18 June 1990 (in Hebrew), quoted by
Coon, 1992, p.73.
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terms( the plans make no reference to provision for
particular racial or religious group." (ibid, p.69).
Construction of Jewish Settlements:
It is difficult to look at the subject of land use in the
OPT without considering the objectives behind the Israeli
policies and practices with regard to settling Jews in
Palestinian land. Issue of confiscation of land,
restrictions imposed on its use and subsequent link to
establishment of Jewish Settlements "colonies" in the OPT
are at the heart of the political conflict between Arabs
and Israelis.
The Israeli authorities pursued a policy aiming at
establishing Jewish colonies in various parts of the land
it occupied in 1967 including the West Bank, Gaza strip and
Golan Heights. Although various Israeli governments
differed in the degree of, and declared intentions for, the
building of these colonies, the process of cleansing Arab
land from its owners and replacing them with Jews continued
all through the occupation, (Map No 3 below). This is
clearly demonstrated by the Israeli policy to ban non-
Jewish Israelis from moving to these settlements,
(Khamayseh, 1993) 13 An ILO report explains the
consequences of building these settlements:
"to establish a settlement in the occupied territories
means: to use its land and water resources, to build
expensive infrastructure (in particular access roads)
and thus to modify the environment.Furthermore these
settlements are considered by the government as
Israeli pockets and, as such, settlers benefit from
the	 application	 of	 Israeli	 legislation	 and
jurisdiction, as
	 well as tax benefits."
	 (ILO;
8974c/v.2, item 124, p.491 1993).
According to UNCTAD; an estimated 65% of total land
confiscated from Palestinians had been used for
establishment of Jewish colonies, while much of the rest
had been turned into closed military areas (UNCTAD, item
9l,p.26, 1993). This is also confirmed by Benvinisti, who
adds that the authorities engineered a special tangled
13	 Dr. Rasem Khamayseh, is an Israeli Arab and Moslem
planner.
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system of primary and secondary legislations to ensure that
Jewish settlers carried with them their personal and
communal status when they moved to the OPT. He adds that
the Arab community, however, was subject to a different set
of laws, mainly issued as military orders and governed by
a civil administration under authority of the minister of
Defence, (Benvinisti, p. 37, 1987). Various proposals drawn
by different Israeli governments for territorial compromise
in the OPT and plans for settling Jews demonstrate
hardening of attitudes over the years, (Map 8). The early
plans drawn by the Labour government showed willingness to
give back part of the occupied territories to Jordan, (Maps
8-11). The Likud government ruled out any territorial
compromise and prepared plans showing settlements to be
established all over the OPT, (Map 12-14).
The ILO report criticizes the dual legal and administrative
system imposed in the OPT. In item 25 of the report, it
quotes the country report on human rights practices for
1992 of the United States Department of State (P. 1028):
"The Palestinians are treated less favourably than
Israeli settlers on a broad range of issues, including
applicability of the right to due process; residency
rights; freedom of movement; sale of crops and goods;
water use; land tenure; ownership and seizure issues;
and access to health and social services.", ILO, 1993.
The report found that this discriminatory situation was
compounded by expansion of settlements and growth of the
Israeli population in the OPT. It adds that specific status
accorded to Jewish settlers ensured that in case of a
dispute with a non-Jewish inhabitant of the OPT, they came
under Israeli legislation and jurisdiction (Ibid).
Implications of Jewish colonisation of Palestinian land are
thoroughly described by Coon in a chapter devoted to the
subject of Jewish settlements and land seizure (Coon, Chapt
6, 1992). Coon investigates what he calls:
"the unreal world of planning in the West Bank, where
a way has been found of planning and providing for two
different sets of population by superimposing two
distinct sets of plans on one territory" (Ibid,
p.156).
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Map (3)
	
Changing Strategies for Building Jewish Settlements
in the West Bank
Source: Coon, 1992
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The Israeli practices, under international law, regarding
the seizure of land and population transfer are illegal as
can be found in both the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949
and the Hague Convention of 1907 14•
Israel was repeatedly called upon by various UN bodies and
Security Council Resolutions, as the occupying power, to
abide by these laws (various UN resolutions 1967-1993).
Criticism for such practices came from other international
organisations such as European Parliament, international
Human Rights Organisations such as Amnesty International,
Israeli Human Rights Organisations such as B'Tselein and
others.
The legality of these practices is also challenged by Coon
who draws attention to the fact that the transfer of over
185,000 Jews to the occupied West Bank was a result of a
sustained Israeli government policy to relocate part of its
civilian population to the territories it occupies (Coon,
1992, p. 167).
After reviewing the way the planning system works in the
West Bank and the needs of the Palestinian population and
the extent to which they had been met, Coon turns to
consider the growth of Jewish settlements, which he sees as
the most obvious characteristic of development in the West
Bank under Israeli administration, (Coon, 1992, p.167-204).
In his opinion this constituted the greatest physical
change there after the Israeli military took control of the
West Bank in 1967. His focus of concern here is the
implication of Jewish settlements for the Palestinians, and
the position of the International Law from these
settlements.
14 - Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention, 1949
states that; "The occupying power shall not deport or
transfer of its own civilian population into the
territory it occupies."
- Article 52 of the Hague Convention, 1907 states
that; "Requisition shall not be demanded... except for
the needs of the army of occupation."
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Coon analyses the objectives of settlement policy in terms
of the justification given by various Israeli sources. The
colonisation, he argues, was justified either as a way of
solving the shortage of water and land and increase in its
population, or as "liberating land from Arab occupation",
or to ensure "secure borders", or as stated in the World
Zionist Organization plan, 1980;
"to defeat any peace initiative and reduce the danger o f
establishing an additional Arab state."(Coon,l992 p.174).
The authorities dilenuna as to whether to concentrate the
settlements in particular locations or to disperse them
over a wide area was overcome by the last plan which
attempted to achieve both. It was based on three main
principles: (a) inter-connection between existing Jewish
areas to create continuity, (b) fragmentation of existing
Arab settlements, and (c) concentration on powerful new
Jewish settlements .
Coon explains that the establishment of the colonies was
accompanied by building of roads to serve them. He adds
that, additionally, the authorities established separate
public transport and telecommunication system, separate
taxation, education, and licensing systems from those
imposed in the West Bank (Ibid).
While the Palestinian equivalent to regional councils under
Jordanian rule was abolished by the Israeli authorities,
they divided the West Bank into seven Jewish "Regional
Councils". Nine of the settlements were given the status of
municipal councils with identical powers to those in Israel
16 Initially Jewish councils authorities were confined to
15 Master Plan and Development Plan for Settlement in
Saxnaria and Judea, in Hebrew) section 2.1.3. World
Zionist Organisation and Ministry of Agriculture,
Jerusalem, 1983. Quoted in Coon note 66, p. 175, 1992.
16	 Moshe Drori, "The Israeli Settlements in Judea and
Samaria: legal Aspects, quoted by Benvinisti, 1984.
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the built-up areas of the settlements. However, M.O. 848,
1981 extended their authority to cover areas confiscated
from Palestinian owners for military purposes or declared
state lands.
The implication of such change as Coon explains, is that it
transferred the authority over a parcel of land from one
planning system, such as the Jordanian system, to an
Israeli planning system once the land was seized. Since the
new system operated under Israeli law, any plot seized
anywhere in the West Bank could be integrated in the
appropriate Jewish regional council. Consequently, as soon
as the new planning authority took over, the occupied
population lost any rights of access to this land or to its
development (Ibid, p. 183).
Coon presents a concise analysis of the development process
of Jewish settlements:
"the role of the Israeli government has not merely
been to allow settlements to take place: the Israeli
government has long standing policies of colonisation.
Land has been methodically seized; complex- almost '
strategies have been prepared to move population to take
control of land as it is seized;
	 legal; administrative
and- most vitally- financial arrangements	 have	 been
coordinated at the highest
	 level."(Ibid, p.184).
Coon describes in detail the amendments that Israelis had
to make to the original British mandate plans, they were so
eager to revive, to allow for the construction of
settlements and associated structures and roads. He reviews
the procedures used for the preparation and approval of
settlements' plans and argues that although theoretically
the Palestinians were invited to inspect the plans and to
object if they wished. The fact that these plans were only
available at the Civilian Administration and the Jewish
local council, where no Palestinian had access, made a
mockery of the procedure.
Additionally, proof of ownership of the land was required
before any objection was considered. Since settlements were
established on land confiscated from Palestinian owners, no
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objection by palestinians could be considered. However, the
issue of Jewish colonies established on confiscated
Palestinian land weht beyond the political and legal
arguments. According to Coon, it is the direct and indirect
implications of these policies and practices for
Palestinian development that needs to be considered.
He demonstrates that the establishment of these colonies
had had an adverse effect on the life of Palestinians and
the prospects for the development of their land. There was
a physical direct impact of loss of land as 95% of the land
used for the building of settlements was privately owned.
He estimates that 25% of Palestinians have had all or part
of their land confiscated, while tens of thousands lost
their livelihood as they lost their agricultural land and
their ability to farm it and earn their living, (ibid).
Another impact, Coon considers, is the practices of Israeli
settlers against the local Palestinians, namely violence.
The violence went usually without punishment and records of
local, Israeli and international human rights organisations
show the seriousness and extent of this problem (i.g. Al
Hag & B'Tselem).
According to Coon and other observers, the building of
these colonies had contributed to pollution and
environmental damage (Coon, 1992). This was demonstrated in
the cases where untreated sewage was allowed to flow into
Arab land and water resources (Ibid, p.204). Other
practices, cited in other reports, such as poisoning water
resources, burning of forests, uprooting of hundreds of
thousands of trees also caused serious damage to the
Palestinian environment (UNEP, 1992, B'Tselem, 1990-1991).
Coon concludes that the reason why the Israelis had denied
the Palestinians the opportunity to plan and develop their
towns and villages was to allow for the full implementation
of their colonisation policy, thus ;
"the Israelis have used all the powers at their disposal of
an army of occupation to ensure that their policies for the
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judaisation of the West Bank are not constrained by the
obligation to provide for an effective town planning
administration for the benefit of the Palestinians."(Ibid).
Planning and Permit Procedures:
While municipal councils could grant permits, and were to
act as local planning councils, their licensing authority
was in fact limited by M.O. 418. As mentioned earlier this
order gave the Higher Planning Council the power to suspend
any of the plans or license they grant.
In a well detailed section about Building Permits and
Demolition, Abduihadi explains the procedure for obtaining
building permits which were required for any type of
construction. These, he considers, were the primary
instrument for controlling Arab growth. The process of
obtaining building permits under Israeli rule as he
demonstrates was complicated and frustrating (Abdul Hadi,
1990).
Abdul Hadi found that the main obstacle was normally the
requirement that the applicant should prove his ownership
of land on which the building was planned. A significant
portion of land was registered under collective village,
tribe, or family os2iership as a means of avoiding tax
during Ottoman and British rule. Consequently, this
condition deprived a number of people of the right to a
building permit.
One other obstacle was the "absentee's" ownership, or
sharing the property with an absentee. This was
particularly significant as a number of the so-called
absentees, included those who were either expelled,
deported, or were not allowed to return during and after
the hostilities in 1967. This allowed the authorities to
act as the Custodians of the Absentee Property, and
consequently to take over or claim a share in the property.
No building permit was issued without a detailed plan
approved by the HPC. This constituted a change from the
original procedure that required plans to be approved by
the district planning committees (composed of local
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citizens and abolished under MO 418). Such requirement only
complicated matters since Palestinians had virtually no
access to the HPC, consequently applications faced
postponement, rescheduling and delays (Diagram 3, Chapter
VI below).
Under a section entitled "Control of Development", Coon
further detailed the procedures for obtaining permits
inside and outside municipalities (Coon, 1992, p. 121-139).
ifl his assessment of the development plan prepared by the
Israeli authority, Coon argues that it failed to provide a
strategy for desired development and change, it also denied
developers the opportunity and guidance. He points out that
since the Israeli military authorities unearthed Regional
plans almost half a century old (British Mandate plans
1942), they set to interpret them selectively to justify
preventing Palestinian development (Ibid).
The Central Planning Department which had, under Israeli
administration, assumed very wide powers was inadequately
staffed. It was also secretive, inaccessible and
unresponsive and therefore he considered it to be unfit to
prepare for the Palestinian needs (Ibid).
The book provides an analytical description of the methods
of controlling development and the policies and procedures
of subdivision of land inside and outside the municipality
boundaries. This included the procedure of obtaining
building permits, the number of permits issued compared to
the number of applications, and the demolition of buildings
without permits and appeals against them.
Coon concludes that the Israeli authorities did not follow
the rules of the International Law in its administration of
the West Bank and summarizes his reasons in three
categories: institutions, plans, and controls
Although the legality of Israeli actions may not be the
prime concern of this research but the fact that, the
Israeli authorities had the "legal" tools to use and
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justify their policies, points out to the danger which
faced the Palestinian residents and the development of
their towns.
The revisions made to building and planning permission
procedures, the authorities involved their powers and
policies are described by Bader in his 1990 report. The
most serious of the revisions, he found, were those related
to land ownership, confiscation of land, owners
notification and right of appeal and compensation laws
(Bader, 1990)
In his review of the Israeli Master Plan for Middle of the
West Bank, he states that, not only did it contradict with
the Jordanian Law of 1966, but more significantly it was
based on expropriation of Arab land for the building of
Israeli settlements. He points out that it restricted the
expansion of Palestinian cities and towns, and divided the
land by wide roads linking settlements and encircling Arab
towns.
Bader refers again to Military Order No.418 which took away
the right of the councils and municipalities to be involved
in the planning process and consulted before any plans are
prepared. He concludes that the Master Plan was prepared by
Israeli authorities who excluded Palestinians from the
planning process. The Plan also gave powers to the Israeli
settlement councils over the use of land and to issue
planning and building permits (Military Order 892).
He argues that the consequences of the restriction on the
natural urban growth of towns and villages while ignoring
the urgent need for development and expansion, as expressed
by local councils and municipalities, resulted in:
1. Increase in rent for housing,off ices space, and shops.
2. Traffic congestion in cities due to inadequate road
capacity and lack of parking space.
3. Rural migration to towns and cities.
4. city residents forced to leave the West Bank
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5. Increase in the number of buildings built without
permits.
6. Lack of industrial areas.
7. Lack of public services in new residential areas.
Bader points out that the Master plan changed the nature of
land use significantly, ignoring ownership rights, and
tightening the grip on the definition of land ownership and
registration contrary to original Jordanian land laws.
Consequently this restricted the amount of land available
for development and increased the likelihood of refusal of
applications for development and building permits.
In his review of the proposed Israeli project for roads in
the West Bank, he describes the policy for building major
roads. This he notes, was aimed at providing access to
settlements and linking them while containing the
Palestinian towns. He describes the revision of original
Jordanian laws for road type and size in relation to urban
and rural areas (Military Order 810) and the effect this
had on areas where land had to be confiscated to
accommodate the Israeli plans.
Bader lists the Military orders issued after 1967 which
restricted construction and building Works by Palestinians
while it authorized the building of Israeli settlements in
the West Bank. He refers to areas of land declared closed
(restricted) zones in various cities and towns (i.e. M. 0.
No.578, and 590 declaring certain areas in Nablus closed).
He also refers to orders which gave authorities for Israeli
settlement councils to develop the land, build and grant
building permissions for their residents.
SECTION 2: Deve1opmnt Constraints
The planning and regulatory structure and policies that
were formulated in the West Bank particularly regarding the
use of land since the occupation, were considered to be
major factors which restricted development. However, there
were other factors that had also contributed to this
restriction, two of the most significant of these, were
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considered to be the fiscal policies of the occupation
authorities and the condition of the infrastructure.
2.1 Fiscal Policies :
As with planning administrative structures, procedures and
policies, all issues related to regulating and controlling
the economic activities in the OPT were placed under the
authority of the military government since the occupation.
A number of military orders and decrees were also issued
introducing new regulations and amending the Jordanian laws
that were in force on the eve of the occupation.
The implication of the policies imposed by the occupation
authorities on Palestinian economy are examined by
economists and specialists in great detail in a number of
international such as UNCTAD and the ILO, and local reports
and studies, such as JMCC, Samed Economist and individual
professionals. However, for the purpose of this study, only
the issues which had an impact on the development of towns
and villages in the West Bank, relevant to the research
topic will be considered.
In the introduction of "The Palestinian Economy" 1988, the
editor of the book George Abed argues that although
achievements of the developing countries remain limited in
terms of development, their progress remain unencumbered by
one crucial constraint. The typical developing country is
not occupied by a force that is bent on dispossessing the
indigenous population. In such countries he adds, projects
for development are commonly promoted, often subsidized and
generally nurtured to maturity, they are not obstructed and
deliberately starved of funds. Resources, above all land
and water, are protected and developed, at least nominally,
for the benefit of the community, they are not expropriated
and denied. The productive sector is supported by publicly
funded infrastructure, subsidized credit, and protected
market. All the above was denied in the occupied
territories (Abed et Al, 1988).
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New regulations, during the occupation, imposed severe
restrictions on vital economic functions and facilities.
According to UNCTAD, the main objective of these measures
indicates Israel's basic policy of ensuring that
Palestinian economic activity did not conflict with or harm
the Israeli economy, (UNCTAD, TD/B/l221 1989). It includes
a quote of the Israeli minister of defence statement
regarding using economic pressure to quell the Palestinian
intifada (uprising).
The Report, which follows a number of UNCTAD and UN
previous reports on the state of the economy in the
occupied territories, reviews the measures and procedures
used by the Israeli authorities to control and restrict the
Palestinian economic activities. It also looks at the
policy development with regard to the Palestinian economic
relations with other Arab countries and markets, under the
Israeli administration, and their effect on the Palestinian
vulnerable economy. It records a continuous decline in the
economic performance especially during the intifada.
The report found that the most significant of such fiscal
policies are:
1. Lack of financial institutions and the closure of Arab
banks after 1967.
2. Lack of credit facilities
3. Failure to encourage investment in the industry and
other vital facilities, such as infrastructure.
4. Imposing exorbitant taxes on individuals and
businesses.
5. Restrictions on external funding and investment.
Another study prepared by UNCTAD (UNCTAD/ST/SEU/3, 1987)
examines the consequence of the closure of Arab banks in
the occupied territories. The study found that the
residents of the territories had lost the system that
managed monetary activities through regulating the money
supply, directing credit and supervising operations of
banking and other financial institutions. This, the study
found, had a negative effect on; production, employment,
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income and investment. The authors of the study found
difficulty in obtaining information with regard to monetary
statistics to allow them a thorough evaluation of the
system that had emerged under the occupation.
The lack of bank services and other specialized financial
institutions forced businesses operating in the occupied
territories, to rely on their meagre savings and even to
accept the prohibitive practices of the informal financial
market.
The study also found the role of insurance companies to be
equally negligible. The only area where an interventionist
government budgetary policy was pursued according to the
study was in taxation. The taxing system that existed on
the eve of the occupation had been changed significantly
through the issue of numerous military orders and
proclamations. Acco)ding to UNCTAD, the new imposed changes
were not intended towards stimulating the economic
activities in the occupied territories, but rather to
increase the government revenues and align the tax system
of the territories to Israeli economic interest, (ibid).
The study argues that the reduction in the threshold of
taxable income and the increase in the tax rate in the
territories, had had an adverse effect on the residents
incentive to work, save and invest. The study shows that
the taxing policies of the Israel administration put the
Palestinian residents at a disadvantage compared to the
more liberal attitude reflected in Jordan and Israel.
The study points out that changes to income tax law, such
as the abolition of administrative procedures, subsequent
coercive measures in tax collection, and the arbitrary way
of treating tax appeals, eroded the public confidence in
the objectivity of the tax system. In addition to the
absence of any helpful tax guide or manual, the authority
did not attempt to consult or involve local authorities,
chtmbers of commerce, the tax payers' professional
associations and experts in their policy decisions. This
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approach further increased the climate of mistrust and
disagreement between the tax payers and the authorities.
A study by Peter Sadler entitled "Investment Opportunities
in the occupied Territories and Possibilities of Future
Development" attempts to examine factors which affected the
structure and performance of the industrial sector in the
West Bank. It found that some of the main obstacles to
development were:
-	 Lack of loans and investment which contributed to the
stagnation of the Palestinian economy.
- Confiscation of Palestinian land for defense and
military reasons and for the establishment of Israeli
settlements on Arab land. This the study found, had a
psychological effect on land owners and investors and
resulted in uncertainty and discouraged them from
using their land for development.
- Lengthy and expensive permission procedures which
discouraged applications for development projects.
According to Sadler, any new development required up
to 20 applications, rejection of any lead to complete
rejection and requires reapplying (Sadler, 1990).
The "Israeli Policy towards Economic development in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip" is reviewed by Shadid in an essay
in Abed's Palestinian Economy, (Chapter 6, pp 121-137,
1988). Shadid summarizes the basis for the Israeli policies
in the OPT by quoting the Israeli Ministry of Defence
Summary Report on (Development and the Economic Situation
in the Administered areas- 1967-69):
"The areas are a supplementary market for Israeli
goods and services on the one hand and a source of
factors of production, especially unskilled labour,
for the Israeli economy on the other."
Shadid describes the conflict between the military
authority and a number of US private voluntary
organizations (PVO) over approval and implementation of
development projects. He then analyzes how US PVO's
development projects were divided and then submitted to the
Israeli authorities for approval. He describes how the
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Israeli authorities interfered to shift the allocation of
projects and budgets. The Israeli authorities, he states,
tended to disapprove of development projects and encouraged
public works. Shadid notes that despite the small size of
the economic development programmes sponsored by the US
PVOs, the authorities insisted on full control of these
projects and where and if they should be carried.
Residents of the occupied territories found that their
chances of obtaininq permits for development projects were
even more difficult1 than those experienced by the PVOs.
Giving reasons for rejecting a paint factory project in
Nablus in 1985, the Israeli official said:
"Why should we permit the building of a factory in
Nablus while Israeli paint factories are operating
below full capacity?" "
Shadid concludes that Israel, like other colonial powers,
profited enormously from the territories it occupied and
turned them into markets for Israeli manufactured goods.
The authorities, he states, seized land and extracted raw
materials, labour and taxes from the Palestinians, (Abed et
Al, 1988).
An ILO report reviewing "The Israeli colonization policy
and its repercussions", found that the occupation
authorities aimed to incorporate the economy of the
occupied territories in the Israeli economy in order to
turn these territories into a market for their own goods
(ILO, 1985). Other factors restricting development, the
report found, were:
"exorbitant taxes, lack of investment in
infrastructure, the failure to encourage capital
investment in industry and other production sectors,
the total lack of credit facilities, the closing down
of Arab banks and the application of arbitrary
restrictions."
17 Interview with Zafer Masri, Chairman, Chamber of
Commerce, Nablus, 19 August, 1985, quoted by Shadid,
p.133.
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As far as investment was concerned, the report argues; that
the problem was not the lack of resources, since the
Israeli authorities collected taxes from the occupied
territories, including value added tax. It also levied
income tax on wages from Palestinian workers employed in
Israel. The ILO report adds that the government invested
heavily in building army barracks and roads which were of
military importance.
The report found that the problem lied in the Israeli
authorities declared intentions not to create conditions
suitable for economic development which were geared to the
needs of the residents of the occupied territories. The
imposed taxes on goods and businesses in the West Bank
resulted in the closure of many Palestinian enterprises as
they were unable to pay them (Ibid, Appendix III page
43-53, 1985).
The ILO report found that Israel pursued a policy to gear
the economy of these territories to the needs of the
Israeli economy with regard to consumption, industry, and
exports. This was demonstrated as the report found, in
forbidding the setting up of sophisticated industries,
imposing a form of specialization on industries, and
limiting them to complementary industries which
specifically met the need of the Israeli market.
The Israeli authorities, according to the ILO report, also
prevented the establishment of industries likely to create
job opportunities for the growing number of graduates such
as engineers, doctors, accountants, and other skilled
personnel, who were increasingly swelling the ranks of the
un2mployed (Ibid).
The report points out that the dumping of Israeli goods on
markets of the West Bank and Gaza Strip resulted in unfair
competition for products from these regions which did not
enjoy the support that Israeli products had. The study
explains that the authorities also obliged owners of
factories, workshops and industrial plants to import raw
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materials through Israeli enterprises. This, consequently,
raised production costs and forced some of them out of the
market.
According to the ILO report, before granting the necessary
permits to any new industry, the Israeli authorities made
thorough checks to ensure that it was in line with the
economic objectives of the Israeli economy. The report
found that the Israeli colonization, the confiscation of
land and water resources and the lack of any development
policy in the occupied territories made it impossible for
the economy in these areas to create new jobs or even
maintain existing jobs. The problem of unemployment was
constantly swelling, especially amongst university
graduates (Ibid)
Another study about "Palestinian External Trade under
Israeli Occupation" prepared by the Secretariat of LINCTAD,
1989 (UNCTAD/RDP/SEU/1) investigates various aspects of
Palestinian external trade. It examines problems
encountered during the occupation and analyses the role of
trade in the Palestinian economy and the factors that had
contributed to the gradual deterioration of Palestinian
trade. The study is based on data from official sources,
published and unpublished reports, studies and other
references, as well as from field information, covering
developments until the end of 1988.
Under a section entitled "Occupation and the Emergence of
a Fragmented Economy", the study found that potentials for
sustained development of the Palestinian economy was
constrained by a process of transformation. This process
was unaccompanied by requisite policies and measures to
absorb and regulate the pressures of readjustment.
UNCTAD found that the economy performed through arbitrary
impulses often alien to its own interest. This state of
affairs was aggravated by restrictive Israeli policies
vis-a-vis Palestinian economic activities. Though
transformations predate 1967, the path of change was
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qualitatively and quantitatively different since (A/i item
2)
The study points out that the mechanism whereby the local
economy might be better planned, regulated and supported
had been eroded over the years of occupation. While power
over economic management had been assumed by the Israeli
occupation authorities, the latter had not assumed
concomitant responsibilities, (ibid).
NCTAD points out that the exclusion of the Palestinian
people from authority and responsibility over their own
economy covered a we range of functions: Industrial and
commercial licensing and regulation; agricultural
production planning; Trade regimes and procedures (tariffs,
levies, import and export licensing etc.). Industrial,
agricultural, trade and other credit facilities, in both
the private and government sectors; agricultural,
industrial and residential land use and construction; the
development and provision of public utilities and
infrastructures and the establishment of appropriate public
services. (Ibid).
The study shows that, increasing concentration of such
activities within the jurisdiction of the Israeli military
authorities continued to inhibit economic performance and
potentials in the OPT (A/i item 4).
The Role of Tax is then reviewed and the study establishes
that the role of such system in providing entrepreneurial
incentives remained nil. According to UNCTAD there were no
indications, at the time, that the authorities envisaged
undertaking necessary reforms.
There was a sharp fall in tax revenue, during the Intifada,
caused by drop in Palestinian income, widespread "tax
boycott" and resignation of Palestinian tax collectors.
This was countered by Israeli policies to enforce revenue
collection through a range of coercive measures. This
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situation highlighted the centrality of fiscal issues in
the territory (Ibid)
The limited services of the Israeli Civil Administration
were further reduced in order to make up for the alleged
heavy losses in tax revenue. This was notwithstanding,
according to this study, renewed indications that revenues
collected by the Israeli authorities from the occupied
territory continued to out-pace expenditures (Ibid, A/4d-
Finance item 43).
The main constraint, the study points out, is that the
Israeli authorities ruled through periodic military orders
and decrees which affected every aspect of Palestinian
economic activity: Taxation, customs, banking, money and
insurance, agriculture, industry and crafts, commerce, land
and water, labour and other areas of endeavour. Whereas
some of these amended and updated Jordanian or Egyptian
laws in force up to 1967, most represented new regulations
reflecting Israeli policy concerns. UNCTAD argues that
these measures were clearly also having a direct effect on
the development of the built environment. The policies and
measures applied by the Israeli authority could be seen to
be based upon certain basic considerations;
1. maintaining minimum order in the local economy with no
commitment to advancing the economic interests of the
territory;
2. ensuring that this regulation of economic activity
corresponds to the relevant patterns of relevant
policy and leg'islation in Israel; and
3. ensuring that Palestinian economic activity did not
conflict with, or harm Israeli economic interests.
The study shows that this major determinant of Palestinian
economic activity worked through a strategy dictated by the
overall national interest of Israel, leaving the occupied
territory with little, if any, recourse to measures or
facilities which might redress the imbalance and protect
vital sectors (2/ item 61).
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The study found that Palestinian manufacturers exports to
Arab markets, after 1967, of certain well-established
products continued; such as soap, processed olive oil,
quarry stone, dairy products. At the same time some new
items were introduced into the export mix (especially
plastics and handicrafts). The Israeli market absorbed some
manufactured exports, which allowed for the growth of
Palestinian exports in certain branches. Some consumer
goods produced or finished in the occupied territory have
made inroads among Israeli consumers, over and above the
domestic market such as ready-made clothing, wood, stone,
and metal products for construction, and certain food
products, (2/ item 57).
The report concludes that the lack of an indigenous
financial system continued to deprive the Palestinian
economy of the means necessary to achieve growth and
development. Only minor credit facilities were available at
a high cost, coupled with deficiencies in the banking
system. Recent Israeli restrictions on entry of funds to
the territory as the Report points out deprived the trade
sector of a major source of funding (F/406). In the fiscal
area, not only did the territory forgo annually sizable
amount of custom revenues on imports from Israel but the
imports embodied inherent subsidies to Israeli producers.
Moreover, the territories' import of raw materials through
Israel was subject to Israeli tariffs rather than the
custom duties prevailing in the OPT, thus rendering its
produce less competitive despite lower labour costs.These
measures were also reflected on peoples ability and
willingness to improve or develop their properties.
The study found that the elimination of these anomalies in
the fiscal system of the occupied territory was an urgent
requirement. The wide range of measures introduced by the
occupation authorities in the Palestinian monetary and
fiscal system of the territory after 1967 were, according
to tJNCTAD, in urgent need of being re-examined in the wake
of the rapidly deteriorating economic situation. The report
emphasizes the need for a more imaginative approach to the
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monetary and fiscal aspects of the economic policy in view
of the severe shortages of financial resources at all
levels in the territories and inadequacy of financial
institutions, in order to revive the economy and trade
(Ibid, F/408)
2.2 deterioration of the infrastructure :
In the absence of a national authority in the West Bank,
the municipalities should have been the most important
local institutions. As discussed earlier (Section 1 above),
the constraints prohibited them from being instrumental in
creating employment, and undertaking capital projects, and
providing essential services.
Prior to 1967, the municipalities played an important role
with help from the national government. They had a share in
the revenues and had access to government funds and easy
term loans. They also acted independently with regard to
various social services. All these arrangements were
abolished after thoccupation and municipalities could not
proceed with new projects including; water, electricity,
roads, school building, without the approval of the
military authority (UNCTAD, 1987). As the municipalities
had no longer the legislative powers they had before the
occupation, they were also not allowed to introduce new
taxes and fees to change their prevailing rates or their
collection procedures without the prior approval of the
military authority.
The infrastructure and public utilities in the West Bank
had deteriorated steadily after 1967. There had virtually
been no upgrading, maintenance, or expansion in these
services during the occupation in spite of the increase in
demand and pressure for development. This resulted from
absence any government support, lack of effective local
authority, and investment.
In Part 1 of a draft report entitled "Public Utilities in
the West Bank and Gaza Strip", prepared by Abu Eisheh for
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UNCTAD Abu Eisheh examines the condition of public
utilities in the OPT to identify the main problems, (Abu
Eisheh, 1993). In the first volume of this study, he
examines the development of public utilities in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip and their condition. These include:
water, electricity, sewage, refuse, and public safety. The
accuracy of the data presented is qualified at the
beginning of the report as a result of the difficulty he
faced in collecting it.
Abu Eisheh also points out that; the data collection for
his research was difficult due to lack of reliable
information, inaccurate data, and shortage of documentation
in many of the sub-sectors, that were to be examined.
Reluctance to give information and lack of co-operation
from officials appointed by the Israelis, added to the
difficulties. Consequently he states that part of the
coverage presented is not systematic or consistent.
In Chapter 1, he describes the development of the public
utilities prior to 1967, in general terms and then in
detail for each district. An account of public utilities,
resources, capacities availability and management before
the occupation in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is
described and then followed by details for each district
(water, electricity, sewerage, refuse, slaughterhouses,
public markets and public safety).
In Chapter 2, the structure, and performance of the public
utilities in WB & GS after 1967 are presented. The report
describes the existing public utility services in the urban
areas in terms of scope, structure, performance, capital
formation, cost and pricing and management. Abu Eisheh
covers utilities provided in the whole area and details for
each regional administrative division (districts). Chapter
3 of the report provides an assessment of adequacy and
efficiency of existing public utilities in the OPT, based
Until July 1994, the report was still not published
according to its author.
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on the findings of chapter 2, which are analyzed in terms
of:
- Supply and demand for urban and rural areas.
- Investment and capital formation.
- Contribution to the economy.
- Cost ,finance and pricing policies.
- Manpower and technological factors.
The first part of this chapter discusses the Supply and
Demand Consideration. Abu Eisheh states that inefficiency
and inadequacy of the existing water utilities were mainly
due to poor planning, limited exploitation of water
resources, limited extent of services in rural areas, high
losses and leakage, lack of water tanks, and the
deteriorating quality of water. Above all was lack of an
established central national institution which could
develop a comprehensive plan for adequate and efficient
water supply.
Palestinians controlled only 55.3% of the sources of water
in urban areas and 46.7% in rural areas. The rest was
administered by Israeli authorities either directly through
Nekorot or indirectly through the West Bank Water
Department. Rates of leakage and unaccounted for water were
high; which was due to the age of existing water
distribution system, the faulty meters, and malpractice of
some consumers, (Ibid). The OPT, he adds, suffered from bad
quality of water due to lack of treatment and quality
controls.
Abu Eisheh explains that supply of electric power in the
OPT consisted of locally generated power, and purchased
power from the IEC. Local Palestinian efforts to resist
this linkage failed following pressure of growth and
Israeli refusal to allow them to expand and import new
generators. The share of generated power to total supply
declined since the linkage. In the WB, share of purchased
electricity from the IEC was close to 95% out of the total
supply. Nablus, however, was the only town which still had
an operational power station, albeit with reduced capacity.
87
Abu Eisheh provides an analysis of the evolution of
overall consumption rates of electricity. In Israel, he
argues, the total consumption of electricity per capita was
ten times as much, while in Jordan the total consumption
was almost three times as much as that of Palestinians in
the occupied territories. The study states that;
"The indicated low consumption rates are mainly
because about 50% of the rural population has no
regular electric supply or no supply at all at
present. In addition , the non-household sectors,
especially the developing industry and service
sectors, do not consume high rates of electricity. The
share of the household consumption to the total
population reaches currently 50 % in some places in
the occupied Palestinian territory, while the
respective share in Israel reaches only 29.1 %."
In general, most towns and villages suffered from sudden
disconnection of electric power which lasted for many
hours, shortage of transformers, and overloaded electricity
lines. The rate of increase in demand which was reflected
in the apparent increase in consumption rates, indicated
that if more electricity had been supplied, the demand and
consumption rate would have been even higher. However, the
study points out that most of the electric supply was not
national supply and was dependent on the Israeli Electrical
Corporation (IEC).
Sewerage services is another utility which the report found
deficient in the occupied territories. Existing supply of
sewer collection systems was not capable of fulfilling the
increasing demand. There were no comprehensive treatment
systems in most towns although facilites for partial
treatment existed in some. Management of waste water
disposal system was limited and most of the time it was
left to run freely in valleys outside urban centres causing
environmental damage. Abu Eisheh found very little data to
assist him in the analysis of the evolution and development
of this utility and to enable him to compare supply/demand
characteristics with those of neighbouring countries.
The refuse collection and disposal is another problem area
in public utilities in the WB, the study found little or no
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development in this sector, and no apparent plans for the
development of garbage disposal or re-use in the occupied
territories. The existing municipal collection services in
urban centres suffered from shortages in containers,
collection equipment and vehicles and size reduction
facilities. The collection process was not organised on
daily basis, and garbage was thrown in open spaces causing
health hazards.
The only solid waste treatment was by the incineration
process where there was great need for control and
environmental protection (Ibid). in the second part of this
chapter the author is concerned with the Investment and
Capital Formation in the occupied Palestinian territories.
The report states that, the Israeli authorities were in
control of all policies and decisions related to
development of services and infrastructure. This was
evident by the fact that any new development or improvement
for an existing project needed the approval of the Israeli
authorities. In most cases applications for such projects
were rejected or obstructed such as Jerusalem District
Electricity Company and Nablus municipal electricity
project. As a result of this, expenditure on public
utilities remained low in the occupied territories.
The report describes the role of the PVO (Private Voluntary
Organizations), in assisting the OPT in the development of
their public utilities by granting aid for projects such as
water, electricity and waste water mainly in rural areas.
The financial analysis for various public utilities are
presented and supported by data and figures for each town.
In Chapter 4, under Short Term Measures and Actions, the
major problems for each of the utilities under
consideration are identified, counteracting short term
measures are suggested.
Conclusion:
In all the above reports and studies the authors seem to be
in agreement about the extent and implications of the
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change of planning policies and structure and the
regulatory procedures imposed by the Israeli Occupation
authority in the West Bank during the occupation.
The authors describe with varying emphasis the consequences
of these policies on the development of towns and cities in
the West Bank. They examine the effect of the restriction
of expansion on the existing environment and services, the
resultant in-effectiveness of local councils and
municipalities. In addition, the inability of Palestinians
to appeal against Israeli decisions regarding land and
development and the adverse effect it has on the quality of
urban life.
However, the effects and consequence of the Israeli
administration of the OPT after 1967 are concluded after a
theoritical analysis of the prevailing planning, legal and
fiscal policies and restrictions imposed on development.
Very limited research was available that examined the
effect of these policies on various elements of the built
environment in Palestinian cities and the ability of local
authorities and institutions and the private sector to
carry out development, improve conditions of their towns
and halt their deterioration. Furthermore no attempt was
made to examine the effect of these policies on the
Palestinians' perception of the problems they experienced
in their towns and what they consider to be main obstacles
to their development.
The observations, analysis and conclusions seem to be
similar in all studies carried out in this field. With the
absence of reliable demographic data and statistics, most
of the studies depend on qualitative data and evidence.
From the above, the situation that prevailed in the West
Bank can be summarized as follows:
(A) The Role of Central and Local Government:
1. All civil authorities and laws were replaced by the
Israeli authorities and military orders.
2. All powers for planning, decision making, and
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implementation were vested in the Israeli military
or civilian authorities.
3. There was no local representation at any level in
the planning, decision making and implementation
machinery.
4. There was no public participation in any planning
process. The Palestinian population also had no right
of appeal, or any effective legal channels for protest
or objection.
5. This extreme case of centralization was aggravated
by the fact that the central government was not the
national government but an occupation military force,
whose interests were in direct conflict with those of
the Palestinians.
6. During the occupation, councils' powers were reduced,
many were dismissed and replaced by Israeli appointed
councils or Israeli councils. Following the Intifada
councils, including Nablus, were forced to resign as
the Israeli restrictions and policies limited their
ability to function and develop.
(B) Zoning and Land Use Restrictions: The occupation
authority used various methods to restrict local residents'
ability to develop their land including devising "legal"
means for confiscation of land and changing the nature of
its use by declaring it either military zones, or security
protected zones. Expropriated land was often used for
establishing Jewish settlements.
(C) Land Ownership : The Israeli authorities also used
lack of proof of land ownership as an excuse to obstruct
development or to confiscate land. Most of the land had
been either registered under a family or tribe name or had
not been registered since the Ottoman rule. This situation
is fairly common in this area, but the Israeli authorities
did not recognize ownership without registration. Another
obstacle was the fact that a number of partners of a
property or land did not have an Israeli residency permit
although they are original West Bank residents. This
enabled the authority to declare their property or shares
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as absentees' land or property. Consequently a number of
residents were discouraged from developing their property
for fear of Israeli measures.
(D) Building Permit Procedures: These were lengthy and
expensive procedures. Application for permit for public, or
industrial development within the municipality had to be
approved by the Israeli military. Residents and local
councils were discouraged from applying as a result of
complicated procedures and frequency of rejection. Most of
the permits obtained within the municipalities were for
private residences and small commercial projects.
(E) Fiscal Policies : Lack of financial institutions and
closure of Arab banks denied residents access to financial
assistance and investment guidance and restricted the
ability of local population to invest or borrow to carry
out new development. High taxes, severe import and export
restrictions also discouraged local population from
investment.
(F) Service Provision: Public utilities, services and
infrastructure were old and overloaded. The local councils
had no funds for their maintenance or upgrading. The
occupation authorities showed no interest in assisting
local councils financially or technically. Furthermore it
imposed restrictions on import of spare parts and new
machinery. Consequently the city suffered from congested
roads, lack of parking facilities and proper public
transport, frequent power cuts and water shortages.
Research Proposition:
The arguments, analysis and conclusions of the above
studies and report,set the political and administrative
context related to issues relevant to urban development in
Palestine and subsequently formed the base of the research
proposition.
The political, planning and fiscal policies that prevailed
during the occupation, as demonstrated above, did not seem
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to have provided the right atmosphere for urban development
in Palestinian towns and the improvement of the physical
condition of their built environment. There also appears to
be a gap in the available literature with regard to the
problems and reasons for the deterioration in the built
environment, the effect of various Israeli policies and
practices on Palestinian urban development. Additionally,
no information was available on Palestinians perception of
these issues and what they consider to be obstacles to
development and to their ability to improve their towns
and, subsequently, their living conditions.
The research is therefore set to investigate the nature and
extent of problems with the physical condition of the built
environment in Palestinian towns. It also aims to examine
if there is a causal link between the Israeli
administration policies between 1967-1994 and the
deteriorating conditions in these towns during that period,
with focus on the historic city of Nablus.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
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Introduction:
The search for documentary evidence and archive records
started at the very early stages of the research. It
involved three visits to the occupied territories; an
exploratory visit for five weeks in December 1991; a pilot
survey for two months between July-August 1992 and a three
months field visit between May and August 1993. The visits
were carried out via Amman, Jordan where one or two weeks
were spent, during the pilot and the field visits,
collecting data from Jordanian sources and interviewing
Jordanian officials.
The exploratory visit to obtain data and information from
Nablus and other Palestinian cities resulted in collecting
some basic information that could not be relied on
completely. Most reports that have been prepared were
qualified for inaccurate data and inability to carry out
surveys. This resulted from the absence of previous
qualitative and quantitative research in this field, the
lack of cooperation between the researchers and the
occupation authority, and the difficult security and
sensitive political conditions.
The first visit signalled the difficulty in having access
to Israeli data with regard to the official planning for
Palestinian towns and the potential lack of cooperation
from Israeli officials in the research process. Some
official Palestinian sources were also reluctant to give
information for fear of Israeli punishment.
Over the two and half years of data collection, the process
for obtaining data through; interviews, questionnaires,
building inspection and observation of activities and
events proved to be difficult, frustrating, unpredictable
and sometimes physically dangerous. The author witnessed
and was subject to, conditions of military clashes between
the Israeli army and the civilian population, army
harassment of respondents and passers by, sudden curfews
imposed by the Israeli authorities, strikes called by the
Intifada's (uprising) leadership and tax raids on shops and
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businesses (sometimes interrupting interviews) .Although
these incidents delayed and created obstacles to the data
collection process, they did, nevertheless, result in a
certain degree of participant observation of the problems
and difficulties that the population under investigation
suffered from.
In spite of the shortage of secondary sources, some basic
data was obtained from UN studies and reports such as those
undertaken by FAQ, ILO, UNCTAD, UNDP, and UNEP (see Chapter
II & VI). Reports and studies were obtained from those
prepared by independent Palestinian research centres, such
as the Arab Studies Centre, PASSIA, CEP and others. Most
planners and engineers at Nablus municipality were helpful
in providing copies of available documents including
reports and drawings. Information was also obtained during
interviews. However, some people were reluctant to help and
refused to be interviewed.
Officials in the Chamber of Commerce in Nablus, academics
at Al Najah National University, Bir Zeit University,
independent private architects and engineers and members of
the Palestinian technical committees in the Peace
negotiating team were helpful with information and data and
gave useful advice.
Scope of the Survey:-
The research aims at investigating the condition of the
built environment and prospects for urban development of
Palestinian towns during the Israeli administration, (1967-
1994). The study includes analysis of the policies and
practices of the Israeli authorities and its consequences.
As will be demonstrated in the following chapters, the
Israeli administration representing the central authority
for the whole of the occupied territories, issued and
implemented military enactments in all areas under its
control immediately after and all through the years of its
occupation of the Palestinian territories. Preliminary
investigations and interviews conducted during the authors
exploratory and pilot visits to the OPT, provided evidence
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that the effects of the administration were uniform
throughout the occupied territories.
The choice of Nablus as the focus for this research was
mainly based on this evidence. Furthermore, Nablus is and
has been for centuries the oldest and biggest urban centre
in the north of the West Bank and is considered, by
Palestinians, as the "capital" of the north. It has been a
major commercial, cultural and educational centre and
continues to be one of the most active in the West Bank.
The examination of the physical condition of the built
environment in the centre of Nablus, development trends,
investment opportunities and prospects for its future was
expected to provide a suitable and representative example
of other Palestinian towns. Additionally, its busy and
active historic core was expected to provide additional
information on the effect of the occupation on historic
buildings and the urban fabric of Palestinian historic
cores. Therefore, Nablus centre with its new and historic
parts presented a variety of activities and functions,
architectural styles and development trends which provides
a wider base for the investigation, (Chapt.IV, Section 1).
The fact that Nablus is the authors home.town, made it
relatively easier to obtain access to various parts of the
centre, and key informants in the city. It also facilitated
carrying out building inspection, questionnaire survey and
observation as it would have been difficult to guarantee
access to other towns in view of the prevailing political
and security conditions.
As will be explained below, the methodology followed in the
this research is based on a multiple source data to enable
corroboration between various sources which will ensure as
accurate results as possible. These sources included;
information obtained from available literature and
documentary evidence and the field survey which comprised
carrying out a questionnaire survey, interviews and
observation, (Section 4 below).
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Therefore, while the Israeli administration, its policies
and methods of their implementation were examined and
analysied for the whole of the West Bank; the field survey
focused on examining the centre of Nablus, the physical
condition of its built environment, the building users
views and perceptions of the problems and obstacles to
development in their town.
The questionnaire survey comprised two parts; a social
survey and a physical survey, (See the questionnaire
design, Item 4.2 of this chapter and App. "C"). The format
of the questionnaire followed that used by the Department
of Environment's Physical Condition Housing Survey for
England and Wales, although questions were designed to suit
the particular conditions in Nablus, (See item 4.2 below).
Following the Pilot Survey in 1992, it was decided that the
survey should cover three sample areas in the centre of
Nablus including the historic quarters. These were selected
on the basis of the age of the buildings and the period
during which the relevant area was developed. It was found
that the centre can be clearly divided into three "time
zones", (Maps 4, 5& 15), these are:
1- Zone "A" (Old): this mainly covers the historic core of
the city which has historic buildings ranging ranging from
over 1000 years old to over fifty years old. Its
development spanned the Islamic period, the Crusade period,
the Ottoman rule and the British Mandate which ended in
1948 following UN decision to partition of Palestine into
an Arab state and a Jewish state. Buildings inspected
included residential quarters, public buildings, shops,
workshops and factories. This area of the city is known as
Al-Qasabah, and the section used in this sample is Al
Khader/Al Nasser street which is the main thoroughfare
"spine" in the old city where most commercial and cultural
activities takes place and which provides easy access to
various parts of the historic quarter.
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2- Zone "B" (Medium): this area was extended to the north
of the old city. The majority of the buildings were built
during the Jordanian rule and before the occupation
(between 1948 & 1967). Some older buildings still exist at
the edge of the old city and in the main city square.
This area represents the focus of commercial activities in
the city centre and acts as the hinge between the old city,
the new business district and other parts of Nablus.
Security problems and traffic congestion were at their
worst in this part of the city. The section used in this
sample extends from upper Ghernata street to the west
through Al Hussain square (main square), to the Commercial
street/Hitteen street to the east. This represents the
"spine" of the business district where most commercial
activities was still taking place at the time the survey
was conducted and where cultural and recreational
activities were concentrated before 1967.
3- Zone "C" (New): this is the new part of the business
district which extends to the west of the main square and
was mainly built after the occupation on what used to be
agricultural land. The new buildings were constructed
without municipal supervision or adherence to building
regulations and safety codes. There was no clear street
pattern in this area, many buildings had no clear access or
pavements leading to their entrances. There were few plots
available for new buildings, some had been excavated for
construction and others were left as rubbish tips.
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SECTION 1: Methodology constraints
The methodology was selected on the basis of the findings
of the pilot visit, and as a result of the review of
available studies on the subject (see Chapter II above). It
soon became clear that the research methodology should take
into account difficulties that were expected, and later
encountered, in both getting access to key informants, and
obtaining evidence from interviews and literature only.
This particularly applied to sensitive issues such as
Israeli undeclared policies and Palestinian views that
could be construed as political. Data related to issues
such as violations of "building regulations" and security
of tenure, and those relating to residency permits were
also expected to be difficult to obtain.
The methodology constraints were experienced throughout the
research period both in the data collection stage and in
the data analysis and interpretation procedure. The
constraints faced while collecting data are described
below, while difficulties in the interpretation of data,
particularly analysing policies and objectives of the
Israeli authorities were encountered from the early days of
the research and throughout the data analysis stage,
(Section 3 of this chapter).
The main areas of difficulty at the data collection stage,
which subsequently affected the choice of its methodology,
can be summarized as:
1- Meetings/Interviews: Meetings with key staff at the
municipality, universities and Palestinian institutions
were easily arranged and held during the pilot visit.
Contact was also established with others to arrange for
further meetings during the field visit. Nevertheless,
there was evidence that the following difficulties could
be encountered during the final data collection stage
(field survey)
1- Meetings with Palestinians working under the Israeli
Civil Administration would be difficult if not
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impossible without the written consent and supervision
of the Israeli military.
2- Meetings with Israeli personnel involved in the d&iicn
making process on planning and regulatory ssues in the
West Bank would be difficult.However, when and if tt
were held it became evident that the chances of
co-operation or obtaining the official data for certain
items would be slim. A lot of the information was
considered confidentialand only few Israelis were allowed
access access (Abed, 1987, Benvinisti, 1988, Coon 1992 and
JMCC 1992).
3- Meetings with some key Palestinians, who could provide
access to past and present information, might not
provide clear evidence for a variety of reasons, in
spite of their willingness to assist. Therefore, some
of the questions were structured in a way that would
not implicate the interviewees in a political protest,
which he/she were unwilling to participate in.
4- Some of the information obtained during the interviews
might not be supported by statistics and hard evidence.
This was mainly the result of the political situation,
the shortage of research funds and facilities, and the
lack of appropriate training for local government
personnel and academic staff at colleges and
universities.
5- Information gathered from various sources, particularly
demographic data varied considerably from one source to
another, (Chapt. I, Limitations). Therefore estimates
had to be based on careful to be based on careful
consideration of validity and reliability of sources,
and may end up as average estimates 19•
2- Secondary
 Sources: At the time the data collection was
carried out, there were little secondary data available in
19 Refer to Limitations, Section 5, Chapter I above.
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this field of research particularly with regard to the
condition of the built environment in Nablus or any other
town in the occupied territories. There was no evidence
that any studies had been carried out to assess the
condition of the built environment; the extent and reasons
for its deterioration; and the main problems that property
owners, tenants, users, seemed to face and consider as main
obstacles to its development (Chapter I, Item 1, and Chapt.
II above). Although a limited number of reports related to
public utilities were available, most of these have
qualified the accuracy of their data due to the shortage of
qualitative and quantitative research and reliable official
statistics.
The available data which was expected to provide indirect
indicators in terms of independent variables, were those
related to the prevailing planning and regulatory policies,
in both fields of economic and social development such as
trade and services.
3- Relevant Literature: During the course of literature
search, no documents were found which discussed the impact
of the prolonged military occupation on the built
environment in occupied territories in post-colonial times.
In addition to the difference in the time during which, and
the method by which, the occupation took place, a great
deal of progress had been made since colonial times, within
international law, with regard to occupation by military
force (The Hague Regulations 1907, Fourth Geneva
Convention, 1949). This has been clearly and repeatedly
expressed in a number of UN and Security Council
resolutions on the subject of Israeli occupation of Arab
land, which has been deemed illegal and condemned by the
International community.
The available literature in respect of similar historic
cities in developing countries and particularly in Arab and
Islamic countries, indicates that generally a lot of the
problems of urban decay in Nablus were similar to those in
other countries. Studies carried out on cities such as
103
Allepo, Baghdad, Cairo, Fez and others present similar
general characteristics of physical problems in the
historic quarters, threat of urbanisation and modern
expansion and inadequate planning policies in most of these
cities 20
However, the causes of these problems in other countries
vary between, inappropriate administrative policies and
structures, mismanagement, implementation problems,
corruption, lack of funds and financial resources. The
pressure of population growth and the rapid pace of
urbanization, centralization of power, breakdown of
communication between central and local government are also
familiar factors (Independent variables).
Although most of the above was applicable to Nablus and
other Palestinian towns, the significant difference is the
unique political conditions that prevailed in the occupied
territories between 1967 and 1994 and the subsequent
policies and harsh administrative measures implemented by
the Israeli authorities during the occupation. Such
policies and measures are reviewed and analyzed in other
parts of this study, (Chapter II, VI, VII, VIII).
The absence of relevant literature with regard to similar
conditions in other countries, and of sufficient
documentation with regard to the physical condition in
Palestinian urban centres restricted the documentary
evidence available for this research, (Chapter II above).
Therefore the data collection strategy had to be designed
to overcome these difficulties, thus a multi source data
technique was selected (Section 2 below). This aimed to
ensure that during the analysis process, data collected
from one source could be corroborated with another one or
more sources. For example, respondents' perception of a
20	 See Antonio, 1982, Aouabed, Ashour, 1988, Bianca 1983
& 1984, Browne, 1977, Cantacuzino, 1976, Lewcock, 1983,
Serageldin, 1983 & 1993, UNCHS, 1986, UNESCO, 1984,
Vigier, 1987 & Warren, 1983.
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certain problem could be verified by the author's
observation, photographs, and/or documentary evidence.
Furthermore, a decision was made during the pilot visit in
1992, that all the questionnaires and interviews would be
administered by this author. This would guarantee that all
lines of inquiry related to a particular source has been
exhausted, as a certain amount of perseverance and
persistence was needed. It also became clear during that
visit that most people had deep suspicions and worries, and
were unprepared to write down their response for fear of
reprisal. The use of a tape recorder was ruled out for the
same reason. Some people were also hostile to the idea of
allowing photographs of buildings to be taken, even if they
were not theirs, and the camera had to be hidden in certain
areas, particularly the old city, until the respondent gave
permission for its use.
The adniinstration of the questionnaire by this author had
the benefit of allowing flexibility in rephrasing certain
questions and rearranging their sequence depending on the
respondents attitude and particular circumstances. It also
allowed informal probing and discussion which produced
valuable additional information, which was also used in
corroborating other sources in the final data analysis. In
the case of interviews with un-cooperative or reluctant
officials, decisions sometimes had to be made on the spot
with regard to an alternative source who might be more
willing to cooperate. This proved to be useful in the case
of Palestinian officials as some were more ready than
others to provide the required information.
In spite of continued efforts, no Israeli official agreed
to be interviewed or to supply any official data. However,
one Palestinian planner employed by the Civilian
Administration, one Arab-Israeli planner, and one Israeli
planner who was the head of the Central Planning Department
until 1980 agreed to be interviewed (Khamayseh, Khayat &
Shkoukani, 1993). The information obtained during these
interviews was valuable to the research findings.
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Therefore, the only available official Israeli data was
that published by government sources, which was rejected or
viewed with suspicion by Palestinians and independent
Israeli planners. Another Israeli source of data was that
published independently by Israeli liberal professionals'
and academics, which being critical of the government
policies in the OPT, was rejected, or at best ignored, by
the Israeli authorities, (Chapter I, Limitations above).
With the refusal of Israeli officials to provide
information or answer specific research questions, and with
the absence of reliable official documents that could be
supported by other sources, the data used in this research
could only be based on the available sources which were
mainly critical of the Israeli policies and practices,
(Chapter I, Definitions). However, the choice of a multi
source methodology ensured that objectivity of the findings
could be maintained as it allowed the information from
various sources to be verified.
SECTION 2: Methodology Background:
The research topic and background required the use a
variety of tools to obtain as much accurate data as
possible to justify the proposition. The research strategy
was therefore based on methodological integration. Primary
sources of evidence were obtained by a variety of methods.
Documentary search and analysis of literature, observation
and interviews provided qualitative soft data. Physical and
social survey in selected areas in Nablus city centre using
questionnaires and physical inspection of buildings and
urban spaces were chosen to yield quantitative hard data to
support the qualitative data.
Methods of collecting evidence in survey methods can be
classified in many ways. However the combination of methods
is often appropriate to make use of their different
strengths and to overcome their limitations (Moser & Kalton
1971). The political and security conditions that prevailed
in the OPT, at the time the survey was planned, together
with the resulting restrictions and limitations, had to be
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taken into consideration before a decision on the final
survey methods was reached.
The only census for the West Bank, was carried out in 1967
by the Israeli authority immediately after the occupation,
(Chap. I, Limitations & Chap. II, item 1.2). Available
statistics and demographic data varied considerably
depending upon the political position of the source. This,
together with the controversy over who was entitled to be
resident, and the limits of recognized city boundaries in
the OPT, meant that the above problems were even more
serious than in other developing countries.
Restrictions on land use under the occupation, difficulty
imposed on land registration for residents, secrecy and the
inaccessibility of land registry documents are some of the
topics under investigation in this research. Consequently,
obtaining land records posed a problem in finding sample
frames. This, together with the absence of reliable
demographic data, meant that the design of the sample
survey, according to the standard methods of random
sampling, had to be ruled out.
Research problems related to absence of reliable data and
inaccessibility of official records are encountered by
researchers in similar, although less harsh, conditions in
developing countries. According to Bulmer, survey research
in developing countries presents a paradox in so far as
sample design is concerned. In many cases, sampling
according to the standard principles poses formidable
problems. There are usually no sampling frames, no central
registry of all citizens, no census tracts with home
addresses. If these exist, they are likely to be unreliable
(Bulmer & Warwick, Chap.7, p.91, 1983).
Bulmer refers to Hersh, Cezar & Roy, 1976, in his argument
that in development research in academic disciplines such
as sociology, anthropology, and political science, non-
probability sampling is more common due to;
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"indefinite population, unavailable sampling frames,
small budgets, lack of time, inexperienced personnel,
pressure for results and the like". He also argues
that the likely extent of non-sampling errors in
surveys in developing countries has led some
commentators to question the absolute value of
probability samples per se (Ibid).
Under the circumstances that prevailed in the OPT, the
response to the questionnaire survey was expected to be
limited. In addition to the absence of a sampling frame,
the questionnaire could only be completed by those who
would accept to answer the questions, particularly those
related to obstacles created by the Israeli administration.
Furthermore, with the unpredictable security conditions and
frequent curfews, completing all questionnaires during the
field visit was not guaranteed. Consequently, the aim of
the survey was to provide as much information as possible
on as many cases as practical, even if these cases did not
constitute a representative sample.
Bulmer justifies ruling out random sampling where sampling
frames are not available, and if the objective is not to
obtain a representative sample but to study few cases and
identify problems. He also argues that in a homogeneous
population or under assumed conditions of homogeneity,
non-probability sampling is acceptable, (Bulnier & Warwick,
Chapter 7, p.98, 1983).
In chapter 10 of Bummer and Warwick's book "Social research
in developing countries, 1983", Ward states that smaller
scale qualitative case studies may yield just as useful
data as attempts at large scale probability samples which
yield unsatisfactory data. He examines the sampling methods
and types of error in Third World surveys and the
difficulties of providing truly representative samples,
(Ward, p. 126, 1983).
As an alternative, Ward suggests the use of some sort of
carefully selected, "purposive" survey design, where the
investigator selects target groups and problems in which
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there is policy interest. This he adds, means going
straight to the heart of questions, using supporting
evidence and information to guide the direction of
inquiries (Ibid, p. 134). The answer to limitations of
random/probability sampling, he argues, lies in making more
selective choices using qualitative in-depth surveys. The
unacceptable data errors may not be important in relation
to analytical issues. This strengthens the argument in
favour of a close integration of statistical and analytical
methods.
The political and security problems in the OPT, inability
to obtain sufficient and reliable data from available
documents during the literature search, and difficulties
anticipated in completing the questionnaire survey, meant
that the research should be based on a combination of
multiple sources of information, including qualitative and
quantitative data, that could be corroborated and
integrated to provide the required evidence.
The integration of research techniques within a single
project opens enormous opportunities for mutual advantages,
(Bulmer 1984). The author states that the value of
"methodological marriage" is apparent, not least because
the weaknesses of one style can be balanced against the
strength of another. Thus, the methodology used for this
research is expected to benefit from such "marriage", in
view of the research topic and circumstances.
On methodological integration in social research, Donald
Warwick identifies cases where such integration is useful
"If for instance, residents in a certain neighbourhood
refuse to take part or show signs of falsifying their
answers, it may be helpful to use more qualitative
approaches to understanding the situation. At the very
least some informal, open ended interviewing might be
done with co!nmunityleaders and other influential people
to explore the nature of local reaction to census. ."
(Bulmer and Warwick, p. 280, 1983).
He lists five main reasons for bringing together two or
more data sources in the same study:
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- additional categories of information: expanding the
number of data sources to obtain crucial information
that is not available from one single method;
- improved accuracy in measuring single phenomena, by
combining data sources will increase confidence in the
accuracy of measurement and observations made on a
given phenomenon;
- qualitative depth, as he argues that findings from
quantitative data may attain a high level of precision
and statistical significance, but still be very
difficult to interpret outside a qualitative framework;
- generalizability of findings across units;
-	 historical interpretation. (Ibid p.2BO-289)
Warwick points out that;
"the case for multiple data sources is especially
strong in the developing countries for the simple
reason that the data collected by any one method are
often subject to substantial error. Survey research, in
particular, is likely to suffer from such drawbacks as
sampling bias; respondents incomprehension of the
method itself; fears about the uses to which the survey
data will be put; difficulties in reaching certain
remote areas; errors arising from interviewers and
other sources of error."
He also points out that;
"anthropological field research may likewise suffer
from the lack of experienced professionals in the
field, government suspicion or regulation of village
studies, and local scepticism about the purpose and
uses of such research. A combination of methods,
while no panacea for the ills of social research, at
least holds the promise of counteracting as well as
comprehending the biases of a single data source"
(Ibid)
The choice of one of the five major research strategies in
social science: experiments, surveys, archive analysis,
histories and case studies, is usually based on the type of
research questions, the extent of control the
investigatorhas on events, and the degree of focus on
contemporary as opposed to historical events (Yin 1984).
Each is a different way of collecting and analyzing
empirical exploratory, descriptive or explanatory purposes.
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Case study research is also based on the use of multiple
sources of evidence.
Most of the arguments put forward by the various authors
quoted above, apply to the circumstances and conditions
surrounding this research. The research methodology was,
therefore, based on methodological integration of different
strategies and relied on a number of data collection
techniques, to ensure that the research findings were as
accurate as possible. It generally followed the design and
methods of case study research in terms of the use of
multiple source evidence, although it did not strictly
involve selecting a case study, but purposively selected
samples.
SECTION 3: Definition of Objectives
3.1 Research problem:
Following the occupation of the Palestinian territories in
1967, the Israeli authorities superimposed military
enactment on most laws and legislative structures which
existed on the eve of the occupation. In addition to
enforcing harsh security measures such as long curfews,
demolition and sealing of property, the occupation
authorities imposed various restrictions on Palestinians
ability to; travel, build homes, use their land, set up
businesses, import and export, with varying degrees of
severity all through the occupation. Thus introducing
dramatic changes to the way people lived, worked, and their
ability to improve their environment and the quality of
their lives.
The objectives of the research therefore are to;
determine the effect of the prolonged military
occupation on Palestinian towns, namely the impact of
the planning and regulatory policies imposed by the
Israeli authorities and their practices on the
condition of the built environment in these towns and
the prospects for their development;
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establish if there is a relationship between these
policies and practices and the deterioration in the
built environment in Palestinian towns with focus on
the historic city of Nablus, (The difference between
policies and practices are defined in Chapter I,
Definitions).
3.2 Research questions:
In order to achieve the research objectives, the following
questions were investigated:
What were the significant changes that were introduced
by the Israeli authorities to laws, regulations and
institutional organisations, which had an impact on the
condition of the built environment and the development
of Palestinian towns?
- What elements of the built environment were directly
affected by the Israeli policies and practices in the
OPT? Why and how were these affected?
How and to what extent did the changed laws and
policies affect the ability of the local Palestinian
authorities to play an effective role in the
development of their towns and to provide the required
services for their community?
What was the impact of these changes on the
professional and academic institutions and the private
sector (formal and informal), and their ability to
contribute to the urban development of their towns?
- what effect did these changes have on the ability of
local Palestinians to build and utilise their
properties, expand and upgrade their businesses and
improve their environment and their living conditions?
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3.3 Hypothesis:
This research aims to examine the following hypothesis:
"The Israeli administration of the occupied Palestinian
territories has been a major cause of deterioration in the
physical condition of the built environment in the city
centre of Nablus during the period 1967-1994."
However, there were a number of difficulties in achieving
these objectives that were recognised from the early stages
of the study, while formulating the research proposition,
and all through data collection and analysis stages in
addition to the constraints described above.
While it was possible to examine and analyse the changes
imposed, by military orders, on original Jordanian laws and
resultant restrictions and limitations of these changes, it
was not possible to find out, from the Israeli authorities,
the objectives of these changes and how they could have
benefited Palestinian towns and their population. Neither
was it possible to obtain information on any existing
Israeli policies which aimed at encouraging urban
development, stimulating investment and improving
Palestinians' living conditions.
Absence of any explicit objectives f or Israeli policies had
the added difficulty in disentangling some of the Israeli
personnel and army's arbitrary practices and those carried
out under guise of security measures from those included in
changes imposed on original Jordanian law such as refusal
of building permits, demolition of houses for planning
reasons and tax collection methods, (Chap. I, Definitions
& Chap. VIII, Sect.1, item 1.3).
Israeli policies often generated certain Israeli measures
and practices which subsequently provoked a chain reaction
from the Palestinians in response to these practices and
measures. The Palestinian response was usually followed by
harsher Israeli policies and more oppressive reaction to
the Palestinian reaction.
This was clearly demonstrated by the resignation of the
municipal council in response to Israeli practices. The
absence of municipal council consequently resulted in
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further deterioration of built environment and services,
(Chap. VII, Sect.1 & Tables 17- 18).
Another example was the Palestinians' revolt against
excessive increases in tax, the introduction of new taxes
and the abolition of the civilian appeal courts. The
Palestinians' refusal to pay such taxes to their occupier
resulted in more severe collection methods, such as tax
raids,	 closure of businesses, confiscation of identity
cards, (Chap. VIII, Sect. 1 & Tables 17-18). Such measures
resulted in further loss of income, discouraged investment
and led to building and business owners neglect of their
properties, which consequently worsened the physical
condition of buildings and services.
Another dimension that needed to be examined was the effect
of the lack of policies and general neglect from the
Israeli authorities for the needs of the population under
its control, their priorities for development. Therefore
the research had to examine the effects of what is
considered "obstructive" policies as well as the effect of
lack of "constructive" policies for development.
This added to the difficulty of linking the cause and
effect of the research hypothesis. Therefore, the research
attempts to explore such connection through the
questionnaire survey and interviews in order to establish
if there was a widespread public perception and opinions
of the problems and their causes which would support the
validity of the proposition, (Tables 17-18 & 37).
The choice of a multiple source data collection methods
which facilitates integration of these methods aimed to
corroborate information obtained from the questionnaires
and informal interviews, with the interviews with officials
and professionals, observation, documentary evidence and
literature review, ( Section 2 above). This, as will be
demonstrated in the interpretation of data in the following
chapters, was planned to strengthen the evidence and
improve the accuracy of the findings.
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3.4 Concepts and their measurement:
The hypothesis contains concepts which propose a
relationship between the deterioration in the physical
condition of the built environment and the policies and
practices of the Israeli occupation. To enable systematic
research to be conducted, the concepts need to be
operationally defined.
An operational definition specifies the procedures that
permit the differences between units to be specified or
measured in respect of the concepts concerned (Bryinan and
Cramer 1990). In order to provide operational definitions
of concepts, indicators were selected which were considered
most relevant to measure the concepts. It is common to
speak of measures as variables to denote the fact that
units of analysis differ with respect to the concept in
question. As Bryman and Cramer explain;
"On the whole, the social sciences are concerned
with variables and with expressing and analyzing
the variation that variables exhibit." (Ibid,
Chapter 4, p.63).
According to I3erger and Patchner, variables are a special
kind of concepts, "A variable is a concept that varies. It
can take two or more values."(Berger and Patchner, p. 29,
1988). They also define hypothesis as a guess about the
nature of relationship between two or more variables. The
independent variable is considered the presumed "cause" of
a particular phenomenon and the dependent variable is the
presumed "effect" (Ibid). A similar definition is given by
Bulmer in his study on the meaning of relationships and
states that;
"The core of sociological analysis is to be found
in the asymmetrical relationships. In this type of
relationship we postulate that one variable, (the
independent variable) is essentially 'responsible
for another (the dependent variable) (Bulmer,
chapter 3, p.71, 1992).
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3.5 Operational definitions:
The research proposition is based on the causal link
between two variables; the Israeli administration as the
independent variable and the physical condition of the
built environment in Nablus as the dependent variable. In
view of the complexity of the problem, the definition of
the Israeli administration as the independent variable, in
reality, refers to a number of "sub-variables" of which the
policies and practices of this administration are
comprised. The policies are examined on three levels,
political, planning and regulatory, and financial.
The built environment under investigation here as the
dependent variable, also refers to a number of "sub-
variables". The built environment is therefore examined at
three levels: The building, its immediate environment
(area) and the city centre as a whole.
Multiple-item measures are often used by researchers. This
entails asking individuals their positions in relation to
a number of indicators, which stand for one concept. The
procedure for analyzing these multiple items is to
aggregate each individual response in relation to each
question and to treat the overall measure as a scale in
relation to which each unit of analysis has a score based
on a pre-coded scale (Bryman et al 1990).
The Israeli adminisLration of the Palestinian occupied
territories: This refers to changes introduced by the
Israeli occupation authorities and administration to the
planning laws, legal and fiscal policies, legislative and
administrative structures which the research postulates,
have created major obstacles to development and contributed
to deterioration in the built environment in Nablus.
Policies and practices also refer to decisions taken by the
military authorities on security grounds that directly
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affect issues such as curfews, access to property, closure
of businesses, restrictions on land use, demolition and
sealing of property, (Chap.I, Definitions, Chapt. VI, VII.&
VIII)
The deterioration in the physical condition of the built
environment: This refers to the dilapidated condition of
buildings, lack of maintenance and inadequate supply of
building space, urban spaces, amenities, services and
infrastructure and to environmental concerns in the city
centre (the central business district and the historic core
of Nablus). It also refers to physical effects of military
confrontation, full or partial demolition and sealing of
property, (Chap.IV, V, App."A", Tables 20-37).
3.6 Testing the hypothesis:
The two main components of the hypothesis will be examined
by the multiple source techniques. Policies and practices
of the Israeli administration (Independent variable) will
be examined through review and analysis of the available
literature and documentary evidence and by studying the
relevant Jordanian laws that existed befor the occupation,
the changes imposed by Israeli military orders and the
implication of these changes. Where possible, a comparative
analysis will be carried out between various planning,
regulatory and financial policies relevant to urban
development in Jordan, Israel, the OPT and Jewish
settlements.
This aims at establishing whether the policies imposed and
implemented under the Israeli administration in the OPT
were equitable to those prevailing in Israel and the Jewish
settlements and whether the changes superimposed on the
original Jordanian laws created obstacles to development,
(Chap. VI).
The composition and powers of central and local
authorities, professional and academic institutions, the
role of formal and informal sectors in the development
process under the occupation will also be analysed, (Chap.
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VII), by examining the existing institutional structures
and the previous and changed laws related to them.
The documentary evidence and review of the literature will
be supported by the views and data obtained from semi
formal interviews with officials, professionals. and
academics. The professional view of the difficulties and
problems will be corroborated with the users response to
the questionnaire of what they consider to be obstacles to
development.
The physical condition of the built environment (dependent
variable), will be examined by; analysing the available
documentary evidence, reports and studies regarding
services and infrastructure, and interviewing officials and
professionals to obtain data and information on the
availability, capacity and condition of public utilities
and infrastructure, quality of construction and development
trends and problems.
The questionnaire survey which will include users views on
the nature and extent of the problems with their building,
area and centre is included in the first part of the
questionnaire (App. "C", Questionnaire, Part A).The physical
condition of various parts of the building and the
availability and condition of building utilities and public
amenities are examined in Part B of the questionnaire. A
further inspection of selected buildings in the three zones
aim at providing a more detailed picture of problems with
the physical condition of the buildings and their
surrounding areas.
The information obtained from the documents, interviews and
questionnaire, together with authors observation are
corroborated and cross checked to improve the accuracy of
data interpretation. In addition to qualitative data
obtained from documentary evidence and interviews, the
indicators for independent and dependent variables were
summarised for easy definition to obtain the building
users' views thus:
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3.7 Independent variables:
As described above, the policies and practices of the
Israeli administration are measured on three levels:
political, planning and regulatory and financial policies.
The three levels are considered to have created obstacles
to development and contributed to the deterioration in the
built environment in the city centre. A number of
indicators have been selected to measure the value of each
independent variable.
(A) Political :
This refers to severe measures and practices carried out by
the military authorities for security reasons, acts of the
civilian resistance groups "Intifada" and the absence of
local police, traffic officers or sufficient authority to
keep law and order in the city. The only law enforcement
was carried out by the Israeli military and mainly dealt
with the Israeli security concerns, (Questionaire Part A,
Q40, & Chapt. VIII, Tables 17-18).
Indicators are:
1. Violence affecting persons and property which includes;
fighting, military clashes, use of weapons and tear gas
by the army. It also includes burning car-tyres and
throwing stones by Palestinian resistance groups.
2. Breakdown in law and order and lack of authority to
enforce them which resulted in vandalism, burglaries,
break-ins, and general criminal incidents.
3. Property and business closure resulting from frequent
curfews, strikes, fighting, and partial closure of
selective streets/areas for different periods of time
(hours to weeks) which resulted in;
- inability to open business;
- inability to reach business (if living in a
different district);
- inability to conduct business particularly
outside Nablus (buying and selling).
4. Demolition of houses and sealing of property for either
definite or indefinite periods of time as forms of
collective punishment.
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5. Uncertainty in terms of the Palestinians worries about
their future and the political prospects for the
territories. This was due to various policies and
measures imposed on them by the Israeli occupation
authorities including;
- residency permits and family re-union laws;
- entry and exit permits;
- expulsion of suspects;
- confiscation of property;
- demolition of property;
- sealing-off property for long periods;
-	
military orders affecting various aspects of
their daily life.
(B) Planning and Regulatory policies
These refer to the changes imposed on the original
Jordanian laws related to institutional structures and
powers of local authorities, planning procedure , land use
and ownership, security of tenure and outdated rent
controls, (Chapter VIII, Tables 17-18 & Quest. Part A, Q40).
Indicators are
1. Absence of municipal councils such as Nablus
municipality which was run for four years by an Israeli
Mayor and council appointed by the military authorities
(M.O. 993, 1982). The last Palestinian council which
took over from the military in 1986 resigned in 1988 in
protest against the political situation. Until July
1994, the municipality, was run by care-takers and had
very limited powers, (Chapt.VII, Sec. 1).
2. Planning laws and building regulations including the
changes in the administrative structure of the planning
authorities which existed before the occupation,
(Chapt.VI, Sec. 1).
3. Control of ownership of land and property by the
Israeli authorities which resulted in the inability of
land owners to register their land, claim it or develop
it. The control was achieved by laws and military
orders imposed on the Palestinian population, (Chap.VI,
Sec. 1).
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4. Rent Control laws were not revised or updated after the
occupation to follow the Jordanian laws. Low rents and
inability of owners to reposess their buildings
discouraged investors from building new property or
improving existing buildings.
(C)Financial:
During the occupation the financial sector was under the
full control of the Israeli authorities. Laws and policies
were issued through military orders and enforced by the
military. These policies restricted the residents ability
to invest, benefit from outside investment and consequently
improve their built environment and living conditions
(Chapt.VI, Section 2, Quest. Part A, Q40). Indicators are:
1. Lack of investment by local residents due to the
political problems, uncertainty, restrictions and high
taxes imposed by the authority. Restrictions imposed on
Palestinians to receive Arab and foreign investment,
constrained potential investors ability to help the
Palestinian economy as the authorities limited the
amount of money allowed to enter the OPT. Israel also
imposed conditions on the type and size of the projects
international organisations or NGO's were prepared to
fund, (Chapt VI, Sect 2).
Although this indicator was a result of the political
conditions (independent variable) and should therefore
be considered dependent. It did, however, contribute to
the deterioration in the physical condition of
buildings and services and thus is also considered as
an independent variable.
2. Absence of any public or private Palestinian financial
institutions to plan the economy, guide investment or
provide credit and saving facilities, (ibid).
3. Closure of all Arab banks, imitediately after 1967. The
only Arab bank allowed to re-open in 1987 was linked to
the Israeli banking system with restrictions imposed on
its assets and operations, (ibid).
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4. High taxes imposed on businesses in spite of the drop
in income and the severe econoTric conditions after the
Intifada. Tax raids were carried out by Israeli
tax officers aided by armed soldiers in army cars,
(ibid & Chapt. VIII).
3.8 Dependent Variables:-
As pointed out in item 3.6 above, deterioration in the
built environment was measured by examining the following
three categories considered as the main dependent
variables:
1. the building or the unit (flat,shop etc.),
2. its immediate environment referred to as the area, and
3. the city centre.
(A) Buildings:
a- old (pre 1948): mainly in the historic core of the
city, familiar problems are: maintenance, dampness, water
penetration, availability of services, structural
stability, external finish, stairs, noise, pollution,
visual appearance, architectural/historical value.
b- medium (1948-67): mainly around the main city square
and main shopping streets, familiar problems in addition
to the above: war damage including deinolitions, broken
glass, twisted metal, damaged doors and windows, abandoned
floors and buildings.
c- new (post 1967): mainly in the new extended part of
the centre to the west of the main square, common problems
in addition to the above are: quality of construction,
level of maintenance, compliance with building regulations,
access, stairs lifts, height, architectural and urban
design value, internal and external finish and condition.
(B) Amenities; such as availability, condition and level
of maintenance of open spaces, parks, recreation
facilities and landscape.
(C) Infrastructure in terms of age, capacity, future plans,
maintenance level, available funds for:
-	 services;
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-	 public utilities
-	 roads/traffic and parking facilities
(D) Environmental issues in terms of health and safety
regulations and control of pollution for: water, air,
sewerage disposal systems, refuse collection, also
noise, pollution and pedestrian safety.
The built environment will be examined by multiple source
techniques, (item 3.6 Testing the hypothesis above). The
above items will be analysed qualitatively in detail in
Chapters IV and V relyiing on available documentary
evidence, reports and studies, interviews with officials,
professionals and academics. However, the questionnaire
survey, (parts A and B), was designed to provide
quantitative data to support the qualitative data. The
above four categories were measured in terms of the users
views as to whether a certain problem existed and each was
scaled as serious, bad, acceptable, or no problem, results
are included in Appendix "A","B", Tables 20-42).
The initial selection of the indicators for the
deterioration in buildings and surrounding areas was
decided after reviewing the limited available literature on
this subject, (BRE "Checklist for rehabilitation of
Traditional Housing", DOE "The English House Condition
Survey", M. Carley "Housing and Neighbourhood Renewal and
the Survey conducted by Medhurst and Lewis in "Urban Decay:
An Analysis and Policy". It was later finalised after
authors own observations and building users comments during
the pilot survey. Variables causing problems considered to
be hazardous to health and safety, or problems that could
continue to deteriorate and cause damage to other elements
and/or threaten the stability of the structure (Britten,
1993, BRE, 1982 & 1990).
The provision and condition of basic services in the
building and surrounding areas were also selected as
indicators.Therefore, the following variables were selected
f or the components under investigation:
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1. Building : Noise, pollution, ventilation, natural light,
draft, water penetration, dampness, access to building,
traffic and parking in front of building, building
utilities such as sanitary facilities, power, heating etc.,
and the level of maintenance. The measurement was based on:
1. users views, (whether the problem exists and if it
is serious);
2. the availability of certain utilities such as power,
water, heating, drainage and sanitary fixtures; and
3. the condition of certain items such as walls, roof,
stairs, entrance, etc. based on the authors' inspection
and observation.
2. Area : Traffic, parking, street vendors, pollution,
hygiene, services, pedestrian safety, access to area/
street, spaces between buildings, security: uighting/
violence, law and order, amenities (parks, landscape,
public toilets). The final measurement was based on:
1. users views and evaluation of the problem/s
2. availability of certain facilities and public amenities
in each area.
3. the physical condition of certain facilities such as,
pavements, landscaped areas where these exist, services
such as drains based on the authors' inspection and
observation.
3. City Centre : Traffic, parking, street vendors,
pollution, hygiene, services, pedestrian safety, access,
spaces between buildings, amenities, level of maintenance,
restoration of historic buildings. The measurement was
based on:
1. user's views and evaluation of the problem/s in the
centre;
2. availability of facilities in the centre as a whole;
3. the physical condition of these facilities supported by
the author's inspection and observations.
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SECTION 4: Methods Used to Collect Data
As described in Section 2 above, the methodology was based
on a multiple source evidence method. The various
techniques used in this research are described below.
4.1 Data Collection Techniques:-
The research aimed at examining the two main components of
the hypothesis, the condition of the built environment and
the policies and practices of the Israeli administration
between 1967-1994, in an attempt to discover if there was
a causal link between the two. As a number of indicators
were selected for each of the variables, these indicators
were measured by a number of the techniques selected as the
sources of evidence.
4.1.1 Scope of Investigation :-
1- The physical condition of the built environment:
buildings, urban spaces, services, infrastructure and
environmental concerns in the city centre (the central
business district and the historic core). These will be
examined by studying documents and records (items a &
b below), carrying out interviews and the questionnaire
survey (item c) and observation and physical inspection
(items d & e).
2- The existing planning and legislative structures,
regulatory and fiscal policies and the process and
implication of their implementation. The examination
and anlysis of this component will rely mainly on
documentary evidence (item a &b), and on interviews
with officials and professionals (item c).
3- The views and attitudes of local residents towards the
above two categories which will be mainly examined by
conducting the questionnaire survey and informal
interviews, (item c).
The multiple source data that was adopted in the research
methodology comprised the following elements:
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4.1.2 Sources of Evidence :-
a Documentation: This included;
-	 Administrative documents, proposals, progress
reports, and internal documents
-	 Agendas, announcements (M.O. 's) ,and other written
reports and events.
- Formal studies and reports carried out in the same or
similar field of research by Universities international
organizations, NGO's, and PVO's)
-	 News clippings and articles published.
b- Archive Records: These included;
-	 Service records and charts.
-	 Maps, drawings and diagrams
-	 Survey Data such as census.
c- Interviews! Questionnaire: The interviews were informal
with open ended questions to obtain facts and
respondents opinions, or semi structured (focused) type
which followed a certain set of questions prepared to
obtain specific information while maintaining the
informal nature of questioning. The questionnaire
included close- ended, pre-coded questions and
comprised two parts; the social survey ( item 4.2.1
below) and the physical survey (item 4.2.2), (Also
Scope of the Survey p. 96-98 above).
d- Direct observation: This provided additional evidence
in respect of a certain indicator, for instance
pedestrian movement, access, or traffic pattern that
could indicate certain problems, this was also
supplemented by photographs.
e- Physical/Visual inspection: This involved a more
thorough inspection of a number of buildings in the
three selected sample areas, which were also included
in the questionnaire, to obtain more information on the
nature and extent of the physical problems in the
buildings and their causes. The inspection schedule
was based on the BRE survey techniques (item 4.2.2 ).
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The physical inspection, together with the "Physical
Survey" of the questionnaire (item c above), have the
added support of drawings, sketches, photographs, video
tape and reference to existing documents.
4.2 The Questionnaire Design:-
A draft questionnaire was prepared in English before the
field visit in March 1993. The questionnaire survey was
designed in two parts and comprised the following:
1. A social survey to obtain basic social data from
building users including building age, ownership and tenure
and rent and frequency of maintenance (Appendix "C", Part
A, Q1-Q33) and their views and perceptions of the problems
with their buildings, their immediate environment and the
city centre, (ibid, Q34- Q39). It also aimed to obtain
their views on what they considered to be obstacles to
development, (ibid, Q40). Questions included in this part
were answered by the users.
2. A physical survey of the building/unit to obtain
information on the availability and condition of various
building elemnets and utilities, (ibid, Part B). Questions
in this part were mainly completed by the users, although
items in the questionniare which involved technical views
such as accessibilty to the building or area, the
description and physical condition of certain building
elements and utilities were completed by the author, (ibid,
Q30-40, itmes 1/1, 1/5-7, 4/1-7 & 5). A more detailed
inspection was carried out on twelve of the sixty three
buildings where the questionnaire was completed.
4.2.1 The Social Survey:-
The first part of the Social Survey involved introductory
questions regarding the buildings, their age and use,
frequency of maintenance and rent issues. Questions
relating to, and generating, expressions of views and
attitudes to the prevailing political situation were
deliberately left to the end of the questionnaire after a
degree of rapport and trust with the respondent had been
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established. These comprised a set of standard questions
related to building owners/users views on the condition of
their building, the area where it is located and city
centre.
The objective was to obtain the occupants' and users'
account of the type and extent of the problems in the built
environment in Nablus and the factors that contributed to
these problems. This included what they considered to be
the main obstacles to development in the field which
directly affected their daily life and/or the running and
future prospects of their businesses (item 3.7 and 3.8)
4.2.2 The Physical Survey:-
The choice of questions, used to assess the physical
condition of buildings, was based on the limited available
literature on this subject. The author also benefited from
her own long experience in architectural practice in the
region while carrying out the physical inspection procedure
of buildings, services and spaces and in assessing their
condition.
A draft questionnaire for the "Physical Survey" was
prepared was prepared based on similar studies, the
authors experience and the pilot survey, (item 3.8 above).
This draft was discussed in a meeting with engineers and
researchers at the Building Research Establishment (BRE) in
order to refine the proposed survey techniques. As a result
of the different circumstances and expectations in various
countries, there is no international standard formula or
measure for the physical condition of buildings.
The check- lists for the Physical Survey and the Inspection
Schedule for this research were loosely based on the BRE
check- lists. However, since the BRE list is thoroughly
detailed to ensure a high standard of construction to be
expected in a developed country, it was evident that such
high standards should not be expected in the case of
Nablus.
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The list was therefore modified to include only the basic
provision of utilities and a checklist on physical problems
that might cause danger to the property, its users and its
inunediate environment. Consequently many items were
excluded such as adequate thickness of insulation, and
appropriate flashing fixing, both generally unavailable, or
unsuitable kitchen or toilet lay outs. Availability of
certain services such as central heating, mechanical
ventilation was also not anticipated and was not considered
an appropriate measure to determine the fitness of a
building for use under the prevailing circumstances in
Nablus.
Senior engineers at the BRE confirmed that measuring
physical conditions in buildings is subjective and varies
between different surveyors carrying out the same
inspection. However, the surveyor/inspector should create
his/her own measurement and base his/her judgement on those
criteria. The engineers advised that the deterioration
should be measured on the basis of items that could either
constitute danger to health and life or that could cause
further physical problems and deterioration in the
building, (Britten, 1993). After the completion of the
English draft of both parts of the questionnaire, it was
translated into Arabic.
4.3 The Field Survey:-
The field survey was carried out at the middle of the
second year of the research. Following the exploratory and
pilot visits, and sixteen months of data collection and
literature review which formed the basis of the
proposition, the methodology and the questionnaire design.
One of the main aims of the survey was obtain the views of
building users and examine the condition of their
buildings and their immediate environment to obtain as much
quantitative data as possible.
Another aim was to interview officials, academics and
professionals involved in urban developemnt in Palestine
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in general and Nablus in particular to obtain their views
on the subject matter and collect any available new
documentary evidence. However, the term "survey" in this
study will refer to the data collected by interviews,
questionnaire and observation and documents between May and
July 1993, during the main field visit.
4.3.1 Collecting Documentary Evidence:
The search for documents and official records started from
the outset of the research and continued until the writing
up stage, which was the end of the study period under
investigation (Israeli administration 1967-1994). The
documents were obtained from local independent Palestinian
and Israeli publications, Nablus municipality records and
archives, Al Najah university studies, and Nablus Chamber
of Commerce records. Palestinian libraries were a main
source of documentation (Arab Studies Centre, PASSIA, Al-
Haq, Nablus Municipality). UN publications were obtained
from UN libraries in London (UN Information Centre), and
Amman (HABITAT & ESCWA), UND? offices in East Jerusalem.
Documents from the ILO and UNCTAD were requested by
correspondence from their HQ in Geneva.
Documents were also made available by officials and
professionals in Amman, Jerusalem, Nablus and Ramallah.
Although very few documents were available in this field of
research in libraries in Britain, copies of some reports
and studies were obtained here from individuals and fellow
researchers in Britain who had an interest in the subject
matter.
4.3.2 The Questionnaire Survey:
The questionnaire comprised two parts, the Social Survey to
be completed by the building users and the Physical survey
which was designed to be completed by the users and the
interviewer/researcher.
Selecting Respondents:
In the absence of a sampling frame, reliable demographic
data and author's inability to obtain an official
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register of owners and tenants, it was decided that
purposively selected samples would be used (Bulmer &
Warwick, 1983).
The method of selecting the "respondents" or interviewees
followed a daily walk-about in the three sample areas. Most
of those interviewed were selected out of those who agreed
to answer questions and were cooperative. Some respondents,
however, were purposively selected either because they
represented an interesting case or because they were
considered to be representative of a certain category such
as a soap factory or a public bath in the old city.
This method of selection, the uncertainty of users rate of
response and ability to complete the questionnaires meant
that building use will not be part of the selection
procedure. Such consideration was ruled out in the early
stages of the research due to the absence of any reliable
register of building uses, number and types of businesses
in the city, (Hanbali, & Hindeyeh, 1992).
The situation was exasperated by the political and security
conditions during the Intifada as a number of businesses
and homes were closed as a result of political and
financial pressures, (sealing of property, inability to pay
tax and business failure) . This was not considered as a
serious handicap since most buildings were under uniform
conditions and suffered the same problems in terms of their
physical condition and the prevailing political and
security conditions.
Although a total number of 63 questionnaires were
completed, during the analysis stage 60 of the
questionnaires were considered for statistical analysis and
three were excluded as many of the answers were missing or
were too general to be quantified. However, these three
questionnaires yielded more qualitative data and were
therefore considered to be more suitable as interviews and
were analyzed as such.
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Most respondents provided more information than was
required by the questionnaire. The additional information
was handwritten at the back of the questionnaire and was
later analyzed as qualitative data. Each questionnaire took
an average of one and a half to two hours to complete.
The size of population in the three sample areas was not
the same (ie Zone "C" is considerably smaller than "A" &
"B") The type of activities in both Zone "A" & "B" is more
varied than in Zone "C" which also justified the difference
in the number of questionnaires completed.
a- Piloting the Questionnaire:-
The questionnaire was piloted by asking six respondents,
randomly selected, from Zone "A" and "B" in the city centre
to answer the questions. This established a pattern of
answers mostly expected, in view of the generality of the
conditions. It also emphasized or negated certain
assumptions made after the pilot visit in 1992,
particularly with regard to suspicion and fear, and
unwillingness to cooperate on certain subjects. This helped
in restructuring/rephrasing some questions that were
subsequently asked in the three sample areas.
b- Completing the Questionnaire:-
The Arabic software which was used in the translation of
the questionnaire in Amman, was not available in the
occupied territories. The author could not revise the
questionnaire and had to carry out the changes by hand
written text on the original form. This proved more
practical as some interviewees were reluctant to answer
certain questions which had to be rephrased a few times to
encourage their response.
While conducting the questionnaire survey, the sequence of
questions was re-arranged according to each respondent's
circumstances. An introduction of 15-20 minutes was always
helpful to break the ice and establish common ground. In
the introduction, it was important to ernphasise the
author's links to Nablus and the objective of the research
as most people in the OPT were reluctant to talk to
strangers.
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Although, the majority of respondents eventually answered
most of the questions related to them and their buildings,
after some probing, few were willing to volunteer any
information about other buildings or their occupiers, in
particular those related to sealed or demolished property.
Political issues were not always the most sensitive that
respondents wanted to avoid, as some were very openly
critical of the Israeli authorities particularly those who
suffered most from their policies and practices. Issues
such as rent, ownership and absentees partners proved
sometimes more sensitive and some respondents were
reluctant to discuss.
It soon became evident that a lot of perseverance, patience
and flexibility was required from any interviewer if this
method was to be successful. It was also evident that most
cases could not be entirely standardized and many
respondents had additional and varied information according
to their different conditions. Some needed persuasion and
probing, while others volunteered information readily.
In conclusion, in spite of offers of help by friends and
staff at the university, the author found that the process
of interviewing and inspection was on the one hand
informative and interesting, but more importantly too
critical to be left to others, thus it was decided that she
should carry out all the work by herself. The two parts of
the questionnaire (The Social and Physical Surveys),
contained questions to be filled by building users
(respondents). The questions included in Part "A" (Social
Survey) aimed at obtaining general information on the
building, their relationship to the unit, rent, maintenance
and their views on the nature and extent of problems with
their building/unit. It also included questions on their
views with regard to their future plans for the business/
building and what they considered to be obstacles to carry
out these plans and to the development of the city, (App.
C, Quest., Part "A").
133
The second part (The Physical Survey), included questions
that were designed to give information on availability and
condition of various building elements and utilities,
description of the building and its main components and
description and condition of urban spaces, services and the
immediate environment. Some of the general questions
included in the first part were repeated in the second as
it was assumed, at the time the questionnaire was prepared,
that each part may be filled by different interviewers.
The questions included in this part of the survey were
designed to be answered by both the building user and the
interviewer/researcher. Those directed to the users were of
more general nature which required information regarding
availability of a certain item, satisfaction of the user
with certain services such as electrical supply. However,
questions of a more technical nature such as the physical
condition of a certain building element such as roof
protection, floor and wall finish, structure and stability
of new extensions were planned to be filled by the
interviewer/researcher, (App. C, Quest., Part "B").
and were filled by the author. Twelve buildings were
selected from those inspected for a more detailed physical
survey, (item 4.3.4 below).
4.3.3 Interviews and Request for Data:
Israeli officials were approached during the field visit in
June 1993. Officials at the Central Planning Department of
the Israeli Civilian Administration, who were in charge of
all the planning issues (Chapter VI), refused to be
interviewed.
A number of administrators and officers were approached by
phone, but would not give permission to visit their
offices, which was located within the Israeli Military
Headquarters of the West Bank and classified as a high
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security zone. The spokes-person for the head of the
Planning Department, asked for some information about the
nature of the research and for a letter from the
university, where the study was conducted, before a
decision could be made. The official letter from the
University of London (DPU), requesting the help of the
authority and a covering letter from the author with the
required information was faxed through (re Fax dated 6.7
1993). After a few calls and further inquiries, the request
was denied on the basis that all the information needed
could be obtained from Nablus municipality.
The information requested involved data on the type and
number of public projects that obtained planning approval
from the Central Planning Department in the Civil
Administration over a number of years, the central
government budget and expenditure on various projects over
a period of time in Nablus (including buildings, roads and
infrastructure). Other information requested involved;
future planning policies, land use, process for obtaining
permission, and existing problems in the built environment,
what they plan to do about it and how it could be resolved,
(see research questions above).
The author tried to obtain information from other
departments at the HPC and CPD after obtaining contact with
key figures from friends and fellow researchers in
Palestine and Israel. Although the response of those
contacted was initially "friendlier", nevertheless, they
were unable to give any information without written
instructions from the CPD.
A number of Palestinians working at the local offices of
the CA in Nablus, in the Public Works and Housing
Department and the Traffic Department declined to give
information and showed the author written instructions from
the CA forbidding them from giving any data without the
written consent of the administration. These offices were
approached twice in 1992 and 1993 with the same results.
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The chief engineer at Nablus municipality was originally
interviewed in 1992, when he provided all the information
requested which was mainly of a general nature (Hanbali,
1992). However, the engineer declined to be interviewed to
answer more specific questions in 1993 and was also unable
to provide any answers to a list of 30 more specific
questions. The list was returned with one comment "Since
1988, there has been no mayor or municipal council in
Nablus, the Law is in absence" (Hanbali, 1993).
The author sent another letter to the cheif engineer
disclosing the comments received from the CPD and
requesting that he answers at least some the questions. In
spite of stamping the letter at the municipality registry
and officially entering it in the official files, the
letter was never answered, (Authors letter to M.
Hanbali.18.7.1993)
All planning issues, expenditure, information and official
policies related to public buildings, at the time of the
survey, were the responsibility of the Central Planning
Department (Chapter VI). Therefore all information was kept
at their offices. During informal discussions with
Palestinian officials it became evident that this
information was either kept away from them, or they were
given misleading or inaccurate information.In-accessibility
of Israeli officials had also been experienced by a number
of researchers previously including Israelis (Benvinisti,
1984, Abed, 1987 & Coon, 1992, 314CC, 1992).
A number of Israeli planners who did not have official or
government positions agreed to be interviewed. These
included academics, ex-planners and Arab Israelis
(Interviews 1993). The author was also able to interview
one of the few Palestinians working with the Local Planning
Committee representing the district level of Planning under
the Israelis (Shkoukani 1993).
The limitations on having access to key informants was
exasperated by the fact that some informants requested that
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some of the data should either not be disclosed or they did
not wish to be quoted. As the West Bank was still under the
Israeli military occupation at the time this research was
completed, some of the valuable evidence obtained by the
author, could not be used as it might have put the sources
at risk.
4.3.4 Physical Inspection of buildings and Spaces:-
In addition to the brief inspection of buildings and
adjoining external spaces as part of the Physical Survey,
(Part "B" of the questionnaire), a thorough inspection of
selected buildings/units was carried out. This included
five buildings in Zone "A", five in Zone "B" and two in
Zone "C". Spaces, streets and pavements in the three zones
were inspected, sketched and extensively photographed for
reference.
The inspection included external and internal examination
of floors and walls, roofs and ceilings, openings,
utilities and service connections. Evidence and causes of
water penetration and dampness, cracking and failure of
finishes, rot in timber and rust in metal elements,
incorrect fixing of openings and overloading and sagging of
floors and balconies were some of the items investigated
and recorded, (Chap. IV, V & App. B).
Selection of this smaller sample of the original sample was
made following few visits to the city centre. It was noted
that certain problems existed in many of the buildings in
the three sample areas which were considered to be serious
and hazardous to both the safety of the buildngs and the
users. This selection was aimed at providing additional
evidence of the deterioration in the physical condition of
these buildings by investigating the extent and causes of
certain problems particularly those related to quality of
construction, lack of maintenance and war damage.
Problems examined and recorded in one building which is a
part of a whole block such as Anabtawi building, (plate
44), was representative of problems in the rest of the
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block. Tue adjacent three buildings had clear indication
of abandoned floors, broken glass, twisted metal, water
penetration, broken steps and other problems. Access to the
whole of a building was sometimes difficult. Access to
roofs and upper floors was also difficult and had to be
ruled out in most cases as a security risk, (Chapt IV)
4.3.5 Observation
During the final survey, which involved 10 weeks stay in
Nablus, the author visited the city centre almost every day
even during strikes and troubles. Most of the time, the
whole day would be spent walking the streets, conducting
questionnaires and interviews, making sketches and taking
photographs. After the initial suspicion and curiosity, the
author's presence became familiar and was eventually
accepted. In later weeks, many, especially youngsters,
offered to help in finding places, introducing key
informants and helping in the inspection of buildings.
The author used three locations (friendly owners), one in
the middle of the Al Hussain square, the second in a shop
in Ghernata street and the third in Zone "C" where people,
traffic and activities could be observed. These were
frequently used as resting places and observation points,
(see map No 15).
SECTION 5 Methods Used to Analyze Data
The data collected and subsequently analysed comrised both
qualitative and quantitative data The former was obtained
front documentary evidence, interviews and observation. The
latter from the questionnare, the physical survey and
available secondary sources such as statistics, tables and
diagrams.
5.1 Quantitative Analysi
5.1.1 Choice of Sample Area:
The questionnaire covered three zones in the city centre
chosen on the basis of the period during which the zone was
developed.
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The criterion used to measure the urban decay in the city
centre was based on the inspection of the physical
condition of buildings and their immediate environment,
according to their location, in three parts of the centre
as defined in the introduction to this chapter. This was
supported by views and perceptions obtained from users in
these areas. Of the total number of respondents who were
interviewed, and whose property was inspected, 21 were in
the historic core, Zone "A", 25 in the middle part of the
city centre; Zone "B" and 14 in the new part of the centre;
Zone "C", (App.B, Table 38).
The decision to divide the sample areas in the centre into
these three zones was facilitated by the fact that the age
of most buildings in each zone could be related to the
historic period during which that zone was developed.
Although there is almost a clear physical division between
the three zones (map No 6), there are few exceptions. This
can be seen at the northern edge of the historic core and
around the main city square (Al Hussain) where a number of
buildings were over one hundred years old, such as the soap
factory in the square and the line of buildings to the
south of it, bordering the old city and linking with the
old gates/city entrances.
Although some of the buildings underwent various
alterations, many remained intact. Another grey area could
be found at the eastern side of Zone "C", where some of the
buildings were built in the mid 1960's during the last
years of Jordanian rule. Thus another criterion was used
based on building age regardless of the zone where it is
located, and that was to evaluate the condition of a
particular building in relation to the period when it was
constructed.
The purpose of the two scales of measurement is first to
define the general characteristics of each zone under study
and consequently the main problems and difficulties. The
other was to examine the quality of construction of each
individual building and to examine if the physical
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condition characteristics could be related to the period
during which it was built. This was expected to provide
indicators to any significant difference between the type
and extent of problems of buildings constructed during
various political periods regardless of their location.
Table (2)
Building/Construction Period
Construction Period	 Number of	 Buildings
Historic	 22
Old (British Mandate)	 10
Medium (Jordanian rule)	 20
New (Occupation)	 8
Total	 60
5.1.2 Choice of Variables:
Out of the original 186 variables included in the
questionnaire, a total of 126 variables were selected for
both the social and the physical survey (Appendix A & B).
Independent Variables: These were selected to represent the
policies and practices of the Israeli administration during
the occupation which are considered as obstacles to urban
development in Palestinian towns. These were divided into
three categories: political, planning and regulatory, and
financial (3.6 above).
Dependent Variables: The dependent variables representing
the deterioration in the physical condition of the built
environment were measured at three levels and were
considered the "Main Dependent Variables"; the building,
the area and the centre of Nablus.
The effect of the three main independent variables was
tested twice in the process of questioning. First, during
the initial questioning of respondents regarding their
relation to the building, their satisfaction with its use
and physical condition, the frequency with which they
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carried out maintenance work and their plans for the
future. This was expected to provide an indication as to
whether their views and plans for the building/business
were related to the political, legal and financial policies
that prevailed at the time of questioning.
The second testing of the variables was after obtaining the
respondents views on what they considered to be the main
problems with the building, the area in which it is located
and the city centre as a whole. This was designed to give
an indication as to whether the respondents related the
problems they specified at the three levels with the
political, legal and financial policies and practices
imposed by the Israeli authorities.
5.1.3 Measurement of Variables:
The questionnaire was only one of the sources of evidence
selected for the research and was designed to provide the
statistical data. All questions included and considered
in both parts of the questionnaire were close-ended
questions and could therefore lend themselves easily to
numerical coding.
As mentioned in the first part of this chapter a lot of
information was given by the respondents in addition to the
answers to the questionnaire. The data that emerged from
these additions was taken down as notes which were later
typed, scanned and analyzed as qualitative data in the same
method of semi-structured interview analysis. Although the
answers were initially coded before the survey was carried
out, it was necessary to re-code them after the translation
to English and as a result of the changes.
The proposed answers to the questionnaire were designed to
facilitate easy coding and were therefore amenable to
statistical analysis. There were no numerical variables in
the questionnaire and therefore raw data relating to all
variables were categorized and coded.
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Entering the Data
To facilitate the use of a computer statistical package for
the analysis of the data (SPSS/PC+), a code-book was
prepared to fit that particular package (Ref. Appendix C).
It included the variable names and labels with their values
as coded on the questionnaire and the value labels (Frude,
1993, Chapter 2, 19).
The data from the sixty questionnaires was entered, for
ease and speed, through a different software EPI which is
compatible with SPSS, and then it was exported to the SPSS/
PC+ software for analysis.
5.1.4 Statistical Analysis:
Frequencies :
The data was summarised to enable the detection of patterns
and tendencies within the answers. Therefore the frequency
distribution was obtained by the use of the package which
demonstrated the number of times each specific answer
occurred. This also indicated the proportion of cases
contained in each frequency such as relative frequency. The
use of frequency distribution and proportion was
particularly useful to demonstrate the number of cases
where a certain facility and/or problem was present within
the sample areas.
Cross-tabulation :
One of the simplest and most frequently used methods of
examining the presence of relationships between variables
is cross-tabulation. A relationship usually exists between
two variables when the distribution of values for one
variable is associated with the distribution exhibited by
another variable (Bryinan and Cramer, Chapter 8, p.150,
1990)
After summarizing the data and obtaining the frequency
distribution and its proportion in each case, it was
important to start investigating the relationship between
various variables.
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As the cross-tabulation procedure enables us to examine the
frequencies of values with respect to two or more variables
simultaneously, the aim was to examine the conditional
distributions: the distribution of one variable under
particular conditions of another.
To enable an assessment of how the various independent
variables affected the physical conditions of buildings of
various ages or locations the cross tabulation method was
used to compare the effect of a certain variable, such as
violence, on buildings located in different zones. This was
aimed to determine whether one zone suffered significantly
more than the others as a result of this factor which would
have provided an explanation of the phenomenon of the large
number of abandoned premises observed in that zone which
have contributed to the deterioration of that area.
The frequency of the occurrence of a certain problem in
relation to the age of the building where it occurred or in
relation to its location could also confirm whether the
absence of the municipal council and adequate building
codes has affected the quality of construction (using
dampness and water penetration as indicators) one zone more
than the others. This was useful particularly in the case
of Zone "C" and the buildings constructed after the
occupation
After deciding on the causal ordering of the variables
which entailed the selection of the independent variables
and dependent variables which need to be examined in
relation to each other, the cross-tabulation method was
used to produce tables. The tables contain information on
the frequency of occurrence expressed as a percentage of
the row total, the column total and the population total.
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The following relationships were examined thus;
- Relationship between independent variables such as
obstacles, constraints (political, legal or financial)
and dependent variables (related to owners and tenants)
such as frequency of maintenance, satisfaction with use
and condition of building/ business, future plans in
terms of the ability to improve or expand it.
- Relationship between certain problems identified in
buildings and the location and age of building. This
enabled establishing the type and extent of problems
in buildings according to their location and age. For
the purpose of this particular exercise, the problem
investigated in the building was considered t
	 h	 e
dependent variable while age or location of t h a t
building were considered the "cause", independent
variables.
- Relationship between the occurrence of certain problems
identified in the area/environment where the building
is located as the dependent variables and three zones
as the independent variables. This enabled establishing
the characteristics of problems in each zone.
- Relationship between the three categories identified as
obstacles to development (independent variables), and
what all users views were on the physical condition of
the unit/building, area, and the city centre as the
three dependent variables.
5.2 QUALITATIVE MJALYSiB
The qualitative analysis involved analysing all the data
obtained throughout the study period which included the
available documentary evidence, secondary data and the data
collected during the field survey from interviews with
officials and professionals and from informal interviews
with building users and local Palestinians.
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The analysis of the documentary evidence started in at the
very early stages of the research and continued until the
final writing up stage. As mentioned earlier, the early
analysis and review of available documents and literature
formed the basis of the research proposition and
methodology techniques.
Although most of the qualitative analysis of was developed
alongside the quantitative at the final analysis stage,
some of it started earlier during the field survey. The
qualitative data was constantly analyzed from the start.
This involved all the field notes, observation notes,
arranged interview notes and notes taken from informal
conversations during the questionnaire survey and sketches
and photographs. A diary was also kept, where events and
special comments on interviews and the days events were
recorded. It was important to examine the evidence as it
emerged from various sources and detect confirmations and
contradictions and clues for further investigation.
The fact that the author is Palestinian and lived in a
Palestinian home during the field survey, meant that she
became subject to, and involved in all the daily events and
difficulties that permanent residents of Nablus experienced
as their "normal" daily routine/life. It was therefore
difficult to maintain a spectator's non-participant
observer role and not to become emotionally involved.
However, as this was anticipated after the pilot survey in
1992, a certain strategy for taking field notes and early
analysis of data was adopted from the outset. Techniques
were followed to inaximise the ability to cross check and
corroborate evidence from various sources.
Walker observed that data yielded by different techniques
differ in kind:
"interviews provide information on reported behaviour,
attitudes and beliefs; discussions yield respondents
reports; observation offers descriptions of behaviour
in a specific context." (Walker, Evaluating Applied
Qualitative Research, Chapter 11, 185, Applied
Qualitative Research, 1985)
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5.2.1 Preliminary Analysis :
Most qualitative analysis is concerned with "coding" the
data into categories. The quickest and easiest way is to
decide upon categories in advance and simply go through
data putting the appropriate sections of data into the
particular categories they illustrate. (Jones, The analysis
of Depth Interviews, Walker, ed.,1985)
A lot of documentary evidence was reviewed before the field
work, which formed the base of the hypotheses and research
questions and subsequently the selection of concepts and
indices. Since one of the methods used to collect data
during the field trip was the questionnaire survey, most of
the preliminary categorizing and coding was already done.
The first part of this chapter was prepared before the
visit, and a list of categories was, therefore, ready for
immediate qualitative analysis during the field work.
Semi-structured Interviews :
Because of the semi-structured nature of the interviews
with officials and key informants, a list of questions was
prepared before the interview as a guide to the subjects
that would be covered, but invariably more subjects were
discussed during the course of the meeting.
Notes of some answers and comments were taken, but some
could not be immediately recorded, as it was more important
to keep the natural flow of the conversation. However, to
ensure that no data was left out, the interview texts were
entered into the computer on the same or the following day,
whether written in Arabic or English, while the information
was still "fresh". While entering the data additional
information emerged which was subsequently entered under
defined categories.
As a result of the political conditions, prevailing at the
time of the survey, it was difficult to programme the
interviews to follow a certain pattern of investigation.
Interviews took place, whenever it was possible to get
access to informants as difficulties were encountered
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during strikes, curfews, or interviews in West Jerusalem
and Israel. The fact that the author is Palestinian made it
more difficult for her, than other researchers, to obtain
access to Israeli officials or to travel easily to other
towns during area closures in spite of her British passport
However, residing in Nablus during the field survey made it
easier for her to continue her survey of buildings and
interviewing users in Nablus during strikes and area
closures, although, obviously, not during curfews and
military clashes. A number of informants also suggested
meetings with other people who could advise on certain
questions or give additional data, a few of whom were
pursued and subsequently interviewed. Some of the prepared
questions had to be modified before an interview to include
queries on notes taken from otherinforniants for
corroboration of data. In some cases another interview was
requested with a previous interviewee for further
clarification, although not all were possible.
As the survey progressed more categories were added and
more input from various informants could be seen to fit
within the categories. In addition to categories already
defined within the survey questionnaire, others were
introduced, such as the professional conduct of
contractors, architects/engineers, building violations by
owners and/or professionals, building codes and regulations
for quality control and the level of co-operation between
municipal engineers and university staff.
Informal Interviews
This refers to the conversations held with respondents to
the questionnaire. Most of the conversations were recorded
at the back of the questionnaire as general notes and
comments. This practice ensured that the notes would be
later related to the location and general characteristics
of the building and its user, for further evidence during
the final analysis stage.
However, it was difficult to take down some of the
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respondents accounts of personal tragedies and suffering
relevant to the questionnaire questions, such as
demolition, sealing of property, imprisonment, economic
hardships etc. It was prudent that such information was
only written in code in order not to reveal sources.
Physical Survey :
A copy of the city centre's plan, was divided to the three
zones under study and enlarged to allow space for notes
during the inspection of spaces. Observation notes were
jotted down at the back of the questionnaires and the
inspection schedule and were later checked against other
notes, and photographs.
Observation:
The observation method of collecting data was conceived as
a non-participant observation to ensure that objectivity
would not be affected. However, as mentioned above, it was
not possible to maintain this position all-through the
survey as it was difficult not to become involved in daily
events. These events included; sudden eruption of
hostilities, army actions which often included shooting,
harassment of residents and tax raids on businesses, and
the Palestinian's Intifada's violent and non-violent
actions.
Thus, during the course of the survey it was inevitable to
experience fear and anxiety, interruption of activities
etc., frustration and delays as a result of inability to
get from one area to another. It was, however, useful to
observe how people survived and managed their daily
business under conditions of violence, curfews, strikes and
closure of business and to experience personally how
vulnerable and uncertain life was under those conditions.
These observations where later included as supporting
evidence in the final analysis.
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According to Becker and Geer:
" Observation provides firsthand reports of events and
actions and utuch fuller coverage of activities, giving
direct knowledge of matters that, from interviewing, we
can know about it only by heresy." (Participant
Observation: The Analysis of Qualitative Field Data,
Chapter 32, 239, Field Research, R. Burgess, ed.,
1982)
5.2.2 Final Qualitative Analysis :
After the field work, and while in the process of
organising and translating the questionnaires to English,
the process of qualitative analysis started, based on the
preliminary analysis carried out during the survey. Sue
Jones argues that;
"the analysis of qualitative data is a process of
making sense, of finding and making a structure in the
data and giving this meaning and significance to
ourselves and for any relevant audience" (Jones,
Chapter 4, Walker, ed. 1985).
The analysis strategy was conceived and developed over a
period of time, whilst also reviewing various publications
on the analysis of qualitative data. In Styles of Data
Analysis: Approaches and Implications, Burgess warns
researchers of the issues, work and time involved in
qualitative analysis, (Burgess, 1982).
Interviews were re-read in their original form, then the
typed text was checked, revised and edited. This was done
while other field notes were read and scanned for new
categories.
The qualitative analysis was a long and slow process as it
involved many sources of evidence which had to be brought
together and linked to certain categories. The video tape
taken at the end of the survey in the three sample areas,
together with the large number of photographs and slides
were very useful reminders and supporting evidence to the
notes and interviews. Walker points out that;
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"analysis involves 'fracturing' data into 'lumps of
meaning' (e.g. events, actions, acts, statements,
concepts) and the subsequent restructuring, first by
categorisation and then by developing relationships
between categories" (Walker, 1985).
The main stages for analyzing data according to Macintyre
(Recording and Analyzing Field Dat, 1979), are:
1. Categorizing and coding of data.
2. Relating topics discussed during interviews and noted
as observations to relevant categories, sometimes
certain subjects can be related to more than one
category.
3. Identifying topics and inter-relationships.
4. Examining relationships between various topics,
(Burgess, Chapter 8, 1993).
The fact that the analysis started while the questionnaires
were translated helped to continue the focus on the issues
and original research questions. Records of informal
conversations were continuously read and re-read and coded
to enable it to be entered under defined categories.
The following summarizes the strategy and process followed
for the data analysis:
1- Written notes and typed texts were organised under
sources of evidence; interviews, conversations,
questionnaire, observation etc.
2- Interviews	 (semi-structured or informal),
	 were
classified as:
- Officials, planners and engineers
- Professionals and academics
- Owners, tenants and building users
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3- Topics were categorised as identified by informants
into:
a- Problems (dependent variables)
b- Causes (independent variables)
4- The written original text and the typed text, were read
and reviewed a number of times and subsequently
compared to notes on maps, sketches photographs, and
observation notes.
5- Interviews were scanned and summarized in terms of;
category, content, and views on the subject.
6- After different types of data were mapped, analyzed and
corroborated the following categories (as problems
and/or causes) emerged:
Legal: Planning obstacles, weak local authorities,
absence of legislative and executive power, restricted
boundaries, violations.
Political: Change of policies after the occupation and
particularly after the Likud government came to power,
damage to city during the Israeli council take over,
restrictions imposed by the military.
Technical: Municipal technical resources, pressure
on services, lack of quality control, building, safety
and health codes, professional practice codes
and existing practices. lack of cooperation between
municipal departments (internally) and universities and
research centres (externally).
Financial : Restrictions on investment, external funds,
banks, and taxes.
151
7- A comparison was carried out between, municipality
officials accounts, academics accounts, professionals
accounts, and finally users accounts from the notes
taken during the questionnaire survey.
8- Frequencies and distribution of each category between
the various informants were checked and recorded.
9- An analysis of the findings was carried out based on
an analytic explanation- building strategy, (Yin, 1984)
10- A diagram/map was drawn representing the various
categories and relationships between them, to explore
the nature of these relationships, whether one caused
the other, or could be explained by the other. The
categories were placed in boxes with arrows indicating
the links between them. The process was repeated a few
times before a final map was produced, (see diagram
page 3).
11- Towards the end of the qualitative analysis, the
statistical results of the quantitative analysis were
ready for the final corroboration.
12- All through the data analysis stage and later during
the writing-up stage, the newly obtained documents and
literature were reviewed, analysed and the originaly
reviewed literature was re-read and also analysed and
corroborated with the survey findings.
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Conclusion:
In conclusion, both the quantitative and the qualitative
analysis provided strong evidence that a link exists
between the two components of the hypothesis. However, some
of the values of the proposed indicators proved to be
stronger than others and subsequently emerged as the worst
problem in the built environment or the most serious
obstacle to development. Other indicators for the
deterioration in the physical environment proved less
critical and were therefore excluded from the analysis
while new elements that emerged were included, ( App. A
Tables 20-37 & App.B, Tables 38-42).
There was overwhelming evidence in both qualitative and
quantitative data to prove that the three proposed main
independent variables (political obstacles, legal obstacles
and financial obstacles) have contributed to the
deterioration in the physical condition of the built
environment according to the vast majority of respondents
and interviews, (Tables 17-18).
The results of the questionnaire survey indicate that
building users put more emphasis on all variables tested
for political obstacles, (ibid). As far as legal obstacles
were concerned, the absence of municipal council and rent
controls were considered as the most serious. The issue of
tax was considered as the main financial obstacle and most
respondents regarded it as serious as political and
security problems, (ibid).
The emphasis of officials, professionals and academics was
directed at the legal and planning issues and effects of
fiscal policies as products of the political situation.
This is attributed to the fact that they were more aware of
the details and implications of the regulations and
policies than the users.
The results of the two methods of analysis, including more
detailed quantitative data related to building surveys,
were used to interpret data, the findings of which are
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presented in the following chapters in support of the
hypothesis. During data interpretation and writing-up
stages, these results were continuously corroborated with
the documentary evidence and literature review to integrate
all the information obtained from the various sources of
evidence according to the methodology selected for this
research (Section 2, P. 111-113 above, Bulmer & Warwick, p.
280-289)
After the corroboration with other sources, the data
interpretation was based on evidence obtained from one or
more sources such as literature and interviews, supported
by quantitative data obtained from the questionnaire which
will be integrated to provide evidence of certain
indicators. However, in the absence or weakness of evidence
from one source, such as secondary sources, for a certain
element of investigation is compensated by the evidence
obtained from primary sources such as interviews and
questionnaires, (ibid). Therefore, the data interpretation
will be an integration of primary and secondary sources
throughout the following chapters.
Therefore, the interpretation of the research findings is
based on the integration of the review of literature,
documents and secondary sources available until the end of
writing up stage, and primary sources obtained during the
field survey from interviews, questionnaires and the
physical survey results, field notes and observation. This
method of presentation was used to strengthen the evidence
and ensure the accuracy and interpretation of the findings.
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CHAPTER IV
The Deterioration in the Physical Condition of the Built
Environment:
Data interpretation and analysis of the physical
condition of buildings, urban spaces and activities in
the centre of Nablus city.
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Introduction
This chapter presents a description and analysis of the
physical condition of the built environment in the centre
of Nablus based on the integration of data obtained from
available documents, the results of the field survey which
included data obtained from the questionnaire (social and
physical survey), observations, and interviews conducted in
1992 and 1993.
It should be noted that the results of the survey represent
the condition of the built environment at the time it was
carried out and are based on available information up to
September 1994.
The survey aimed at examining the condition of buildings,
urban spaces and services in order to establish if, and to
what extent, they have deteriorated. It also aimed to
establish if the political situation, legal and financial
policies, that prevailed under the occupation, have
contributed to their condition.
The physical condition of the buildings and spaces in the
centre of Nablus was selected as representative of the
condition of other Palestinian urban centres, (Chapt. III,
section, Scope of Survey). Nablus centre also includes its
historic core which offers substantial commercial and
social services, the changes in the activities and the
physical condition in this part of the city provides a
further indication of the effect of the Israeli
Administration policies and practices on the national
heritage of Palestine.
The results of the physical inspection were corroborated
with users views of the problems with their buildings, the
immediate environment and city centre, (Chapt III, Sec. 5,
Quest. Part A). To enable an assessment of users ability to
overcome these problems, and to maintain and improve their
property and business, their views on the obstacles that
faced them were also obtained and further analyzed in
Chapter VIII, (Quest. Part A, Q 40, Tables 17 & 18).
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In the absence of documented evidence concerning the
condition of the built environment before and after the
occupation, samples from three areas, which were developed
at different periods, were selected to enable a comparison
between the quality of construction and the change in
activities in each area, (Appendix "A", Tables 20-37).
In order to understand and evaluate the conditions that
prevailed in the city centre, a brief background of past
activities and trends is presented in the first section of
this chapter. The section describes the existing
architectural styles and urban design elements in the city
centre. It reviews the past and present activities in the
three areas and analyses the pattern of change in these
activities under the occupation. It also gives a brief
description of the institutional structures and development
patterns in the city over the years.
To evaluate the physical condition of buildings in the
three zones, basic external and internal elements of the
selected buildings are examined and analyzed, and general
characteristics of the observed problems are summarised in
Section (2). Condition of urban spaces and amenities in the
city centre is presented in Section (3). Details and
results of the statistical analysis are included in
Appendices A (Tables 20-37) and B Tables (38-42).
Definitions :
Physical Survey: refers to the inspection of buildings,
units and spaces in the city centre in the three selected
zones which formed part B of the questionnaire survey. A
further inspection of twelve selected buildings from the
original sample was also part of this survey, ( Chapt III,
items 4.2.2 & 4.3.4). However, due to the limited time and
resources it was only possible to carry out a visual
inspection rather than a thorough physical survey. This
exercise could only "scratch the surface" and highlight the
main physical problems in the built environment. It was not
feasible to carry out technical or structural stability
tests which would require the employment of professional
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surveyors, structural and service engineers. It is
therefore recommended that a thorough physical
investigation is carried out in the future to enable a more
accurate assessment of the problems revealed by this
research.
Urban design & architectural styles: description of
building form, urban fabric, architectural styles, building
materials, heights, spaces, landscape, special
characteristics of the area such as fountains, roof-scape,
archways and bridges etc.
Activities in the city centre: review of past and present
activities in both the old and new parts of the centre in
terms of building use, current business trends and changes
from previous business types, difficulties and problems
facing business owners and users, existing traffic and
circulation patterns.
Changing trends: analysis of traditional, aesthetic and
cultural characteristics and how these changed over the
years. Also review of the current architectural and
construction practices such as new building styles,
location and quality of new buildings and level of
adherence to building codes.
Scope of the Survey :-
During the field trip to Nablus between May 1993 and July
1993, a questionnaire survey comprising a social and
physical survey were carried out in the centre of Nablus
(Chapter III, Section 4). The survey covered three main
areas The selection of buildings in each area was according
to the period during which the three zones were developed;
pre 1948 period Zone "A", 1948-1967 period: Zone "B", and
After 1967 period Zone "C", (Map No 5, below). The physical
survey was supported by a more detailed inspection of a
smaller sample of twelve buildings, (Chapt.III,itern 4.3.4).
158
_____ -
- antre
-	 -. -
/
I;
-
-
	
-	 -
'.
'- •__.s%	 f
	
/ 	 .-.
•
i -C -'
I
_--.-	
•	
-z:;/
I •. /
	
• •-, -	 r-,	 I I -:	 :
j.:t .-J/..	 LL	
:Jl.	 / 
44
;
_,'__.)
.3_'(___	
I	 I
i	 '	 r'	 4. I
•
I	 •	 ,.
r: L__/	 -Tf
-oric Quarter (pre-1948)
____	 Area (1948-1967)
Area (po8t 1967)
Map (5)
Section 1: General Description
Regional Context:
Major changes had been imposed by the Israeli authorities
on administrative structures and jurisdictions that
prevailed in various regions of the WB before 1967.
After the unification of Jordan with the West Bank in 1950,
the Jordanian government initially maintained the British
Mandate structures. However, in 1957 it established a three
tier administrative structure of District (Liwa), sub-
district (qada), and rural sub-districts (nahiyeh). The
three main "superior" districts, which were later redefined
as counties (muhafatha), were; Nablus, Jerusalem and
Hebron. Nablus district/county consisted of: Nablus sub-
district (divided into two rural sub-districts) and sub-
districts of Jenin and Tulkarin, each with its own rural
sub-district, (Benvinisti & Khayat, 1988, p. 34).
After the occupation, the Israeli military authorities
abolished the Jordanian structure and divided the West Bank
into seven sub-districts, thus stripping Nablus and Hebron
from their higher status. More significantly, Jerusalem was
"illegally" annexed to Israel and areas under its
jurisdiction were transferred to Bethlehem and Ramallah
sub-districts, (ibid).
A dual administrative system was later developed in the OPT
after the creation of Israeli regional councils (Military
Order 848, 1979). Under the new system, a dual division of
one Arab (military sub-districts) and one Jewish (regional
councils) were created, (ibid). The Arab sub-districts
included Nablus, Jenin, Tulkarm, Rainallah, Bethlehem and
Hebron. Jewish jurisdictional areas were mainly in Arab
land brought under Israeli control by a variety of methods
(Chapt. VI, Sect. 1). and was consequently used to
establish Jewish settlements.
This ethnic division was demonstrated in separate judicial,
administrative and economic systems, (Benvinisti, 1988 &
Chapter VI below). However, Palestinians continued to refer
to Nablus, Hebron and areas originally under their
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jurisdiction as "counties or regions" in spite of major
administrative changes imposed by Israeli authorities.
According to Palestinian sources the region of Nablus
extends over 2500 square kilometres, and its population was
estimated at around 669000 in 1990, (CEP, 1992, Table 1).
The region comprises Nablus city as the regional centre,
and the secondary centres of Jenin, Tulkarm, Qaiqilia and
Tubas. The region's population were distributed among 268
urban, semi urban and rural communities and seven refugee
camps, (CEP, 1992).
The pattern of urbanisation in the OPT could not be easily
defined as it was difficult to distinguish between urban,
semi-urban and rural communities in the absence of reliable
statistics. No new municipalities were created during the
occupation and the populations in some village conununities
exceeded those in certain cities, (ibid).
In many developing countries, urbanisation can be
attributed to massive population movement from rural towns
and villages to major cities in order to improve employment
opportunities and economic and social conditions. However,
due to the unique political conditions in Palestine,
urbanisation has not been a result of any significant
population movement, but rather as a result of the natural
growth of cities and gradual transformation of smaller
towns and villages into semi-urban centres. Since this
trend took place and continued without monitoring or
intervention from central or local authorities, many
villages and smaller towns maintained their traditional
life styles in spite of acquiring more urban functions,
(ibid). In the absence of any central government support,
such communities suffered from lack of services and
utilities to enable it to carry out their new functions,
(ibid).
Palestinian sources, in an attempt to identify urbanisation
trends, divided the communities into four categories:
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1. Urban Conununities which have a definite urban role with
centres that perform administrative, commercial and social
functions. Main urban centres in this category are
Jerusalem, Nablus, and Hebron. Urban towns also considered
under this category are Jenin, Tulkarm, Qalqilyah,
Ramallah, E1-J3ireh, Bethelehem and Jericho.
2. Semi-Urban Communities which include a number of rural
towns and villages which acquired urban characteristics as
a result of their location, increased population, changed
functions, and economic activities.
3. Rural Communities which include all communities
predominantly active in agriculture with no significant
administrative conunercial or service functions.
4. Refugee Camps which include Palestinians who lost their
homes in historic Palestine after the creation of Israel.
Most of the camps are located near or within urban centres.
Although communities in camps may be counted as part of the
urban population, their final status can only be determined
after reaching a final political solution. Palestinian
sources estimated in 1990, that around 43% of the
population lived in urban communities, 5% in semi-urban
communities, 35% in rural communities and 17% in refugee
camps, (ibid). In Nablus district "county", 32% lived in
urban and semi-urban communities, 59% in rural communities,
while 9% lived in refugee camps, (ibid).
Historical Development in Nablus:
Nablus has been the biggest and most active urban centre in
the north of Palestine for many centuries and is considered
by Palestinians as the Capital of the north, (Nablus Draft
Master Plan, 1990). The city is located at a central
junction, 110km to the west of Amman, 66km. to the north
east of Jerusalem and 42 km to the east of the
Mediterranean. Its central location, water resources and
fertile land, together with its traditional educational,
cultural, commercial activities, historic and religious
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background contributed to its significant role in
Palestine, (ibid). In spite of losing its regional "title",
Nablus continued to act as the regional centre serving the
population in towns and villages of the region and the rest
of the West Bank. Its commercial centre, schools, colleges
and university, hospitals and various social services
attract customers, businessmen, students, and patients
(Hanbali, Kalbouneh 1992, H.Araf at, H.Touqan & observations
1993).
The old city of Nablus was built on the ruins of Roman city
of Neapolis on Jerzim mountain and developed over the
centuries (re item 1.1 below). Under the Ottoman rule and
until the British Mandate in 1918 most of the development
was confined to the lower part of Jerzim mountain away from
agricultural land. The old city boundaries were 880m. long
and 550m. wide, (Map No 2, 1926) . After the earthquake in
1927 a large part of the old city was destroyed. Although
most buildings were later restored, many residents were
encouraged to move out and start building outside the old
boundaries, (Kalbouneh, 1992, Touqan, 1993, Nablus Draft
Plan, 1990) The development of Nablus could be summarised,
according to historians, officials and available records,
thus:
1. Between 1918-1945:
Consolidation and increase of the built areas and
restoration of buildings destroyed by the earthquake in
1927 continued within the old city boundaries. However, in
the late 1920's, expansion started outside old boundaries
in the centre between Jerzim and Eibal mountains and at the
lower slopes of Eibal. New and higher buildings were built
to the east and west of the new centre particularly
commercial and public buildings. Most of the development
was taking an east-west direction, as a result of the
difficult topographical characteristics of the city (Nablus
Plan, 1990).
2. Between 1945- 1967:
With the increase in population and subsequent increased
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economic and commercial activities and accelerated
urbanisation there was a significant increase in buildings
outside the old city boundaries. The development was
characterised by:
- Increased expansion in all directions although it was
still confined to lower slopes of Jerzim and Eibal
mountains and on east west axis. Agricultural land in
the centre was, however, maintained.
A new commercial centre was established to the north
of the "old centre" in the historic city which
included many public and commercial buildings.
- New residential areas were built along Nablus,
Rafidia, Qalqilia axis to the west of the centre and
the old city.
- After 1948, the partition of Palestine, and influx of
refugees, refugee camps were established mainly to the
east of the city, (Askar and Balata camps) which
subsequently encouraged development to the east. This
trend continued after the unification of the remaining
part of Palestine with Jordan and new development
followed Nablus-Amnman direction to the east, (ibid).
- An industrial area was designated to the east of the
city which later linked with the expanded refugee
camps in the early sixties.
3. After 1967
After the occupation, Nablus development was redirected to
the west, although construction continued on mountain
slopes to the north and south of the city. Construction,
however, continued to the east along Nablus-Aimnan road and
the Refugee camps of Askar and Balata continued to grow as
the population increased.
In the late 1970's and early 1980's the growing pressure
for land and expansion forced many land owners in the
centre to develop their agricultural land and to increase
their building heights. Lack of a development plan for the
city and the problems and restrictions encountered by local
authorities and institutions, (Chapts VI & VII of this
164
study) meant that most of the new development was not in
accordance with the needs and priorities of the city.
Quality of construction also did not comply with building
codes and regulations (Chapt VII,Section 3).
Legislative and financial restrictions, discussed and
analysed in other parts of this study, (Chapts II, VI, &
VII), deprived the city from the ability to expand its
centre according to its needs or to create new sub-centres
to ease pressure from the existing centre.
The Study Area:
The centre of Nablus was selected as the focus of this
study for the following reasons:
1. nationally, it was subjected to the same political,
administrative legislative, and financial conditions as
other Palestinian centres and therefore could provide a
suitable representation of the effect of the policies and
practices of the Israeli administration on urban
development of Palestinian towns.
2. locally, the centre included a variety of activities and
functions which provided a wider view of mixed activities,
styles, and trends relevant to urban development that
existed at the time of the survey. The centre with its
historic and new parts provided a representative case of if
and how these were affected by the occupation, how the
users perceived the problems with their city and obstacles
to its development.
Three sample areas were chosen within the centre which were
considered to present historical development in the city as
described above. These are referred to as Zone "A"; THE
historic core, Zone "B", the middle area in the centre and
Zone "C"; the area developed after 1967 to the west of the
centre, (item 1.1 below, Map No 3 and Map No 15). To ensure
a higher response rate and a wider selection of activities
and functions, main streets "spines" of Zone "A" & "B" were
selected where a variety of buildings and activities were
concentrated. This was not possible in Zone "C" as there
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was no clear streets and many sites were either under
construction or empty when the survey was completed.
1.1 Urban Design and Architectural Styles
1.1.1 ZONE (A):
General: The historic core is the original old city of
Nablus, built on the slopes of Mount Jerzim extending to
Nablus Valley on the remains of the original Roman town of
Flavia Neapolis (from which the present name derives). Some
of the existing buildings have their origin in the
Crusaders period (li th - 12th C.), others were built during
the Mamlouk period from 12th to 16th C.. However, most of the
remaining buildings and structures were built during the
Ottoman rule and more recently during the British Mandate
which ended in 1948. The average age of buildings is
estimated in hundreds of years (Kalbouneh, 1992). This area
will be referred to as Zone "A".
Development pattern: A large proportion of the city was
destroyed by earthquakes over the years, the last was in
1927, buildings were restored or rebuilt in a manner that
kept the urban fabric almost intact. The building process
continued during the Ottoman rule and British Mandate.
Apart from some new buildings on the periphery to the south
of the old town and some additions and extensions to
existing buildings, the majority of buildings in this zone
are historic, (Map 6).
For hundreds of years, Al-Nasser street 21, in the old
city, acted as its main thoroughfare extending from Al-
Khader street to the west and to Sahat Al-Manarah to the
west. Typical of traditional streets in most Islamic
cities, it has a mix of residential quarters, commercial
activities, public and religious buildings, factories and
workshops. Residences are normally located on upper
21 Al Nassr street was selected as the main sample area
in Zone "A". Its varied mix of buildings and
activities makes it a suitable representative of this
zone.
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floors, with shops, warehouses, public baths, and factories
mainly on ground and lower floors.
The topography of Nablus is steep and hilly, which gives
the buildings and the old city's plan their special
characteristics. The buildings were constructed and
extended vertically against the mountain slopes. This gives
each floor the advantage of courtyards and internal
gardens. The design of the houses is inward looking with
most rooms opening into the courtyards and benefiting from
the cool fresh breeze in summer. Traditional Islamic
fountains and citrus trees are main features of the
courtyards.
The size of residences varies between large multi-floor
residential complexes (referred to locally as
"palaces"),described by 19th century travellers as
"fortresses with iron gates... to be compared with medieval
family palaces in Italian cities" (Burgoyne 1987), and
small apartments linked together by steep stairways and
qantarah's 22
Most shops are small units selling mainly food, household
goods, and small handicraft products, not exceeding 30-40
sq.m. in area. Some "factories" or workshops such as sweet
factories, dress and shoe-makers, carpenters, upholstery
manufacturers, and handicraft shops do not occupy much
bigger premises. However, soap factories are bigger in size
and usually occupy two floors. Al Nasser street has at
least four soap factories, of which Nablus has been famous
for hundreds of years. Only one of the factories in this
street remained fully operational, one was partially open,
another had been converted to shops and a coffee house and
the fourth had been closed for many years.
22	 Qantarahs are a main architectural feature of the old
city, these are rooms built as links and bridges
between buildings intersecting and articulating the
street-scape.
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A
There are twelve mosques in the old city, three of them in
Al-Nasser/Khader street. The Protestant Church and the
Greek Orthodox Church are also both located on the west
side of the street in Al-Khader street. Need for security
and privacy, and the topographical characteristics of the
town has resulted in a close-knit urban fabric with high
building density. The maze of narrow lanes and dead-end
alleys, vaulted in places to offer shelter from the hot
summer sun and winter rain, gives the historic core its
special character (Burgoyne 1987). The traditional
architectural style is also reflected by the extensive use
of domes, crossed vaults, and terraced structures. There
are also numerous landmarks and nodes such as minarets,
sebils (fountains) and ornamental monuments.
The external architecture is characterized by solid stone
facades with minimum openings on the ground floor level and
screened windows and mashrabiyeh's on upper floors to
ensure privacy and provide security to the residents. The
old town is divided into six quarters. The traditional
neighbourhoods reflect the social, cultural, and climatic
needs of the area. They were designed to provide a gradual
transition from the public space of the Suq, to the private
residential space via semi private streets and pedestrian
routs and dead-end lanes (Qamhiya, 1992).
1.1.2 ZONE (B):
General: This is the main business district of Nablus. It
was extended to the north of the old city gates in the late
forties towards the end of the British mandate. It
comprises the main city square and the main shopping
streets including the main spine extending from the Ottoman
Bank building to the west of Ghernata street, to the
municipality building in Faisal street passing through the
Commercial street and Hitteen street west of Al-Hussain
square as marked on Map No.15. Although this section
describes the general architectural and urban design
characteristics of the zone as a whole, the sample area
selected is confined to the main spine and the main city
square.
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The steep topographical characteristics of Nablus, which is
sandwiched between two mountains, forces the development to
take an east-west direction. Although new housing expanded
to higher levels of both mountains, the business centre
expansion was confined to the more flat land in the centre.
However the period during which this area was developed was
characterised by an increase in population and economic
activities and intensive urbanisation (Nablus Municipality
Draft Plan, p. 42, 1990).
Development pattern: The architecture of this area is a mix
of contemporary stone low rise buildings (2-3 floors),
mainly built in the late l940s and 1950s, and modern
concrete high rise (over 4 floors in height) built in the
l960s and early 1970s, but most of this area was developed
before the occupation. A number of buildings located at the
northern edge of the old city was originally built during
the British Mandate period but have since been partially
altered or replaced by more modern structures mainly during
the 1950s.
A number of buildings constructed at the turn of the
century and after the 1927 earthquake were built in this
area such as Al-Watani hospital to the north of the main
city square, the old municipality building, A1-Wakaleh
building, the railway station and others. However, most of
the area was developed between the 1940s and 1960s. It is
possible to identify historically the period during which
a certain building or street was developed. From
interviews, questionnaires and observation it was evident
that the development of the centre took place in two phases
which is reflected in the style of architecture and urban
design characteristics.
The most noticeable aspect of the 1950s architecture is
that it did not depart from the architectural styles of the
historic buildings in the old city in terms of scale,
building material and use. The difference is expressed
mainly in the level of detailed decorative elements and
internal lay outs.
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Except for buildings located at the southern border of the
historic core, external facades became simpler in detail
than those of the older buildings. The buildings were built
from concrete walls with stone cladding and although the
old mashrabiyas and balconies in the old city disappeared,
designers maintained stone clad balconies on first and
second floors, with simpler lines and less decorative
elements to those in the historic core. Arches, domes and
vaults also disappeared in the newer buildings and
decorative elements were replaced by linear bands above or
under openings which took a more rectangular shape.
However, some of these elements can still be found in some
buildings in Ghernata street. Most buildings have flat
roofs although few, close to the old city, were built with
partially sloped and tiled roofs.
Windows had timber frames and traditional timber shutters,
and floor finish maintained the decorative coloured
terrazzo tile designs, with plaster and paint as the main
wall and ceiling finish.
Buildings were constructed adjacent to each other and apart
from the main square and a small square to the east, there
was no special provision for open areas in the centre.
However, there was plenty of green fields and landscaped
areas immediately to the west of the square which was
mainly agricultural land. The main city park is located, at
few minutes walk to the west of the square.
Building uses in this zone remained in general similar to
those in the old city with commercial activities on the
ground floor and residential quarters and flats on the
upper floors. Some of the flats were recently converted to
offices and other uses. The expansion direction did,
however, follow the last British Mandate 1946 plan (Nablus
draft Master plan, para.4.2.6, p. 57, 1990).
New modern office buildings such as Al-Anabtawi and Al-
Aloul were built on the main city square of concrete
construction with render finish and aluminum windows.
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Although the height of these buildings did not initially
exceed six floors above ground, soon higher buildings were
constructed. Generally this part of the city centre is
still small in scale in spite of the few high rise
buildings to the west and south of the square.
Internal finishes began to change, although the main floor
finish remained as locally manufactured terrazzo tiles,
plastic floor finish was introduced and so was the use of
suspended ceiling tiles and wall covering. The new
buildings had retail facilities on the ground floor and
office facilities on upper floors, and the provision of
residential floors started to disappear.
After the partition of Palestine in 1948 and the
unification of the West Bank and the Kingdom of Jordan in
1950, the city expansion was directed to the east, and a
main Nablus-Anunan route was developed. The three main
Palestinian refugee camps in Nablus were established at the
east side of the city alongside this route.
Main public buildings and facilities such as the
municipality, the post office, the police station were also
located on this route. This trend is also contributed to
the fact that most of the land to the west of the main
square was agricultural land and green fields whose owners
were then reluctant to develop.
Development Control:
The planning institutional structure was based on the
British Mandate three tier system which comprised central,
district and local authorities which was maintained under
Jordanian Law No. 79, 1966. Although mayor and council were
democratically elected during that period, candidates came
invariably from strong influential families and a land
owner background rather than from technical and
professional backgrounds. The number of qualified
architects and engineers in the municipality was limited,
as it was in other parts of the country.
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Towards the late 1950s and early 1960s the political and
technical structure of the council began to change. Mayor
and council elections reflected political affiliations and
parties, and young newly qualified architects and engineers
began to join in the modernization process of the political
and architectural aspects of the city. Many designers were
influenced by the modern movement and their design
reflected the new style.
Development controls were largely based on zoning and land
use restrictions, height limits and setback requirements.
Building and safety codes were generally derived from the
British Mandate laws (Ibid).
1.1.3 ZONE (C):
General: This area is located to the west of the main city
square and was developed on agricultural land. The pressure
for growth and need for expansion together with the
restrictive nature of the topography in Nablus influenced
the municipality decision to draw up a detailed plan for
this area in 1988 (ref. plot no.24012 & 24013 un-numbered
municipality drawings). This followed a trend encouraged
when an Israeli mayor and council took over Nablus
municipality in 1980, (Chapt. VII, Sec 1, Hanbali, 1992, H.
Arafat, Khayatt, & H. Touqan, 1993).
Development Pattern: Although few buildings were
constructed in the 1970s and 1980s around the main square
and east of the business centre, most of the expansion was
directed to the west. Building activities however, slowed
down considerably in the early 1980's when an Israeli
council took charge of the municipality, (Chapt. VII,
Sec.1). Although there was a considerable increase during
the period of the last Palestinian council in 1986-87,
building activities decreased dramatically between 1987 and
1992 at the height of Intifada (Table 3 & Chapt. VII, Item
1.4). All new buildings built in this zone were high rise
ranging from seven to ten floors high. Although the height
limit should not exceed six floors for this area, most
owners have built higher regardless of the
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condition of their building permit, such as No. 12, 13 14,
&15 (Hanabli 1992 & Nabulsi 1993)
Concrete is the main construction material with either
stone cladding or rendered finish and the architectural
style of the new buildings follows the modern style
predominant in the 1960s.
Development Control: The municipality had no mechanism to
check the ability and the professional conduct of
consultants and contractors (Chapter VI & VII below). The
modest technical requirements for permits within the city
boundaries meant that any junior draughtsman could produce
work which complied with these requirements. With the
absence of supervision requirements (ie. as is the case in
Jordan, ref. Jordanian Engineers Association 1972 Law No
(15) and amendments, 1991, and Engineers Offices and
Companies Revised Regulation No (31), 1989), most owners
and developers relied solely on simple drawings with little
details to carry out their construction. The Engineering
Association of the West Bank was also unable to supervise,
implement or ensure compliance with Jordan Engineers'
Association Laws, to which it was affiliated (M. Nabulsi,
1993).
Development was carried out without provision for amenities
and landscape, although required by law, few pavements or
paved entrances had been provided and the entrance to
buildings was usually kept to the minimum size acceptable.
Few commercial buildings were constructed in this centre
prior to 1992, (Table 4). There was a noticeable increase
of building permit applications for new buildings,
following the initiation of the peace process, within the
municipal boundaries according to municipality engineers in
the planning department (Hanbali, 1992 & Qanthieh, 1993).
Due to the shortage of land available for development in
the centre there was an increasing trend to expand towards
the west to Rafidia's growing commercial centre.
174
Table (3)
Number of approved building permits applications between
1983-1992 based on Nablus municipality records 15.9.1992
Year	 Authority	 No of permits
approved
1983	 Israeli mayor	 530
1984	 Israeli mayor	 325
1985	 Israeli mayor	 380
1986	 Palestinian mayor	 1303
1987	 Palestinian mayor	 4089
1988-1990	 No mayor	 436*
1991	 No mayor	 239
1992	 No mayor	 229**
* Applicants could not legally obtain permits without a
municipal council, therefore, engineers issued receipts for
payments of permit fees instead of an official permit
approval after they were satisfied that the applicant
complied with the legal requirements.
** This figure represents the number of applications
approved until 15.9.1992.
Table (4)
Construction trends 1983-1992
Year	 Type construction	 No of permits
1983-1990	 unavailable	 _________
1991	 Housing	 233
Industrial	 5
Commercial	 1
1992	 Housing	 223
Industrial	 4
Commercial	 2
(Tables 1 & 2: S. Touqan 1994, source: municipality
records, 1992).
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1.2 Activities and Building Use :
1.2.1 ZONE (A):
Until the 19th century and the early 20th century, the old
town represented the whole city of Nablus as an independent
self-contained entity with all the required public
institutions, religious, administrative, educational,
commercial, industrial, health and recreational facilities.
Nowadays, the old city still has this mix although many of
the old uses and crafts have disappeared or have lost their
importance. Nabulsis and Palestinians from Nablus district
and from other towns continued to visit the old city to buy
soap, sweets, handmade leather goods and other similar
light industries and handicrafts 23 . The political and
security problems particularly during the Intifada affected
many of these functions.
a- Residential: As is the case with many old cities, most
of the original dwellers moved out to the new and more
modern part of the city. Lack of modern facilities in the
house, difficult transport and parking facilities, and
general lack of interest in the conservation and reuse of
the old buildings, contributed to the migration from the
old to the new part of the city (Nablus Plan, 1990).
Consequently, the physical condition of buildings and
spaces, continued to deteriorate, as rent became
substantially cheaper in the old quarters relative to the
rest of the city. This encouraged low income groups to move
in and replace the original wealthy residents.
As is common in many similar cases the rent controls
discouraged owners from improving or upgrading their
buildings which have also contributed to neglect of old
buildings. Thus, the increasing need for maintenance and
upgrading of buildings, continuous neglect from owners, and
poverty of present dwellers, resulted in worsening
conditions in the old city and less attraction to
investors.
23	 Refer to maps 4.13, 4.20, 4.25,4.23, & 4.34, showing
buildings and spaces, Qamhiyeh, 1992.
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Many large houses (old palaces) were left empty for more
than thirty years although some were partially occupied by
either tenants or squatters. Most other residential
buildings comprised small flats on top of shops, or a
complex of apartments on different levels. At the time this
survey was conducted, many of these apartments were empty
and derelict, some were occupied by poor migrants from
villages and squatters whose houses had been sealed or
demolished by the Israelis, (Quest. Nos 29, 50 & 54).
b- Commercial! industrial:
Almost all commercial activities are mainly concentrated in
the, covered and uncovered, commercial markets "bazaars"24,
located at the ground floor, or lowest level of the street
in the residential quarters such is the case in Al Nassr
street. These include, small shops which are mainly food
outlets, larger shops for cloths and household retail,
small workshops and handicraft shops, and traditional soap
factories .
Many shops and workshops have gone out of business over the
years, the old established family businesses were closing
down and were replaced by modern and new shops selling
mainly plastic and household products as can be seen in Al-
Nasser street. Other commercial streets in the historic
core such as Khan Al Tujjar, were selling cloths, shoes and
small electronic goods.
Industries in the old town were described by John
Mills in 1860 during a visit to Nablus, thus: "
Besides the bazaars, the streets are enlivened by
workshops. These are like recesses in the walls, and
open to the streets, and as you pass along from street
to street you may observe the handicraftsmen of town
at work. These consist of silversmiths, weavers,
shoemakers and all other kinds of artisans necessary
to the well being of a community" (Mills, 1864, p.89).
Hand made olive oil soap is a traditional industry in
Nablus, most of the factories have closed down or were
converted to other commercial or industrial
activities. Out of the original 26 factories, only
three remained operational in 1994 and another three
were partially opened.
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The change in business activities can be related to many
factors mainly;
1. Political:	 The Intense fighting in the old city
especially during the Intifada, forced many businesses to
close and move out. Many shops were also forced to close
down by the Israeli authorities as a form of collective
punishment for the owners, members of the families or
friends (Al-Hag records, 1993). The Israeli authorities
also devised methods to control access to the old core from
the rest of the city by introducing security "gates" at all
entrances to the city, as can be seen on Map No 7.
The gates remained closed for many months during the
Intifada, although some were partially opened when curfews
were lifted, others remained completely closed for many
years. Following progress in the peace process, some gates
that sealed off the old city from the north were removed
but the main metal gate at the top of Hitteen street was
still closed when the survey was completed in July 1993.
This practice had a detrimental effect on circulation in
the old city and in effect social and economic activities,
(Plate No.s 39-42, Chapt VIII, Sect.1, Table 17 & 18). The
gates marked on Map 7 show those remaining at the time of
the survey, and were still restricting movement and
aggravating traffic problems, (ibid).
2. Financial:
Taxation policies: Many business were also forced to close
by the Israeli authorities for tax reasons, either directly
for failure to pay the high taxes imposed by the Israelis
(Chapter VI, Section 2, Stephen, 1990, Al-Hag affidavits
1989-1991) or indirectly by forcing business owners to
close down or move out to avoid paying tax (B'Tselem,
1990/1991, p. 161-167). Many street vendors in the main
city square, carried their goods away from their shops in
the old city and only used their shops to store their
goods, (Tables 17-18).
Loss of customers: The intense fighting in the old city and
frequent curfews discouraged a lot of customers from
shopping in the old city. Residents preferred to shop in
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the main city square, where it was easier to run home when
fighting erupted. This forced many small businesses to
close and encouraged others to move to the main square as
street vendors (physical survey, interviews 1993). The
situation was aggravated by the introduction of the
security gates to seal off the old city.
security siege: The Israeli decision to seal-off the West
Bank from Jerusalem and from Israeli areas, following
various security incidents, resulted in the loss of
business in small shops, which were already under a lot of
financial pressure. The closure of the occupied territories
had severe adverse implications on the Palestinian economy
as a whole ( UNCTAD, TD/B/40 (1)! 8, p.7, September 1993,
Jordanian foreign ministry: department of Palestinian
affairs report, April 1993, B'Tselem, 1993, PHRIC, 1993,
Saed S., 1993 & Al-Quds, p.2, 12.5.1993).
Modernization: Like many old cities in the Middle East,
many small shops and workshops went out of business as a
result of; loss of interest in their products, change of
fashion, industrialization, albeit at a modest scale, mass
produced cheap products such as clothing, plastic and
household products.
c- Commercial/Public Buildings:
Public Baths (Hammams) :
The public bath (Haramam) used to be one of the main
features of the historic core. Out of eight baths that used
to operate in the old city, only one was restored and
reopened in 1993 (quest. No 25). Some of the other baths
remained empty, derelict, and in need of urgent repair,
while others were converted to factories. The change of use
was carried out without permission from the local council,
professional guidance, or adherence to health and safety
requirements. (Kalbouneh 1992, Qamhieh, 1993 & Abdul-Haq
1993)
Hotels and Restaurants:
There is a limited number of hotels in the old town, as
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many had disappeared as result of 1927 earthquake or lack
of maintenance. The high standard hotels "Wakaleh" were
found near main bazzars and town gates. Most of these have
been converted to other uses, as was seen in Khan Hindeyeh
in Sahat Al Manarah, which was converted in 1993 to a shoe
factory (Quest. No 32 and Plate No. 31).
Coffee houses had an important social function in the old
city as meeting and eating places, most of which have
closed down. Although some were still operational,
customers stayed away as a result of the continued fighting
and curfews (A.Kalbouneh, 1993). Most of the food outlets
and eating places are small scale cafeterias, sweet shops
and sandwich bars. A number of these went out of business
during the Intifada, although some started to reopen after
1992, (Quest. No.56).
d- Public Buildings:
Religious :
Religious buildings in the old city are mainly mosques and
Islamic shrines, there are 12 mosques most of which were
well maintained and in very good physical condition,
and nine shrines. There is one Greek Orthodox church, one
Protestant Church and one Samaritan Synagogue.
Educational :
Education was carried out in mosques or in schools linked
to religious institutions which was traditional in Islamic
cities. There were at least four such religious schools in
Nablus built in the 13th century and continued to be used
until the 14-15th centuries, (Qamhieh 1992). The buildings
remained in the old town although most of these schools had
ceased to function for many years.
Jail House:
The jail house (prison) used until the end of the British
Mandate, is located in at the east end of Al Nassr street,
was converted to a sweet factory, (Plate No.11). The
building was in a bad state of decay and the conversion was
carried out illegally and without any technical or
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professional guidance. The exposed tangled electrical
wiring seemed dangerous and there was no provision for fire
escape or health and environmental protection.
e-Public Spaces:
Most of the open spaces, gardens and parks had either been
built up or were neglected and became rubbish tips over the
years. The remaining small green areas are badly maintained
such as Bustan Hinno and Bustan Ja'jaa. In spite of the
efforts of the last council, which included renovation of
Khan Al-Tujjar, restoration of the Sebeels (water drinking
fountains) and general cleaning up of the old city, the
positive results of their work disappeared after six years
of fighting and troubles in the old city.
1.2.2 ZONE (B):
This zone acts as the main business district of Nablus and
is the busiest and most dynamic part of the city. It was
also the scene of the worst battles and fighting between
the Israeli army and the Palestinian resistance fighters.
The Israeli army check point was located at the top of the
roof of the highest building in the main square until 1994.
The area comprised most of the office and retail spaces and
used to accommodate most of the entertainment activities of
Nablus. It also incorporated the public and administrative
buildings such as the municipality, the post office,
Israeli local civilian administration offices, the fire
brigade, Al- Watani hospital, the Shari'a court and others.
The main public transport facilities (Buses and collective
taxis) were also "illegally" located in the main square.
The availability of commercial and public facilities mix in
this area attracted residents from various parts of the
city and the district. They were also encouraged by its
central location and the relative ease of access and "exit"
compared to other parts of the centre which also encouraged
street vendors. This phenomenon exasperated the traffic
congestion problem in this area which was the worst in
Nablus, (Table 25). With absence of any parking
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facilities in any of its streets or the main square, the
illegal parking of buses and taxis, traffic problems were
very severe, (Table 26). This was reflected in the results
of the questionnaire survey as most respondents in this
area complained of the traffic problem, (Appendix A Table
27 & Plate No.s 2, 20 &26). The following are the main
activities in this area :
a- Residential :
Traditionally, buildings in many of the streets in this
area, particularly, Ghernata, Palestine and Hitteen streets
were designed as a commercial/residential mix (residences
were flats on upper floors). Many of the residents moved
out, and their flats were converted to offices, surgeries,
and workshops. The changing trend was due to a combination
of factors including the intensive fighting and security
problems in the centre, the changing uses in new buildings
and increase in commercial activities over the years and
subsequent traffic generation. The presence of street
vendors and subsequent hygiene and pollution problems was
also a main factor for the move as the survey results show
(App. A, Tables 27, 28 & 29). Pollution and hygiene
conditions were also contributing factors that forced
residents to move out of this zone (ibid).
b- Commercial (Retail and Offices) :
There were very few industrial buildings in this zone,
apart from the soap factory on the main square and some
workshops. Upper floors in buildings were used as
warehouses as well as workshops for dress-makers and other
light manufacturing industries. The soap factory was the
only one to be built outside the old city and was fully
operational in 1994. High taxation, restrictions imposed on
the import of raw material and level of export to Jordan
and the Gulf (traditional customers), forced others to
close down, (A. Nabulsi, 1993).
As a result of the political and economic difficulties
during the occupation, retail facilities experienced a
decline as sharply as those in the old city. Rent controls,
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high key money and increase in the rent values of new
buildings discouraged tenants from moving and therefore,
very few shops changed tenants before 1992.
This situation changed rapidly following the Peace Accord
as businessmen became anxious to move into the centre
before rent increased and therefore paid high key money to
previous tenants. It was observed that not all the new
rented property was used as some tenants took over to
reserve it for future use 26
In Ghernata street, spaces in newly renovated buildings
were let before renovation was completed as many
businessmen wanted to reserve the space before the expected
escalation in building cost and rent value (A.Touqan,
1993). Most of the retail space was used for fashion and
cloths, leather and shoe shops, jeweller shops, household
goods and food outlets.
There was an increasing number of pharmacies and service
shops. As a result of security problems and frequent
curfews, there was a severe shortage in the number of
coffee shops and restaurants open to business, particularly
during the Intifada.
Upper floors in low and high rise were occupied by offices,
medical and dental surgeries. High rise buildings were also
occupied by private education institutions such as computer
centres, typing, secretarial and technical schools.
Many shops and offices, however were closed for long
periods due to the security problems. This was more evident
in units located on the upper floors. Some of these,
particularly those located on the main square,were
26 A street vendor located in the Commercial street, the
busiest street in Nablus, is reported to have paid JD
80,000 in key money to take over the rented space from
a well established pharmacy. Until the end of this
survey, he was still using the pavement for his
merchandise and used the new shop for storage.
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completely abandoned for many years (quest. No.1, 6, 30,
36, 47 & 60). In spite of the modest improvement in the
economic conditions after 1992, a number of buildings
remained under-used especially to the west of the centre in
Ghernata street and Palestine street and were in urgent
need of repairs and refurbishment.
Banks that were located in this area before 1967 were
closed by the Israeli authorities immediately after the
occupation (Chapter VI, Section 2). In 1987, Amman-Cairo
bank was allowed to reopen under strict conditions and
under the control of Israeli banks. A new license was given
to the Bank of Jordan to open in Nablus and other
Palestinian cities during the study period, (Observation
and interviews, 1993).
Hitteen street, to the east, always provided the link
between the business district and the north to the east
part of the city, to the institutional buildings in Faisal
street, to Askar and Balata refugee camps and the
industrial zone. It also linked with main Nablus-Jerusaleni
road. The street was cut of f from these areas after the
introduction of a metal gate with barrels (see photo)
during the intifada. This hindered the circulation and
deprived the residents from an important connection and
business owners from customers (quest. Nos. 22 & 41).
c- Coj'nrnercial/Public buildings:
(including recreational and tourist facilities)
Zone "B" also represented the recreational centre of the
city since the early fifties, all four cinemas were located
in the main thoroughfare (the sample area of this zone).
Al-Assi and Assi Studio cinenias were located off the
commercial street and were built in 1953, Ghernata cinema
opened in 1954 and Rivoli cinema, opened shortly after,
were both in Ghernata street (Assi, Shakka', 1993).
Many coffee houses and cafeterias were established along
this route to cater for the cinema customers. This location
is also close to the main public library and Nablus main
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public park (Muntazah Abdul Nasser). Palestine hotel, the
best hotel in Nablus until it closed down in the 1980s, was
also located in Ghernata street.
According to residents particularly those living or working
in these streets, the area was always lively and buzzing
with activities until late evenings (Ibid). All the cinemas
were closed during the Intifada, and three of the four were
severely damaged as a result of intense fighting and fires.
Rivoli cinema was abandoned for years with clear signs of
severe war-damage such as broken glass, twisted metal,
burnt walls and doors, (Observation, physical survey, video
and Plates No.s 45-47).
An inspection of Ghernata cinema was carried out and it was
evident that it was in a serious physical condition. It
suffered from broken glass, severe dampness, broken
sanitary facilities, damaged ceiling tiles and chairs, and
at the time the survey was carried out it was used as a
warehouse. Al-Assi cinema, the oldest in Nablus, was badly
damaged and closed down before the intifada, however, its
owner, encouraged by the progress in peace negotiations
carried out major improvements and renovation works for
both Al-Assi cinema and the Studio. According to its owner,
few weeks after it reopened, it was partially burnt down by
Palestinian extremist (Assi, 1993).
Many coffee houses, pastry/sweet shops , and restaurants,
which used to open until midnight, closed down and had been
out of business for many years. It was noted, few of these
started to re-open in 1993.
d- Public Buildings and Institutions:
There was little publicly owned land in Nablus,
particularly in the centre. According to municipality
records only 17.7% of land is owned publicly but mainly as
Niri land and Waqf, the municipality owned less than 3% of
Nablus is known for its sweets for generations which
attracts customers from all over Palestine.
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the land in Nablus, and probctbly less in the central area
(Nablus Plan, 1990).
Almost all public buildings and institutions were located
in this part of the centre. The Israeli Civilian
Administration which included the Traffic Department, the
Department of Public Works and Housing, and the Police
Station were located in Faisal Street to the north of the
main city square. The Municipality and the Post Office were
also located in this street, so was the Land Registry
Office, staffed and guarded by Israeli officials and
military. Other main public buildings such as the Chamber
of Commerce, the Fire Brigade Al Watani hospital, the
offices of the Red Cross were located either on the main
square or very close to it. The main northern cemetery, The
United Nations offices of UNRWA were also close to the main
square.
Apart from the Israeli Civilian Administration offices,
virtually no public buildings or administrative offices
were built after 1967. In 1987, the municipality obtained
a building permit from the Israeli Planning Council in Bit
Eil to build a new fire brigade station in Eibal mountain
to the north of the centre and construction commenced in
1993.
1.2.3 ZONE (C):
Most of the buildings in this zone were privately developed
and were built for mixed use of retail, office and
residential spaces for rent. However, the majority of the
new spaces were allocated for office use which was in
demand all over the occupied territories after 1992.
According to one owner/developer, the lack of available
space forced business owners to share rented space in spite
of the relative increase in rent value from other parts of
the city (Kalbouneh, 1993).
It was noted during observation of building and
construction activities that only few buildings were
constructed in this zone during the previous ten years.
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The municipality records showed three approved building
applications for commercial projects in Nablus between 1990
and 1992. As there were no records available for the years
before (Hindiyeh, 1992, Table 4), the author had to rely on
own observation and residents accounts and recollections
with regard to construction dates.
It was also evident that little construction took place
during the Intifada between 1988 and 1992, (Table 3).
Therefore new buildings were assumed to have been built in
the early to mid eighties. Some of the construction which
started before 1987, was completed after 1992. According to
tenants, although buildings such as Al-Shunnar were
completed six years ago, most offices and shops remained
unoccupied until 1992 (Abdul Hadi, 1993).
Observations and interviews indicate that a great deal of
the new construction involved expanding existing buildings
and adding extra floors, albeit illegally (Hanbali, 1992,
H.Arafat, M.Nabulsi & Qamhieh, 1993). Absence of
legislative authority, high land prices and increased
demand for office and retail space, and the subsequent
increase in rents were given as the main reasons for such
practices, (ibid).
Many engineers and officials stated that a great deal of
violations to building codes and construction on green
fields took place during the period when the Israeli
appointed council took over ( Hanbali 1992, R. Abdul Hadi,
H. Arafat, Dweak, Hashem, Jarayseh,M. Nabulsi & H. Touqan
1993). While the HPC was rejecting applications to build
outside municipal boundaries, the local Israeli council was
not concerned about adherence to regulations and
environmental protection within the city boundaries
although it had all the powers and might to enforce them,
(Chapt. VI, Sec. 1, & Chapt. VII Sect. 1).
a- Residential:
The available residential space in the new buildings was of
higher quality than that in adjacent areas such as
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Palestine street. Most of residential space available was
part of a mixed commercial/residential development. However
since a lot of office buildings were still under
construction it was difficult to make an assessment of the
overall quality in this small sample.
b- Commercial:
Most building use in this zone, in both new and medium age
structures, was commercial. Although there was a lot of
service office space available such as lawyers, engineers,
doctors and dentists, most of the rented office space was
for newly established businesses and companies. This was
confirmed by the increased number of applicants for the
membership of the newly elected Chamber of Commerce in
Nablus which recorded a steady increase in its membership
since 1991 (Hashem, 1993).
Table (5)
(S. Touqan, source: Nablus, Chamber of Commerce, 1993)
c- Commercial/Public Buildings:
There was none available in this zone at the time the
survey was carried out.
d- Public Buildings/Institutions:
No public buildings were observed in this zone during the
survey.
1.3 Changing Development Trends
It was difficult to evaluate the changing trends in
construction and design practices in the OPT except in the
context of the political conditions that prevailed after
1967. Therefore it could be assumed as temporary in nature
and as a result of all the political, legal and financial
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conditions. This assumption is supported by the change in
the type, size and speed of development and demand after
the peace talks in 1992 and the relative relaxation of some
restrictions on investment and development following the
issue of Military Order No. 1342, 1991, concerning
encouraging investment.
According to planners, officials, economists, investors and
building users, the increasing demand for commercial space
and shortage of land in the centre increased land values
sharply and resulted in increasing rent values, and higher
key money when rented space changed hand. Consequently,
some owners were encouraged to demolish and reconstruct
their buildings, expand and add floors to existing
buildings without obtaining municipal approval to Inaximise
their profit. Information obtained during these interviews
was supported by observations and photographs taken during
both surveys (Plate No.s 27-32).
1.3.1 ZONE (A):
1. Physical changes:
Israeli Practices: Continuous fighting and security
problems were very severe in this area all through the
occupation and particularly during the intifada, (Chapt. 1,
Definitions & Chapt VIII, Sect 1 & 2). Al Qasabah district
witnessed fierce battles which partially destroyed and
damaged buildings. In addition to war damage, the worst
result of the military conflict was the collective
punishment imposed on building owners and tenants, their
families and neighbours. Consequently a number of historic
buildings was demolished, partially or completely. A number
of houses and shops were sealed, for the same reason, for
many years and consequently deteriorated (Chapt VIII, Sect
1, item 1.1 & Tables 17-18).
Local Practices: It was noted that an increasing number of
owners in the old city zone were demolishing their old
stone historic buildings and erecting concrete structures
in their place for commercial use. The municipality
architects stated that this was carried out without their
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approval and contrary to existing building regulations.
Although some of the buildings demolished were in a bad
state of decay, there was no available mechanism to assess
whether these were structurally sound. Owners usually
carried out the demolition without notifying the
municipality planning department (Qamhieh, 1993).
During informal discussions with residents and building
users in the old city, it was evident that although most of
them expressed pride in the historical value of the city
and the need to preserve it, many also complained of
economic hardship, poor services and physical conditions
and the need for modernisation (Quest Nos. 20, 29 & 55).
Although a high proportion of respondents were concerned
about the lack of restoration and protection of the
historic buildings only one third considered it serious,
(App. A, P 463).
In addition to all other factors which encouraged owners to
demolish their property, the lack of clear plans for the
future of the historic core, also encouraged the owners to
implement their own plans, according to what they believed
would improve the physical condition of their property and
consequently its economic viability.
The new construction work, whether it was complete
reconstruction or additions and extensions to existing
structures, was carried out without any attention to its
suitability to the existing historic buildings and the
urban fabric of the city, in terms of scale, style,
building materials, finishes or details. As most of the
work was built without any professionals involved, and
without the approval of the council, there is fear that it
was not only structurally unsafe, but it may also cause
further damage to existing structures and adjacent
buildings, (plate No 27-30).
New floors were adding more load to existing buildings, new
openings and roofs were built without damp and water
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prevention measures which was exasperating the dampness
problems, causing corrosion to metal work and rot in
existing timber structures. Physical survey results and
residents response to questionnaires confirmed a severe
problem of dampness in the historic core (App.A,Tables 20-
22 & App. B)
2. change in Building Use :
Many houses, flats and old palaces were empty and abandoned
in the old city for various political, legal and financial
factors, described in detail above. However, the housing
shortage, the restrictions on new development and shortage
of land, did not encourage original owners or partners to
move back to their own rent free property. The last thirty
years witnessed a decline in the population and the
"gettoisation" of its residents, as only very poor families
desperate for shelter remained in, or moved to, the old
city and accepted the deteriorating physical condition and
services28 . Therefore, the old city residents became
associated with low or no income groups.
Many old industrial and public buildings such as soap
factories, hotels, public baths and others were converted
to light industrial use not all of it clean or safe (Ref.
quest. Nos. 8, 32 & 53). Services were connected sometimes
illegally and without technical expertise, and did not
follow the minimum safety and health codes.
Fire regulations were non existent as far as the building
law was concerned, and although the director of the fire
brigade expressed his concern over the dangerous conditions
in some of these buildings, he had no executive powers to
prevent people from using unsafe buildings for potentially
dangerous and polluting uses (Al Jabi, Qaxnhieh, 1993)
28 Arafat House was one of the few houses in the historic
core which was regularly maintained and professionally
preserved. The old multi level house also includes
courtyards and landscaped areas, two apartments and an
abandoned soap factory. The owners continued to occupy
the house and refused to move out of the their house
in spite of the social pressure, (Saba Arafat, 1993).
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The exodus of shopkeepers from the old city to work as
street vendors in the city centre is described in detail
above. Consequently, there were many empty and closed shops
in what used to be a highly active and often busy street,
(Table 27). This was exasperated by the number of
properties sealed off by the Israeli army for security or
tax reasons or as a form of collective punishment (Plate
43-44, Chapt. VIII, Sect 1, item 1.1 & 1.3).
However, major renovation work was carried out by the
owners of Al-Jidedeh public bath in Al-Nassr street which
was let and reopened for the public in the summer of 1993
(quest. No. 25) . The work was carried out in consultation
with the municipality and some conservation advisors at Al
Najah university. Although the quality of restoration work
and workmanship could have been better, the owners
considered that this pilot project could encourage other
owners to do the same.
Some owners of large houses (Palaces), which had been empty
and dilapidating for many years, were considering restoring
their buildings. These palaces usually comprise a building
complex with a number of multi purpose units such as
stables, shops and sometimes public baths and/or small soap
factories on the ground floor, residential quarters on
upper floors have large rooms and spacious courtyards and
internal gardens.
Accepting the fact that it may not be practical to reuse
these buildings as residences, owners were discussing the
possibility of converting such property to cultural
centres, hotels or public libraries (S. Nimr, & H. Touqan,
1993)
The conversion of an old soap factory in A1-Khader street
to small shopping outlets on the ground floor and a coffee
house on the first floor worked well in terms of its new
arrangement, although the renovation and construction work
was of poor quality (Quest No. 53).
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1.3.2 ZONE (B):
1. Physical changes:
There was a great demand for office space and service
retail facilities in Nablus, and also for the provision of
parking facilities within new buildings which all need an
approval of the HPC under the occupation. Some owners
already prepared plans for redevelopment of their land and
property and were waiting for a political settlement before
they could go ahead (quest. Nos.2, 3, 7, 58 & 59).
Apart from severe war damage to buildings and some urban
spaces, especially around the main square, very little had
changed in this part of the centre. Although some owners
started to explore the possibilities of redeveloping their
land and reconstructing or upgrading their property, only
four buildings in this zone have were either redeveloped or
was under construction at the time of the survey in 1993.
Land and property values in this zone were the highest in
Nablus mainly around the main square, Ghernata street, and
the commercial street. Record rents and key money were paid
for small units in the above areas in 1993. At the time
both surveys were conducted (1992 & 1993), owners of
buildings had talked about future prospects for their
property and their plans for expansion and reconstruction.
Main obstacles often mentioned were uncertainty of the
future of the territories, planning restrictions, rent
control and ownership status. However, some carried out
limited additions and upgrading of their buildings after
agreeing the terms with their tenants, and without changing
the use of the building. This was confined to small scale
residential and commercial buildings.
Four buildings inspected in this area were upgraded or
expanded, or were undergoing some construction in 1992. Two
of these buildings were in the Commercial street and had
shops on the ground floor and the newly opened banks
occupying the upper floors. The other two were located in
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Ghernata street also with shops on the ground floor and
offices and surgeries on upper floors. All the renovation
work and the additional construction were carried out by
owners with municipal "building permit". The additional
floors were built of concrete and facing stone, and it was
evident that an effort was made to produce simple design
which was sympathetic with the general architecture of this
area.
Construction of the completed buildings in Ghernata street
was of medium quality with poor waterproofing details, as
tenants already complained of dampness and water
penetration problems. (App. A, Tables 20-22, App. B, p.
506-509 & Quest. Nos. 45 & 46). There were also examples of
tenants carrying out major construction works without the
approval of owners or building extension permit. Work
carried out 1992 already showed serious problems of
leakage, water penetration and deteriorating building
elements and finishes, (Quest. No.16).
2. Change in Building use
Not a great deal of changes were observed in the use of
buildings in this area. Most owners of buildings on the
square and in Ghernata and the Commercial streets,
discussed their future plans for their property, which
would include major redevelopment and increased space
capacity. Most were reluctant or unable to take any
practical steps as they were awaiting for major obstacles
to be resolved including:
-	 the final outcome of the peace negotiations which
would resolve the ownership issue as most of the
properties	 belonged to the second generation of
families, not all in position of residency permits.
- changes in the rent control law and implementation of
the Jordanian revised law as a minimum guarantee to
improving owners rights.
-	 the election of a local council and expected
dismantling of the Israeli Civil Administration and
the end of its control on development which was still
unresolved during the survey.
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Owners of the soap factory on the main square and of its
the adjacent shops in Commercial street and Qarraen street
(quest 58) and Ghernata cinemas complex (quest. 3 Shakaa,
1993), stated their intentions to carry out major
redevelopment commercial projects to replace their
buildings. Their ability to carry out their plans depended
on the results of these negotiations or the implementation
of the new rent laws.
1.3.3 ZONE (C):
1. Physical Changes:
During the survey in 1993, a lot of construction was taking
place in Nablus city. Due to the limited amount of land
available for development in the centre with other complex
issues such as ownership and planning laws, most of the
construction was carried out in the suburbs to the east and
west of the centre.
During the survey it was noted that one site in Zone "C"
was excavated and another's foundation was already under
construction, both were planned for commercial development.
Others, according to residents of the area were scheduled
for construction within the next year and also as
commercial developments. Three to four large plots were
empty and used as rubbish tips. According to some
interviewees, their owners were not allowed to live in the
OPT and therefore their land could not be developed
(Chapter VI, Section 1).
Unfortunately, in view of the legal difficulties, discussed
at length in other parts of this study, most of the
construction was of poor quality, (Chapt VI sect 1 &2,
Chapt.VII). Additionally, developers were not allowing any
space for landscape and amenities and many extended their
buildings, illegally, outside the limit of their plot, thus
reducing the area required for pavements and setbacks
(Hanbali 1992, M.Nabulsi, 1993).
There were no defined streets or pavements in this area,
and many empty sites had been turned into rubbish tips.
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There was very few public land in this area and almost no
provision of amenities such as open spaces and landscape or
any parking provision
2. Change in Building Use:
In line with the rest of buildings in this zone, the
commercial development was mainly retail and office space
with limited space for residential uses. There was a
considerable number of old dilapidated buildings at the
edge of this zone (Plate No.13, facing Palestine street).
The rush for development, increased land prices and rent
values are normally associated with economic "boom"
conditions all over the world, and during which certain
problems associated with development trends and practices
arise. However, in the case of Palestinian towns this was
exasperated and aggravated by the special circumstances
under which this development took place.
SECTION 2: Analysis of the Physical Condition and
characteristics of Buildings, urban spaces and amenities in
the city centre
2.1 Scope and summary of the buildings' survey:
The physical survey of buildings was carried out to assess
the condition of various building elements and components.
The investigation was limited to visual inspection to
determine the state of surfaces of walls, ceilings and
roofs, condition and fitness of openings and balconies and
the general appearance of finishes.
Although the examination aimed to determine the level of
maintenance and state of repair of the buildings, it was
focused on problems that showed evidence of deterioration
over time and which was likely to continue to deteriorate
if no immediate action was taken. It also concerned
decaying elements that needed repair and could cause
problems in other elements if repair was not carried out.
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This included evidence of water penetration through
openings which caused dampness in walls and roofs, rust in
metal elements and timber rot. To examine the extent and
causes of the serious problems in the three sample areas,
twelve buildings were subject to a more thorough
investigation by the author, (Chapt. III, Sect.4, items
4.2.2 & 4.3.4).
As mentioned earlier, the survey did not include an
examination of the structural stability of buildings,
although cracks, fragility of certain roots and balcony
structures were recorded. The results of the survey were
based on visual inspection taking into consideration the
views of building owners and users.Details of the results
are included in Appendix "A"and tables 20-37.The physical
inspection detailed results and evaluation of indicators of
physical problems by the author are included in Appendix
"B" and are summarised in Tables 38-42.
Summary results:
A summary of the physical survey findings, (questionnaire
Part B & detailed inspection) is presented below. The
detailed results are included in Appendix "A" and "B" and
Tables 20-42. This summary highlights the serious problems
recorded in the majority of buildings in the three zones
and considered to have provided indicators for the
deterioration in these buildings. The selection and
evaluation of indicators for the deterioration was based on
the criteria described in Chapter III above, (Sect. 3,
items 3.6 & 3.8).
2.1.1. ZONE (A):
Externally: Stone walls, suffered from erosion, spalling
and discolouring. There was also evidence of bulging
cracking and settlement. Mould and plant growth was
damaging the wall surface and mortar. Cracked and damaged
mortar was extensive and new application was inappropriate
technically and visually. There was a general failure of
render and cladding due to severe dampness, staining and
rot in timber elements.
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Windows and doors were incorrectly fixed and showed sign of
rot in timber elements and rust in metal elements.
Balconies and cantilevered structures were overloaded,
incorrectly fixed and generally unsafe.
Roofs had no waterproofing and the traditional water
proofing was damaged and badly maintained which caused
severe water penetration and dampness problems, (Tables 21
& 22).
Internally: Walls and ceiling had evidence of condensation,
severe dampness, stains, general failure of finishes.
Floors had damaged or cracked finishes, overloading and
water penetration through walls at lower levels.
Violations of building and safety codes and construction
without permit , official or professional supervision was
extensive in many parts of the old city particularly in the
sample area, (Plate Nos.27-32). Incidents of illegal change
of building use, illegal extensions and additional floors
causing overloading and structural instability were also
observed and recorded during the survey and corroborated
with officials and users.
2.1.2. ZONE (B):
Externally: Stone was mainly used as cladding but was
generally in fair condition. There was however, evidence of
mortar damage. Concrete walls had evidence of severe
erosion of surface, dampness, staining, and spalling. With
the exception of stone cladding there was general failure
of rendering and cladding in this zone.
Roofs are mainly flat in this zone and there was clear
evidence that no water proofing was used for the roof
finish. Moat buildings suffered from dampness in upper
floors and staining of external walls.
Evidence of war damage is more evident in this zone
particularly around the main city square. Broken glass,
twisted metal and burnt walls are found in many buildings
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in the centre. Other problems with openings include,
incorrect fixing, rusty metal and rot in timber, although
not as severe as the old city.
had evidence of
general failure of
damaged in some
or have not been
Internally:	 Walls	 and	 ceilinas
condensation, dampness, staining and
finishes. Stairs were extensively
buildings, lifts were out of order
installed.
There were fewer incidents of building violations in this
zone in comparison to Zone "A" &"C".
2.1.3 ZONE (C):
The main problem with the buildings inspected in this zone
was the poor quality of construction. Although relatively
new, the buildings showed severe signs of water
penetration, dampness and deteriorating finishes.
Externally: Stone cladding was inadequately fixed, mortar
joints were of bad quality and application. Most concrete
walls had evidence of severe dampness, staining and in some
buildings cracks.
Windows and doors were incorrectly fixed to openings with
degraded finishes and stains. There was no evidence of any
application of flashing, damp proofing, or rainwater goods.
Absence of damp proofing and leaking roofs caused water
penetration and dampness in upper floors and staining in
parapets and balconies.
Internally: There was clear evidence of severe dampness and
failure of wall and ceiling finishes, condensation and
cracks. Floors had damaged tiles and finishes, cracked and
uneven surfaces. Stairs also had damaged finishes, broken
steps and uneven surfaces.
Violations in this zone involved adding floors to existing
buildings without permit, exceeding heights as
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required by permit conditions, ignoring set-back
requirements and not providing lifts for high rise
buildings, (Hanbali, 1992, H.Arafat, M.Nabulsi & H. Touqan,
1993). Such serious violations posed serious safety
conditions for buildings and users, increased the pressure
on services and roads and aggravated environmental problems
in the centre.
The main problems in the physical condition of buildings in
the centre of Nablus, (according to authors inspection and
users views), could be summarised as:
1- The majority of respondents in the three zones were
dissatisfied with general condition of their buildings,
access, utilities, pollution and hygiene conditions.
Physical survey and observation also showed general lack of
maintenance, pollution and hygiene problems.
2- The evidence of severe dampness and water penetration in
floors, walls, roofs and cantilevered structure indicated
a worsening condition which was spreading and endangering
the stability of the structure, the health and safety of
users and residents. This was confirmed by:
a- the vast majority complained of pollution, water
penetration and dampness, (Tables 20-24).
b- the physical inspection of buildings also showed
evidence of general lack of maintenance, severe
dampness in walls and ceilings, water penetration due
to roof leakage, burst pipes, incorrect fixing of
doors and windows to openings.
3- The violation of building and safety codes were causing
serious safety, health and environmental problems. The
overloading of buildings by the construction of additional
floors and extensions "illegal" was threatening structural
stability of these buildings and the safety of users and
residents, particularly in Zone "A" & "C" of the study
area. This was also adding pressure on the already
overloaded services and roads and exasperating the traffic
and environmental conditions in the city.
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2.2 Analysis of the physical condition and characteristics
of urban spaces and amenities in the city centre
2.2.1 The main city square:
Al Hussain square is located at the lowest point in the
valley between Jerzim and Eibal mountains and acts as the
hinge connecting the old city with the expanding centre.
The level and variety of activities in and around it
demonstrates the importance of its function from a planning
and urban design point. This is due to its central location
and accessibility from all parts of the city and outside,
and its proximity to a variety of public and private
services. Furthermore, it was the only open space available
for the residents of Nablus and their visitors. The square
acted as the main distributor for transport between Nablus
and the rest of urban centres and villages in its district
and also to other Palestinian districts, (Plate No 2, Map
No 5).
In the absence of alternative distributors, and the
restriction imposed on horizontal expansion of the city and
on the development of sub-centres, it suffered most of the
consequences of overcrowding, pollution and all urban d€cay
problems in Nablus.
The extent of the damage and deterioration in the built
environment in this part of the city was demonstrated by
the peeling paint and dampness in concrete facades, smoke
and graffiti marks on concrete and stone walls, broken
glass and twisted metal and other signs of war damage and
intensive fighting that took place around the square (Plate
Nos 45-47). This was exasperated by the serious traffic
congestion, presence of street vendors carts and
merchandise displayed on pavements and walls around the
square, and the subsequent hygiene and pollution problems
(Plate Nos 22-26, App. "A", Tables 25-37).
The results of the questionnaire survey showed that most
respondents were dissatisfied with the physical condition
of their buildings and the level of maintenance in this
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area. They also complained of parking and traffic problems,
(Table 25 & 26) and the presence of street vendors, (Table
27) . Pollution and hygiene problems were also a major
concern to most respondents (Appendix A, Tables 28 & 29).
The square has traditionally provided a place where people
meet socially, as well as reach other areas for shopping
and business. Before the occupation, Nabulsis used the
square as a public park when seating was available. Like
many Mediterranean cities and villages, a lot of businesses
and shopkeepers extended seating facilities in front of
their units, the old soap factory used its wide pavement as
an informal public place, where political figures,
academics, and writers met to discuss and debate current
issues as they also did in nearby coffee-houses.
During the occupation and particularly after 1987, it
became the only public landscaped space available, albeit
in a shabby condition, used for recreation and for public
gatherings during festivals and special holidays, and later
for political demonstrations and the scene of many military
clashes.
The last Palestinian council made a considerable effort to
improve and to upgrade the physical condition of the square
to regenerate it. A lot of planting, soft and hard
landscape was provided with fountains and new pavements,
street lamps and monuments, (Plate No 2).Harsh conditions
during the seven years of Intifada destroyed most of this
work. Landscaped areas suffered from severity of fighting,
fires and consequently lack of maintenance.
2.2.2 Landscape, amenities and open areas
Apart from the landscape in Al-Hussain square which
extended to King Hussain street, there were few landscaped
areas in the centre of Nablus. A wide island in the middle
of King Hussain street was lined with heavy planting and
mature trees (Plate 38). After the Intifada,
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the Israeli army uprooted these trees as they were
considered a security risk (obstructed them from chasing
Palestinian resistance fighters).
The last municipal council provided soft and hard
landscape, alongside Faisal street and Jerusalem road, up
to the eastern municipal boundary. It also provided
landscape to the west of Faisal street alongside Haifa
street and along Zawata road. The landscape work included
planting,trees, paved areas, fountains, street lamps and
monuments up to the same standard provided in the square
Nablus municipality annual report, April 1987).
The effect of the improvement, however, was still evident
during the survey. The areas where pavements and landscaped
areas were provided and upgraded in 1987 were still in
better condition than other areas in Nabius and other
Palestinian towns.
As mentioned above, there were few open public spaces in
Nablus which were available for recreation and social
activities. There was also a limited number of empty spaces
that could be used in the future, mainly near the city
square. Two of these spaces are archaeological sites which
cannot be developed. The larger site to the north west of
Al Hussain square attracted a lot of interest in recent
years, of local architects and planners, as a potential
public space (Map Nos 6 & 15,).
There were no seating facilities in any of the spaces
inspected in the centre, nor rubbish bins, public
telephones, or public toilet facilities.
Lack of amenities was considered a problem by a majority of
respondents, particularly in Zone "C", (App. "A", Table
36)
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2.2.3 Parks and Recreation facilities :
Immediately after the occupation, all public parks came
under the jurisdiction of the Israeli public parks
authority (Military order No.89, August, 1967). There were
two public parks in Nablus. The main park was "Muntazah
Gamal Abdul Nasser" to the west of the centre which was
developed in the 1950s, and a smaller park to the east
"King Faisal Garden". Both were closed for various periods
under the occupation, and during the Intifada. In spite of
years of neglect, Carnal Abdul Nasser park reopened in 1993.
King Faisal park, severely damaged and dilapidated, was
still closed at the time of the survey.
Although clubs and sport centres suffered from lack of
maintenance and investment under the occupation, they
continued to provide useful facilities for residents in
Nablus, albeit irregular. All these facilities closed down
after 1988, some sport clubs reopened in summer of 1993
although they were in bad need of maintenance.
During the physical survey, it was evident that none of the
available cinemas in Nablus was working. These suffered
from frequent curfews, area closures, near by military
clashes, war damage and subsequently declining attendance,
(Tables 17-18). All four cinemas closed down completely in
1988.
There were also no hotel facilities at the time the survey
was carried out, although two floors for hotel
accommodation, in a newly developed office building, were
under construction in July 1993 (R. Abdul Hadi, 1993).
In conclusion, at the time the survey was completed, apart
from the reopening of one park, and a football club, there
was no recreation facilities in the centre of Nablus for at
least the previous seven years. In spite of its historic
core, including a number of religious and historic
monuments and archaeological sites, there had been no
tourist related activities in Nablus for the preceding ten
years and only limited activities before.
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Conclusion:
The physical survey of buildings and urban spaces in the
centre of Nablus provided evidence of severe problems. The
results of the social survey indicated that the majority of
building users were dissatisfied with the condition of the
building they occupy, the area where it is located and the
city centre in general.
The study area covered three different zones, built at
different periods. However, in spite of the difference in
the degree of the severity of a certain problem, generally
most buildings and spaces suffered from the same problems,
(Tables 20-37, App. "A"). In general, the problems that are
considered, were those which were creatinq health and
safety hazards to people, and structural instability and
further physical problems to buildings, (App. "A" & "B").
The deterioration in the physical condition in the built
environment in the centre of Nablus could be attributed to
many factors. Some of these factors were more severe in one
area than the other two. In addition to war damage and the
effect of the military conflict, there was evidence of
general neglect, lack of maintenance and lack of
investment, particularly in Zone "A" and "B". This was
confirmed by users who were discouraged from improving or
upgrading their buildings/businesses, as a result of the
political, legal and financial obstacles, (Table 17 and 18,
Chapter VIII).
Violations and illegal construction added to the general
physical and aesthetic deterioration in the built
environment, particularly in Zone "A" and "C". New
construction did not follow building regulations and health
and safety codes particularly in Zone "C", and its quality
was generally bad. Moreover, new construction whether
complete new structures or additions and extensions to
existing buildings was carried out without any attention to
its suitability to existing urban fabric particularly in
the old city.
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Deterioration in the physical condition of buildings and
urban spaces and amenities was exasperated by the
degradation in the environmental conditions in the centre,
particularly pollution, hygiene and loss of green and open
spaces.
Physical deterioration was accompanied by changing
development trends. In the absence of a devel.opment plan,
regulations or guidance from an effective local authority,
the change seem to have been a response to the difficult
political, security and financial obstacles, and not a
response to modern technical and professional advances or
to existing and future development needs and priorities.
The policies and practices that could have contributed to
this condition will be examined and analysed in following
chapters of this study, (Chapt.VI, VII and VIII).
In conclusion, after twenty six years of Israeli
administration, there was clear evidence that the physical
condition of the built environment in the historic and new
parts of Nablus city centre had deteriorated.
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Plate (10)
Physical Condition: Zone "A"
1. Dampness, mould and failure of external finishes
2. Cracked plaster and stained walls aggravated by severe
water penetration from openings and roof. Exposed wiring
adds to hazardous health conditions.
2.
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Plate (12)
Plate (13)
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Phygjca]. Condition: Zone ABrV
1. Deteriorating external finishes in an office building on
the main square.
2. Deteriorating internal finishes and services in a
shopping precinct.
Plate (14)
Physical Condition: Zone "B"
Stone wall facade with bad surface quality: evidence of damp
stains, peeling plaster and paint.
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Physical Condition: Zone "B
1. Deteriorating finishes of ceilings and walls in a
conunercial building on the main square.
2. Damaged ceiling tiles, severe dampness in ceiling caused
by water penetration from skylights in an office
building on the main square.
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Plate (17)
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Physical Condition: Zone B
1. Damp and water stains and exposed wiring
2. Wall cracks, stains and exposed wiring
Plate (18)
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Physical Condition: Zone "B/C"
1. Severe dampness, water penetration in a high rise office
building with mould growth, stains and general failure of
cladding and finishes.
2. Facade of shopping precinct suffering from damp stains,
roof leakage affecting internal finishes
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CHAPTER V
The deterioration in public services and
environmental conditions
physical condition of
and examination of the
occupied Palestinian
Description and analysis of the
public services and infrastructure
environmental conditions in the
territories.
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Introduction:
The public utilities and services sector in the OPT
suffered from neglect, lack of investment and absence of
maintenance and upgrading during the occupation. The
increase in population and subsequent pressure and demand
for expansion had not been met by an increase in the
provision of services or improved facilities.
There was inadequate increase and improvement in the road
stock and transportation facilities and communication under
the Israeli administration. Public utilities had also
suffered from shortages, frequent cuts and inadequate
supply.
Until 1994, there was no evidence of any available
department or authority with the responsibility for
environmental protection within the Israeli military
establishment or its Civilian Administration.
Thus, there had been a deterioration in general
environmental conditions in the OPT as a consequence of
inadequate supply and poor quality of public services,
general indifference to environmental problems and concerns
from the Israeli administration, lack of public awareness,
in addition to safety and health hazards resulting from
military actions and practices during the occupation.
This section examines available documents and studies on
the subject and analyses the implication of the level and
quality of service supply and environmental conditions on
urban development and residents lives in Nablus. This is
supported by views and data obtained from interviews and
questionnaires. In the absence of reliable statistics and
relevant quantitative and qualitative research in this
field, the interpretation and analysis of data in this
section is an integration of multiple sources of evidence
such as literature and documents, interviews, observation
supported by the results of the questionnaire survey where
applicable, (Chapt I, Limitations, Chapt. III, Sect.1,2 &5)
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SECTION 1: Public services and infrastructure:
1.1 Roads and circulation
According to Palestinian engineers and researchers
estimates, 40% of West Bank roads were below acceptable
operational standards, (PASSIA Diary, p.198, 1994 29). There
was a limited expansion of roads and very little
maintenance carried out on existing stock. Only 10% of
households in OPT owned a private car, a level suppressed
by Israeli taxes on sales and import, road tax, and control
of vehicles and driving licenses, (ibid).
Like other sectors of development, the transportation and
communications sector, constrained by the occupation, had
been rendered unable to perform its developmental tasks.
The only means of transportation was the inadequate road
network which provided for the movement of people and goods
within Palestine and connected it with the outside world
(CEP, p.66, 1992), which could only be done through either
Israel or Jordan.
Public transport consisted of buses and shared taxis. The
buses operated on a franchise system which dated from the
Jordanian administration, and the majority of companies
operated only one or two buses. Absence of subsidies forced
operators to abandon less profitable routes, which left at
least 150 villages with no bus service, although some
villages ran unlicensed system of pick up vans and taxis
(PASSIA, 1994).
1.1.1 Roads capacity and condition:
The total length of the West Bank road system (paved) was
656 km in 1947, 1,332 km in 1967 (103% increase), Israeli
administration paved 350 km up to 1987 (26.2% increase)
according to the West Bank and Gaza Atlas, (p.34, 1988).
Although there had been considerable improvement in the
road quality, as the length of Class I roads increased
29 PASSIA is the Palestinian Academic Society for the
Study of International Affairs based in Arab East
Jerusalem.
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from 368 km to 731 kin, this increase was mainly due to
Israeli partisan interests (Benvinisti & Khayat, West Bank
and Gaza Atlas, p.351 1988).
According to the authors, road alignment and construction
reflected the geo-political planning strategies of the
authorities in control, more than the transportation needs
of the West Bank population. They add that the road
alignment under Israeli rule had been established to serve
the political objectives of the occupation authorities and
their new settlements in the occupied territories.
"In practice, two parallel road systems have been
created in the West Bank: one for Israeli use and
another, in existence prior to 1967, and with certain
improvements, for Palestinian use" (Benvinisti &
Khayat, p.36, 1988).
UNCTAD noted that the Israeli authorities had been
indifferent to promoting, developing, or even improving the
road network in the territories where no new Israeli
settlement had been constructed. This indifference led to
the deterioration of the condition of many local roads,
rendering them hazardous to traffic. Lack of maintenance
also led to continuous deterioration of the roads (UNCTAD,
item 131, p.37, 1993).
According to an earlier UNCTAD report, secondary and feeder
roads were almost totally neglected in Palestinian towns
and villages despite improvements in transport services on
main roads. Their inadequate and poor state and the
increasing orientation of the transport system to Israeli
prerequisites meant that it became a serious bottle-neck
for the expansion of trade (UNCTAD/RDP/SEU/1, Chapter 5,
1989). There were no sea, nor air travel facilities in the
OPT and the reduced institutional structure was dominated
by the occupation authorities.
Although some development in the main road network was
accomplished after 1967, it was mainly aimed at
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facilitating the movement of Jewish settlers within other
settlements and also between these settlements and major
urban centres in Israel, often by-passing Palestinian towns
and villages.
The main existing road network consisted of two major
north-south highways connected by a number of east-west
roads in the inland region. This network connected Nablus
to the south with Ramallah, Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Hebron
and to the north with Jenin and Tulkarem to the north west
of the West Bank. The east west highway connected it to the
east to Damieh bridge, the exit to Amman which was closed
in 1993 and the road to the East Bank had been diverted to
Alenbi bridge via Jericho to the south east (Map No 2
above). The local roads provided access between smaller
towns and villages which were generally narrower than
secondary roads. More than half of these roads suffered
from poor surface and geometrical conditions (CEP, p. 68,
1992)
A report by the Strategic Review found that before the
occupation the West Bank and Gaza had a total of 1800 km
road stock of which 93% were paved. The increase of only
360 km between 1967 and 1992, was not in proportion to the
population increase and subsequent scale of development and
transport demands. Planners argue that the occupation
authority objectives were not to provide for Palestinians'
need in this field, but for the needs of their own Jewish
settlers (Strategic Review, 1991, p.35).
This policy led to the confiscation of thousands of donums
from Palestinian owners. The constraints imposed on the
land surrounding these roads restricted the ability of land
owners to use it and also the ability of nearby towns to
expand, (ibid, p.25).
A study was conducted on two 10 km samples from a projected
road "Road 57" which crossed the West Bank from Tulkarni
passing through Nablus to Al Far'a concluded that; in
addition	 to	 confiscating	 thousands	 of	 donums
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from Palestinian owners, the proposed project would involve
the demolition of some 164 houses, in addition to a school
and other buildings. All these road schemes would not have
even benefitted the Palestinians on whose land it was
constructed 30•
Following the intifada in 1987, the authorities changed
circulation patterns and street directions in most
Palestinian towns to serve its own security needs.
Palestinian planners and engineers were not involved in the
planning and implementation of new changes and therefore
local needs were not taken into consideration when the new
plans were drawn (ibid).
1.1.2 Traffic and Parking Facilities:
There were no traffic lights in any city or town in the
West Bank, these were considered a security risk by the
authorities (Strategic Review, p. 39, 1991, Observations,
survey 1993). The reason given by the authorities for any
application or request for permission to use traffic lights
was; that there was not enough traffic to justify them (Abu
Eisheh, Shkoukani, & H. Touqan 1993). With relative
increase in traffic volume and lack of expansion of road
stock, the use of traffic lights could have improved the
situation and reduced the risk of accidents.
The author's attempt to meet with the Israeli officer in
charge of traffic in the Civil Administration was
unsuccessful, nor was she able to obtain data from the
Palestinian official working in the local traffic
department in Nablus police station except that there was
a dramatic increase in road accidents in the city between
1991 and 1992, (Table No 6, & Habaybeh, 1992).
During the field visit in 1993, it was noted that no
physical changes or measures had taken place to improve the
situation in spite of the escalation in the number of road
30	 This exercise was conducted for a case taken to the
Supreme Court by Palestinian lawyers and human right
groups in 1984 cited in Khaniayseh, 1989, p.32).
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accidents. Although new figures could not be obtained, eye
witnesses reported a more dramatic increase in number of
road accidents and particularly deaths.
In spite of the serious problems suffered by drivers and
pedestrians in Nablus and other towns, there was no
available traffic management system in the city or the OPT
as a whole to reduce these problems and the subsequent
delays affecting businesses and consumers, (Abu Eisheh,
1993).
Table (6)
Road Accidents in Nablus 1991-1992
Year >	 1991	 1992	 Increase
Accident
simple	 87	 83	 -4 (-6%)
serious	 106	 157	 51 (48%)
total	 193	 240	 47 (24.3%)
Deaths	 26	 38	 12 (46%)
Serious	 31	 41	 10 (32%)
injury
minor	 284	 308	 24 (8%)
injuries__________________
total	 315	 349	 34 (10.7%)
injuries________________
total deaths	 57	 79	 22 (38.5%)
and serious
injuries________________ ________________
Based on information obtained from the, CA, Local Traffic
Department, Nablus, 1992.
According to Abu Eisheh, there was no proper control of
traffic in terms of circulation and accurate studies for
traffic flows and congestion problems in the city, this was
demonstrated in:
1. complete absence of traffic signals, demarcation lines
and pedestrian crossings;
2. the available pavements were of inadequate widths and
poor quality of construction, pavements were not
available in many areas;
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3.	 absence of protection rails for dangerous areas and
crossings in streets
Parking: There were no planned parking facilities in the
city, in spite of an annual increase of 10% in car
ownership (higher than the natural growth in population of
(2.5-3%). At the time of the survey, there were no plans to
meet the pressure in demand in terms of regulations and
provision of parking facilities and road capacity (Ibid).
Randomly parked cars and congested traffic, was a severe
problem in most Palestinian towns such as Nablus,
Rammallah, and Hebron. After the eruption of the Intifada
(uprising) in 1987. This condition was worsened by the
presence of carts and street vendors, which blocked access
to buildings, pedestrian walkways and disrupt car movement
(Plate Nos 21 & 26, and App. A, Tables 25-27).
There were no clear regulations for parking and movement of
traffic within city boundaries. The Israeli authorities
dealt only with matters that concerned security, and local
matters were largely left to the local authorities. The
implementation of any regulation was difficult due to the
weakness of these authorities.
On the other hand, there were no available private or
public parking facilities in most major Palestinian towns
such as multi storey car parks, surface car parks, or
parking meters. A recent parking survey in Nablus central
business district (CBD), and one of the few available,
conducted by the Faculty of Engineering at Al Najah
National University found that in addition to on-street
(curb parking), which it considers to be "legal", there
were only 43 other official parking spaces in the CBD, (Al-
Najah, 1990, Table 3-2, p.44).
The free on-street parking (curb parking) though limited,
added to the traffic congestion in the already congested
streets as a high proportion of it was "illegal" (Al Najah,
Fig 3-7, p.46 & Table 3-3, p.47-49, 1990). The above study
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concludes that in their sample area they found the number
of "legally" parked cars to be 605 and those "illegally"
parked to be 331 (35.3%). It is, however, not very clear
how "legal" parking was defined or whether it was based on
an official study and statistics.
The absence of any demarcation on streets and allocation of
parking spaces and zones made it very difficult to
distinguish legal from illegal (Observation Notes, Survey,
1992 & 1993, App. A, Table 26). There were also no marked
areas for waiting, loading and unloading, emergency exits,
bus and taxi garages, or any street marking. In the absence
of regulations, cars were parked -or double parked- in any
available space; on pedestrian walkways, pavements,
building entrances, and close to street intersections,
causing danger and inconvenience to drivers, pedestrians
and building users
Increase in the population and in car ownership was not
matched by any measures to cope with the pressure it caused
on the city centre, or to increase the available road stock
or to provide car parking facilities. A recent study
carried out by Al-Najah University in Nablus, recorded a
steady increase in car ownership in Nablus:
Table (7)
The Increase in Car Ownership
Year
1978
1982
1987
1992
2 000*
expecte
Population
85,070
97,000
115,942
137,702
181,328
No of cars
1344
2777
7363
11200
18000
Car/ 1000 p
15.80
28,45
63,51
81,34
99,27
(Source: extracted from A1-Najah National University, table
5-3, p. 146, 1990).
The above table indicates - between 1982 and 1992- an
increase in car ownership in of 403 % in the city (an
increase of 265% in the first five years).In spite of the
235
of the decline in car sales during, and as a result of,the
Intifada, there had been an increase of 152%. This increase
did not represent the actual need for vehicles in the OPT,
the substantial increase in taxes imposed by the Israelis
on Palestinian drivers reduced the ability of many to own
a car. A recent survey by the Palestinian research centre
"Maqdes", found that since the Intifada road tax have
increased from NIS 28,00 to NIS 467,00, driver's license
renewal from NIS 7,00 to NIS 54,00, and car insurance
premium increased by at least 80%. Experts on the
Palestinian economy estimated that Israel revenue from
traffic related tax in the occupied territories reached NIS
100,000,000/yr (Strategic Review, p.18-25, 1992).
The occupation authorities also introduced an additional
tax on cars referred to as the "Intifada tax". Palestinian
sources estimated that the revenue from this tax was
$4,000.000 per year. An official in Nablus Chamber of
Commerce stated that the authorities collected more than
$l0,000.000 in one month from the residents in Nablus
(Ibid). The overall increase in the cost of buying cars,
particularly new cars, resulted in the increase of the
number of old cars on the road.
As is the case with other developing countries, the
increase in the volume of traffic, the number of vehicles
and the inadequacy of the road stock increased the
congestion in Palestinian centres and subsequently
increased the emission of carbon monoxide and the overall
pollution. In addition, the age of cars and the quality of
their maintenance, the quality of petrol, as well as the
total absence of any form of traffic management had
worsened the situation (Harris, p.8-9, 1990).
Traffic problems had been aggravated by the introduction of
"security gates" in various parts of the city centre,
(Chapter IV, Sect.1, & App. A, Table 32). The objective of
these gates was to obstruct the movement of cars and
pedestrians in various parts of the city depending on what
the army considers to be the location of the troubles.
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The gates were installed at all entry points to the
historic core and at other "strategic" parts of the city
centre such as the top of Hitteen street, Faisal and Haifa
streets, north of the square. These "gates" were either
large metal doors (entry to Suq El basal in the old city),
or metal screens with metal barriers (Hitteen street), many
comprised layers of large metal barrels filled with
concrete (Al-Watani hospital and Bawabat El Beyq), while
some were made of layers of large stone blocks, (Map No 7
& Plate Nos 39-42).
Many of the people interviewed during the survey complained
of the effect these gates had on their business as it
restricted their ability to move and to have access to
their business and also it discouraged and sometimes
prevented their customers from reaching their business
(quest. Nos. 18, 22, 23, 31, 38, 41, 50 & 56, App. A,
Tables 31-32).
The economic and social consequences of this practice on
the residents of Nablus, particularly in the old city is
well documented in Human rights organisations records,
affidavits and the last municipal councils files (Chapter
VIII, Sec 1).
1.1.3 Transport
There was no comprehensive transport strategy for the
occupied territories, either from the Israeli authorities
or from local Palestinian councils. These councils had no
jurisdiction over any of the activities related to the
development of existing systems nor to the construction of
new ones, whether during planning, implementation and
operation stages.
There was an apparent shortage of qualified personnel and
technical staff, and general lack of training facilities
for existing staff. The local set-up was totally dependent
upon the Israeli system for transport and communications.
238
Public transport comprised of buses run by private
companies, and self regulated public taxi service
(shared/collective). These offered services within the
towns and between various districts in the occupied
territories. In spite of providing a certain amount of the
needed service, there was still an obvious shortage.
Services were not regular, there were no time-tables or
allocated stops and garages for buses and taxis, most
vehicles parked conveniently where they believed they can
pick up customers which was usually in the middle of main
streets and squares. The absence of a legal authority
and a Palestinian police/traffic force hindered the
implementation of any law.
The transport services in Nablus were similar to those in
any other city in the OPT. In the absence of official data
on each particular city, the information below is based on
observation and secondary data obtained from available
research and studies mostly qualified for inaccurate and
insufficient quantitative and qualitative data.
Responsibility for the administration of transport and
communication in the occupied territories was under the
control of an Israeli military officer working under the
direction of the head of the Civilian Administration, who
in turn was under the control and direction of the Israeli
Defence Ministry (UNCTAD/DSD/SEU/2, para 127, p.36, 1993).
The Israeli public transport system in the West Bank was
operated by the Israeli national bus company (Egged). The
Israeli West Bank grid was fully integrated in the national
system to which all Jewish settlements were connected and
Arab localities bypassed (Benvinisti & Khayat, p.36, 1988).
The Arab bus-grid, however, remained practically unchanged
after 1967, its inefficient system demonstrated the lack of
regional planning and neglect by the central authority
(Ibid)
In the absence of other means of transport such as air and
rail travel in the occupied territories, the main
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transportation facilities were the bus service and public
(shared) taxis, which were not sufficient to meet the
needs. The situation is summarised as follows:
- Number of private cars in the West Bank increased
between 1970 to 1987 from 1626 to 39091 which is equal
to one car per 22.2 persons based on Israeli
statistics of 868,100 West Bank population in 1987,
compared with 1 car per 5 person in Israel.
- Number of public "shared" taxis increased by 64 cars
between 1970 and 1980, and by another 50 cars in the
year 1987, which is equal to an increase of 2.94 cars
per year.
- Number of public buses increased by 220 buses between
1970 and 1987 equal to an increase of 13 buses per
year (Strategic Review, Issue No.9, p.30-40, 1991).
In addition, insufficient and deteriorating road stock and
subsequent traffic and parking problems, discouraged
Palestinians from buying cars. Tax imposed on vehicles in
the OPT had also contributed to the demise of the transport
system. Military order No. 1249, 1988 stipulates the amount
of tax car owners should pay, based on the size and age of
vehicle. The tax imposed on cars in the OPT was three times
higher than that in Israel. Tax for a car such as a 1987
BMW in OPT was MIS 2065 MIS compared to MIS 685 in Israel
for the same model (ibid).
As mentioned above, the authorities increased tax after
1988, to include "Intifada tax" (Chapter VI, section 2).
This tax was to be paid on all vehicles (cars, donkey
carts, and bicycles), with an annual revenue amounting to
some $28 million. There had not been, however, a noticeable
corresponding improvement in public services for
Palestinians since (JMCC, 1992).
The increase in road and car related taxes increased the
cost of travel by public transport. The Palestinian
passenger in the OPT paid 300% more than the Jordanian for
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the same distance of travel. The Strategic Review report
anticipated a decline in bus services in the OPT as a
result of high cost, high taxes, lack of road improvement
and inability of bus companies to maintain and replace
their buses. This forecast was confirmed in an TINCTAD
report in 1993 which states that the once growing transport
branch which had begun to face serious pressures. According
to the report, one of the oldest Palestinian bus companies
was bankrupt in mid-1992 due to taxation and fines, high
insurance premiums, rising costs and inability to finance
the replacement of its aging stock (UNCTAD, TD/B/40(1)/8,
para 50, p. 20, 1993).
The bus fleet in 1993 was reduced to one third of its
capacity in 1988, according to the same report. The number
of buses decreased from 700 vehicles in 1987, to 400 in
1992, with the closure of the OPT in 1993, 200 more
vehicles were rendered idle (Ibid).
UNCTAD noted reports that the Israeli authorities had
intentionally avoided the development of the transport
network by decreasing the budget allocations. The report
found that in certain years the allocation amounted to few
thousand dollars, not enough to cover the maintenance of a
portion of the network (TJNCTAD/DSD/SETJ/2, para 130, p.37,
1993)
Efforts of local and international NGO's to improve and
help the transport sector were thwarted by the high customs
duty on imported vehicles, high registration fees and a
package of combined taxes (duty, income and VAT), imposed
by the authorities.
The Israeli policies slowed down the development of this
sector which became an export market for old used Israeli
public transport vehicles (Ibid).
1 • 1 • 4 Communications:
The only communication services which were available in the
OPT were telephones and postal services. Until the end of
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1994, there were no broadcasting facilities including
radio, television or any other type of transmitting
stations (CEP, p. 71, 1992). Nor was there a
telecommunications' authority or institution. The Israeli
authorities took control of the transmitting centre after
the occupation and incorporated it in a military compound
(UNCTAD/DSD/SEU/2, para 129, p.37, 1993).
The provision and control of all telephone lines and
communications facilities were with the Israeli
telecommunications company which received its directions
for its activities in the OPT from the officer in charge
for transport and communications in the Civilian
Administration.
To maintain direct control on Palestinian communication
systems and safeguard Israeli security concerns, all
existing Palestinian communication networks were connected
to the central communication exchanges in major Israeli
cities (UNCTAD/DSD/SEU/2, para 128, p.36, 1993). The extent
of this control was evident during the first year of the
intifada, when the Israeli authorities cut off all
telephone connections between the OPT and the rest of the
world as a "security" measure (Ibid).
Such practice was often carried out, albeit for shorter
periods, as a form of collective punishment during severe
security conditions, (observation notes, interviews, 1992
& 1993).
In 1990, there were 13 major telecommunication facilities
in main Palestinian towns providing direct local exchange
lines, international trunk switching centres and telegraph
services (CEP, p. 71, 1992). At the time the survey was
completed, there were only a limited number of telex and
facsimile services.
There were 60 formal post offices providing local and
international mail services, rental post office boxes,
banking and monetary transactions and telegraph facilities,
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together with 200 informal offices in smaller urban
settlements (Ibid).
1.2 Public Utilities:
Until 1967, basic public utility services were expanded to
reach most urban areas in the OPT, in addition to a few
number of rural communities. After the occupation, the
development of such utilities was not facilitated and
sometimes was obstructed by the Israelis.
1.2.1. Water:
1) General: Following the occupation, the Israeli
authorities issued a number of military orders and
administrative instructions affecting all aspects of water
resources exploitation, distribution, use and management.
Accordingly, all surface ground water resources were
considered public property; authority over them was vested
with the military commander (UNCTAD/ DSD/ SEU/2, para 94,
p. 27, 1993).
According to Palestinian estimates, the population
increased in the OPT from 976,000 on the eve of the
occupation to reach 1.726 million in 1990, (Abu Eisheh,
1993). This increase, combined with yearly per capita
increase in water consumption increased the demand
considerably, which exceeded supply, as shortages were
observed in many locations especially in the summer.
The West Bank has a total annual renewable water capacity
of 850 mcm, of which around 580-600 mcm were stored as
ground water (estimated by researchers). Most of the ground
water capacity was withdrawn and utilized by the Israelis
without recognition of Palestinian right of ownership of
utilization of their own resources.In 1990, the amount of
water transferred from the WB & GS to Israel was estimated
at about 515- 530 mcni/year out ofthe total West Bank supply
of some 700 mcm annually, (UNCTAD/DSD/2,para
95,p.27,1993),while that transferred from Israel to the OPT
was limited to 0.60 mcln/year.
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The West Bank Water Department was part of the Jordanian
Authority of Natural Resources until the occupation. Until
the survey was completed it was managed by a Palestinian
engineer working under the direct supervision and control
of the Israeli officer in charge of water. Management of
all water resources in the WB was transferred in 1967 from
the water department to the Israeli Water company Mekorot.
Consequently, the responsibility of the water department
was reduced to the collection of bills from municipalities
and local councils, and minor technical office work.
There were rio official Palestinian organizations
responsible for regulating and managing the water
environment (water resources exploitation and management,
water quality and management, water quality and protection,
and water supply). The full and direct control of these
activities were in the hands of the Israelis. However,
municipalities regional water authorities and councils
managed and controlled the basic daily services (Abu
Eisheh, 1993)
International, as well as Israeli and Palestinian
researchers argue that Israel had given the priority from
the beginning for its water needs and also for its
settlements in the West Bank and Gaza (FAQ, para 77, p.
C16, 1991). These were allowed as much water as they need
while the Palestinians faced more restriction and watch
their water resources depleted to serve the needs of their
occupiers.
The Israeli Hydrological Service estimated that 95% of the
potential in the West Bank was being used, but regards the
problem to be a local case of both overexploitation and
under utilization (FAQ, 1991). Although this was true to a
certain extent, responsibility for it was still that of the
authorities.
The Report found that according to various available
estimates at least three quarters of the water resources
were being used by Israel (including settlements) and
244
probably less than one quarter was used by the
Palestinians.
The FAO mission found problems in the maintenance, repair
and replacement of pumps as permission to carry out any of
these had to be obtained from the Civilian Administration.
The procedure was usually slow and time consuming although
the report noted some evidence of farmers delaying the
action until the last possible time which resulted in loss
of efficiency.
Demand for water by municipalities grew fast under the dual
stimulus of expanding population and urbanisation. The
overall picture was dominated by competition between
Israelis and Palestinians for water supplies.
The Palestinians considered the Israeli water regime
oppressive as it was oriented towards securing the greatest
possible amount for Israel. The Israelis, on the other hand
argued that they were only applying the same restriction
they applied in Israel. (FAO, Para 94, p. C19, 1991).
Nevertheless, Palestinian farmers had their water supplies
frozen at pre-1967 level, while large amounts of water had
been made available to settlements in the West Bank and
Israel. The main weakness in the Israeli argument is that
until its occupation of the territories, the Palestinians
had access to all their available water resources and that
the idea of sharing their resources with their occupier was
unacceptable.
A report by UNEP on the environmental situation in the
occupied Palestinian and other Arab lands, quotes another
FAO Report in response to the executive Directors report,
1989 as follows;
"The water supply is one of the main problems in the
occupied territories, particularly Gaza Strip, where
a report prepared by a UNDP consultant, specifies:
The deficiencies in the arrangements for disposing of
sewage and other effluent and the need to improve
water supply systems to rural villages pose serious
health problems.", (UNEP, para 25, p 6, 1992).
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Although water problems must be viewed in the wider context
of water problems in the region, the Palestinians position
with regard to water was not equitable as they were unable
to control their own water resources while under
occupation.
Israel closely controlled and restricted water use by
Palestinians in the OPT after 1967. It changed the
Jordanian legislation on use of water before 1967 and
replaced it by Military Orders which required a license for
any operation to use water. Such license could be denied
without giving a reason (FAO Report 1991,c 91/10).
Overall, in the West Bank, Palestinians controlled 55.3% of
the sources of water in urban areas, and 46.7% in rural
areas. The rest was administered by the Israeli authorities
either directly through Mecorote or indirectly through the
West Bank Water Department. Water supply resources
administered by local Palestinian councils had bore holes
of limited depths and capacities. There was an urgent need
for the rehabilitation of the existing wells and drilling
of new bore holes with higher depths and stable yields
(Bitar, Shaheen 92, Abu Eisheh & UNCTAD 1993).
Water quality was another major problem, service and
environmental engineers in Nablus municipality, expressed
their concern over its quality. According to these
professionals there were no water quality monitoring and
treatment programmes in any of the urban and rural areas in
the occupied territories. The only available treatment was
chlorine which was added without proper supervision or
accurate measurement. Laboratories were not available in
most Palestinian cities, including Nablus, to test the
water quality and determine its suitability for drinking.
There was also no protection or supervision for the water
tanks (Bitar Shaheen, Titi, 1992, UNCTAD, 1993).
According to Abu Eisheh, the inefficiency and inadequacy of
existing water utilities were mainly due to poor planning,
limited exploitation of water resources, limited extent of
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services in rural areas, high losses and leakage, lack of
water tanks, and the deteriorating quality of water. Above
all, was lack of an established central national
institution which could develop a comprehensive plan for
adequate and efficient water supply (Abu Eisheh, 1993).
Rates of leakage and unaccounted for water were high (more
than 50% in some cities like Nablus); which was due to age
of the existing water distribution system, faulty meters,
and malpractice of some consumers. On the other hand, loss
through distribution systems in Jordan reached 25%, (ibid).
ii) Nablus
Water supply before 1967:
The first water distribution system in Nablus was installed
in 1934. The four springs of Em Dafneh, Ras El-Em,
Qaryoun, and Em El Assal, with a total capacity of 120
m3/hr, were used to supply drinking water to 17.000
inhabitants in the city. As the city grew, the water supply
and distribution systems were expanded under the Jordanian
administration. The capacity of these springs was enhanced
and two wells in Dir Sharaf, to the west, were drilled in
1965 at a depth of 300 in and with a capacity of 50 m3/hr
each. The total supply of water during the year 1967 was
around 1.7 mcm/year (Abu Eisheh, 1993).
Water supply after 1967:
Water resources were very limited and had even decreased
after 1967, as a result of restrictions imposed by the
Israeli authorities on digging new wells and the amount of
water available for Palestinian consumption. The decrease
in water levels of some of the pre 1967 wells forced the
municipality to abandon them due to the high cost of deeper
digging and power. According to local officials in Nablus,
Palestinians were not allowed to use new wells dug in the
Badan and Faraa areas between 1978 and 1987.
In 1969 , the Israeli authorities drilled a bore hole at
(Badan No.1) at a depth of 748 in & capacity of 200 m3/hr.
After many petitions from the municipality it was allowed
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to rent it in 1972. Badan 2 was drilled in 1979 at Al Faraa
at a depth of 400 m and 430 1n3 /hr capacity it started to
operate in 1987 only. The two wells at Deir Sharaf stopped
operating in 1982 and 1986. The municipality requested
permission from the Israeli authorities to dig two more
deeper wells to replace them, but in spite of promises, the
permission was not granted (Shaheen, 1992). Water springs
in Nablus supplied 1.629 mcm/yr and the municipality wells
supplied 2,851 cmc/yr. The municipality had to buy from the
Israeli authority's controlled wells of Bit Elba
(represented by Mekorot) to meet the increasing demand (Abu
Eisheh, 1993).
Number of water subscribers reached 19.000 in 1990.
Municipality figures in Nablus estimated the loss of water
(unaccounted for) to be between 50-60%. This was attributed
to the old pipe network and pumps, inability to replace
damaged parts, inaccurate meter reading, unaccounted
registration and increased theft. From 1982, it had been
difficult to maintain and regulate the meters. With the
resignation of the council in 1988, there was no legal
authority within the city to control development and to
impose punitive measures when needed (Hanbali, 1992).
To keep the cost of water supply low, it was subsidized
from the municipality resources (one m3 was sold at JD 0.60
while its actual cost exceeds JD 1.00).
As a measure of the demand increase, the number of
subscribers had increased in most Palestinian towns
relative to the increase in population. According to
officials in Nablus municipality, the number of subscribers
increased from 12,000 in 1978 to 20,000 in 1992. However
the existing network did not have the capacity to cope with
such increase. The available water was 650 1n3/hour, while
the need was for 1100 ni3/hour, (Shaheen, 1992).
Engineers in the water department in Nablus complained, in
addition to the shortage of resources and restrictions
imposed by the Israelis on its use, of the maintenance
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problems they faced; dealing with aging networks, lack of
facilities and financial resources to obtain spare parts
for pumps and pipes (A. Masri, & Shaheen, 1992)
The water network in the historic core of Nablus suffered
the most serious damage. Built in 1932, it was the oldest
network in city. Time, lack of maintenance, misuse, illegal
connections and over-crowding in the old city often result
in burst pipes and further loss of the already scarce
commodity (W. Assi, Hanbali & A. Masri, 1992, Qamhieh,
1993).
During frequent visits to the municipality in 1992 and
1993, the author met with a number of residents at the
water and maintenance departments complaining of the
shortage of water and frequent cuts in supply for weeks
mainly in residential areas but also in hospitals and
public buildings. During both surveys the cut in water
supply was frequently experienced by the author which,
according to informants, became normal practice especially
during the summer months. The steep topography meant that
higher places suffered more due to inadequate pumping
facilities.
1.2.2 Electricity:
i) General
As part of the Israeli plan to control the economy of the
OPT, and to make it dependent on its own, it forced the
linkage of the local electricity companies in major towns
and villages to its own national grid (UNCTAD/DSD/SEU/2
para 103, p.29, 1993). The Palestinian producers of
electricity were restricted from using their power stations
and maintaining them, as they were not allowed to import
spare parts or buy new units. Their role became limited to
distribute electricity purchased from the Israeli
Electrical Corporation (IEC).
Supply of electric power in the OPT consisted of locally
generated power, and purchased power from the (IEC). Local
Palestinian efforts to resist this linkage failed following
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pressure of growth and Israeli refusal to allow them to
develop their power stations, expand their installed
capacity or maintain them, (UNCTAD,DSD,SEU/2, para.l33, p.
38, 1993).
Share of generated power to the total supply declined since
the linkage in the West Bank as the share of purchased
electricity from the IEC was close to 95% out of the total
supply. It is worthy of note that the only power station,
which was still in operation, in any of the cities in the
West Bank was in Nablus. However, since it was forced to
link with the IEC, its share of electricity production
became only 40% of the total distributed power in the
district (Ibid).
An analysis of the evolution of overall consumption rates
of electricity shows that total consumption of electricity
per capita per year in WB increased from 33 Kw/hr in 1967
to 139 Kw/hr in 1972 and reached 274 kw/hr in 1980, and 462
kw/hr in 1990.
In Israel, total consumption of electricity per capita was
ten times as much (4,492 kw/hr in 1989). In Jordan total
consumption was almost three times as much per capita as
that of Palestinians in the OPT as it reached 1,114 kw/hr
in 1990, (Abu Eisheh, 1993).
Therefore, it can be concluded that demand for electricity
in the OPT was not completely satisfied (Abu Eisheh, 1993).
Abu Eisheh states that;
"The indicated low consumption rates are mainly
because about 50% of the rural population has no
regular electric supply or no supply at all at
present. In addition, the non-household sectors,
especially the developing industry and service
sectors, do not consume high rates of electricity. The
share of the household consumption to the total
population reaches currently 50% in some places in the
OPT while the respective share in Israel reaches only
29.1%." (Ibid).
In general, most towns and villages suffered from sudden
disconnection of electric power which lasted for many
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hours, shortage of transformers and overloaded lines,
(Appendix A, below).
The rate of increase in demand, which was reflected in the
apparent increase in consumption rates, indicates that if
more electricity had been supplied, the demand and
consumption rate would have been even higher. However, the
study points out that most of the electric supply was not
national supply and was dependent on IEC which should,
therefore, be considered in planning future infrastructure
and resources (Ibid).
Quality of servicing the electricity network according to
UNCTAD was unsatisfactory as most towns suffered from
frequent and sudden disconnections due to shortage of
transformers and overloaded lines, (UNCTAD/DSD/SEU/2, para
105, p. 30, 1993).
ii) Nablus
Electrical supply before 1967:
Electricity services began in Nablus district in the 1950s
when municipalities of major towns operated their own
electrical power stations. Before that, services were not
uniform and were mainly supplied through small generation
companies or small owned generators. Overall, less than 5%
of the total population of the district had electricity
services by mid 1950's.
Nablus had had ordered electricity services since 1957,
when the municipal electricity project was put into
operation. Before that, service was supplied by private
companies generators to less than 25% of the whole
population in Nablus.
The municipal generation station began to operate in 1957
utilizing four small diesel units, with a nominal power of
900 kw. the capital investment at the beginning of the
operation of the project reached JD 180,000. By the end of
the year, total number of subscribers reached 1,300, of
which 62% were domestic subscribers, 3% were institutional
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and 5% were industrial subscribers. Consumption was very
low, (ie the average consumption per factory ranged from
1200- 2400 kw per year).
Increasing demand required the municipality to expand every
few years. The newly purchased generating units were
operated with use of heavy fuel. By the end of 1966, total
nominal generated power was increased 4-fold to reach 3,540
kw in ten years. Total cost of the expansion project was JD
250,000, and number of subscribers reached 9,120, of which
72% were domestic, 21,2% were trade, 4.8% industrial, and
1.5% were institutional subscribers.
The area covered by the project was limited to that inside
Nablus municipal boundaries. However in 1965, an agreement
was signed to supply the small neighbouring town of Anabta
with electricity from Nablus, but technical problems and
the 1967 war did not allow the connection to be completed.
Overall the project was considered to be satisfactory in
supplying the electric power needs of the population for
domestic, lighting and small factory operations.
Electricity supply after 1967:
The establishment of Nablus Electric Corporation was
authorized by the Jordanian Electric Authority in 1965.
However, the Israeli authorities refused to recognize or
allow such corporation to exist. Therefore, the electricity
in Nablus continued to be produced by the municipality.
The Israeli authorities, however, refused all requests to
develop and expand the electric power station in Nablus.
Furthermore, the municipality was not allowed to import
necessary spare parts for its old generating units, or to
buy new units. Deterioration of existing units caused
frequent and long power cuts, almost daily, (Abu Eisheh,
1993, App A, p 473) .Results of the survey indicated that
although more than half the respondents were satisfied with
the electrical supply, 59 out of 60 respondents (98.3%)
experienced power cuts. More than two thirds of them at
least once a week (ibid).
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Some progress was achieved in 1981 when permission was
given to the municipality to import three new diesel units
which was funded by Palestinians living abroad. Although
initially this was expected to ease some of the pressure of
demand, the improvement was negated as two old units broke
down due to lack of maintenance and spare parts, (Hanbali,
1992)
By 1984 many villages to the west of Nablus and a year
later suburbs to the east and west of Nablus were also
linked to the Israeli national grid. The generated power
from Nablus old generators continued to decline (from 96.4%
in 1984 to 39.3% in 1990). Old generators and inadequate
maintenance were the obvious reasons behind this increasing
dependence on power purchased from the Israeli national
grid. Only two of the existing nine generators were still
operating in Nablus in 1993.
Electric losses in the system were around 15% of the total
generated and purchased power. These were mainly caused by
inefficiency of the old and the overloaded distribution
electric grid. Due to lack of control and absence of
authority after the Intifada there was the additional loss
of 3-5% which was considered black loss. The age and lack
of maintenance of the old generators led to higher
consumption of expensive fuel, which also resulted in
higher unit value of the generated power compared to that
purchased from the Israeli National Grid (Ibid).
Table (8)
The increasing number of subscribers shows the pressure of
increasing demand for power supply as follows :-
Year
1966
1970
1980
1990
No.
domestic
subscriber
7900
15000
19720
No
industrial
subscriber
490
710
930
No
inst/trade
subscriber
2380
4260
6010
Total
9120
10770
20070
26660
Source : Abu Eisheh, 1993
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Table (9)
Increase in hourly peak loads
Year	 load in mega-watts load in mega-watts
______________________ generated power
	 purchased from ING
1973	 3.1	 --
1980	 5.6	 --
1989	 6.3	 9.2
Source: Abu Eisheh, 1993
1.2.3 sewerage Service:
i) General:
Sewerage services also suffered from lack of upgrading and
maintenance in the OPT. The existing supply of sewer
collection systems was not capable of fulfilling the
increasing demand. There were no comprehensive treatment
systems in most towns although facilities for partial
treatment existed in some. Management of waste water
disposal system was limited and most of the time it was
left to run freely in valleys outside urban centres
damaging the environment.
There was very little data to assist in the analysis of the
evolution and development of this utility or to enable a
comparison of supply! demand characteristics with those of
neighbouring countries (Abu Eisheh, 1993). An UNCTAD study
found that both urban and rural areas suffered from
inadequate sewage and refuse treatment and disposal
facilities (UNCTAD/DSD/SEU/2, para. 190 (f), p.60, 1993).
In Nablus 75% of the population were connected to the main
sewerage system by 1991. As a result of its steep
topography, 58% of collected waste water flowed to the west
and discharged into a wadi along Tulkarem road without any
treatment. The remaining 42% discharged to the east also
without treatment. The major portion of the existing sewers
operated as a combined system with the storm-water disposal
system. The municipality had plans for a treatment plant
and for separating the two systems (Nablus Municipality
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Report, 1991), which until the end of 1994 were still not
implemented.
According to an environmental engineer who worked in the
Health Department of the Israeli Civil Administration,
problems of the sewerage network in Nablus and other
Palestinian towns were very severe. He referred to examples
of problems that had serious consequence on the Palestinian
health and their environment such as; open sewers in both
western and eastern areas of Nablus which sometimes mixes
with the water wells causing water pollution. There was
also no sewage treatment plants in most Palestinian cities.
The projects planned in 1964 under the Jordanian rule such
as that planned for Nablus were shelved after the
occupation (Titi, 1992).
ii) Nablus:
In Nablus, like other places in the occupied territories,
untreated open sewers were found running in the middle of
towns. Liquid waste from factories in the town centre and
the industrial area was disposed on the ground were it
seeped through, destroying agricultural land and
contaminating crops. The sewerage and storm water systems
were combined. The network, built in 1960, was no longer
sufficient for the present demand of the increased
population.
Lack of upgrading and maintenance after 1967 resulted in
frequent burst pipes and connections, blockage, overflow of
manholes and consequently added pollution and service
disruption. The major portion of the existing sewers,
including all the old city, operated on a combined system
that drains off the surface rainwater in addition to the
sanitary sewage (Nablus Municipality, Sewerage Department
Report, 1991). According to service engineers in Nablus
municipality, there were no available comprehensive studies
or statistics for present load, capacity and need, (Bitar,
1992)
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1.2.4 Waste Disposal:
i) General:
There was little or no development in refuse collection and
disposal services and no apparent plans for the development
of garbage disposal or recycling in the OPT. The existing
municipal collection services in urban centres suffered
from shortages in containers, collection equipment and
vehicles and of the size reduction facilities. The
collection process was not organised on daily basis, and
garbage was left in open spaces causing health hazards. The
only solid waste treatment was by the incineration process
without control and concern for environmental protection
(Abu Eisheh, 1993).
Although responsibility of this service was of municipal
and village councils, there was no sufficient number of
workers in the departments who also lacked general
education and proper training in handling solid waste.
However, it was reported that some municipalities have
purchased new vehicles and modern equipments in 1993.
ii) Nablus:
In Nablus landfill, where refuse was dumped, was only 300-
500 m. from residential areas, where children were observed
playing with the rubbish. The only treatment that was
available for solid waste was incineration. There were no
transfer stations with size reduction capabilities, (Ibid).
There was no proper programme for the collection of solid
waste which accumulated in the centre of Nablus and there
was no garbage disposal unit. The number of garbage
collecting vehicles was not sufficient for the need of the
city (four vehicles working two shifts only) which covered
less than 25% of the need.
Accumulation of refuse/solid and liquid waste from street
vendors in the city centre which increased during the
Intifada, caused environmental pollution, health hazards
and also blocked drains in the city centre (Titi, 1992).
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According to Palestinian officials working under the
Israeli Civilian Administration, accumulation of garbage
for long periods without collection, due to long periods of
curfews and shortage of municipal staff, meant that solid
waste from houses, commercial and industrial areas was
collected without control. Consequently, residents tried to
get rid of the rubbish by burning it, the smell and smoke
resulting from these fires increased the air poliLtion.
There was also no control for the use of solid, liquid
waste or fuels in the whole of the West Bank. This was
confirmed during the survey questionnaires, interviews and
daily observation in all areas of the city. All respondents
to the questionnaire complained of the state of hygiene in
the centre of Nablus and 94.7% complained of the problem of
pollution (Appendix A, Table 20 &28).
Garbage incinerators were close to residential areas, which
had a detrimental effect on the lives of human beings and
animals and have destroyed close agricultural lands. The
main incinerator to the east of Nablus, generated harmful
fumes up to 10 km radius (Arab Studies Society Report,
1992)
In Nablus, solid waste exceeded 40 tons/day from the city
and 100 tons/day from nearby towns and villages. Land
allocated for garbage collection was already overloaded and
expanding quickly.
Health studies conducted for Palestinian towns including
Nablus indicated a sharp increase in illness and diseases
related to the accumulation of garbage for a long time and
the increase in insects and rats in these areas (Bitar &
Titi, 1992). The only procedure used to get rid of the
refuse was by burning it. This was a slow and often
incomplete operation generating smoke and harmful gases
which spread over a wide area around the incinerator, thus
further damaging the environment( Nablus Municipality,
Service Engineers Report, September 1992).
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1.2.5. Public Safety and Quality Control:
i) General:
Public safety utilities and services (i.e fire fighting,
rescuing, first aid and emergency services) in the West
Bank was considered satisfactory to meet small scale
demand. In cases of bigger operations and emergencies,
assistance was sometimes required from neighbouring and
Israeli centres as there were no regional centres, (Abu
Eisheh, 1993).
Absence of a local government meant that there was no
Palestinian authority to control development and ensure the
use of safe building materials and techniques. There were
also no clear building regulations, health and safety codes
or fire regulations that were observed or followed by
professionals in the building industry.
ii) Nablus:
New buildings were constructed in Nablus without taking
fire, health, and safety codes into considerations either
from public or private sectors. Requirements for safe
access, fire and emergency exits, ventilation were often
ignored (Al Jabi, 1993), and deleterious building materials
long banned in other countries were still used like
asbestos. Building sites, where new public or private
construction, was carried out were left with no protection
and very often used as rubbish collection pits in the
middle of towns and residential areas ( Appendix A below,
Plate Nos 22-26).
Absence of any legislation for quality control and lack of
authority to implement it, together with lack of standard
specifications for production in the OPT, turned the area
into a dumping ground for Israeli products that did not
meet Israeli specification standards. According to
officials in the Chamber of Commerce in Nablus, products
which had either expired or failed quality control tests in
Israel found their way easily to Palestinian markets
(Hashem, 1993).
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Summary:
The decline in the expenditure on public utilities in the
OPT provides a strong indication of its condition, (Abu
Eisheh, 1993).
It was difficult to obtain a clear per capita expenditure
comparison as the Israeli statistics included the Jewish
settlers and the cost of supplying public utilities to the
settlements which formed a major part of amount spent in
the territories. However, even with the assumption that all
the expenditure was only benefiting Palestinians in the
West Bank, it should not have been less than 25% of that
spent in Israel in proportion to the population in each
country 31
Abu Eisheh draws comparison between capital expenditure on
public utilities in the West Bank in the year 1987-88 which
reached only NIS 9.19 m ($5.5m), and that spent in Israel
which reached NIS l5l.93m ($ 90.98m). This meant that the
amount spent in the West Bank was around 6-7.7% of that
spent in Israel. In the year 1988-89, capital investment in
public utilities declined to NIS 2.37xn (70% less than the
previous year).
This decline could be attributed to the Intifada, the
subsequent resignation of the municipal councils, and the
increase in the curfews imposed. Consequently, budgets for
municipalities became smaller, and their income from fuel
and real estate taxes, which was distributed through the
Israeli authority, dropped considerably. The problems with
various sectors of public utilities could be summarised as:
(1) Water :
1. Lack of planning
2. shortages of water supply
31 This ratio is based on an approximate population
figure of West Bank Palestinians in 1992, of 1.250,000
(PASSIA, 1994) or an estimated 1,492,000 Palestinians
in 1990, (CEP, 1992) compared to 4,600,000 Israelis in
1990, (UN World Population Chart, 1990).
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3. Limited water utility service
4. High losses and deterioration of waste
distribution systems
5. Deterioration of water quality and lack of labs.
6. Lack of proper pricing policies
7. Lack of funding
8. Lack of training
9. Management
(2) Electricity :
1. Lack of planning
2. Shortages of power supply
3. Limited electric utility service
4. Overloaded electric distribution systems
5. Lack of proper pricing policies
6. Lack of funding
7. Lack of training
8. Management
(3) sewerage, Refuse Disposal
1. Lack of planning
2. Limited sewerage utility services
3. Limited solid waste utility services
4. Lack of solid waste disposal
5. Lack of proper pricing policies
6. Lack of funding
7. Lack of training
8. Absence of labs
9. Management
(4) Public Safety and Quality Control
1. Limited public safety utility services
2. Lack of/ Inadequate public safety facilities and
quality control regulations and implementation.
3. Lack of funding
4. Insufficient training
5. Management
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SECTION 2: Environmental Conditions
During the data collection stage, There was limited
reliable quanititative and qualitative data and statistics
on environmental isssues in the OPT. Therefore, this
section is based on the integration of the information
obtained from the limited available reports and studies by
local and international organisations, interviews and
observation and data obtained from the questionnaire survey
where possible.
General:
The environmental deterioration in the OPT could be
generally attributed to most of the factors which affect
other developing countries. However, in this case, the
literature points out that these factors had all originated
from, or had been influenced by, the prolonged occupation
and the subsequent policies and practices and institutional
changes imposed by the Israeli authorities after 1967
(Chapter VI, section 1). These changes had a direct impact
on the use of land and other resources, and the condition
of services and infrastructure. It is therefore necessary
to examine these policies and practices and try to
determine their effect on the Palestinian environment.
2.1 Institutions, Mana gement and Legislation:
The Ministry of Environment in Israel is the principal
organ responsible for environmental matters. Although, in
theory, the same environmental regulat±ons and standards
applied in Israel should have been applied in the occupied
territories, in reality, the standards observed there
showed a big difference to those in Israel and the
settlements (UNEP, 1992).
During the occupation, the Israeli authorities showed
little interest in protecting or improving the
environmental conditions in the occupied territories.
Neither the Israeli military establishment nor its Civilian
Administration had any facility with environmental
responsibility, (UNCTAD/TD/40(l)/8, para 60, p.24, 1993).
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Absence of an indigenous central authority to encourage
public environmental awareness, and prepare an overall
environmental Agenda, together with ineffective local
councils, had adverse effect on the Palestinian environment
and quality of life (Ibid/para 61).
According to the UNEP report, one of the factors which was
responsible for the unsatisfactory standard of services in
the OPT, was the Israeli authorities total control of the
administration, (tJNEP/GC.l6/5, para 83, p.18, 1992).
At the local level, Palestinian authorities were weak and
lacked financial, technical resources and expertise in the
area of environment. They were also ineffective owing to
lack of mechanisms to legislate and enforce environmental
laws and regulations (Chapter II & VII).
Scientific institutions and universities were confined to
research and experimental work in this field due to lack
of resources and absence of any government support. Even
when attempts to establish an institutional nucleus for
environmental protection had succeeded, competition and
duplication drained their resources (UNCTAD, TD/B/40(1)/8
para 60, 1993)
2.2 Urban and Industrial Development:
The restricted municipal boundaries and inability of owners
outside the municipalities to use their land led to
overcrowding of urban centres, loss of green areas and
further environmental damage.
Until the completion of this study, there was no overall
strategy to identify the type and size of industry that
could be economically viable in the occupied territories.
Without comprehensive development plans for Palestinian
towns, there was no clear indication where industries
should be located, (Hanbali, 1992, Shkoukani, 1993).
Although there were certain identified industrial zones in
Palestinian cities such as Nablus, Hebron, Ramalla and
Gaza, these zones were phased out for industries before the
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occupation. Urban sprawl and residential development close
to these areas meant that a lot of care and control was
needed to identify the type of industry that could be
allowed to function in such areas (ie, Nablus industrial
zone became part of a large residential settlement of kufr
Qallil and Balata).
As demonstrated in the previous section, service networks
and infrastructure had not been maintained, upgraded or
expanded to cope with either the new residents of these
areas, nor with any additional load generated from any new
industrial development.
Absence of an overall strategy and criteria for
development, in addition to the fact that most of the land
that remained under Palestinian control was privately
owned, was expected to result in the loss of more
agricultural land to industrial development with adverse
environmental effects.
According to the UNEP report, with few exceptions,
polluting emissions and effluent, noise and related adverse
impacts were still limited (UNEP, 1992). However, the same
report warns that the proximity of the occupied territories
to Israel could expose them to environmental hazards
originating from the industrial activity inside Israel if
adequate environmental protection measures were not taken.
There is very little known, internationally, about the
movement of hazardous waste between developed and
developing countries. In developed countries, government
controls, public awareness and pressure groups are making
the disposal of such wastes in their countries very
difficult. Therefore some of these countries are trying to
relocate their most polluting industries in countries with
weaker environmental controls, namely developing countries
(Harris, p. 15, 1990).
There was evidence that such conditions existed between
Israel and the OPT. Although, some could argue that it was
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in Israel's own interest to ensure safe environmental
practices in the occupied territories, in view of its
proximity, and indeed the Israeli settlements, to
Palestinian areas. However, very little information was
available with regard to hazardous waste disposal in the
occupied territories, which meant that even Israeli groups
concerned about the local and global environmental issues
could not effectively campaign or pressurize the government
for tighter controls.
2.3 Ecoloqy:
Environment as a whole was extremely fragile in the
occupied territories. With serious shortage in water
resources there was need for plant cover, sound methods of
agriculture and soil management.
One of the adverse effects of the Israeli occupation was
neglect of land by Palestinian farmers. This was due to
superior employment attraction in Israel for Palestinian
workers (excluding periods of security seige), flooding of
Palestinian markets by Israeli cheap products, and general
lack of security in terms of movement or future prospects
(UNEP, 1992)
Long periods of curfew and internal security conditions
particularly after the Intifada, restricted the Palestinian
farmers' ability to attend to their land and forced them to
neglect and sometimes abandon it. Entire crops were
completely ruined in cases where the curfew coincided with
the harvest. Valuable crops were extensively damaged by the
IDF and Israeli settlers in the occupied territories, who
had also caused serious damage to the environment by the
felling and burning of trees and the destruction of
valuable olive trees (B'Tselem 1992).
As a consequence of the neglect of land there had been a
neglect of essential services and activities related to
agriculture such as research, manpower, institutions,
extension work and development of financial lending
institutions.
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The IDF destroyed mature trees and green areas within city
boundaries for security reasons. This resulted in depriving
the towns and the population of an important commodity.
Trees in the middle of Nablus main city square and
alongside Al Hussain Street were uprooted after the
intifada for security reasons, (Hanbali, 1992, Touqan,
1993, Plate 38 below).
2.4 Israeli Activities:
In addition to policies and practices of the Israeli
occupation authorities, which had both direct and indirect
effect on the Palestinian environment, there were other
actions which had an adverse effect on the environment
including:
1) Transfer of polluting industries: Cases included;
a- the case of the reclamation and reprocessing of used
motor oil from Israel, forced to close by Israeli
pressure groups and therefore relocated in Palestinian
areas-northern region of the West Bank- releases toxic
and carcinogenic fumes. (UNCTAD/ TD/B/40(1)/8, para.59,
p.24, 1993).
b- the location of an Israeli quarry close to Al Deheisha
refugee camp in Bethlehem cause noise and air
pollution, case taken to court and won in 1988 and was
not moved until UNCTAD report was published, (ibid).
2) Uprooting of trees as a form of collective punishment:
At least 150,000 trees have been uprooted after the
Intifada (UNEP/GC.16/5, para 59, p.13, 1992 &
UNCTAD/TD/B/40(1)/8, para 71, p. 27, 1993).
3) Long successive curfews and general security problems:
This made access to land very difficult and dangerous
for farmers who neglected the land and sometimes were
forced to abandon it. It also created problems of soil
erosion as terraces collapsed and whole mountains
sides had lost their top soil (B'Tselem 1990/1991,
p.55, UNEP, 1992 & UNCTAD, 1993).
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Summary:
The deterioration of the urban and rural environment in the
OPT can be summarised as:
(1) Urban :-
-	 Overcrowding of towns and cities as boundaries were
not allowed to expand, (Chapt.VI & VII).
-	 Overloaded service networks and infrastructure and
insufficient road stock, (Sect. 1 above).
-	 Shortage of open areas, parks and green fields in
cities, (Chapt. IV, Sect. 2).
-	 Increase in traffic congestion within cities and
consequently more air pollution from gas and fuel
emission, (Sect. 1 above, App. A,& Table 25, 28).
- Illegal building including conversion of housing units
to factories, exceeding allowed heights, horizontal
projection on streets and adjacent sites with serious
environmental implications, (Chapt IV, Sect. 2, App.A,
p. 464 & 468).
(2) Rural :-
-	 Destruction of land suitable for rural development
-	 Damage to green cover, felling of trees and
eradication of forests.
- Decrease in the area of land available for cultivation
as a result of the confiscation of agricultural land
for security reasons and for settlement building.
-	 Decrease in area of land available for grazing.
-	 Damage to crops resulting from settlers use of
pesticides and weed killers.
-	 Decertification to what used to be/could be green
areas.
- Restrictions imposed on the use of water by
Palestinian farmers for agricultural use in addition
to long periods of curfews and general security
conditions prevailing in the OPT since 1987, forced
Palestinian farmers to neglect their farms and
sometimes to abandon it (UNEP 1992).
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Conclusion:
During the occupation, the Israeli authorities were
responsible for all policies and decisions related to the
development of transportation, communication, public
utilities, and infrastructure in the occupied territories.
Most applications for new projects and expansion and
upgrading were rejected or obstructed
According to the World Bank Agenda for the 1990's, the
determinants of urban environmental degradation in
developing countries are identified in as;
1) Economic and Management Policies: absence of
protective actions due to inadequate economic and
management policies. Inappropriate measures such as
under-pricing water and other services usually result
in source depletion and higher levels of pollution.
2) Land Use: inadequate land use control or inappropriate
land tenure systems usually hinder the effective use
of land leading to over- regulation of land markets.
3) Curative Actions: inadequate curative actions such as
the use of inappropriate technologies, inadequate
investment in pollution control and insufficient
control of environmental regulations.
4) Political Implementation: insufficient political will
particularly when public environmental awareness has
not yet been developed (World bank, Agenda for the
1990)
As was demonstrated above and in previous chapters, the
Israeli authorities took few preventative or curative
measures to control environmental degradation in the OPT,
(Chapter V, Section 2). Israel also had the full control of
land and its use which was mainly geared to serve its own
political objectives, (Chapter VI, Section 1).
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Therefore, the environmental degradation in the OPT under
the Israeli administration can be contributed to all four
determinants as identified in the World Bank Agenda.
In addition to the absence of any economic and management
policies in the Palestinian territories after 1967 and of
any measures to protect and improve the environment, the
Israeli authorities policies and practices during the
occupation had increased and accelerated the degradation of
the environment. This was manifested by various legislation
and enactments they imposed to control development,
restrictions on use of land and other natural resources and
other actions carried out by the army and the settlers in
the occupied territories. This was corroborated by users
views in the results of the questionnaire survey, (App. A,
p. 464, 468, Tables 20, 28 & 29, & Plates 22-26)
Thus the condition of public utilities and infrastructure
continued to deteriorate as a result of lack of planning,
management, appropriate policies and funding during the
occupation. The deterioration of these services resulted in
environmental damage in rural and urban areas.
Furthermore, planning and development policies, control of
land, water and natural resources, together with military
actions, had also contributed to the degradation in the
environmental conditions in Palestine.
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Environmental Conditions
1. Blocked rain pipes in Zone "A"
2. Broken pavement and blocked
drains in Zone "B"
3. Burst water pipe and broken
pavement in Zone "C"
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Environmental Conditions
Zone "C"
1. Inadequate protection of building sites and
accumulation of rubbish in empty sites.
2. Empty sites used to dump rubbish creating health and
environmental, hazards.
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Environmental Conditions
1. Rubbish accumulation in Zone WA
2. Rubbish accumulation in Zone "B"
2.
Plate (24)
1pp.
- T -—	 •1
r	
j
.
Environmental Conditions
-
,•1', &'
Exposed wiring and unprotected
electrical connections; common
practice in the old city.
Plate (25)
I	 I	 I	 .-
Street Vendors
1. Entrance (security gate) to the old city.
Shopkeepers moved to the main square.
2. Street vendors in Ghernata street, Zone "B".
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CHAPTER VI
The Israeli Administration of the Occupied Palestinian
Territories, (1967-1994):
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Introduction
The literature points out that, immediately after the
occupation, the Israeli authority began to extend its
control over Palestinian land and the local population by
issuing and implementing military enactments dealing with
every facet of civilian life, (Chapter II). An Israeli
Military Area Commander was appointed and was endowed with
all legislative, executive and judicial powers previously
held under Jordanian and Egyptian governments. Thus, as
will be demonstrated below, Israel embarked on a process
of irreversible change to the administrative structures,
laws and regulations that prevailed on the eve of the
occupation much of which, as will be shown, had an adverse
effect on the lives of Palestinians and the deterioration
of their towns.
Contrary to international laws 32, governing one country's
military occupation of another, Israel took permanent and
drastic measures to change laws, impose restrictions on
movement, and the personal freedom of Palestinians and
their ability to build, expand, invest or benefit from
outside aid and investment. It also engineered plans to
move the local population out of their land and property,
and to move its own population into the occupied
territories to replace its original owners.
All through the occupation, Israel ignored all United
Nations Security Council resolutions and the international
community's continuous demand for its withdrawal from the
territories it occupied in 1967. It also defied all
resolutions to halt the process of land confiscation,
building of Jewish colonies on Palestinian land and the
expulsion of Palestinians from their country.
32	 Refer to:
- The Hague Regulation, 1907
- Fourth Geneva Convention, 1949
- United Nations and Security Council Resolutions,
reports and directives on the Palestinian Occupied
Territories and the Question of Palestine between
1967-1994.
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In addition to imposing restrictions on land use, building
and development permits and on the powers of municipal
councils, the Israeli administration made little attempt to
address the problems and needs of the local population and
its welfare. The Israeli policies and restrictions created
a situation of fear and uncertainty amongst the Palestinian
population which discouraged them from investing in the
improvement of their towns and living conditions which will
be further described in Chapter VIII below, (Tables 17 &
18)
The aim of this, and the following two chapters is to
explore the Israeli administration's policies and practices
and examine to what extent did these affect the prospects
for urban development in Palestinian towns in general and
the physical condition of the built environment in Nablus,
as a representative case. It will analyse the various
policies and practices, that are believed to have created
obstacles to development, to demonstrate how each factor
contributed individually and collectively with other
factors to the deterioration in the built environment.
To enable an understanding of how structures and powers of
various institutions were changed, and how amendments and
additions to original laws were introduced, the relevant
military orders, that were directly responsible for these
changes, are examined. It is also important to study how
these orders initially evolved and were gradually amended.
More significantly, how they have been implemented to
provide greater controls on the occupied population and its
territories.
It is neither the intention nor is it within the capacity
of this research to present a thorough comparative analysis
of all the legislative and administrative changes that took
place under the occupation between 1967 and 1994. This
section will therefore only examine the changes that might
have had an impact on urban development and the ability of
Palestinians to carry out policies to improve their built
environment and living conditions. As this covers a wide
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range of issues, each worthy of a separate investigation,
only a summary of the changes that highlights the aspects
directly related to the subject matter are covered here.
Following this, the impact of the various restrictions
imposed by the complex network of military orders and
security measures enforced by the Israeli administration is
examined on:
1. the prospects for the development of Palestinian towns
and on plans to improve physical and environmental
conditions;
2. the ability of Palestinian local authorities,
professional and academic institutions to play an
effective role in the urban development of Palestinian
urban centres; and
3. the willingness and ability of building owners and
users to invest in the improvement of their
environment, and the expansion or upgrading of their
properties and business and to contribute to the
development of their towns.
This and the following two chapters will present evidence
based on the integration of data collected and obtained
through documents and literature, available at the time of
the study, interviews and the questionnaire results and the
authors own observation, (Chapter III, Sect. 1, 2, 4 &5).
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TION 1: ArlalysiB of Military Orders concerning planning
issues and construction procedures:
The Israeli authorities started issuing military orders
from the first day of the occupation. These have been used,
as will be demonstrated, as tools to control the occupied
population, its movement, actions, ability to use its
natural resources and to restrict future social and
economic development prospects. This section examines how
the orders evolved and developed to demonstrate the extent
of control that the Israeli authorities have achieved by
issuing these orders.
The following military orders were selected out of over
1500 orders (1377 numbered) and their implications
analyzed to illustrate how certain disciplines related to
urban development, came under the total control of the
military authorities soon after the occupation and to what
effect. The list is by no means exhaustive.
1.1 Acquisition of land and natural resource and control
over their use:
1.1.1 Acquisition and Control of Land:
Immediately after they seized the Palestinian territories,
the Israeli authorities used a variety of methods to bring
Palestinian land under their command. Some of the first
Military Orders issued in the early days of the occupation
dealt with the issue of land control. UNCTAD reported in
1987 that 90% of Palestinian land seized by Israel was
privately owned (UNCTAD/ ST/SEU/3, l987,p.2). The following
is a summary of the methods used and the relevant military
orders, issued to "legalise" the confiscation procedures,
(Table 10).
M.O. No.1377 issued 12.7.1992 was the last numbered
order issued at the time the survey was completed.
Apart from M.O. 1369 issued in December 1992, an un-
quantifiable number of M.O.s was yet to be issued.
Most of the numbered orders were published
chronologically, although that was not usually the
case of unnumbered orders (JMCC, 1993).
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(a) Land considered "Absentee Property"
- Military Order 58 (23.7.1967), concerning Absentee
property deals with what the authorities called "abandoned
property". The absentee property is defined in the order
as "property whose legal owner, or whoever is granted the
power to control it by law, left the area prior to 7 June
1967 or subsequently." In practice this order allows the
Area Commander to appoint a custodian of absentee property
to whom any right that was previously granted to the owner
was to be automatically transferred. In reality,
"absentees" refer to the Palestinians, from the West Bank
and Gaza Strip, who either; 1. were out of the country at
the time the war broke out in 1967 ( many at the time were
working in other Arab countries and abroad, or studying at
Arab universities), or 2. fled the territories as a result
of the war. Although hundreds of thousands of Palestinians
came under the above categories, very few were allowed back
to their homeland and lost their right to claim their
property as a result. Many Palestinians were also expelled
from their country for what Israel described as security
reasons.
The Israeli authorities refusal to allow those Palestinians
to return to their homeland had far reaching consequences
including the separation of many families and subsequently
the inability of those members who were allowed to stay to
use their land and property.
Theoretically, according to the order, the custodian should
have returned the property or a similar property to the
owner if he returned "legally" to the area and could prove
his/her ownership. However, very few absentees were allowed
to return and the proof of ownership was usually very
difficult to establish as will be discussed below. More
significantly, Article 5 of the order states that;
"any transaction carried out in good faith between the
custodian of absentees property and any other person,
concerning property, will not be void andwill continue
to be valid even if it is subsequently proved that the
property was not at that time absentee property".
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In effect, the order gave the authorities under the guise
of custodian of absentee property, the right to take over
and control Palestinian land regardless of the residency
status of its rightful owner.
Other orders followed extending the powers of the custodian
such as M.O. 150 (23.10.1967), which also gave him control
of company shares belonging to any absentee owner;
"Any company with absentee share-holder should report
the fact and provide appropriate documentation. The
appropriate authorities have the right to take control
of the assets and running of any business owned by an
absentee person. All money and dividends due to a
person residing in a hostile state will be deemed an
absentee' s money".
The significance of the last paragraph is that it affected
the property and money owned by the majority of exiled
Palestinians, who were not allowed to return. Most of whom
lived in other Arab countries which were considered
"hostile" as they were all in a state of war with Israel.
(b) Land declared "State Proterty"
- Military Order 59 (31.7.1967), concerning state property
was issued soon after the occupation and enabled the
Israeli occupation authorities to declare vast areas of
Palestinian land as "state property" under various
pretexts. The order defined state property as;
i.	 All property which on the specified date (i.e. 6 June
1967) pertained to one of the following:
(a) the enemy state,
(b) a juridical body in which the enemy state
possessed any right, whether directly or indirectly,
and whether the right referred to control or not;
ii. Property which was registered on the specified day in
the name of one of the above two;
iii. Property in which one of the above two was a partner
on the specified date;
iv. Property in respect of which on the specified date one
of the two mentioned in (i) above was either the owner
in partnership, or a registered owner, or was in
possession.
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According to the order property could be both movable and
immovable and included items such as money, bank accounts,
vehicles, transportation equipment, quarries and mining
areas. The state property was placed under the control of
the Custodian of state property who had the jurisdiction to
negotiate contracts, manage, maintain, develop or otherwise
dispose of the property in whichever way he deemed
necessary.
Furthermore, Article 5 of the order states that;
"every transaction made in good faith between the
custodian and another person concerning property the
custodian considers, at the time of the transaction,
to be state property, shall not be cancelled and shall
continue to be binding even if it is proven that the
property in question was not state property at the
time when the transaction was made"
The significance of the above article is that it did, in
effect, allow the custodian the freedom to deal with any
land whether it was state property or not. According to
Shehadeh, a careful reading of this order in its original
unamended form reveals that it was intended to enable the
Custodian of Government property (which office was created
by M.O. 59) to assume control over and to manage the
property of the Jordanian government (Shehadeh, p.27,
1988)
The law regulating land ownership in the West Bank is the
Ottoman Land Code , which was amended over the years by
Quote cited in "Israeli Military Orders 1967-1992",
314CC, p.9, 1993.
According to the Land Code, all lands in the WB are
classified into the following categories :
1. Wakf land: lands dedicated to pious purposes
2. Mulk land: lands that were initially given out
by the Ottoman Sultan and, then,
ruler of the area to Muslim residents and the
Kharaj lands to the non-Muslims;
3. Miri, Matruk, and Nawat land: Considered by the
Israeli authority as state lands. Miri lands are
lands which the Ottoman Emir did not allow to be
dedicated to Waqf or given out as Mulk. It
continues to remain under the Emir's jurisdiction
who would grant its use to the public.
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the British and the Jordanians. The theoretical basis of
land law in the West Bank was the Jordanian Law . At the
time of the occupation only one third of the land in the
West Bank had been registered according to the "Settlement
of Disputes over Land and Water Law". According to
Shehadeh, the inspection of records of land registered
before 1967 shows that only 13% of land in the West Bank
was in fact registered in the name of the state. It was
never the practice of the Jordanian government then, nor is
it the practice of the present government to consider lands
except lands falling in the Waqf and Mulk categories as
state land.
However, Jordanian Law No. 49 of 1953 removed all the
restrictions previously imposed on the extent of use which
the possessor of miri land could make of the land, thus
removing any practical difference that existed between
powers of the owner of mulk land and the owner of miri
land. Furthermore, Jordanian Law No. 41, 1953 transferred
all miri lands falling within municipal boundaries as mulk
land. The present Israeli policy was to consider all miri
land as "state land" (Ibid, p.24).
M.O.59 also allowed the Military Commander to declare
uncultivated, unregistered land as "state land", unless the
ownership could be proved to the Ministry of Justice and
the Military (later "Civil") Administration.
According to the Ottoman Land Code, land which had not been
under cultivation by its owner during the previous ten
36 In theory, the basis of the English land law is
similar to this law. All the land came into the
ownership of the crown after the Norman invasion when
it was acquired by conquest. The crown gave
out land to the people to use in accordance with
different tenures. However, the maxim "no land without
a lord" has always applied, and the ultimate lord is
the crown. In practice, the only lands which
are in the actual ownership of the crown are those
areas classified as crown-hold. The rest are in the
actual possession of their registered owner or user
(Shehadeh,1988).
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years and to which proof of continuous cultivation could
not be produced, was considered "state land" and,
therefore, became eligible for expropriation. This was also
extended, by the Israeli authorities, to include land the
Israeli army and Jewish settlers had destroyed and uprooted
its fruit bearing trees and olive trees, which were planted
by the Palestinians. Thus, such land was later re-
classified as "uncultivated" and subsequently confiscated.
The order also states that no one could have ownership
claims to land improperly registered or surveyed. In
addition to the high cost of surveying and registering
land, and inaccessibility of the land registration
Department to Palestinians, the Israeli authorities stopped
the process of land registration after the issue of
Military Order 291 (19.12.1968).
The difficult requirements of "satisfactory" proof of
ownership of unregistered, uncultivated land, together with
the restrictions imposed on cultivation and the systematic
destruction of cultivated land resulted in vast areas of
land becoming "state" land by default. Consequently
hundreds of thousands of donums of land
were seized and confiscated.
- Military Order 364 (27.12.1967), superseded M.O.59 by
expanding the definition of "state property" to include any
property the owner of which was unable to prove before a
military committee that it was his private property
(according to the rules of evidence which they determine).
The order helped in expediting the transfer of more
Palestinian land to be used for building Jewish colonies by
declaring it "state" land. The order rendered;
"a mere declaration by the authorities that land is
state land, is sufficient proof for the land to be
considered as such until the opposite is proven".
Thus, the burden of proof lay not on the party making the
claim but the party contesting it.
One donum equals 1000 sq. meters.
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- Military orders 321 (28.3.1969) and 949 (30.11.1981)
amended Jordanian Law of Expropriation 2, 1953 and
transferred all appointments made or jurisdiction granted
under this law, by the Jordanian government, to the Israeli
Officer in Charge. The consequence of the order was that it
allowed the Israeli military authority to seize land for
"public purpose" which was subsequently transferred to be
used for establishing and expanding Jewish colonies. The
owners of land declared "state land" were subject to heavy
fines and imprisonment if they resisted the confiscation
order.
These orders brought about serious changes to the Jordanian
Law including the introduction of a military authority
appointed by the Military Commander which was given all the
powers and privileges originally vested in the Jordanian
government. More significantly it cancelled the requirement
to obtain the approval of the Council of Ministers and the
endorsement of the King, the necessity to publish the
approval, and the requirement to submit the pertinent
documents to the land registrar, when the body seeking the
expropriation order was appointed by the Military
Commander.
(c) Land declared "Closed Military Areas"
- Military Order 60 (6.8.1967), concerning closure of
certain areas as military training zones for "security
provisions". The order specifies the zones to be closed and
was followed by other orders specifying more closed areas.
In 1970, Military Order 378 (20.4.1970), gave the military
Commander the power to declare any area a closed military
area. By 1985, 23 closure orders covering over one million
donums were issued. Although the requisition of land should
not in theory affect the ownership of land, the
restrictions it imposed on possession and use effectively
removed it from the control of its rightful owner.
The acquisition of land by this method was used under the
pretext of the Fourth Geneva Convention which allows the
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seizure of land for military purposes, and continued to be
used between 1968 and 1979. The fact that such land was
used for building Jewish settlements was challenged in the
courts successfully in the Elon Moreh settlement case in
1979. The settlement was to be built,like many others, on
private land declared a military closed area.
Although the judge ruled for the claimant, his ruling in
the case facilitated a more "legal" course for the military
authority to pursue. By ruling that international law
prohibits the taking of private property, the court
suggested to the government that it would hold differently
if the property seized were not private property (Shehadeh,
p.21, 1988). The court required two conditions on any
future recourse to the high court in cases of land
requisition or possession by the military authorities
according to Shehadeh;
"1. only seizure of privately owned land could be
prevented or reversed by recourse to the High
Court,
2. The high court was not prepared to intervene in
any dispute over the ownership status of land"
(Ibid)
In effect this meant that if a private owner petitioned the
court over the authorities decision to declare his land
state land, the court was unwilling to consider it. The
settlement of Elon Moreh was later built on "state land",
a short distance from the original site. Thus, the main
method of acquisition of land used by the Israeli
authorities in the OPT, since the Elon Noreh case, was by
declaring it state land.
(d) Land Declared Nature Reserve
Military Order 363 (22 .12 .1969) establishes the
jurisdiction of the nature reserve authority and lists
areas declared as Nature Reserve Areas. The order was
amended by 19 other orders between 1969-1984, some of which
declared more areas under this category such as M.O. nos.
554, 751, 803 and 894.
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The declaration of land as nature reserve did not result in
its confiscation, but in the prohibition of its use for any
other purpose. Since the Israeli authorities had
transferred areas designated as nature reserve under the
British Mandate to the establishment of Jewish settlements,
Benvenisti argues that "nature reserves are considered by
the authorities as an integral part of the land seizure
programme". By 1985, 250,000 donums had been seized under
this pretext ( Benvinisti and Khayat, 1988).
(e) Restrictions on Re gistration and Subdivision of Land
- Military Order 291 (19.12.1968), concerning settlement of
disputes over land and water. The order amended the
Jordanian Land and Water regulation Law 40, 1952 and
halted the process of land registration. Consequently,
since 1968 Palestinians were unable to register their
lands, which in addition to the requirement to prove
continuous cultivation, allowed Israel to confiscate vast
areas of land.
The order also gave the Military Commander the jurisdiction
to cancel any regulation in the law or any land or water
transactions even if these were ratified by civil courts.
Restrictions imposed on the transfer of land and on its
subdivision further impeded the ability of Palestinians to
develop it. In this instance Israel followed Jordanian Law
no. 79, 1966 Article 28, which required the subdivision of
land or parcellation schemes to be; "in accordance with a
planning scheme approved by the local commission". The
Jordanian law required that parcellation schemes followed
approved outline and detailed plans.
The Jordanians had little time to prepare such plans to
enable the enforcement of the Law. However, between the
issue of Law 79 in 1966 and the war of 1967, the Jordanian
authorities continued to give permits despite of the lack
of	 plans.	 Israeli	 planning	 authorities
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continued this practice for few years after the occupation
and until the Likud government was elected and the Central
Planning Department came under the control of more extreme
elements of the administration.
The Israeli authorities also did not allow the subdivision
of land and its re-registration under more than one
Palestinian owner's name, as would be the case of an estate
inherited by a number of persons. According to Coon,
"With large families, most inheritances are divided,
so it seems likely that well over half of the land
which was registered in 1967 is not registered in the
name of its present owner; hence only about one sixth
of the West Bank is registered in the name of its
present owner. Permission to subdivide the rest is
rarely given, and consequently building permits are
withheld" (Coon, p.115, 1992).
The inability of Palestinians to register their land or to
subdivide it became one of the main obstacles to
development as the Israeli authorities rejected
applications for building permit if the applicant was not
the registered owner of the land.
This is not a requirement under Jordanian law, which also
considers that land title may be proved by purchase and
use. In Jordanian Law no 79, article 2(26), the owner is
defined thus;
"Owner in relation to any land or building means the
registered or reputed owner thereof and, includes:
partner, trustee, agent, person receiving rent,
occupant,... person holding a building permit for the
land or building,... architect, builder, contractor or
their representatives."
The categories of land which the Israeli authorities
refused to subdivide, and consequently the owners were
unable to develop include:
(a) unregistered land: which comprises two thirds of the
land in the West Bank;
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(b) land registered in more than one name: either
because it was originally registered under the
family name, or if it was inherited by more
than one member of the family;
(C) land incorrectly registered: either incorrectly
recorded in the registration records as a result of
surveying error or in an attempt of owners to under-
represent it for tax reasons;
(d) absentee land and land falling under the conditions
detailed in section.. above;
(e) land seized by the Israelis: by methods detailed in
items 1-4 of this section (Coon, p.116, 1992)
In conclusion, the Israeli authorities required each
building on its own plot which was registered in the single
name of the applicant. As discussed above, most of the land
was either unregistered, incorrectly registered, registered
under more than one name, or was already seized by the
Israeli authorities for any of the above reasons. Since the
authorities halted the land registration process in 1968
most land owners were unable to subdivide their land or
obtain a building permit.
According to Coon, there were very few formal plots which
qualified for obtaining a building permit outside municipal
boundaries. The Civilian Administration required that any
applicant should prepare a detailed plan for his plot.
Apart from the cost involved in preparing such plan, it
usually had a low chance of success.
In later years, the Civilian Administration also required
applicants within municipal boundaries to prepare a
detailed plan where plot boundaries need to change to allow
any development to take place. This requirement created a
serious obstacle to development and further undermined the
role of municipalities (Ibid, Table (9), p.120).
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LOCATIONS AFFECTED
Land registered in the name of
the Jordanian government -
mainly In Jordan Valley, and
military bases
Other land presumed to have
been in the ownershipof the
Jordanian government
Uncultivated and unregistered
land ... ie. mainly away from
villages, and In the south
Unregistered land
AREA SEIZED
(hectares)
52,700'
17,300 1
	(1980)
110,000	 (atrnid-1984)'
Table (10)
METHOD
1. Declaration as Abandoned
Land
2. Compulsory acquisition
2,1 Israeli Law
2.2. Jordanian Law
(as amended)
3. Purchase from Arab owners
3.1 by Hamanuta
3.2 by Israeli companies
4. RequisitIon for Military
Purposes
PERIOD
Mainly 1967; also
1967 to present
1967 to present
Mainly since 19802
1979 to present2
1968-1979
LOCATIONS AFFECTED
Widespread; towns as well as
rural areas
East Jerusalem only
Main roads and access roads to
settlements, also settlements
in early 1970&
Approximately 30 locallon&;
used (or Jewish sctticmcnt
as well as milltaiy purposes.
AREA SEIZED
(hectares)
7.333	 (1973)
plus
35,800 identified' (1973)
2,000+'
5,000'
plus
10.000 Identified for purchase3
) (believed to be small)
4,668'
METHOD
	 PERIOD
5. Declaration as State Land
5.1 Taking possession of
	
1967
Jordanian government land
1968.1976
5.2 Declanng additional
	
From 198(Y
land to be state land
30,000	 (at mid-1984)3
identified for
seizure
6. Closure for MilItary	 Mostly in the Jordan Valley. 	 c. 100,0002
Purposes	 Most but not all of this land
has been seized and Is Included
In categones 1,2,3 or 3.
Halab, Usamah, Turner. Mon. Benvenisi,, Mercin Land Alrnaii. sin the We,i Bash - A Legal and Spatial Analysis West Bank Data Ilate Project, Jerusalem, 1965.
Shehadeh, Raa ccupiers Law Institute for Pa estine Studies, Washington DC. 1985.
Benvenisti, Meson and Khayat, Shiomo The V*st Bask and Gaza Alias West Bank Data Base Propxi. Jerusalem. 1984.
ethods of Land Seizure
ource: Coon, 1992
Coon summarizes the dilemma which faced Palestinians with
regard to development permits, thus;
"It works like this: The Israelis have stopped the
process of land registration- so most Palestinian land
is not formally registered- so the Israelis do no
recognize ownership rights to that land- so they do
not allow subdivision of that land- so they refuse
development permits." (Ibid, p.114).
1.1.2 Control of Water
Military Order 92 (15.8.1967), concerning Jurisdiction over
water regulations, this order amended the Jordanian law on
water. It vested all powers defined in any Jordanian law
dealing with water in the hands of an Israeli officer
appointed by the Area Commander. Military order 158
(19.11 .1967), prohibited the construction of any new water
installation without a permit. It gave the Officer in
Charge the right to refuse a permit, revoke or amend a
license, without justification. Military order 291,
discussed above declared all prior settlements of disputes
regarding water invalid, thus increasing the jurisdiction
of the Officer. Order 291 above also rendered all
settlements of disputes regarding water no longer valid,
thus increasing the jurisdiction of the officer.
1.2 Control of planning and construction procedures:
In addition to orders issued concerning the control of land
and restricting its use, two military orders were issued in
the early years of the occupation which had serious
implications for the lives of Palestinians and the
development of their land. The orders, their subsequent
amendments and rigorous implementation by the Israeli
authorities completed the circle of full control, by the
occupier, of all planning, building and development
activities of those under his occupation.
1.2.1 Restrictions on Construction works:
Military Order 393 (14.6.1970) concerning supervision of
construction works gives the area Commander the
jurisdiction to prohibit, limit, halt the construction of
any building if he thinks that it endangers the security of
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the Israeli military forces, and to demolish or take down
any building or part of a construction which defies this
order.
1.2.2 changes in Planning laws and administrative
structures:
(a) Historical Background of Town Planning in Palestine
Ottoman Laws:
Statutory town planning had been established in Palestine
since the later stages of the Ottoman occupation in the
19th century. The Ottoman Laws provided for the
registration of land and established land courts and
relevant jurisdiction. Although the system regulating
rights of land, ownership and tenure was complex and caused
confusion, the law governing land use became more
sophisticated. It dealt with strategic issues such as
planning and construction of new roads and railways,
establishing transport networks and other utilities 38•
At the local level, the municipal council was given powers
relating, amongst other things, to the provision of streets
and pavements, construction of public buildings, markets,
water pipelines and expropriation of land for public use.
The Ottoman system remained for most part in force
throughout the Mandatory period and for another twenty
eight years under Israeli law (Fruchtinan, Chapter II, p.22,
1986)
British Mandate Ordinances:
Town planning under British Mandate in Palestine maintained
most of the Ottoman laws. It brought more refinements and
additions and was largely based on British legislation. The
Central Mandatory government, however, exercised more
powers in Palestine.
The Ottoman planning laws were based on 19th century
Law of Administration of Vilayet, 1871; Law of
Construction and Alignment of Streets, 1891, cited by
Fruchtman, 1986.
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A lot of progress was made in town planning under the
British Mandate. It was regulated by Town Planning
Ordinances of 1921 and 1936. Under 1921 Ordinance, skeleton
schemes were prepared for designated town planning areas
including Jerusalem and Nablus (Coon, p.40, 1992).
The 1936 Ordinance established the District Commissions, a
middle level of planning authority between the central and
local authorities, and a comprehensive system of
development control was achieved. A new Ordinance was
published in 1945 in Palestine but was never enacted.
(b) Jordanian Planning System:
Although the Jordanian Planning Law is generally based on
a combination of Ottoman and British Mandate Law, the 1936
Ordinance remains the basis of all subsequent planning in
Jordan, and in Israel to a great extent.
On the eve of the occupation, the planning law that
prevailed in the West Bank was the Jordanian Law of Cities,
Villages and Buildings, No.79, 1966. The law superseded the
Law of Planning for Cities, Villages and Buildings no. 31,
1955.
In theory, planning legislation in the West Bank has
maintained all plans and regulations prepared under
previous legislation. No new plans or regulations were
published after 1967 in the OPT, and it was not clear which
of the original plans and regulations were still in force
(Coon, 1992)
Planners who worked at Nablus municipality at the time the
survey was carried out, stated that they believed some
plans existed although they could not produce evidence of
any. The Israeli planning Department was inaccessible to
this author to verify the information (Chapter III, Sect.1)
Planning Authorities: The Jordanian Planning authority
constitutes a multi level hierarchy. Under Law 79, 1966,
three levels were established representing central,
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district and local authorities (re. Section I, articles 4-
10 of the Law).
The Central Authority is represented by the Higher Planning
Council (HPC) headed by the Minister of Interior with
representatives of municipal councils, relevant ministries
and professional institutions; the District Committee
level, headed by the Governor, also includes
representatives of various ministries, and a representative
of the relevant local authority. The Local level is
represented by elected Municipal Councils or elected
Village Councils. A Central Planning Department was
established to act as a consultant to the HPC and other
committees, prepare surveys and plans, provide technical
advice to the HPC regarding plan preparation and approval,
and the granting and appeal of building permits.
The Law also provides for a hierarchy of three development
plans (regional, skeletal (outline), detailed plans and a
plan for the subdivision of land "parcellation plan" (re.
Table No.).
Section (III) of the Law details all the information and
regulations required to be shown on the various plans,
their extent and contents.39
The plans vary in the level of their details. The Law
requires that development should be carried out according
to the following plans:
1. Physical and Social Survey Plans: prepared by the
Central Planning Department (Article 14).
2. Regional Plans: These are prepared when the need
arises by the Central Planning Department for all
regions in the Kingdom (Article 15). The Regional
Plans show location of towns or their new extended
The authorities responsible for the preparation of
these plans are included in the description of duties
of each authority in Section (I) of the Law (re. Table
No..).
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boundaries,	 general zoning,
	 roads,	 transport,
infrastructure and communication at the regions level.
3. Skeletal Plans: These are prepared by the relevant
Local Committees for all towns in the Kingdom (Article
19). The Skeletal Plans (outline plans) contain all
land use in the area covered by the plan, including
prospects for urban and socio-economic development in
that area. The plans show in more detail zoning of
various uses and public utilities with detailed
building regulations.
4. Detailed Plans: These include:
1) Plans prepared by Local Committees for
various parts of towns in accordance with
the Skeletal Plan (Article 23).
ii) Combined Skeletal/Detailed plans for
villages and small towns prepared by their
respective local authority (Article 23-2).
These are prepared for areas within an approved
Skeletal Plan. A Detailed Plan includes location of
various public buildings, plot sizes, setbacks and
elevations. It also classifies areas of special
historic or architectural values and identifies areas
for redevelopment or expropriation for public use.
5. Parcellation Plans: Prepared by the Developer to the
approval of the Local Committee and in accordance with
an approved Detailed Plan (Article 28).
Cc) The Israeli Planning System:
The Israeli planning system was also based on the British
Mandate Planning Ordinance of 1936. Although it was revised
in 1965 with a number of further modifications since, it
still follows the same spirit of the British Law (Jerayseh,
1993). Therefore, it only differs in detail from the
Jordanian Planning mechanism.
The Israeli Planning Law maintained the three tier system
of Central, District and Local planning levels represented
as follows:
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i. Central Level: The National government is represented by
the Minister of Interior or his representative at the
Regional Planning level. The Regional Committee is
comprised of 11 members representing various ministries,
local municipal councils, professional organisations, women
organisations, Higher NGO's Council and representative of
the settlements organization.
ii. District Level: Is represented by the District
Committee, which comprises representatives of various
government departments and professional bodies with five
public representatives and one independent member.
iii. Local Level: represented by municipal, village and
neighbourhood councils and elected every five years.
Development plans also follow a hierarchy similar to the
Jordanian Development plans. The development is carried out
according to regional, district and local plans prepared by
their respective authorities.
Cd) Planning in the Palestinian Territories under the
Israeli Administration:
Theoretically, during the occupation, planning in the West
Bank was in accordance with Jordanian Law No.79, 1966.
However, ten military orders issued between 1970 and 1988
all but annulled the Jordanian Law. The most significant of
these orders is Military Order 418 (23.3.1971). The issue
of this order had far reaching consequences on urban
development in Palestine and the lives of Palestinians
during the occupation.
M.O.418 amended the Jordanian Law of planning cities,
villages and buildings No 79, 1966 and drastically changed
the planning procedures and administrative structures of
planning authorities. It effectively removed the
participation by all local authorities, academic and
professional institutions and national planning committees
in decisions affecting planning and land use. It also
restricted the licensing powers of municipalities and
transferred the regional, district and village planning
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committees to an Israeli Higher Planning Council. The ten
additional orders which amended M.O.418 were issued between
1974 and 1991 and gave more powers to planning committees
run by Israelis (Table 12 ).
Since the issue of this order, almost all planning powers
were transferred from the authorities designated by Law
No.79 to others appointed by the Israeli military Area
Commander, (Table 13). The most significant changes brought
by this order are:
Planning Structure:
1.	 The powers of the (Jordanian) minister were
transferred to the "person in charge" who was
appointed by the Area Commander (Article 1/a and
2.1).
2. The Higher Planning Council (HPC) was taken over by
the Israeli authorities and members of the council
were appointed by the Israeli Commander (Article
4/a)
3. The District Committees planning level was abolished
and the powers of the Committees were transferred to
the HPC (Article 2.2).
4. The powers of the local Committees were transferred to
a special planning Committee appointed by the HPC
(4/b)
5. The Village Councils- elected and considered as local
committees under Jordanian Law- were dissolved and
their powers transferred to the Village Planning
Committees (sub- committees within, and appointed by,
the new HPC) (Article 2.4).
6. The Municipal Councils were allowed to continue as
local committees although they lost most of their
legislative and executive powers which were
transferred to the HPC (Chapter VII below).
7. Powers of the Central Planning Department, appointed
by the minister and acting as a consulting body within
the Ministry under Jordanian Law, were transferred to
a new CPD within, and appointed by the HPC, (Tables
11, 12 & Diagram 2).
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Powers:
The new HPC appointed by the Area Commander was vested with
ultimate powers (original and additional special powers) by
M.O.418 to;
1. amend, delay, cancel or disregard any previously
approved plan or permit,
2. assume any of the powers of any of the above mentioned
committees and authorities,
3. issue, amend, or dispense with the requirement for any
permit normally under the jurisdiction of any of the
above committees.
Consequently, the Order gave the HPC the power to disregard
all provisions of the Planning Law, and thus the Law could
no longer deliver sound, consistent, informed and
democratic planning decisions. As Coon noted;
"since the HPC is answerable only to the military
commander, and particular articles of the order are
never quoted in decisions, citizens do not know
whether official actions are sanctioned by the
Planning law or by the dispensation which the military
commander has given himself to disregard the
provisions of that law."(Coon, p.59, 1992).
Local Palestinian Participation:
To enable a better understanding of the implications of the
changes in the Law, the composition of the various
authorities is examined below, and where possible analyzed
to assess the ability of the newly formed authorities to
plan in the interest of the local Palestinian population
and the ability of those Palestinians to participate at the
various decision making levels. The composition of these
authorities was as follows:
1. The HPC consisted of six Israeli military officers
chaired by the head of the Interior Department in the
Military! Civil Administration. The HPC was located in the
Military headquarters compound which was inaccessible to
Palestinians except by special invitation.
2. The nature, composition and exact responsibilities of
the sub-committees are unknown.It was, however,evident that
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they were all Israelis and almost all of them were
soldiers. The three most important were; the Demolition
Committee, the Settlement Committee and the General
Committee. The tasks of the first two are clear from their
titles, while the general committee was responsible for
Palestinian "development" plans and permits. There was no
Palestinian representation in the first two committees and
limited number of Palestinian staff in the third, but
without powers to make decisions.
3- The Central Planning Department which under Jordanian
Law is responsible for the preparation of regional plans
(Law No.79, Article 7-1/b) and skeletal plans, where these
did not exist (7-1/c), were not, while under Israeli
control, engaged in any planning activities that might have
benefited the Palestinian areas and their communities,
(Table 11). The Department incorporated an "inspectorate"
section which worked in liaison with the demolition
committee to identify Palestinian construction which had no
permit (Coon, p. 61, 1992). Although it was staffed by
Israelis and Palestinians, the Israelis worked in the HQ
and were involved in planning and implementing Jewish
settlements while the Palestinians, with little decision
making powers, were positioned in local offices (Arafat,
Batrawi, Khamayseh, Nabulsi & Shkoukani, 1993).
The head of the Central Planning Department made all
decisions related to planning, land use and building
permits. Although his deputy was Palestinian, he had no
influence on policy formulation or planning decisions
(Coon, 1992). The head of the CPD was also a member of
various committees within the HPC including the main three
sub-committees. He had one of the most influential and
sensitive positions in the whole of the Administration,
(Table 11 &12, Diagram 2).
Therefore, the appointment by the right wing Likud
government of one of its members, who was also a member of
the extreme Gush Emunim movement and a settler of Maaleh
Adumim, in that position, had a detrimental effect on the
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demographic and geographic characteristics of the
Palestinian territories. Until a final political agreement
over the issues of land and Jewish colonies is reached,
decisions made by the HCPD and his department will continue
to have this effect.
The involvement of the HCPD with the settlement planning
and demolition, while being responsible for all decisions
concerning issues related to Palestinian development,
presents a case of conflict of interest demonstrated over
the years by the policies and practices of this department.
Like the HPC, the CPD was located in the military HQ of the
Israeli Occupation Authority. The department became even
more inaccessible to Palestinians when the HCPD moved it to
a Jewish settlement the same year he took over. Eventually,
it moved back to the Military HQ.
4- At the local level, the village committees, which
replaced the original elected councils, were staffed by
Palestinians employed by the Civilian Administration. Their
responsibility was only administrative, since all decisions
were taken by the HPC.
5- By 1967, 25 municipalities had been established in the
West Bank. None was created after the occupation although
the population in some villages exceeded those of some
municipalities. The powers of the municipal councils were
drastically reduced and were put under the control of the
HPC and CPD. No municipal council elections were held after
1976. The results of those elections were not favourable to
the Israeli authorities who eventually expelled their
mayors, dissolved their council and replaced them with
Israeli military councils during 1982-1986, (Chapter VII
below).
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(e) Planning laws in Jewish set€lements:
The Israeli authorities referred to Jewish settlers as the
"local population" when they confiscated land from
Palestinians by either declaring it "state land" or to use
it for "public purposes". Eventually this land was
allocated and used for the "public purpose" of building
Jewish colonies. The establishment of settlements started
by the Labour government soon after 1967, and continued
throughout the occupation. However, there was a gradual and
increasing hardening of attitude towards territorial
compromise and settlements activities over the years. There
was also a different approach and "justification" for such
policy between Labour and Likud, (Map 8). While the Labour
government plans were based on "security" requirements,
they indicated nevertheless areas of Palestinian land, it
was ready to return to Jordan, (Map 8-11). On the other
hand, Likud plans were based on ideological claims for the
right to establish "Greater Israel" in Palestine and showed
ambitious and extensive future building of settlements all-
over the OPT, (Map 12-14).
The Jewish population in the OPT are Israeli citizens and
therefore, enjoyed the benefits and protection of the
Israeli laws. Military Orders regulating Palestinian lives
and affairs were not extended to Jewish settlements.
However, all planning policies and standards in these
settlements were in accordance with the Israeli legislation
and its legal system in every respect (Benvinisti, 1988,
Shehadeh, 1988). The discrimination between application of
different legal systems in the occupied territories was
described in a recent ILO report. The report notes that the
Arab community in the OPT had developed separately from the
newly established Jewish community, the former being
subject to specific legislation governed by a civil
administration placed under the Ministry of Defence while
the latter was subject to Israeli legislation and
favourable treatment.
The report found that the discriminatory situation was
aggravated by the expansion and growth of settlements in
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the OPT. It quotes a 1992 country report on human rights
practices for the United States Department of State on the
dual legal and administrative system and states that;
"Palestinians are treated less favourably than the
Jewish settlers on a broad range of issues, including
the applicability of the right to due process;
residency rights; freedom of movement; sale of crops
and goods; water use; land tenure; ownership and
seizure issues; and access to health and social
services." (ILO, item 125, p.49, 1993).
An earlier ILO Report in 1990 quoted a Country Report on
Human Rights and Practices for 1989 issued by the United
States Department of State, (16) which pointed out that;
"Palestinians are excluded from the Higher Planning
Council, which draws up plans for land use in the
occupied territories, and exercises certain powers
transferred from local municipal and village councils
in 1971, while Israeli settlers are represented on the
Council. Israeli settlements also receive large annual
subsidies from the government, and individual Israelis
may receive inducements to take up residences in the
occupied territories." (ILO, 1990)
1.3 Building Permit Procedures
The issue of M.O. 418 resulted in transfer of all powers
and decisions to give building permits inside and outside
municipalities to the HPC and the CPD.. Building permits
were issued by municipal councils, where these existed,
only to residential buildings, private houses (not to
exceed three at one time for the same application) and
small commercial projects. However, the HPC could still
exercise the powers given to it by the above order to amend
or cancel any permit. Permit application was a cumbersome
and expensive procedure as far as the Palestinians were
concerned, (Table 12 & Diagram 2 & 3).
The speed of obtaining a permit depended on many factors
including the severity of disturbances, and Palestinian
resistance to the military occupation. It also depended on
the people in charge of the CPD 40 The first few years of
40	 Political objectives of different Israeli governments
are expressed in their declared views with regard to
withdrawing from the OPT and are demonstrated in their
plans for Jewish settlements.
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the occupation witnessed a great deal of house building and
some development as the then Israeli government intentions
concerning the future of the OPT were different from those
of Likud which always considered the OPT as part of Israel.
Interviews with Palestinian officials and professionals
confirmed that attitude of Israeli planners, with regard to
building permits, under a Labour government was more
lenient than those under a Likud government,(Hanbali 1992,
H. Arafat, Khayat, Khamayseh & M. Nabulsi, 1993)
1.3.1 Permits outside municipalities:
All decisions concerning granting permits for development
outside municipal boundaries were centralized in the hand
of the head of the CPD and his "civil servants" (Coon, p.
126, 1992). With the abolition of district councils and
local village councils all permit applications had to be
submitted to the CPD and were subject to its approval. In
effect this covered all rural or semi rural areas (inside,
outside and between semi rural-towns and villages), where
70% of the Palestinian population live.
The process of obtaining permits was complicated, unclear
and frustrating, (Coon, Fig. 10, p. 122, 1992). It involved
a number of unpublished internal regulations which were
changed without public knowledge. The complex procedure is
summarised in the attached diagram No 3.
Many obstacles facing Palestinian applicants were created
by new rules and requirements including:
1. need to prove ownership of land (item 1.1.1 above),
2. need for the land to be correctly registered,(ibid),
3. need to prepare the application in accordance with an
approved detailed plan 41,
41 Under Jordanian laws these permits were approved by
the district planning committee, composed of local
citizens. The procedural change introduced by the
Israelis complicated matters as applicants had
virtually no access to the HPC. Therefore they were
unable to follow up, inquire or expedite their
applications which sometimes took years to process
with limited number of applications approved.
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4. the development was required to be in accordance with
the Mandate plans, contrary to Jordanian Law which
does not require building permits to accord with
regional plans.
5. there were no guidelines to enable applicants to
decide the type and location of development that was
allowed by the authorities.
6. the application procedure was lengthy and expensive
and the fees were non-refundable 42 . The average time
for deciding on a permit was usually over a year
although many had to wait for years before a decision
on their application was made. It was impossible to
predict how long a permit would take, or whether it
would have a chance of being approved.
All or some of the above are standard requirements in many
countries. However, in view of the restrictions, imposed by
the Israeli authorities on land use, registration,
subdivision (item 1.1.1) and above all the fact that no
development plan was available to guide applicants, made it
impossible for Palestinians to comply with such demands.
The Israeli authorities set up an "Information Committee"
to decide whether the site in the application was in a
"development area" and to determine whether it complied
with their policies. Decisions to consider an area
"development area" and regulations relevant to the site
were made in secret and without prior Palestinian public
consultation. There was no mechanism through which
Palestinians could find out what the policies were, since
these were not published. This procedure provided no
opportunity for Palestinians to appeal against refusal of
a permit.
42 According to Coon, the cost of a permit to a
Palestinian applicant was likely to average $2500
including surveyors, lawyers and architects which was
likely to be wasted. The same amount of money was paid
by Jewish settlers to purchase highly subsidised three
bedroomed house in a settlement, (Rawley, Gwyn: The
Jewish colonisation of the Nablus Region- Perspectives
and continuing development, p. 352, Geojournal, August
1990, Vol.21 no.4,cited by Coon, p.128, 1992).
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Coon sumniarises what he considers to be the injustice of
this system as; 1. it did not only prevent particular
developments from taking place but also reduced the overall
level of development, 2. the development control procedure
imposed unreasonable costs in terms of its cost
in addition to the time it took, 3. the effect was not only
felt by the individual applicant, but by the whole
community as decisions were made on an ad hoc basis and
consequently the development that took place was
inefficient, fragmented and unbalanced. He quotes a 1987
UNCTAD report which concluded:
"..obstacles to issuing building permits... have
stifled efforts and effectively barred a potentially
large number of families from procuring decent
housing."(Coon, p-i26-128, 1992).
1.3.2 Permits within municipalities:
Military order 418 maintained the ability of municipal
councils to grant building permits within their municipal
boundaries. This however was confined to small private
residential and commercial projects only. Contrary to
Jordanian Law all applications for "public projects" were
required to be submitted to and determined by the CPD. This
included almost all other projects including petrol
stations, mosques, markets, warehouses, workshops and
factories. Permit applications for more than three houses
also fell under such category as these would be considered
"public housing projects".
There was also no mechanism to determine all types of
development under this category as many decisions were
taken in an arbitrary manner and municipalities which were
required to refer such applications to the CPD were never
involved in the decision making process (Hanbali, 1992, H.
Arafat, M. Nabulsi 1993). The procedure under Law no. 79 is
to provide applicants with site regulations based on the
approved Jordanian skeletal "outline" plan according to
which the project will be drawn up and submitted for
approval.This practice continued during the first years of
occupation. In Nablus consideration was given to the
diffIcult topography and steep slopes of the city and
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development was approved for a higher density than that
shown on the original plans, (Table 11).
1.3.3 Role of Palestinian councils:
The procedure to apply and obtain a permit for projects
under the reduced jurisdiction of municipal councils was a
simple and quick operation. In general, the majority of
applications were approved provided they complied with the
basic requirements. This was often easily fulfilled due to
the applicants' knowledge of all zoning restrictions,
(Diagram 3).
Generally, most of the buildings were constructed in
accordance with the terms of a valid permit. After the
Intifada erupted in 1987, municipal councils ability to
exercise their limited powers diminished particularly in
Nablus which was without a mayor or council from 1988 and
until the completion of the survey. However, the problem of
controlling development was not so serious during the first
few years of Intifada since very little construction
activity was taking place (Chapt VII, items 1.2-1.4).
In general, Palestinian councils tried to exercise
reasonable flexibility in granting permits under their
jurisdiction (Hanbali, 1992) in order to help, in their
limited capacity, in meeting basic shelter needs and to
encourage Palestinians to develop their land and improve
their living conditions.
On the other hand, they faced a dilemma with regard to
violations of regulations and carrying out development
without permit. While most of these councils wanted to
implement the law and ensure better standards and quality
of construction, they had no executive authority to enforce
the available legislation. For obvious nationalistic
reasons, these councils could not impose punitive measures
nor would they accept to refer the matter to higher
authorities. The only authority they could go to happened
to be that of their occupier which they considered to be
the cause of their problem.
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Diagram (2)
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On the whole, Palestinian officials wanted to approve as
many permits as possible- within reason- even if it was not
strictly within the planning requirements for various
delicately entangled reasons including:
1. their appreciation of the pressure for expansion which
had not been met and need of the population
for basic housing provision.
2. most if not all housing was provided by the private
sector. Very often the applicants struggled to provide
the funds to build as there were no government or
local subsidies, grants or any public housing.
3. there was a strong resentment towards what
Palestinians considered to be discriminatory treatment
in favour of Jewish settlers and the ease,
speed and substantial government subsidies to provide
them with housing and infrastructure. There was a
surplus of vacant housing units in all Jewish
settlements while Palestinians suffered from acute
housing shortage.
4. there was a real fear amongst the vast majority of
Palestinians that any vacant land was a possible
confiscation target. The fact that most land
confiscated was located outside municipal boundaries
did not alter the fact that land and property within
municipalities such as East Jerusalem and Hebron had
also been confiscated for the use of Jewish settlers.
Palestinians regarded building when and where they
could, not only as a way of meeting a basic need for
shelter, but also as a national duty to safeguard
against, or at least create an obstacle to, the
ability of Israelis to seize more land.
Conclusion
The Israeli Military Orders systematically and gradually
changed the laws and legislation that prevailed before the
occupation concerning the control of;
i. land, water and natural resources,
ii. development and construction activities and
iii. all administrative and planning structures.
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The changes had far reaching consequences for the lives of
Palestinians and their ability to develop their land,
expand and improve their urban centres, which can be
summarised thus:
1. The planning and implementation of an extensive
programme for land confiscation by the Israeli authorities
from 1967 deprived the Palestinian legitimate owners from
68% of their land by 1993, 90% of which was privately
owned. Restrictions imposed on the use, registration,
transfer and subdivision of the remaining land meant that
Palestinians had less than 20% of their original land which
they could develop.
2. The Israeli occupation authorities exercised total
control over all development outside municipal boundaries
and over most development within municipal boundaries.
Moreover, the obstacles and delays Palestinians met in
their effort to expand their municipal boundaries, obtain
approval for any public project outside and within their
boundaries, or merely to obtain a building permit for a
house, meant that they were unable to develop the
diminishing small area of land they still had.
Furthermore, the Israeli authorities had power to prohibit,
halt or demolish any construction, a power often practised
as a security measure to punish, deter and discourage the
Palestinians from carrying out new development. This
situation added to the pressure for development within
existing urban areas. Consequently most of construction
activities were concentrated around the built areas in town
centres. This included extensions and additional floors to
existing buildings, redevelopment of existing buildings and
used land, and new buildings built legally on land with
building permit or illegally risking demolition.
3. The drastic changes in Planning laws and administrative
structures excluded Palestinians from all positions of
power and from any decision making role which would have
enabled them to develop their urban and rural areas
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according to their needs and priorities and improve their
built environment and living conditions.
The abolition of district councils and village councils
and the severe reduction of the powers of municipalities
denied the Palestinian population in urban and rural
areas any representation or mechanism through which they
could convey their views to the central authority.
A recent UNEP report on the environmental situation in the
occupied territories noted that:
"apart from the forcible appropriation of their lands
by the Israeli government, the indigenous Palestinian
and Arab population are denied any effective role in
determining the ways in which even those lands left
for their occupance may be used" (UNEP/GC.16/5).
In conclusion, as Palestinians lost most of their land
under occupation, and also lost their control over the use
of the remaining land, their ability to build, develop, and
expand became very restricted. Various military enactment
passed and implemented with regard to ownership of land and
absentees property, and restrictions on building permits,
denied many the right to build on their own land. Although
the majority of land affected by confiscation, restriction
of use and other policies was outside municipal boundaries,
the inability of Palestinians to build outside municipal
boundaries or to expand their boundaries, resulted in
overcrowding of towns, high land prices, violations,
overloading of public utilities and services and subsequent
environmental degradation.
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SECTION 2: Analysis of Military Orders concerning the
Fiscal policies and their consequences:
The prospects for sustained development of the Palestinian
economy had been constrained by the lack of necessary
policies and measures during the occupation and the
restrictive Israeli policies vis a vis Palestinian economic
activities.
The occupation authorities eradicated most mechanisms
through which Palestinians could have supported and
improved their economy. The Israeli authorities took
control of many fields related to the Palestinian economy,
its regulation, legislation and management from the early
days of the occupation. On the other hand, it did not
assume its responsibility as the "Central Authority"
towards, planning, encouraging, or supporting that economy.
Additionally, the authorities excluded the Palestinian
population from taking the responsibility for most aspects
of their own economy.
According to UNCTAD, the Israeli domination and full
jurisdiction over all economic activities inhibited the
economic performance potential in the OPT (UNCTAD/
RDP/SEU/1, 1989, p.1, para.4).
A more recent UNCTAD report noted that in the domain of
public finance, the Israeli military authorities had
assumed responsibility for preparing, implementing and
auditing government budget for the OPT since 1986. The
budget had been classified as a "security matter" and
therefore was attached to the ministry of defence through
the Civilian Administration (UNCTAD/DSD/SEIJ/2, 1993,
para.73, p.21). The government budget had never been
allowed to play its economic and social role for
development as the UNCTAD report found:
Its structure and orientation were almost totally
governed by political considerations in line with
occupation objectives and policies. It could not be
classified under generally accepted schemes of being
"economic", functional and/or object oriented. Even in
terms of its organisational line, it left a lot to
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be desired.Neither on the revenue nor on
expenditure side had the budget been allowed to serve
as an instrument of public policy."(ibid, para 74).
The Israeli government budget and the local Palestinian
budgets played very limited role in creating jobs and were
mainly confined to paying government departments and
institutions staff salaries. Nor did they have any effect
on creating jobs related to economic and infrastructure
projects as these were virtually non-existent. These
budgets also played no role in: allocating and distributing
resources; controlling prices; balancing production and
consumption or improving the balance of trade and
international payment. UNCTAD points out that;
".. the budget had not served the mobilisation,
allocation and stabilisation objectives of positive
public policy. Similarly, the impact of the government
budget on the level of national income and consumption
had been equally negligible. Much of the expenditure
to cover urgent social and economic needs was provided
from abroad through multinational and bilateral
sources." (ibid, para 75).
Military orders were issued to ensure the authorities full
domination. Restrictions imposed on the Palestinians
included matters ranging from; banking, import and export,
tax, custom duties and excise; to planting tomatoes and
picking wild thyme. These restrictions were used to
guarantee the subordination of the Palestinian economy to
that of Israel.
Thus, while benefiting the Israeli economy the authorities
deprived the Palestinians from any form of economic
independence which,they feared, would have led to in their
political independence.
In addition to restrictions imposed by military orders and
implemented by military force, as often used in the case of
business closures and tax collection procedures (Chapter
VIII, Sect. 1, item 1.3), the Israeli government took no
measures to encourage investment and stimulate the economy
even if it did not compete with its own.
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This section aims to demonstrate the effect of the Israeli
policies and practices on economic development in the OPT
and its effect on the Palestinians' ability and willingness
to invest and improve their built environment and living
conditions.
2.1 The Financial Sector:
Since the occupation, the Palestinian economy operated
without any specified or published budget, banking,
financial institutions or credit system. All Arab and non-
Arab banks and other financial institutions were closed
down and replaced by Israeli Banks and institutions. The
Palestinian economy was managed, after 1967, without
guidance from an indigenous central authority and had no
overall or any defined monetary policy. The Central Bank of
Israel made no effort to base its planning, or link its
activities to the needs of the Palestinian economy nor did
it allow local residents to participate in its planning or
regulating operations.
During 1967-1987, not one single Arab bank was allowed to
operate in the occupied territories and until 1992,
strict restrictions limited the amount of money Palestinian
residents were allowed to receive from abroad. The limit
imposed on money transfer varied according to political
conditions in the OPT and the level of collective
punishment the Israeli authorities wanted to inflict on the
occupied population .
Without vital financial facilities, and without a national
central authority and relevant institutions, the
Cairo- Amman bank was allowed to reopen in 1987 under
strict conditions limiting its operations and
resources and acting through an Israeli correspondent
bank, (Interview with bank official, 1993).
The corroboration between the increase in Israeli
punitive measures against the Palestinians and the
level of civilian unrest and resistance, particularly
since the beginning of the Intifada, are widely
reported in UN and Human Rights publications on this
issue.
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Palestinian economy was deprived of any resources that
could be directed to promote growth and development. The
Palestinian financial sector was regulated by numerous
military orders, the most significant included:
2.1.1 The Banking System:
By 1983, a total of 122 Military Orders were issued dealing
with banking and financial activities. The Orders and their
subsequent amendments created a complex set of financial
regulations (UNCTAD/ST/SEU/3, 1987, para 83).
- On the second day of occupation, Military Order 7, (8
June, 1967) was issued to close all Arab banks in the newly
occupied territories and to prohibit all trading and money
transactions. The authorities subsequently froze all
accounts, removed documents and transferred cash to the
Central Bank of Israel. The Bank of Israel took charge of
all banking matters in the OPT.
The "Examiner of Banks" appointed by the Military
government was vested with powers over banking and monetary
operations, including banks licenses, foreign exchange,
administering bank assets and liabilities, liquidating
banks and setting credit level, interest rates and all
other banking matters and monetary regulations.
- Military Order 21 (18.6.1967) amended the Jordanian
Corporate Law 12, 1966. According to the order an Israeli
official in charge was granted considerable powers of
jurisdiction over the running of banks, the appointment and
dismissal of bank employees, and over the accounts. He was
given the power to transfer funds from one bank to another
and to manipulate bank funds in whichever way he deemed
necessary. Military Order 25, issued the same day, rendered
it illegal to conduct business transactions involving land
and property without a permit from the military
authorities.
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- Military Order 45 (9.7.1967) amended the Jordanian Law on
banks, 1966, Law of Companies 12, 1964, and Jordanian
Central Bank Law 3, 1966. It granted the official in charge
of banks the jurisdiction to appoint and delegate
responsibility as specified in the above Jordanian laws. It
also cancelled the appointments and delegations made prior
to 6.6.1967.
Many amendments to the above orders and others controlling
currency, bills of exchange and gold continued to be issued
imposing more restrictions on the operation of the
financial sector in the OPT.
One of the significant consequences of Order 45, was that
it allowed banks, awarded a trading license from the
official in charge, not to register as a foreign company in
accordance with chapter 12 of the Companies laws. This
allowed Israeli banks and companies to operate freely in
the OPT.
Israeli banks, which operated in the OPT, offered little
credit to Palestinians. The main objective of Israeli bank
operations was to facilitate transactions between the OPT
and Israel and to provide banking services for the Jewish
settlers. It is argued by many Palestinian economists that
the long term objective of the authorities was that, with
the closure of Arab and foreign banks, Palestinians would
be forced to use Israeli banks and thus promote more
economic dependency which will allow them more control over
the Palestinian economy.
For their part, the Palestinians refused to deal with
Israeli banks except when they were forced to use them to
carry out certain transactions. Deposits by Palestinians in
Israeli banks were minimal. This was due to the Israeli
hyper-inflation between 1977 and 1985, the devaluation of
the IS in the 1980s, and the deep rooted suspicion of
Israeli intentions, such as fear of seizing their assets or
higher tax claims against their deposits (JNCC, 1992,
p.148)
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Israeli banks' contribution to facilitating links between
depositors and borrowers were minimal, so was their role as
a source of credit. With the absence of Arab banks and
financial institutions, credit facilities were only
available on a modest scale through money changers and
small lending agencies.
According to UNCTAD, the Israeli banks did not play the
conventional and fundamental role of serving as
intermediaries between borrowers and depositors which is
essential to mobilise local financial resources and to
channel them to investment opportunities in the OPT. This
was aggravated by economic and political uncertainty
associated with military occupation and political
objections to cooperate with an occupying power. It was
also a result of the Palestinians' preference to dealing
with Jordanian currency as opposed to the highly unstable
Israeli currency. It was also due to the uncommitted
attitude of Israeli banks to serving the Palestinians and
helping their economy (UNCTAD, 1987, para 122).
With the absence of indigenous banks and subsequent lack of
credit and saving facilities, the Palestinian private
sector was deprived of a major incentive to invest in new
projects or in the improvement or expansion of existing
property and businesses. Municipal councils also had no
facilities to raise funds for new projects or for the
expansion and upgrading of public services and
infrastructure.
2.1.2 Insurance Companies:
Israel took control of all insurance operations from the
early days of the occupation. Military order 93 (22.8.1967)
amended the Jordanian Law Regulating Insurance Operations
5, 1965. It transferred all appointments made or
jurisdiction granted under the above law by the Jordanian
government or any of its institutions to the Israeli
officer in charge. Until recently only one Arab insurance
company was allowed to operate, having been established
before the occupation. No other companies were established
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as the Israeli authorities would only grant permits on the
condition that the company would be established in
partnership with an Israeli company; a condition rejected
by Palestinian investors.
Military Order 1215 (30.12.1987) introduced significant
changes to Jordanian Law of 1965. It cancelled article 20
of that Law which required an Insurance agent to be a
Jordanian citizen, above 21 years old and registered with
the Jordanian Chamber of Commerce. The article was replaced
by an amended article 20 which gave the Observer "Head of
the Economy Department in the Civil Administration" the
power to issue a permit to establish an insurance company
to a resident of the territories or an Israeli citizen
(Article 20/a/i). The Insurance company should be
registered according to Israeli Law (article 20/b/i).
Consequently, during the occupation, all but one insurance
enterprise in the OPT were predominantly agencies for
Israeli firms or foreign companies working in Palestinian
towns through Israeli agents. Moreover, insurance premiums
were four times as high as they those in Jordan. Thus the
insurance market in the OPT was very limited and very few
companies were able to protect their business and property
by using available insurance policies. This also
contributed to the atmosphere of uncertainty and increased
local residents' reluctance to invest in new businesses and
property.
2.1.3 Restrictions on the flow of foreign currency and
money from outside the OPT:
The Israeli authorities, in an attempt to control the
financial activities between the occupied territories and
the outside world, imposed strict financial legislation.
Two military orders issued in 1982 brought significant
constraints on foreign currency flow, M.O 952 (20.1.1982)
and the flow of money into the OPT, M.O. 937 (9.6.1982).
Subsequent amendments to these orders introduced further
restrictions over the years.
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M.O. 952 required that a permit must be obtained from the
authorities for:
-	 any transaction in foreign currency carried out by a
resident of the OPT whether inside or outside the
territories;
-	 exporting money from the OPT;
-	 bringing Israeli money from outside the OPT;
-	 any transaction involving property in the area if:
a resident of a foreign country was party to the
agreement; or if the resident of the OPT was party
to an agreement with an absentee Palestinian living
in exile; or related to any property outside the
territories;
-	 possession of foreign currency by a resident of the
OPT.
Many Palestinian families relied heavily on financial
assistance received from members of their families working
abroad particularly in the Gulf. Difficult political and
economic conditions in the OPT meant that some families
were totally reliable on income from abroad.
Restrictions on money received from relatives abroad and
from other Arab countries and institutions, while
increasing the general hardship in the OPT, also
contributed to the shortage of funds to build new homes,
establish new businesses, expand or improve existing stock.
2.2 The informal Financial Sector:
Palestinians relied heavily, during the occupation, on the
informal sector in the absence of an adequate formal
financial sector. The informal sector was comprised mainly
of money changers dealing in foreign currency and offering
some of the banking services such as depositing, transfer
of funds, cheque clearance and granting small loans. The
informal business relationship between customers and the
money changers was based on oral agreement and personal
trust and runs a high risk factor as a substantial amount
of the money was smuggled due to the Israeli restrictions.
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Another source of informal financing was small loans
organisations which included a number of Arab and
international organisations. These offered very limited
credit facilities but did not have the capacity to
compensate for the absence of a banking system and
financial institutions. It therefore had no significant
impact on enabling the residents to invest in their
property and businesses.
2.3 Restrictions on International assistance and foreign
aid:
Israeli restrictions and conditions imposed on foreign
aid seriously limited foreign investment in services and
infrastructure and other vital sectors of urban development
in the OPT. These restrictions included the amount of money
allowed to enter the OPT, types of projects foreign aid is
directed at, their location and who would benefit from
them.
United Nations institutions such as UNRWA, UNDP as well as
the EC experienced problems with Israeli intervention with
the flow of aid to the OPT. Some US and European NGOs had
also encountered obstacles in implementing their
programmes. An UNCTAD report on Prospects for Sustained
Development in the Palestinian Economy , para 84, 1993"
states:
"The conflict between the donors and the Israeli
Civilian Administration over the financing and
management of development assistance had been evident
for over two decades".
Despite a multiplicity of external sources of finance, the
flow of external aid to the OPT encountered numerous
obstacles which reduced its impact and effectiveness
(UNCTAD, para 83, 1993). The report argues that the
military orders which changed the original laws, and the
arbitrary manner in which the amended laws were applied,
had constituted serious obstacles to development. It
considers the creation of the Civilian Administration as a
step to institutionalize the Israeli key objective of
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successive Israeli governments to control the OPT. One
method to achieve this objective was to control the flow of
incoming aid and manipulate development contrary to
international laws.
The report found other obstacles that faced international
and external aid to the territories such as the relentless
efforts by Israel to channel aid through the offices of the
Administration. This, donors argued, served the Israeli
objective to adapt the inflow of donations to serve its
priorities in the OPT (ibid, para 84).
Moreover, since allowing Palestinians to receive foreign
aid was used as a "carrot and stick" measure, only those on
friendlier terms with the authorities were allowed access
to foreign aid. According to Ray, private NGOs were
frustrated by Israeli restrictions on groups Israel
dictates that they should finance. She quotes a director of
one NGO thus;
"Ninety eight percent of the projects approved by the
Israeli authorities are for groups we do not want to
work with." (Sara Ray, Development under Occupation,
p.73, 1991).
International observers argue that the Israeli authorities
showed a clear preference for projects that maintained the
status quo and were production rather than investment
oriented (ibid). Ray states that:
"One political goal of the Israeli government aims to
prevent the formation of an independent Palestinian
state. This in turn has resulted in official
restrictions on a range of project activities
perceived to decrease Palestinian dependence on the
social infrastructure established by Israel inside the
OPT" (ibid)
UNCTAD found that the Israeli authorities interference with
the flow and operations of external aid in the OPT
was aimed at achieving two important objectives:
"(a) preventing the implementation of projects which
empowered Palestinians and decreased their
dependency on the Israeli economy; and'
330
(b) relieving Israel of its international obligations
towards the Palestinian population under its
control by directing external aid to areas of
government activity, including infrastructure,
and partially financing current economic projects
and social services expenditure.", (UNCTAD, para
84, 1993).
Therefore even international donations were also used to
serve the political objectives of the Israeli
Administration rather than the population needs and
priorities.
Many towns, such as Nablus, continued to suffer shortages
and deterioration of services and infrastructure, lack of
amenities and environmental degradation as their councils
and residents were out of favour with the administration
particularly during the Intifada.
2.4 Israeli Taxation Policy in the occupied territories:
The law of belligerent occupation concerning taxation is
contained in the Hague Regulation IV, 1907. The legislative
power of the occupant is regulated by Article 43 which
states that the occupant should take all measures in his
power to restore and ensure, as far as possible, public
order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely
prevented, the laws in force in the country. Article 49
defines the limits of an occupants license to collect tax
and states that the revenue collected should be returned to
the occupied territory (Stephen, 1990, p.5-17).
The Israeli authorities continued to claim that the
Jordanian law on tax in the West Bank was the base of its
taxation policies. However, since the early days of the
occupation, the Israeli authorities issued changes by means
of military orders dealing with tax. As a result, by 1992
and after some 200 orders, the original law was
unrecognizable. These orders effected significant changes
in the tax system including changing the scope and rate of
taxes, imposing new taxes to increase government revenues
and linking the tax system in the OPT to the Israeli
system. After the transfer of all issues related to tax and
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customs to the Israeli military authorities on the second
day of the occupation, military orders began to be issued
as amendments to the Jordanian Tax Law 25, 1964, Property
Tax relating to Building on Land Law 11, 1954.
Military Order 28 (22.6.1967), gave powers to change the
laws and regulations to the Israeli Official in Charge
appointed by the head of the Israeli forces.
Military Order 84 (10.8.1967) extended his powers to revoke
the appointment of any person. Furthermore, Military Order
135 (29.9.1967) allowed the Military Area Commander to
delegate his ultimate power over the collection of taxes to
whomever he chose.
2.4.1 Income Tax
Nowhere in the tax system of the OPT are changes more
pronounced and frequent than in the area of income tax. The
changes affected rates, income brackets, methods of
assessment, collection and appeal procedures, (UNCTAD /
ST/SEU/3, 1987, para.269). Jordanian income tax law was
amended forty times after 1967 (JMCC, p.132, 1992). A
series of orders redefining income tax brackets and rates
were issued over the years regardless of the economic
hardship suffered by the Palestinian population and without
any reciprocal benefits.
Various orders were also issued concerning assessment of
tax and right to appeal. Military Order 109 (5.9.1967),
transferred the appeal against tax assessment from local
courts to military courts. This was followed by M.O. 172
(22.11. 1967), 355 (7.9.1969), 406 (1.9.1970), and 410
(6.9.1970). All these orders further restricted the ability
of local Palestinians to appeal against tax imposed on
them. Military Order 1225 (15 November 1987) states that;
"It is permissible for the Head of the Civil
Administration to change the upper brackets of tax
levels, in accordance with article 241 of the law, and
also the discount rates and payments".
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By 1985, 34 Military Orders had amended tax rates, income
brackets and exemptions. They reduced the minimum threshold
of taxable income from JD 400 to JD 40, increased the rates
up to 55% and income brackets were reduced from a maximum
of JD 8,000 to JD 3,768 (UNCTAD, 1987, tables 30 &31).
An UNCTAD report noted that a comparison with income tax
liability in Jordan puts the taxpayer in the OPT at a
disadvantage. It noted that the threshold for a tax payer
with a spouse and four children was raised from JD 320
under the 1964 Income Tax Law to JD 1,400 under the 1982
Income Tax Law (ibid para. 272). iJNCTAD found that
amendments to the Jordanian Income Tax Law introduced by
the Israeli authorities in 1982 Law had resulted in an
average family tax burden 9 times higher than its
equivalent in Jordan.
Israeli Law also lowered personal allowances for all family
sizes. The allowances ceiling in the OPT was only 33% and
13% of that of Jordan and Israel respectively. The fact
that per capita income in the OPT was only 29% and 72% of
that in Israel and Jordan respectively aggravated the
effect of tax changes, (Tables 14.1 & 14.2).
Military Order 770 (5.11.1978) concerning tax collection
regulations, cancelled Chapter 14 of Jordan Tax Law 25, and
introduced the PAlE method of advance payments regardless
of the level of earnings in the OPT. The order also
empowered tax assessment officers to obtain an order from
a "special court" to delay the departure of a person from
the OPT.
Although the advance payment system is also practised in
Israel, there, it is indexed to the cost of living, while
in the OPT it was indexed to the average exchange rate of
the Israeli Shekel to the Jordanian Dinar. UNCTAD noted
that the final amount of tax collected in the West Bank in
two similar cases was higher than it was in Israel. Further
amendments and additional fines were introduced and the
ability of Palestinians to obtain any license or permit was
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conditional on obtaining a Tax certificate ensuring that
there was no tax due to the government.
Military Order 1262 (17.12.1988) states that;
"any person authorized to provide a license or service
under a provision of the Law or security legislation
listed in the Appendix may make
provision of the service and license, including its
renewal, contingent on submission of evidence that the
applicant has performed all actions imposed on him
under any tax law and has paid the tax he owes at that
time".
This applied to 23 spheres, encompassing virtually every
aspect of daily life in the OPT.
B'Tselem, the Israeli human rights organisation noted in
its annual report that the extensive administrative powers
this order, conferred on tax authorities, would not
withstand review under the principles of Israeli law. It
violated the system of rights and obligations by imposing
on inhabitants the "supreme duty" to pay taxes; a person
who failed to do so was deprived of his rights even if he
had fulfilled all relevant requirements, (B'Tselem, 1991,
p.165). In describing the injustice of the tax increases
imposed on Palestinians in the OPT it quoted the following;
"If I were to try to introduce inside the Green Line
some of the measures I used in the territories to
increase tax collection, I would be strung up in
[Jerusalem's] Zion Square."45
An UNCTAD mission to the OPT found that more important than
the striking changes to collection procedures was the
changes to the appeal procedures that existed under
Jordanian law. M.O.406 delegated the powers of the special
Court of Appeal to an "Objection Committee" with the
military Command having the final say in the matter.
Eventually, appeals have been revoked and confined to an
administrative/military	 committee	 without	 judicial
Mordechai Bereket, head of the Customs and Tariff
Branch, quoted in Ha'aretz October 31,1989, cited by
B'Tselem, 1991.
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competence. Thus the Palestinians had no machinery within
an established judicial system to deal with appeals. This
acted as a dis-incentive to work and invest especially
among the middle and upper-middle income groups who usually
generate wealth in an economy (UNCTAD, 1987, para 281).
The serious violations of the tax system were further
demonstrated in the treatment of Jewish settlers which
should, according to UNCTAD, be taxed under Jordanian Law
as such income is "derived, received or obtained" in these
territories and not in Israel. However an amendment to
Israeli tax law considered that income produced by Israeli
citizens in the territories as income, produced, obtained
or received in Israel. In conclusion, the share of the OPT
in taxes ended up in the Israeli treasury (ibid, para. 283
& 400)
Additional taxes were introduced as early as 10 September
1967 as Military Order 120 introduced village tax, poll tax
and education tax. Since the occupation, land tax had been
increased three times and was collected as government tax.
Stamp duties under Jordanian law for daily transactions
were increased 15 times after 1967 and bridge-crossing tax
was introduced46 . It was estimated that in 1986, travel
taxes amounted to over $32 million, in addition to 30-40
million paid annually in custom fees at the bridges and
about $3 million from taxis and trucks crossing the bridge.
The total amount collected for travel permit renewal is
estimated at $200,000 annually. In 1988, M.O. 1249 a new
tax was introduced for Payment of Special Fee for vehicles
47
46 Soon after the occupation, border crossings "bridges"
on the River Jordan between Jordan and the OPT were
established to enable the movement of Palestinians
with Jordanian passports between the two banks of the
river. The river crossing was also the main gate that
linked the Palestinians with the rest of the world and
facilitated the export of Palestinian agricultural
products and goods.
This tax was popularly dubbed the "Intifada Tax". The
reasons stated for introducing the tax were "due to
the present circumstances there is a shortage of
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2.4.2 Customs Fees and Excise:
Over 60 military orders were issued determining custom fees
on all imports to, and exports from the OPT. Military Order
31 (27.6.1967), vested absolute power and decision making
related to customs fees and excises in the hands of the
Israeli Area Commander who would appoint an Officer in
charge of customs and excise duties. Tariffs and VAT were
charged on all imports even when they were in transit
through Israel (JMCC, p.91, 1992).
Military Order 309 (16.2.1969), authorises any person
appointed by the Head of Customs and Excise department to
arrest without a warrant anyone who violates or is
suspected of violating any of the laws specified in M.O.
31.
Military Order 378 added more powers of seizure;
"Officials may seize and detain wares, objects,
animals, documents, or any item pertaining to which he
has reason to believe an offence against customs and
excise has been or about to be committed."
Property may also be seized, by order of a military court,
in order to persuade a person to come out of hiding (ibid,
article 82-a); any premises may be searched at any time if
there is reason to suspect they have been used to commit an
offence to house or property liable to be seized, (Ibid,
article 81). Vehicles maybe stopped by force if necessary,
(Ibid, article 83).
finances to cover the vital services to the public."
(Stephens, 1990).
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Table (14.1)
Income Tax as a
Annual Gross
Wage (NIS)
12,000
24,000
36,000
48,000
60,000
ercentage of Annual Gross Wage
Israeli	 West Bank
Earner %
	 Earner %
	
5.8	 13.0
	
18.3	 28.5
	
26.3	 36.9
	
31.1	 41.4
	
34.1	 45.0
Source: S.J. Baxendale, "Taxation income in Israel and the
West Bank: A Comparative Study, 1989, cited by Stephen, 1990
Table (14.2)
Income Tax for wage earner with two children, whose spouse
if	 4i,-m	 IC,aip.	 i	 %
—	 . aLa W.fl	 a	 a	 as a
Monthly Income Tax in Israel
	 Tax in OPT Tax in OPT
Sept. 1991
	 Jan. 1991
400	 -176	 2.5	 0
500	 -176	 7.2	 0
600	 -176	 12.6	 5
700	 -176	 19.2	 13
800	 -176	 28.0	 21
1,000	 -176	 53.0	 33
1,500	 -176	 196.4	 122
1,970	 -152	 443.0	 255
4,000	 +655	 2,174.0	 1,117
The table takes into account an allowance for children
derived from income tax, paid in Israel through National
Insurance.
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2.4.3 Value Added Tax
Further to the changes imposed on tax law and additional
taxes, the introduction of Value Added Tax in the OPT had
had severe repercussions on the Palestinian economy and the
ability of the private sector to invest and expand.
The introduction of this tax by the issue of military Order
658 (1.7.1976), is illegal under international Law (The
Geneva Convention and the Hague Declaration) which forbids
the imposition of new taxes in occupied areas. The new tax
provoked strong opposition among Palestinian politicians
and businessmen who appealed to the Israeli High Court of
Justice in 1983. However in defiance of international law,
the decision was upheld by the Court.
Regardless of the legal aspects, the introduction of the
tax as UNCTAD found, carries elements of inequity in the
territories. The introduction of VAT in Israel was balanced
by income tax reductions. It also compensated low income
families who do not benefit from the reductions in direct
tax. None of the compensatory considerations have been
applied to Palestinians. UNCTAD points out that;
"On the whole, the VAT has evolved over the past few
years to become one of the most fiscal constraints to
the development of Palestinian industry and trade"
(UNCTAD, 1987, para.404)
The tax system prevailing in the OPT as UNCTAD concluded;
".. has been largely confined to the traditional role
of providing revenues for the government. As such its
role in resource allocation through influencing
entrepreneurial decisions has been nil. None of the
existing old and new investment related incentives are
at work in the territories.. .the amendments to
existing taxes and the imposition of new taxes have
served to discourage entrepreneurs. This appears to be
in stark contrast to the range of incentives extended
to Israeli settlers and their businesses in the
occupied territories" (ibid. para 405).
International and Israeli observers argue that most of the
revenue of tax levied from the occupied population was
channelled to the national Israeli budget and to the
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building of Jewish colonies. The Israeli government
continued, however, to claim that the tax collected from
the OPT was returned in the form of services and
development projects, for the benefit of local tax payers
(Civilian Administration Annual Report, 1985).
UNCTAD examination of the national income accounts of the
territories found little evidence of the tax revenue
being used in the territories (UNCTAD/ST/SEU/3, 1987,
p.101).	 Benvinisti refers to tax collected from
Palestinians to supplement the Israeli economy and calls it
"occupation tax". He argues that;
"In 1987 alone, when the Civilian government budget
became balanced, at least $US 80 million of
Palestinian contribution were directed to the Israeli
public expenditure. . the 1986-1987 "occupation tax"
could have doubled the territories development budget
of that year."4.
Government taxation policies are criticized by taxpayers in
many countries, including Israel. However, Israel's
taxation policy in Palestine was based on money collected
by the occupier from those under his occupation. The
Palestinian taxpayer was different from other tax payers as
he/she:
-	 was not paying tax to his national government but to
his occupier,
- was not represented at the decision making level when
these taxes were fixed, nor could he anticipate when
and why new taxes would be imposed, and where and how
the tax revenue would be used.
- paid more than taxpayers in Israel and Jewish colonies
on his land, with less favourable treatment and no
concessions,
-	 had limited, or no, chance of appeal against
overcharging,
-	 already suffered economic hardship and loss of income
as a result of military conditions, frequent
Meron Benvinisti, 1987 Report; Demographic, Economic,
Legal, Social and Political developments in the West
Bank, p. 30, cited by Stephen, 1990.
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curfews and closures which were not taken into account
by tax assessors,
-	
was forced to pay tax under duress and threat of
punishment and physical military force,
-	
did not benefit from tax revenues by improved public
or social services.
Consequently, the implication of Israeli taxation policies
in the OPT was not only confined to material loss of income
the residents had to endure, but also the psychological
impact of an atmosphere of fear, mistrust and intimidation.
During interviews with business and property owners, many
expressed their reluctance to invest because of existing
tax burden and fear of additional taxes. A number of
respondents declared that the tax assessor used any
improvement carried out on their property as an indication
of increased profit and consequently a justification for
higher taxes. All respondents to the questionnaire
confirmed that tax was a serious obstacle to improving
their property and the development of their city.
Conclusions:
During the occupation the Palestinian economy was
constrained by restrictions and obstacles created by the
Israeli administrative and fiscal policies in the occupied
territories. The Israeli authorities changed the laws that
existed before the occupation and imposed new legislation.
Their policies and practices, with regard to the financial
sector in the OPT, aimed at ensuring their control over
every facet of economic activities and the complete
subordination of the Palestinian economy to the Israeli
economy, thus making it complimentary to, and dependent on,
its own.
The situation with regard to the financial sector in the
OPT during the occupation could be summarised as:
-	
It was characterised by the absence of an indigenous
banking system, financial institutions or any
effective mechanism to promote investment and
stimulate the economic needs in the OPT.
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- The closure of all Arab and non-Arab banks and the
absence of financial institutions resulted in the
absence of any channel able to provide credit and
saving facilities and direct investment.
- There was a severe shortage in government investment
which meant that most investment was provided by the
private sector.
The ability of Palestinian businessmen and private
investors to create new businesses and job
opportunities and contribute to improve the economy
was severely hampered by Israeli obstacles such as:
increased taxes, restrictions on exports and trade,
restrictions and sometimes ban on transferring money
from abroad, high income and corporate taxes and the
introduction of value added tax.
-	 The Palestinian salaried workers and small business
owners and investors saw their income tax multiply
under occupation and new direct and indirect taxes
introduced by their occupier. Such policies were
imposed regardless of the worsening economic situation
in the OPT and loss of business and income
particularly during the Intifada. These conditions
discouraged local investment and restricted the
ability of Palestinians to improve or expand their
businesses and homes and improve their living
conditions.
-	 Furthermore, Palestinians were frustrated by the
favourable treatment to Jewish settlers on their land
by the occupation authority. The revenue from tax
collected from the OPT was used to finance public
projects and infrastructure in Jewish colonies without
any benefit to the local highly taxed Palestinians.
- External assistance by International and Arab
countries were frustrated by restrictions imposed on
the amount of aid that was allowed. Israel insisted on
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channelling all external financial aid to the Civilian
Administration. Thus, the Israeli authorities ensured
full control of all operations to determine the type
of projects, their location and who should benefit
from them, regardless of Palestinian needs and
priorities.
UNCTAD 1989 report on the state of the Palestinian economy,
made the following assessment:
"The economy that has thus emerged in the OPT is
subject to a range of pressures and weaknesses and
sorely lacks the sense of purpose and direction that
can be imparted by an indigenous central authority. In
these circumstances, a stable and rational development
path and concomitant policies and measures cannot
emerge spontaneously. While indicators are at times
discernable, these do not reflect the emergence of
sound indigenous basis for sustained growth and
development of the Palestinian economy. Today the
problem runs deeper than delineating the complex web
of Israeli policies and measures which inhibit or
simply ignore Palestinian economic development.
The adverse effect of these policies, the impact of 21
years of unequal competition with the Israeli economy
and the inability to further develop the territories
historic economic relationship with the Arab
hinterland have combined to shape a new Palestinian
economy. It is an economy which is fragmented, lacking
of internal consistency, and forcibly prevented from
taking its own affairs into hand and forging the most
appropriate development path through effective
mobilisation of the human and natural resources at its
disposal." (UNCTAD/RDP/SEU/1, 1989, p.2, para 5).
Without an indigenous national economy, central government
support, or external assistance and with the lack of the
basic components of an independent financial sector, both
the public and private sectors were unable to plan and
invest in urban development projects. The situation was
aggravated by restrictions imposed on the use of available
funds.
Therefore, both public and private sectors were incapable
of providing basic needs such as new housing, public
utilities and infrastructure nor were they able to
maintain, upgrade and renew existing stock and halt the
deterioration in the built environment.
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CHAPTER VII
The Impact of the Israeli Administration on Local
Institutions, Private Formal and Informal Sectors:
Review of Administrative Structures and Institutions in
the Occupied Palestinian Territories 1967-1994,
prevailing building and safety codes, environmental and
conservation policies.
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Introduction:
"Israel has no plans to leave Judea, Samaria and Gaza,
nor will it ever have such plans. .we have built in the
past, we are building now, and we will build in the
future."
The paradox of the Israeli administration of the
Palestinian territories lies in the fact that the presence
of Israel in these territories is considered as a temporary
illegal military occupation under international law (The
Hague Regulation, 1907 & Fourth Geneva Convention, 1949),
and by the entire international world community and
organisations (UN and Security Council resolutions 1967-
1993) . However, over the years, the policies and practices
of various Israeli governments were creating drastic
geographical and demographic changes leading to a more
permeant presence of the occupying force in part or all of
the territories.
The declared political objectives of the Likud government
had always been the complete integration of the territories
as part of Eretz Israel (Greater Israel). Although it was
willing to concede limited autonomy for Palestinians over
increasingly diminishing land (Map 8-14), its final
intention was to stay in the occupied territories
indefinitely. On the other hand, Labours' policy was to
return part of the occupied territories, although it was
still unwilling to abide by UN resolutions and withdraw
from the Arab land it occupied in 1967. The difference
between the two ideologies had been mainly quantitative.
During the first years of occupation, the Israeli
authority, in charge of the OPT and population, was called
the military Administration (1967-1981). The Likud
government, in an effort to imply a softer approach to the
OPT, and under the pretext of preparing or implementing the
"autonomy for residents" plan within the framework of
the Camp David agreement, created a "Civilian
Ariel Sharon, Likud Housing minister, quoted in the
Jerusalem Post 1991, cited by JMCC, 1992, p.17.
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Administration" in 1981 (M.O.947 & 950 and section 2.1
above) . However, many would argue that the aim was to
prepare for the final annexation and integration of the
occupied territories as part of Israel (Benvinisti, 1986,
Shehadeh, 1988)
This move separated the military branch from the civilian
branch of the military government which was described in an
UNCTAD report thus;
"The significance of the Civilian Administration goes
beyond the exigencies which brought about its
establishment. It represents the passage from an ad-
hoc military government to a more permanent system of
rule over the local population." (UNCTAD/ST/SEU/3,
1987, p.8, para.10).
While the International community, represented by the UN
and other organisations, continued to demand the withdrawal
of Israel from the occupied territories and pass
resolutions from 1967 (including those condemning land
confiscation, settlement building and deportations), the
Israeli authorities were gradually and systematically
changing facts on the ground.
Meanwhile, Palestinians, their land, and natural resources,
remained unprotected and ruled by an army of occupation and
its military enactments. Thus, regardless of the name given
to the "Administration", the Palestinian territories
continued to be under military occupation from 1967 and
until the completion of this study.
In the absence of a national central government,
Palestinian local councils and institutions struggled to
survive and to provide the local population with their
basic needs.
Their efforts were often hampered by lack of financial and
technical resources and absence of any support from central
authorities (The Israeli Administration), and above all, by
the various obstacles and severe restrictions created by
the authorities for political reasons and objectives.
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In response to the dire conditions in the OPT, the lack of
effective local institutions and the inadequacy of service
provision, Palestinian groups took the initiative to
provide some of the needed services and formed various
private voluntary organisations (PVOs).
This chapter examines the structure, composition and powers
of the Israeli Administration of the OPT to enable an
understanding of their effect on the extent of powers and
abilities of local councils and various institutions. It
then examines the resultant changes in the structures and
capabilities of municipalities, and the main obstacles that
stopped them from playing an effective role in the urban
development of their towns. The abilities and changing
roles of the chambers of commerce, academic and
professional institutions are also considered, together
with the subsequent rise and increase of voluntary and
community based organisations.
SECTION 1:
Local Authorities, professional and academic institutions
and their role in urban development during the occupation
1.1	 The Israeli Administrative Structures and Central
Authority:
On the first day of the occupation, Military Proclamation
(2) endowed the Area Commander with all legislative,
executive and judicial powers. It declared that laws, which
were in force up to that day (7.6.1967,) "shall remain in
force as long as these are not superseded by a subsequent
military order".
The assumption of all authorities by the Israeli Military
government established shortly after the occupation and the
issue of the above Proclamation, transferred all decision
making and policy formulation responsibilities in the
occupied territories to the Prime minister of Israel and
the Minister of Defence. Policy implementation and day-to-
day decisions were entrusted with the military
administration assisted by personnel recruited from various
government ministries and from non-government agencies. The
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new system made no provision for any institutional or
formal mechanism for local participation in the formulation
of these policies (UNCTAD/ST/SEU/3, 1987, para.7, p.6).
Upon the issue of this proclamation, the Area Commander
assumed control over any property, vehicle, money or
ammunition which previously belonged to the Jordanian
government or any associated organisation. Proclamation (3)
followed and stipulated that military courts and their
directors shall adhere to the Geneva Convention, 1949 for
the protection of civilians during war and relating to
judicial procedures. The reference to the Convention cited
certain	 clauses	 concerning	 detention,	 searching,
confiscating, restriction on movement, censorship, curfews
and appointment of a military commander and specifies his
jurisdiction and powers.
Consequently, the clauses in the Convention which justified
certain conditions in time war and temporary occupation
formulated the foundation for the Israeli Policies and
practices in Palestine after 1967.
The reference in the Convention to the protection of
persons and property (Part I, article 4 & Part III,
Sections 1-3), the prohibition of property confiscation and
transfer of civilians was ignored on the basis that this
only applied to temporary occupation. On the other hand,
such logic was not extended to the application of military
enactments and security provisions, governing a whole
nation, during one of the longest military occupation in
recent history.
The Israeli Authorities in the OPT represented the central
government all through the years of occupation. While it
did not clearly establish branches of its own ministries in
the OPT, administrative structures of various offices
within the military head quarters corresponded with those
in the Israeli government. However, there are two
significant differences between the administrative
structures of Israel and those extended over the OPT;
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1. In Israel, government offices, departments and relevant
organisations are comprised of Israeli citizens appointed
by and working for their own elected government and serving
their own people. On the other hand in the occupied
territories, and as far as Palestinians were concerned, all
these central government departments and institutions were
staffed by foreign military and civil officials and
personnel, appointed by a foreign military force which
served its own government and its political objectives.
Thus the first significant difference is that Palestinians
were ruled by a foreign military occupier acting on behalf
of its own government. Consequently, there had been an
obvious conflict of interest during the Israeli
Administration of the OPT as the political objectives of
the administrator/occupier conflicted with the needs and
welfare of the administered/occupied.
2. The administrative structure in Israel is based on a
hierarchy of power whereby a three tier system is in
operation at the central, district and local levels. The
Israelis and their representatives participate in all
operations at the three levels (Chapter VI, Section 1).
Local authorities are vested with certain legislative and
executive powers to enable them to make decisions and take
actions at the local level.
Although such a legal and administrative system was
transferred to the Jewish colonies in the occupied
territories, it was not, however, transferred to
Palestinian towns and villages. This included the
administrative structures in these colonies as well as all
laws and legislation such as criminal laws, tax, insurance
legislation, defence and others 50• In effect, Israelis
residing in the State as well as Jewish settlers living in
50 To enable an extension of Israeli laws to settlers,
the meaning of Israeli resident was redefined in
Emergency Regulations 6B, 1984 as: "any person whose
place of residence is in the region and who is an
Israeli citizen or entitled to acquire Israeli
citizenship pursuant to the Law of Return, 1950."
(Shehadeh, 1988, p.66)
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the OPT enjoyed the democratic rights of electing their
central government, their local councils and having
representatives in every field at all levels.
The second significant difference, therefore, is that in
addition to the exclusion of Palestinians from the "central
government", they could not benefit from the extension, to
their land, of the Israeli "democratic" system of
empowering local council. Thus, all authorities dealing
with Palestinians were centralised under the control of the
Israeli Administration whether it was called military or
civilian.
1.1.1 The Military Authority and Security Provisions:
An Israeli human rights report described how the military
government in the West Bank exercised absolute control over
Palestinians in the following manner:
"Each branch is headed by an army officer who is
responsible for the activity of civilian offices
functioning under him. The number and titles of the
offices correspond basically to those of the Israeli
government ministries. Each office is headed by a
staff officer who is a civilian representative of the
relevant Israeli ministry." 51
The Area Commander of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF),
working under the Minister of Defence acted as the supreme
authority in the territories. His powers were described
thus;
"The Area Commander is the exclusive formal authority
within the area. He is the legislator, he is the head
of the executive and he appoints local officials and
local judges" (ibid)
Immediately after the occupation, the Minister of Justice
introduced regulations entitled Emergency regulations,
1967. These were based on Israeli Law and Administration
Ordinance of 1948 which gave the Prime Minister or any
51	 Singer, Joel, The Establishment of a Civil
Administration in the Areas Administered by Israel, in
Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, Vol.12, 1982, p.247,
cited in Shehadeh, 1988, p.69.
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other Minister, the power to enact emergency regulations
following a public declaration that a state of emergency
existed.
"..as may be expedient in the interests of the defence
of the state, public security and the maintenance of
supplies and essential services" (section 9(a))."
The validity of these regulations continued to be extended
annually and later bi-annually by the Israeli Kenesset all
through the years of the occupation. This continuous state
of emergency and the subsequent issue of security
provisions continued to be the basic tools that facilitated
and justified all Israeli policies and practices in the
OPT.
Military Order 378 (14.4.1970), concerning security
provisions established the legal basis for consequent
military actions in the OPT. It established military
courts, defined their structures and scope of their
jurisdiction, conviction and sentencing procedures (Section
2 of the order). It provided elaborate definitions of
"Offenses" (Section 3). It also gave the military officers
wide powers for arrest, search, seizure and forfeiture
(Section 4), and for issuing restriction orders,
supervision orders and administrative detention (Section
5). It gave the Military Commander, or a person acting
under the general or specific authority of a Military
Commander, the power to issue instructions to restrict
traffic and declare curfews.
Consequently, the Israeli army (IDF) was virtually given a
free hand to take any action against Palestinian civilians
under the pretext of security. The severity of measures and
actions, related to security provisions, taken by the
Israeli army was demonstrated during the Intifada and is
well documented in various human rights organisations
reports and affidavits from individual Palestinians (Al Hag
annual reports and records, B'Tselem report 1991/1992,
Playfair, 1987, Authors survey 1993).
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1.1.2 The Civilian Administration
Military Order 947 (8 .11 .1981), concerning the
establishment of a "Civilian Administration" was also
issued by the Israeli Defence Force Area Commander who was
responsible for appointing the "Head of the Civilian
Administration". The order stipulated that:
"The Civilian Administration will administer the
civilian affairs in the region, in accordance with the
directives of this order, for the well being and good
of the population and in order to supply and implement
public services, and taking into consideration the
need to maintain an orderly administration and public
order in the region."(Article 2).
The order, as Shehadeh demonstrates, had two main and
closely related effects;
1. it institutionalised the already existing separation
of the civilian from the military functions in the
military government by formally establishing a new
structure of civilian governments empowered to act
within the powers determined by the order,
2. it also enabled altering the temporary nature of the
vast number of Military Orders and legislative
enactments issued since 1967, to the status of
permanent laws (Shehadeh, 1988, p.69-70).
The establishment of the new administration and the powers
given to the Head of the Civilian Administration (HCA)
facilitated this change. A clear definition of the powers
vested in the HCA was specified in Article 3 and 4 of the
order thus:
"The Head of the Civilian Administration shall be
accorded powers as detailed below:
1. All the powers set forth in the law, except for
powers set forth in acts of legislation that are
detailed in the first appendix.
2. All powers set forth in the security provisions
as detailed in the second appendix " (Article 3
(A))."
Article 4 of the order empowered the Head of the Civilian
Administration (HCA) to proclaim subsidiary legislation by
virtue of the law and the security provisions according to
which he was empowered to act. While Article 5 accorded him
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with the power to; appoint office holders in the Civilian
Administration, authorise any person to act according to
the law and to security provisions and to authorise others
to issue subsidiary legislation by virtue of the law and
the security provision.
However, by defining the powers of the HCA, the order
implied that all powers, not transferred to the
Civilian Administration, were military and security issues
which remained under the control of the Military Area
Commander. Thus the HCA was empowered to administer a
corpus of military orders and legislative enactments.
Schedule 2 of M.O.947 included 170 orders which came under
the administration of the HCA. These included the control
and regulation of:
- All issues related to the financial sector such as
taxes, customs and duties,imports and exports,banks
and insurance.
-	 All issues related to land ownership, use and
registration.
- All issues related to public utilities and services
such as water, electricity, telephone and postal
services, roads traffic and highways.
Some of the above issues and others included in the orders
were totally incorporated within the Israeli system such as
roads, insurance and banking (when the first Arab bank
reopened in 1987). Others dealt with licensing of
professionals and regulating civil service personnel; a
number dealt with the supervision of publications, books
plays and films.
This new development rendered an already weak local system
of public administration in the territories incapable of
fulfilling its responsibilities and meeting the growing
needs of the population (UNCTAD, 1987, para.11). UNCTAD
found that this deprived the local population from
effectively participating in the design, formulation and
implementation of programmes related to the economic and
social development of their country.
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1.1.3 Relationship between the Military and Civilian
Administration:
Regardless of the changed name and division of functions
between the civilian and military, as far as the
Palestinian population was concerned, the structure of the
new administration remained basically the same as it
continued to be staffed by military personnel or Israeli
civilians working under them. The "new" administration was
established by the Military Commander of the West Bank, and
created by a military Order and its Head was appointed by
the Area Commander to whom he was accountable.
The Civilian Administration, until the completion of this
study, was still located within the military HQ at Beit
Eu, and was still inaccessible to Palestinians.
The Area Commander accorded the Head of the Civilian
Administration all powers set by the law with additional
powers assigned in security provisions which he could
exercise in his name and on his behalf and which he could
decrease or increase as he saw fit (Ibid). A memorandum
issued by the legal advisor to the Military Government
confirmed that the Commander still legislates in civil and
military matters, thus effective authority and source of
power remained with the Area Commander. Nevertheless, the
Commander of the Israeli Defence Forces confirmed his
ultimate authority in M.O.950 (16.12.1981). The order
amended M.O.947 to confirm that;
"In order to remove any doubt nothing in the previous
provisions of this order restricts or abrogates any
privilege or power vested in the Commander of the
Israeli Defence Forces in the area in whoever was
appointed by him or his agents."
Shehadeh argues that by the issue of this order a clear
distinction was created thus;
"between legislative powers to create structures and
set broad policies, which remains within the exclusive
domain of the military government, and the
administrative authority to dispense patronage
selectively within that framework", (Shehadeh, 1988,
p.73)
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Most of the orders were issued, prior to the establishment
of the Civilian Administration, to set up the legislative
structures. Although the RCA was given the power to
administer these structures he had no power to alter or
amend them. Nevertheless, he and his delegates were given
substantial latitudes to exercise their discretion in
granting or holding permits by virtue of laws and military
orders.
1.2	 The role of Palestinian munici pal councils and
changes imposed during
 the occupation:
Prior to the changes imposed on Jordanian Law 79 of
Planning Cities, Villages and Buildings, 1966 (M.O.4l8 and
section 2.1 above), a number of orders were issued which
had adverse effects on the original municipal laws. Under
Jordanian rule, the public administration in the West Bank
was entrusted to local authorities. Municipal Law 29, 1955
and its amendments gave the municipal government the
authority to act in 40 different areas including town and
road planning and zoning, issue of building permits,
service provision (water, electricity, gas, sewerage
systems), regulating the use of water and public markets,
business activities, transportation, public health, town
protection and civil defence, cultural and sports
activities and others (Law 29, Article 40/a).
Until 1967, municipal councils served as the highest
indigenous political institutions at the local level and
comprised elected members with elections taking place every
four years. Contrary to Jordanian laws, after 1967,
elections were held once in 1976 in the West Bank while
none was held in the Gaza Strip during the occupation.
In view of the absence of a national government,
Palestinian municipal councils became the most important
local institutions that could provide public services,
collect taxes and fees and be instrumental in creating job
opportunities, and undertaking public projects and
development programmes. However, the reduction of their
powers and authority, which they enjoyed before 1967, and
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Israeli constraints introduced through military orders and
legislation, restricted their ability to fulfil their role.
Order 194 (25.12.1967) amended the Jordanian Municipal Law
29, 1955 and transferred all jurisdiction granted or
appointment made under it, to the Israeli official in
charge. The order also gave the officer in charge the power
to appoint different people to replace all the appointments
cancelled by the order. Soon afterwards, M.O 236
(26.3.1968) was issued and granted the officer in charge of
internal affairs retroactive jurisdiction, previously
endowed to the Jordanian government and the king. Fifteen
additional orders amending M.O. 194 and 236 were issued
between 1967 and 1987.
Most of the changes, brought about by the above two orders,
were not directly felt by the local authorities and various
professionals in the OPT. It was only after the issue of
M.O. 393( 1970), M.O. 418 (1971) and further amendments to
Municipal Law 29, that the systematic decrease and
weakening of Palestinian authorities and the increase of
Israeli controls over issues of planning, land use and
urban development became evident.
More significant changes were introduced to Municipal Law
29, 1955 by the issue of Military Order 537 (17.2.1974).
The order gave the Area Commander wide ranging powers
including; the right to employ people to fulfil the
municipal services which have not been carried out by
municipal authorities, or oblige the authorities to do the
job. He was also given power to appoint an investigation
committee to study the municipal boundaries or any
development projects or activities carried out by the
municipality. Moreover, he was also empowered toorder
modification of any municipal boundary. The significance of
this order only became clear after few years of its issue.
Military Order 830 (8.4.1980) ordered municipalities to
continue to function, even if they lacked a quorum, until
they were suspended by a future military order. This was
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later amended by M.O. 965 (11.3.1982) which ordered the
municipal councils to remain in office until a new order
was issued by the Civilian Administration. Two weeks later
M.O. 970 (25.3.1982) granted the jurisdiction, originally
given to mayors, to the appropriate authority to be
appointed by the Area Military Commander until a new mayor
was appointed.
This order entitled " Order Concerning Vesting Jurisdiction
in Nablus Municipality" (provisional instructions) followed
the dismissal of the duly elected mayor of Nablus and
forced the resignation of the council. Similarly M.O. 971,
issued on the same day, transferred the mayor of Ramallah's
jurisdiction to an "appropriate" authority appointed by the
Area Military Commander after dismissing the elected mayor.
These two orders complemented M.O. 537, 1974 and were
followed by M.O 993 and 994 both issued on 10.6.1982
concerning vesting Jurisdiction in the Municipalities of
Nablus and Raniallah respectively. The two identical orders
stated that;
"if the Head of the Civilian Administration is
convinced that either a member or the entire
membership of the municipal council are refusing to
cooperate with the appropriate authority' then it is
permissible for him to transfer all the jurisdiction
granted to that municipal council.".
These last two orders paved the way for Israeli councils to
replace Palestinian councils in the two towns.
Military Order 1049 ( 28.2.1983) amended M.O. 830 to extend
services of municipal councils by stating;
"If the municipal council tenure is terminated, a
committee to administer the municipality can be
appointed by the head of the Civil Administration and
it will remain in service regardless of any law or
legislation".
Thus the Israeli control on all Palestinian authorities was
complete.
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In 1983 two further military orders were issued. M.O. 1063
(7.7.1983) dismissed the Hebron Municipal council and M.O.
1064 (8.7.1983), vested all jurisdiction previously granted
to the Arab council to the "appropriate authority"
appointed by the Military Commander.
The Palestinians considered the latest moves to represent
the loss of their only indigenous authority and the final
nail in the coffin of their independence and national
rights. As a result, a period of disruption of services and
civil disobedience on the part of Palestinian engineers and
personnel in most municipalities followed the Israeli take-
over. The only two departments which continued to function
in municipalities were the fire brigade and the maintenance
department in order to carry out emergency work.
According to a number of municipality employees, the
Israeli army forced the Palestinians to go to the
municipality to work under the new Israeli council. The
Chief engineer in Wablus was escorted, by force, in an army
vehicle, to his office at the municipality. Although he and
others went to their offices, they refused to work with the
Israeli council which was comprised of military personnel
(Arafat, Shakhsheir, 1993).
The Israeli council appointed Israeli engineers and
architects and some new Palestinian architects from other
towns who accepted to work with the new council. However,
all members of the new council and their staff were
boycotted by the majority of the original staff and local
residents (Arafat & Touqan, 1993).
1.3 Municipal Powers and Finance:
General
1.3.1 Legislative Authority:
As discussed above, the military orders abolished all local
and district planning councils and transferred all planning
authorities to an Israeli Higher Planning Council.
Therefore Palestinian municipal councils with reduced
powers came under the full control of an Israeli authority.
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The legislative authority of local municipal council were
confined to the issue of permits for small scale
residential and commercial projects within their
boundaries, which could be over ruled by the CPD or HPC at
any time (M.O.418, Article 7.3 &7.4, & Table 11-13 above).
Municipal councils were not represented in either the HPC
or the CPD. All decisions were made without even notifying
them. Municipal officials very often only learned of new
legislation if it was relevant to a permit application or
a detailed plan submitted for approval.
It is worthy of note that most of the M.O.s which
drastically changed the laws and legislation dealing with
planning, land use and control, central and local
authorities and institutional structures, were issued
during the early days of the occupation under a Labour
government. However, these were not strictly implemented
until the right wing government of the Likud party took
over.
According to Nablus municipality personnel and engineers,
the repercussions of the changed laws and transfer of
powers at the local level were only realised after the
change of government in 1976. Nevertheless, it was a Labour
government which had created the legal framework to control
land, construction, development and the institutional
structures of central and local authorities and facilitated
the colonisation process of Palestinian territories. This
process was started in earnest by Likud as soon as they
came to power.
Most professionals, academics and politicians dealing with
urban development in the OPT have noted the difference in
the attitude of the HPC under Labour and under Likud (R.
Abdul hadi, Abu Eisheh, H. Arafat, Batrawi, Khainayseh & H.
Touqan, 1993). It was no coincidence that the process of
land acquisition and establishment of Jewish colonies was
confined to areas of security significance under the
former, while it took a more expansionist trend under the
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latter, (Jewish settlements proposed plans: Maps 14-18).
Thus the process of land confiscation and establishment of
Jewish settlements, related roads and structures was
accelerated all over the occupied territories. The ne
government policy was to establish these colonies near
Palestinian towns and urban centres unlike the previous
governments (Benvinisti, Shehadeh 1988, Coon, 1992), as can
be seen on the above maps.
Although the HPC and its executive arm the CPD, under the
labour government, exercised full control over land outside
municipal boundaries, it allowed municipalities to exercise
their limited powers within their boundaries. It also
approved detailed plans and allowed limited development
outside the boundaries as decisions related to development
were often based on professional considerations, rather
than political interests, (Arafat, Hanbali, Khayat, Nabulsi
& Touqan, 1993)
1.3.2 Finance:
Municipal and local councils in the occupied territories
were also deprived of funds, technical staff, and any form
of government support. In addition, they were not allowed
to receive outside funding from donors or foreign
investors. Any source of financial support had to be
approved by the occupation authority. Severe restrictions
were imposed on the amount of money residents were allowed
to bring to the occupied territory and local councils could
receive from Arab and international donors.
Before 1967, municipalities received a certain percentage
of revenues from tax collection from the sale of gasoline
which constituted a significant part of their budget.
Special funds were made available by the Jordanian
government to the disposal of municipalities for
development projects on easy terms and granted them loans
subject to the approval of the District Commissioner.
Nevertheless, municipalities acted independently at the
regional level regarding the provision of various social
services projects.
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All these arrangements were abolished after the occupation
and municipalities were denied the ability to exercise any
significant legislative powers as they became subject to
the legislative and executive authority of the military
commander (UNCTAD/ST/sEU/3, 1987, p.193, para 252).
All through the occupation, the amount of the Israeli
administration's contribution in the shape of grants and
loans to municipalities depended on the political climate
in the territories and the level of satisfaction with any
particular municipality. The amount of grants and
contributions underwent a steady decline over the period of
1980-1984 after the change of government in Israel, (ibid,
para.256). Following the eruption of the Intifada in 1987,
grants and loans all but stopped	 (Hanabli,l992,
H.Touqan,1993).
Moreover, the level of these loans and grants were adjusted
by the authorities depending on the revenues received by
the municipalities from Jordan and other Arab or non-Arab
sources (Ibid).
Consequently, municipalities were unable to carry out new
projects (water, electricity, roads, provision of social
services and others) without the prior approval of the
Israeli authorities, which was either denied or delayed for
a long time. Moreover, local councils were continuously
under threat of being dismissed (Hebron, Nablus, Ramallah),
exiled from their own country (Hebron, Jerusalem ,Ramallah)
and taken over by the Israeli military.
Municipalities were also denied the right to introduce new
taxes and fees or change their rates or collection
procedures without the prior approval of the Israeli
authorities (UNCTAD, 1987, para. 254). Furthermore, the
absence of financial institutions and Arab and foreign
banks in the OPT (Chapter VI, Section 2) meant that there
was no organisation to give financial assistance or to
offer investment guidance, saving and credit facilities to
local Palestinian residents. This also affected the ability
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of local councils to carry out essential public sector
projects such as infrastructure, public buildings and
others.
Severe import and export restrictions had also hampered the
local authorities ability to import new machinery, or
spare parts to replace their damaged machines and equipment
which they were unable to maintain after the occupation (W.
Assi, Bitar, Hanbali and Shaheen, 1992, and H. Touqan,
1992)
1.3.3 External assistance:
After 1967, the Jordanian government continued to support
the municipalities in the West Bank through loans and
grants from the Cities and Villages Development Bank and
the Arab Bank.
The Jordanian- Palestinian Joint Committee, created in
1979, took over with funds donated by Arab, particularly
Gulf, countries and from money provided by Palestinian
expatriates (Ba'ba, 1993). However, to ensure their control
over any external funds received by municipalities, the
Israeli military authorities established a "Development
Fund" into which all municipalities should transfer
contributions received from this committee. As they failed
to implement this scheme, Israeli authorities applied
further restrictions on the amount of funds brought into
the territories for municipal or any other purpose (UNCTAD,
1987, para. 253).
Although theoretically, Jordan's budgetary provision was
maintained, municipalities could not spend available
revenues without Israeli approval. The approval, as
demonstrated during the Intifada, was subject to Israeli
satisfaction with political conditions in Palestinian towns
(H. Arafat,H. Touqan, 1993, & Item 1.4 below).
1.3.4 Management Skills and Training Facilities:
There was also virtually no training facilities and
no opportunities for local authorities personnel and
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engineers. International organisations needed the approval
of the Civil Administration for any major administrative
training programmes. Although few International
scholarships were provided for some Palestinians at
universities and councils, these were extremely limited and
the Israeli authority had the final say as to whether the
candidate was allowed, on security grounds, to leave the
country to study or train abroad.
Organisational structures and staffing in municipalities
did not change during the occupation to cater for new
technical developments and subsequent needs. Most
municipalities suffered from over-staffing at the
administrative level and under-staffing at the technical
level. Since senior staff at municipalities were denied
access to training, exposure to outside development in
managerial and technical skills and any form of "Central"
government support, they were unable to utilise the
available scarce human technical and financial resources at
their disposal.
UNCTAD noted the dire need of Palestinian municipalities
and local councils for action to improve their performance
at all levels. The public administrative system was in need
of modernising its revenue structure and processes,
enhancing its resource mobilisation and increasing the
capabilities of municipalities to enable; an adequate
provision of services, improving the performance of
employees at various levels through appropriate training
programmes (ibid, para.191).
1.4 The Situation in Nablus:
1.4.1 Background
Until the completion of this study, Nablus like some other
Palestinian towns, had had no municipal or local council
from March 1988 52• Relationship between Nablus municipal
52	 Following the progress in the implementation of the
Peace Accord and the establishment of a National
Palestinian Authority (NPA) in Gaza and Jericho, the
NPA appointed mayors to run such municipalities in
362
council and the Israeli authorities had been difficult from
the first years of the occupation. Various members of
consecutive councils were subject to harassment and
intimidation over the years and the chief engineer in the
municipality was deported for three years in 1969 (Arafat,
Shakhsheir, & Touqan, 1993). However, municipal officials
and engineers maintained that, in general, conditions
worsened after the Likud Party came to power in 1976.
The issue of M.O. 418, did not affect the ability of the
council to function within its municipal boundaries albeit
with much reduced powers. A reasonable working relationship
between the engineers at the municipality and planners from
the CPD was, however, established after the return of the
engineer from his exile in the early 1970s (Arafat, 1993).
Arafat stated that, before Likud took over, permits were
given by the CPD for projects on a professional basis and
not according to political objectives. Arafat explained
that they were able to implement the Jordanian law at the
municipality, within the limit of their reduced authority,
and obtain permits for projects outside municipal
boundaries (ibid). According to many Palestinian architects
and engineers in the private and public sectors, the Head
of the Central Planning Department made his decisions,
mainly, on professional basis. He exercised flexibility in
implementing M.O.418 and considered the British Mandate
plans obsolete and therefore unsuitable to meet local
population needs, (H.Arafat, Dweak, Khamayseh, Khayat, &
M.Nabulsi, 1993).
After the municipal elections of 1976 which resulted in the
election of a "nationalist" council, the relationship
between Nablus Municipal Council and other Palestinian
councils on the one hand and the Israeli authorities on the
other, changed as the former were considered to be PLO
sympathizers. The election of a new Israeli government
July 1994, until a date for elections is agreed with
Israel.
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resulted in a complete breakdown of communication between
the "Central" Israeli authority and the local Palestinian
councils. This was aggravated by a noticeable acceleration
in the confiscation of Palestinian land and in the
establishment of Jewish colonies.
Building permits outside municipal boundaries and public
projects within municipal boundaries were rejected without
explanation and what turned out to be a systematic process
of colonisation was under way.
During their rule of Nablus, the Israeli mayor and council
showed no interest in improving the standards of living in
the city, or in encouraging development and ensuring an
adequate provision of services. Consequently, basic
services were neglected and "Central" government grants and
loans to the council were stopped in retaliation. Moreover,
the number of building permits which were granted by the
Israel council within municipal boundaries declined sharply
and the number of building violations increased according
to municipality officials (Table 3, Chapter IV).
In the absence of a Palestinian council and due to the
difficulty in obtaining permits, local Nabulsis were forced
to either build without permits or convert and extend their
buildings without referring to the municipality. Thus, the
physical and social condition of the city deteriorated to
a great extent.
Planners and engineers, in both public and private sectors
in Nablus, all noted the link between the decline in the
level of service provision and quality of services and
public utilities and the Israeli take over of the council.
This, they agreed, was only matched by the decrease in
building activities and the deterioration in the quality of
construction.
Most high rise buildings completed during that period were
constructed on green fields and were built with three to
four extra floors over and above what was acceptable within
364
the regulations. According to engineers and planners in
Nablus, the Israeli council did not follow the same
criteria for development controls within the municipal
boundaries which were implemented in Israel and the Jewish
colonies.
As the general conditions in the city continued to worsen,
local residents asked the Chamber of Commerce in Nablus to
try and take control of the municipal council (Municipality
files 1986-87 and Annual Report 1986, Touqan, 1993). The
Chamber requested formally from the Israeli authorities to
allow the Chamber to run the Baladiah , and after a period
of negotiations their request was accepted. This was
carried out in coordination with and approval of both, the
PLO and the Jordanian government (H. Touqan, 1993).
The Chairman and members of the Chamber took over the
municipality in 1986 while maintaining their positions in
the Chamber. The new mayor, was assassinated few months
after he was appointed, and his deputy took over both
positions. The new mayor tried to improve conditions in the
city and meet some of the residents basic needs. He also
tried to raise outside funding and to get permission from
the authorities to allow it in (ibid).
Touqan recalled that during the first year of the councils'
time in office and with relative decrease in violent
incidence in the city, the Israeli authorities allowed the
new council a "grace period" to improve the deteriorating
condition of the built environment in the city after years
of neglect and mismanagement. The councils applications for
grants and loans were approved and some were delivered. The
new council started to plan public projects including
digging new water wells and establishing a new public
market, new road construction and a new fire station and
Baladiyah is Arabic for municipality. The term
continued to be used by the Palestinians to refer to
the remaining staff at the municipality who provided
limited services for the local residents after the
resignation of the Council in 1988.
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others. The Civilian Administration promised to provide
funds for these projects, and the Municipality obtained
funds from the UNDP and other international donors for
other public projects.
The Municipality embarked on a scheme for the restoration
of historic buildings and monuments and the conservation of
the historic core of Nablus and completed the renovation of
the historic Khan Al Tujjar. It also implemented a number
of landscaping projects and upgraded a number of streets
and public spaces. However, there were no significant
schemes aimed at the economic development of the city or a
comprehensive plan that could meet its economic, social and
physical needs.
In 1986, the council put forward proposals for the
expansion of Nablus municipal boundaries to cater for the
pressure of population growth and demand. The municipal
council requested that the boundaries be increased from
18040 donums to 44000 donums. However, in 1987, the HPC
approved an increase of 8500 donums which increased the
boundaries to 26500 donums as shown on the table below
(Nablus Municipality Report, 1987).
Table (15)
Nablus Municipal Boundaries
Year	 Area in	 Population	 Donum/person
donums
1963	 18,040	 62,000	 0.29
1985*	 18,040	 115,000	 0.16
1987**	 26,500	 115,000	 0.23
2005	 26,500	 260,000	 0.10
(Source: Nablus Municipality Annual Report, 1987)
*	 Boundaries before expansion
** Boundaries after expansion
*** All population figures are based on Israeli CBS
estimates. Palestinian and independent sources
estimated the population in Nablus to exceed 160,000
in 1987 which reduced the donum per person ratio
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According to the Law, a Master "Skeletal" Plan had to be
prepared by the municipal council in accordance with the
new expansion and to be submitted to the HPC for their
approval.
An private Israeli planner was initially commissioned to
prepare a Master Plan for Nablus in 1986, however, his
comrnision was terminated before the plan was completed,
(Khayat & Touqan, 1993). Palestinian planners at the
irnmnicipality considered that such plan should be prepared
by the local professionals who know their town's needs and
priorities, (Hanbali, 1992, & Touqan 1993).
The Plan which was submitted in 1990 was rejected by the
CPD and returned for revisions a few times. According to
municipal engineers they could never anticipate whether
their plans would be rejected or whether if they met one
additional requirement it would guarantee approval next
time (Hanbali 1992, H.Arafat, M.Nabulsi, H.Touqan, 1993).
The Plan was still not approved at the time this survey was
completed nor was any development allowed outside the old
boundaries. Many argued that the boundary extension was
never intended to be implemented and others explained that
the authorities' rejection of the Plan was part of the
collective punishment the Israeli occupation exercised in
the OPT particularly following the Intifada and the
subsequent resignation of the council in 1988.
According to Touqan, at the beginning of their second year
in office, the Israeli authorities started to exert
pressure on the council to take a more political role which
would be more sympathetic to the Israeli position. The
council insisted to function as a Palestinian Civil Service
and refused to be politicised. Subsequently, the
authorities started to apply financial squeeze on the
council by refusing grants and stopping funds for half
finished projects. New building permits were denied
particularly those outside the old boundaries.
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With the increased Palestinian unrest and the growing
resistance to the Israeli military practices in the OPT,
Israeli pressure on the municipality was increased as
another form of collective punishment of the local
population. The eruption of the full scale Intifada at the
end of 1987 brought with it harsh and severe measures from
the Israelis including shooting of civilians, arrests, long
curfews, closure of business, and house demolition (Al Haq
records and reports 1987-1993, B'Tselem Annual report 1990-
1991 and records, Municipality files 1986-1988).
In the absence of a national authority that could protect
the population, the residents turned to the Council to
protect them and to try to mediate with the Area Military
Commander. The Council repeated requests received no
response from the authorities (Municipality Files 1987).
The new municipal council soon realized that it could not
have any effective power to continue in its civil capacity
and provide the minimum needs in the city. Nor could it act
as representative of its people and be able to protect them
and safeguard their interests in the face of severe
"security" operations carried out by the IDF against them.
There was the added pressure from leaders of the Civil
Uprising for the council to resign as a form of united
civil disobedience. Finally the Council, just over two
years after it took over, resigned in March 1988. After the
resignation of the council and until the completion of the
study, Nablus had no mayor or council which created a legal
void at the local level (Hanbali, 1993).
1.4.2 Nablus Municipality 1988-1994:
Until July 1994, Nablus municipality was administered by
the municipality's Secretary who acted as caretaker and its
technical departments were run by the municipality's Chief
Engineer. Its technical staff consisted of some engineers,
technicians, and a few skilled and unskilled labour who
carried out emergency repair works. The Baladiyah was
extremely short staffed on the technical level with no
training facilities for its employees. However it was also
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heavily staffed at the administrative and clerical level,
which further stretched its already poor financial
resources.
Responsibilities :
a. Local : The absence of a municipal council meant that no
building permits could have been "legally" issued. It also
meant that land owners were unable to apply for the
subdivision of their land and consequently were unable to
develop it. However in an attempt to help people in need of
housing, the chief engineer embarked on a process of
issuing "quasi permits".
The procedure involved examining the proposed plans and -if
approved- a "temporary fee" for the application was paid.
Subsequently the Engineer issued a receipt for the fee
which was considered as a "quasi permit". The engineer's
role was confined to studying, commenting on drawings and
accepting fees. His weak position neither gave him real
legislative executive status, nor did he have the guidance,
support and backing of a national government. Consequently
he had no power to supervise and ensure that buildings were
constructed according to plans submitted and approved.
Although he could issue notices in cases of violations, he
had no power to penalize or to correct offenses.
The technical staff at the Baladiyah carried out emergency
repair work for roads and services with very limited
resources and manpower. However, frequent power cuts, water
shortages, traffic congestion etc. could only be relieved
temporarily (Assi, 1992).
The Baladiyah had neither the power nor the resources to
plan or implement any local comprehensive plan that could
bring about a long term solution to such problems. The
Baladiyah was also responsible for service connections to
subscribers once their application was approved, and for
collecting connection fees and service revenues. However it
had no power to disconnect in case of payment failure. A
lot of revenue was lost due to illegal connections, leakage
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and frequent power and water service failure which again,
the municipality was unable to rectify.
Therefore, the absence of a municipal council resulted in
the absence of any local executive power to ensure
compliance with permit conditions, stop violations and take
people who break the law to court. This fact encouraged
some people to ignore the regulations. The dilenura that
faced the local municipal staff was that to ensure that
residents complied with the building law they had to refer
the matter to the Israeli authorities "the enemy". This was
a course few Palestinians would take regardless of their
views towards certain actions and violations and their
nature.
The Israeli authorities on the other hand, made no attempt
to appoint a coimnittee to take care of the municipality and
ensure the provision of minimum services to the population
as stipulated under International law. The Israeli
Administration watched passively the deterioration in the
provision and quality of services and the worsening
physical condition in the city as it considered the
Palestinians responsible for their own difficulties. The
Administration continued to react swiftly and ruthlessly to
any action it considered to be a security threat, including
Palestinians refusal or inability to pay tax, (Chapt.VIII,
item 1.3).
b. Central: As discussed above, the issue of M.O.418
limited the Baladiyahs' authority except for granting
building permits for housing and commercial projects within
its boundary. Any public building or industrial development
had to be approved by the Israeli Central Planning
Department (2.1 above). Their final decisions were made
without coordination or consultation with the Baladiyah.
The Baladiyah was not consulted also by the occupation
authority on its decisions to confiscate land, demolish or
evacuate houses. Neither did it have any power or channels
to protest or appeal against such decisions.
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However, in spite of its limitations, the municipality
presented the only link between the local population and
the Israeli authorities. The mayor also had access to
foreign embassies and consulates where he could request
some assistance concerning intervention on behalf of his
constituency. The last mayor of Nablus succeeded in
stopping the demolition of a large section of the historic
core, which the Israeli authorities were planning to carry
out to widen streets to allow for easy access of army
vehicles in 1987. The mayor and his council stopped the
Israeli plan by lobbying the international community
through contacts with their embassies (H. Touqan, 1993).
Therefore, the absence of a local authority in Nablus after
1988 resulted in the loss of the last form of protection
the local residents had.
Summary! Conclusions :-
The military government, which took control of the OPT in
1967, maintained its legislative and executive authority
all through the occupation. However, by the creation of the
Civilian Administration in 1982, it delegated to it some of
its administrative powers concerning civil issues.
International, local and Israeli professionals have been
critical of the policies and practices of the Israeli
administration in the OPT and in particular its effect on
local municipalities and councils. The councils, dis-
empowered, impoverished and in dire need of human and
financial resources, training and technical support could
not fulfil their role and serve their communities during
the long years of occupation.
The situation in Palestine with respect to its public
administration was summarised by an UNCTAD report thus;
"As experience has shown throughout the developing
world, a major limitation on the capacity of
government to provide public services to a growing
population and to mobilize human and material
resources has been the inadequacy of public
administration. These shortcomings are magnified in
the territories, where a weak fragmented system of
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local government has been subjected to harsh treatment
over the past 20 years" (UNCTAD/ST/SEU/3, 1987,
p.8.para.11).
It should be noted that this assessment was made before the
eruption of the Intifada at the end of 1987. After the
report was published the Palestinian territories went
through their worst years of violence and subsequent
hardship and the population was subjected to various forms
of collective punishment at the hands of the military.
The Israeli Administration policies in the OPT can be
summarised as
- The Israeli Administration was highly centralised with
all decision making powers and government related
departments in the hand of the Military government and
Civilian Administration.
-	 The Administration was discriminatory as all decision
making roles and administrative departments
representing the central government were appointed,
run and staffed by Israelis.
-	 It was exclusive to Israelis, as no Palestinian
representatives were informed or consulted about all
issues and policies that the Israeli Central
authorities took on their behalf.
- 
It weakened and marginalised municipal councils,
deprived them of funds, access to external funds,
training facilities and any form of technical support.
- Its political objectives particularly after 1976 were
in direct conflict with the needs and concerns of the
Palestinian community which was under their control.
- 
It defied the requirements of international law
concerning the occupiers' responsibilities towards the
civilian population under its control and its duty to
protect persons and property as it acted:
In spite of some progress in the implementation of the
Peace Accord, the Civilian Administration maintained
all its powers related to planning and building
activities, within and outside municipal boundaries,
until the completion of this study.
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1. illegally, according to international laws, when it
dismissed the democratically elected Palestinian
councils and appointed Israeli mayors and councils to
replace them. It also made no effort to ensure that
Israeli councils acted in the interest of the local
Palestinian population, (The Fourth Geneva Convention,
1949, Part III, Section 1, Article 31 and Section 2,
Article 47).
2. negligently after the resignation of the councils
in 1988 by leaving Palestinian towns without the
services of a legal local authority, (ibid). This
deprived the local population of the simplest forms of
assistance and protection and the provision of basic
services (Shehadeh, 1993).
The interruption in the availability of indigenous
municipal councils and the disruption of their work and
restrictions imposed on their activities, and human,
technical and financial resources, had far reaching
consequence on the ability of these councils to provide
minimum services to their towns and constituencies.
In Nablus, all past and present municipality officials and
engineers, who were interviewed, expressed their
frustration at their helplessness to halt the deterioration
in services and infrastructure and the environmental
degradation in the city particularly after 1988. The
majority of respondents to the questionnaire considered the
absence a of municipal council as a major obstacle to the
development of their city and the improvement of their
property/business.
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Violations
Zone "A"
1. Roof top of an historic building: Owner demolished
original domed roof to build additional floors.
2. New construction carried out without building permit.
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Violations
Zone "A"
1. New construction carried out without building permit
and without technical supervision. Municipal staff had
no executive power to stop such practices.
2. New construction adjacent to existing buildings. Old
structures showing evidence of cracks and structural
instability.
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SECTION 2: Professional and Academic Institutions and
role of Community organisations:
The difficulties and restrictions imposed by the Israeli
authorities, did not only affect the Palestinian councils
and local authorities. The work of Palestinian chambers of
conunerce, professional, and academic institutions, was
frequently disrupted. Their powers were undermined and
their ability to play an active role in the development
process was rendered negligible.
Israeli policies and practices towards public
institutions representing any group of Palestinians were
hostile and obstructive. Such groups were viewed with
suspicion and their activities were considered to serve
political objectives incompatible with the objectives and
security needs of the Israeli authorities, (Hashem,
Nabulsi, 1993). Legal changes introduced by Military Orders
were superimposed on original laws to weaken them and
restrict their functions and ensure their subordination.
2.1 Chambers of Commerce:
The role of Chambers of Commerce was weakened after 1967
and most of the time was confined to providing clerical
services such as registering companies and collecting
membership fees.
This deprived the Palestinian trade sector of technical and
professional services which could assist in promoting
trade, establishing new trade links and reviving or
extending old markets. It also denied the Palestinian
exporters the necessary mechanism to help in arranging
financing, transport and other services (UNCTAD, 1987)
The UNCTAD report found the Palestinian chambers of
commerce and their structures to be badly in need of
training in modern management techniques, human and
financial resources at all levels.
No chambers of commerce elections were allowed in the OPT
between 1972 and 1992. Military orders were issued to
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extend their terms. The Chambers, however, were never
allowed to participate in the formulation of policies nor
were they consulted in any matter concerning Palestinian
trade and business operations. During most of the years of
the occupation, the chambers were unable to alleviate the
injustice inflicted on Palestinian businesses as they had
no power over, or access to, the decision making machinery
in the Military government and the Civilian Administration.
One previous chairman of the Chamber of Commerce in Nablus
who was a member during 1967-1988, stated that the
chambers' role was confined to try to fight battles on
behalf of the Palestinians rather than be involved in the
decision making process to improve trade links and direct
and guide businesses;
'tWe tried to help with the problem of high custom
duties imposed by the Israeli authorities, high direct
and indirect taxes, the consequences of imposing VAT
on businesses, the intentional delays businessmen
encountered to obtain a development permit or license.
Some people, who were lucky to be able to import
goods, had to wait for long periods to clear the goods
from Haifa port. By the time the goods are released
they are already damaged.
Moreover they have to pay the storage for the time the
goods were not allowed to leave the port.
In summary, the authorities objective was to
discourage Palestinians from importing without having
an Israeli partner or using an Israeli agent. In the
end we were spending the time negotiating licenses
with the Civilian Administration and trying to release
goods from ports, and mediating on behalf of people
who had their businesses closed for tax or security
reasons. These were mainly battles we could not win.
Instead of doing our job to help companies and
exercise some kind of control over their activities to
protect them, the consumer and the town, we ended up
trying to protect them against the authorities." (H.
Touqan, 1993).
Following progress in the Peace Process, new elections for
the chamber of commerce in the OPT were held in 1992. This
coincided with the Israeli authorities relaxation of some
of the rules that restricted investment and trade
activities. However, until the end of the field survey
conditions were still far from satisfactory as the deputy
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and Secretary of the new Chamber pointed out;
"The Occupation authorities took over the role of the
legislative and executive authority in all matters
related to economic development and investment. The
Chamber is marginalised and has no authority. Chambers
of Commerce all over the world have a very important
role to play in the economy. All legislation that
deals with any economic or social development in the
country should be decided by the government, chamber
of commerce, and trade unions. In Jordan, the Chamber
of Commerce has a very significant role.
Even now with the "relaxation" of conditions on
investment, the decision is not ours and the military
order that was issued concerning this is ambiguous. We
sent it to the Israeli authorities for clarifications.
As far as we are concerned we still cannot do any
thing without their permission and that is never
guaranteed. We suffer from many things as a result of
the Israeli policies. If for instance we want to
import something we have to do it via an Israeli agent
or representative, as they would tell you that they
already have a representative in Israel. You are
either forced to deal with an Israeli agent or you
have to abandon the project altogether." (Hashein and
Hijjawi, 1993).
The weakening of chambers had a direct effect on prospects
of economic development in the OPT and consequently on
urban development. The absence of a strong institution to
facilitate trade and encourage investment and restrictions
imposed on import and export activities had contributed to
the inability of residents to initiate new projects, expand
and improve existing businesses.
2.2 Professional Institutions:
Professional associations and Trade Unions were established
in the West Bank in the fifties and early sixties and
participated in almost every development activity. After
1967, professional associations in Jordan became stronger
and developed more sophisticated and
advanced procedures and operations to protect various
professions, members' codes of practice as well as their
rights. In addition to varied legislative and executive
powers, professional associations in Jordan have had an
active and free political role, since the 1980s, often in
opposition to some government policies.
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After the occupation, the professional associations in the
OPT remained linked to the main associations in Jordan. All
through the occupation, the Palestinian associations
received political, technical and financial assistance from
their "mother" associations. Qualifications were checked
and verified by the main association in Amman, membership
was accepted according to Jordanian standards and
membership fees were paid by Jordanian associations on
behalf of the Palestinian members.
The Palestinian professional associations could not
however, benefit from the technical and managerial advances
achieved in Jordan. New legislation and policies issued by
the various associations and institutes, to improve
standards of practice and regulate the professions, were
not transferred to the OPT.
Theoretically there was no direct obstacle to stop
Palestinian affiliates to Jordanian associations from
extending the new legislation. However,absence of a
national government and lack of legislative and executive
powers meant that Palestinian associations had no mechanism
to implement either the original or revised legislation.
Jordan Engineers Association Law No 15, 1972, with its
revisions, sets the required qualifications for engineers,
including architects, codes of professional practice,
various recognized engineering fields, classification of
consultant offices and professional fees. Article 61 and 62
of the Code of Professional Practice prohibits
engineers/architects holding public office or employed by
public institutions to take on private work unless allowed
under the rules of their institutions. Employees of
government offices or institutions are not allowed to use
their positions to obtain work for themselves or others.
The law allows for classification of consultant offices
based on the number and specialty of their technical staff
which also determines the amount of work they could
undertake.
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Any permit application for a building with more than two
floors and above a certain area should be signed by a
registered architect and a structural engineer. Larger
projects need the involvement of chartered service
engineers for electricity, water and sewerage design.
Before applying for a building permit, local councils and
municipalities require that detailed technical drawings for
the project should be examined and approved by the
Technical Committee in the Engineers Association's Building
Department before these are submitted to the relevant local
councils. The Technical Committee requires that the
drawings should be in accordance with Jordanian Building
Code and its Standard Specifications which are based on
international standards.
However, in the OPT none of the above was implemented.
After the occupation, the quality of construction and
professional and technical standards had steadily
deteriorated, as the Engineers Association was unable to
enforce the law (R. Abdul Hadi, H. Arafat, Batrawi, Khayat
& M. Nabulsi, 1993).
According to the President of the Engineers Association in
the West Bank;
"Architects and Engineers now are designing and
executing projects and signing permit applications
without any supervision or accountability. The
majority ignore the building codes and regulations,
and also the Professional Code of Practice, although
they are members of the Association. Offices are
practising without reference to classification, and to
any authority, to check whether they are qualified to
handle the work and whether their work is in
accordance with the law." (Nabulsi, 1993).
Many of the engineers working for municipalities had
private practices which attracted clients as they felt it
may be easier to obtain permits (within the councils
jurisdiction). A number of engineers in private practice
prepared their designs without reference to other
specialists or accepted to sign permit drawings, even if
they were prepared by a non-professional for a certain fee.
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The absence of a"technical watchdog" contributed to large
scale malpractice and consequently to deterioration in the
quality of buildings after 1967.
The council's requirements to grant a building permit were
very simple compared to Jordan, and followed pre- 1967
requirements. The permit was given on preliminary design
proposals without any calculations or detailed drawings.
Under the circumstances, the council's engineer showed
flexibility to enable the residents to build.
Up till 1994, there was no classification for contractors
in the OPT. The council required no pre-qualifications
from contractors before they submitted their tenders.
Tenders were usually awarded to the lowest bidders
regardless of whether he had the professional, technical
and financial abilities to undertake the project. Despite
the fact that a limited number of public projects had been
constructed in the previous few years, there was no
adequate mechanism to ensure that they were built to
reasonable standards (Abdul Hadi, Arafat, Nabulsi, 1993).
The Israeli authorities and the Civilian Administration
showed no interest in the condition of the built
environment in the OPT nor in the right of the local
population to safe and healthy buildings, (ibid).
Some argued that this was "self-inflicted" damage by
Palestinian professionals, and that an occupation authority
should not be expected to protect the Palestinians from
each other (Khayat, 1993). International Law (Geneva
Convention and the Hague Declaration) requires the
occupying power to protect people and property whilst under
its control (Shehadeh, 1993). While others argued that the
Israeli authorities and the IDF were quick to respond
ruthlessly to any potential security risk and implemented
laws, concerning security provisions, instantly and
severely. Israel in this instance was negligent of its duty
of care to protect civilians from hazardous conditions
(ibid).
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Without the protection of a central government, local
institutions and councils were unable to ensure that
appropriate legislation, building regulations, safety
and health codes, proper classification of professional
institutions were implemented. The indirect impact of this
situation contributed to the inadequate quality of
construction, service and amenities provision which
worsened the situation.
2.3 Academic Institutions:
During the occupation, educational institutions were
subject to short and long closures individually and
collectively (B'Tselem, 1991, & WUS, 1993), forced entry
and take over by the army, and in some cases physical
destruction of their properties, (B'Tselem, 1990-1991).
Palestinian universities were often regarded as "trouble
spots" by the Israeli authorities. They received neither
support nor assistance all through the occupation and
relied on contributions from abroad particularly Arab
countries (WUS, 1993, p.32).
Following the Intifada, schools and universities were
forced collectively to close for long periods. All
universities in the OPT were closed by military injunctions
from February 1988 to May 1990, (ibid). However, it was not
until 1991 that the gradual opening of universities was
allowed. Al Najah National University in Nablus reopened in
October 1991, (loss of 4 academic years). After reopening,
universities were subject to various short closures in
addition to closures during curfews.
According to WUS, M.O. 854 issued in 1980, which set
conditions for colleges to operate, constituted the most
far reaching attempt to bring universities under direct
Israeli control. Although it was not fully implemented,
many individual lecturers were exiled as consequence
(Ibid)
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During the closure, staff at universities tried to give
their classes unofficially and "illegally" in "secret"
locations outside the campus and university buildings. The
procedure, although well intentioned, could not have
provided the best conditions for education.
Political and security conditions were exasperated by lack
of financial and human resources to cover basic needs for
academic qualifications. Research facilities at
universities were very limited anc consequently the role of
universities in the development process was minimal.
Although the situation started to improve after 1992, there
was still severe shortage in technical and managerial as
well as financial resources.
There was a general lack of cooperation and coordination
between universities and municipalities which resulted in
wasted efforts and duplication of work. Although
universities could offer some limited training facilities
for municipal staff and would have benefited from joint
projects, the municipal staff (ie. in Nablus) were
reluctant to work with them (Abu Eisheh, 1993).
Until the last few years, before this study was carried
out, there was a severe shortage of research centres and
scientific institutions. Political and financial obstacles
hampered the efforts of many qualified engineers and
researchers to carry out badly needed research and studies.
A relatively large number of research centres and
institutions had since been established. However, their
efforts were fragmented and much of their work duplicated.
The military and political conditions, frequent closures,
curfews, and financial hardship, limited the ability of
educational institutions, sometimes, to provide even basic
education facilities to the population. Moreover, they were
also unable to fulfil their role in the development of
Palestinian urban and rural areas in the fields of research
and training to enable them to identify problems and define
development needs and priorities. Restrictions imposed on
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travel and movement also restricted their ability to
exchange and learn from other educational institutions
abroad and benefit from their experience.
2.4 The Role of Community Organisations:
Without an adequate public administration to encourage and
initiate development activities in the OPT, the role of
Palestinian local institutions and voluntary organisations
was significant. Palestinian community organisations took
the initiative, inside and outside the OPT, during the
occupation to carry out and support development projects
including various social and economic activities. Their
role, albeit limited, was vital to the provision of basic
social and physical services particularly during the last
few years of occupation.
"Amid increased pressure exerted by external factors
and turbulence, Palestinian initiatives continued to
leave their mark on development during that period"
(UNCTAD, 1993, TD/B/ 40(1)/8 para. 13)
Palestinian PVO's efforts were often hampered by Israeli
restrictions and interference in their activities which
were sometimes arbitrarily banned as an UNCTAD report
recorded;
"Banning activities of a network of Palestinian
charitable institutions and popular committees
providing local services including efforts to
establish marketing associations and expand household
economy." (UNCTAD/ TD/B/1221, 1989 :para.5).
Although Palestinian PVO5 took the initiative and
demonstrated a capacity to direct and manage resources
under difficult conditions, particularly after 1987, both
inside and outside the OPT, there was need for training and
strengthening their institutional infrastructures.
The two main institutions which had been involved in the
development process in the OPT were private voluntary
organisations (PVOs) and the private enterprise sector.
The emergence of the PVOs was in response to the shortage
and inadequacy of many vital services in the OPT
particularly after the Intifada. After 1987, these
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organisations were increased and expanded and had a wider
public participatory involvement covering a wider range of
activities. Nevertheless, due to political, legal and
economic pressures, PVOs efforts remained fragmented and
inefficient. Although international donors continued to
find working with PVOs, as the best available channel for
direct assistance, they found that their structures were
weak and insufficient to cover all fields of intervention
as they were uncoordinated, understaffed and lacked
resources (UNCTAD, TD/B/40(1)/8, 1993, para 18).
The private enterprise sector performed a vital role in
promoting and encouraging development projects in the OPT,
albeit on a small scale. However, the long years of
occupation and exclusion of the OPT from the latest
developments in modern management and high technological
advances, restricted their ability to create and promote
modern corporate practices and organisations. This
situation was aggravated by the uncertain and turbulent
political and economic conditions in the OPT which did not
help in creating the right climate for investment and
business activities.
The Jordanian government continued to provide financial
assistance to the public sector, in the form of salaries
for civil servants, rent paid on government premises,
subsidies to municipalities, guarantees on bank loans to
local Palestinian institutions, direct grants, provision of
education, health and other services. Additionally, it
continued all through the occupation to support official
and semi-official charitable institutions. Other Arab
sources of finance including Arab fund for Economic and
Social Development also channelled funds, when possible, to
various Palestinian institutions. However many of the Arab
and Islamic donors stopped, or substantially reduced, their
contribution after the Gulf War.
The Jordanian-Palestinian Joint Committee, created in 1979,
served as an institutional arrangement to channel and
manage Arab aid for the steadfastness of Palestinians in
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the OPT in various socio- economic sectors. Aid began to
decline due to a decline of donors funding and constraints
imposed by the Israeli authorities on entry of funds into
the territories, staffing and managerial inadequacies,
project formulations, implementation and capacity for
financial and technical field supervision.
The work of international NGOs and international
organizations was also subject to Israeli authority
approval. These were frustrated on many occasions, when the
Israeli government interfered in the nature, size, location
and timing of projects they planned to carry out in the
occupied territories, (tJNCTAD/DSD/SEU/2, 1993).
International and United Nations agencies recent reports
noted the problems of the institution building process in
the OPT which affected the efficiency and productivity of
their operations which were summarised as:
"a combination of factors have diminished the impact
of these initiatives such as: the absence of a
Palestinian authority in the territory capable of
establishing priorities and guiding development
decisions, inadequate and inappropriate local
expertise in the area of institution building,an
unwarranted degree of politicization of otherwise
professional institutional and or business
initiatives; failure to embark upon initiative in a
coordinated or comprehensive manner and selective
intervention by the Israeli authorities (UNCTAD, 1993,
TD/B/40(1)/8, para 15).
As was the case with local councils and institutions in the
OPT, Palestinian PVOs suffered from restrictions on human
and financial resources and from the intervention
by the Israeli authorities in their activities and funds.
Whereas these organisations were created in response to the
shortages of social and technical services in the OPT,
their ability to help in fields related to urban
development such as housing, training, women empowerment,
environmental improvement and conservation initiatives were
obstructed by various Israeli measures.
390
SECTION 3:
Building regulations, codes for construction, quality
control, environmental protection and conservation policies
3.1 Building and Safety Codes, Regulations and Quality
Controls:
Laws and regulations, concerning construction and building
activities in neighbouring countries such as Jordan
(Hanbali, 1992, Nabulsi. H. & Nabulsi M., 1993) and Israel
(Jerayseh, 1993), are continuously revised and updated to
cater for the changing needs of modern societies. These
revisions and improvements were not carried out in the
OPT,(Shkoukani, 1993), nor were there any moves, by the
Israeli Administration, aiming at improving the remaining
laws to follow the superior laws of Israel, except in
matters of security. Building codes based on international
standards used in both Israel and Jordan were not
implemented in the OPT. Nor were standard specifications,
quality controls in buildings or contract
conditions (R. Abdul Hadi, M. Nabulsi, 1993).The absence of
an effective local government and appropriate building
regulations meant that there was no authority to control
development and ensure the use of safe building materials
and techniques. There were also no clear building laws,
health and safety or fire codes that were observed or
followed by professionals in the building industry.
New private and public buildings were constructed without
taking fire, health, and safety codes into consideration.
Regulations, for ventilation, safe access, fire and
emergency exits, where these existed, were often ignored.
Additionally, deleterious building materials, long banned
in other countries such as asbestos were still used in
construction. Building sites, where new public or private
construction was carried out, were left with no protection
and very often used as rubbish collection pits in the
middle of towns and residential areas, (App A, Table 28 &
29, Chapter IV, Sect 1, Item 1.3.3).
A recent UNCHS report on housing conditions in the OPT
noted that;
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"The lack of adequate and appropriate building codes,
regulations and standards represent another constraint
on large scale housing activities. Existing codes and
regulations have virtually not been updated for the
last three decades and will require intensive review
and modifications to improve there efficiency and
compatibility with the new requirements" (TJNCHS,HS/C/
14/2/ Add.l, 1992).
To ensure the protection of the occupied residents and
their property, as required by international law, Israel
ought to have made an attempt to impleent minimum safety
standards and regulations in buildings and services in the
OPT similar to those it was implementing in other parts of
the territories, namely Jewish settlements.
3.2 Environmental Protection and Conservation Policies:
3.2.1. Environmental Protection: The Israeli military
establishment and its Civilian Administration had neither
facilities with environmental responsibilities, nor any
environmental protection policies for the occupied
territories, (UNCTAD, 1993). As Israel was in control of
the OPT, it had the main responsibility for the protection
of the environment and natural resources of the territories
as required by international law (Fourth Geneva Convention
1949 & Principle 23 of Rio Declaration, 1992).
The Ministry of Environment in Israel is the principal
organ responsible for environmental matters. Although, in
theory, the same standards applied in Israel should apply
in the occupied territories, in reality, the standards
observed there showed a big difference to those in Israel
and settlements. (UNEP 1992) After 1967, the Israeli
authorities showed little interest in the protection or
improvement of the environmental conditions in the occupied
territories. There was a shortage of reliable and
scientific data with regard to environmental problems in
the Palestinian territories, due to lack of research in
this field. Lack of environmental controls and legislations
were aggravated by the Israeli army's and Jewish settlers
actions in the territories, which contributed to
environmental degradation in the OPT, (Chap V 1 Sect 2).
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3.2.2 Conservation Issues: While Palestinian historic
centres, such as Hebron, Jerusalem and Nablus, suffered
from lack of funding and the impact of military clashes and
arbitrary demolition of valuable historic buildings by the
Israeli army, the urban fabric in these centres remained
reasonably intact. However, this situation started to
change rapidly after progress in the peace process, and
with the relative relaxation on some of the Israeli
restrictions on investment.
The situation was exasperated by the absence of a
conservation programme and regulations, and the lack of
legislative and executive authorities, the shortage of land
and the increase in property prices. Consequently, some
business and property owners in the old cities were
encouraged to convert their buildings to uses unsuitable
for the type and age of their building or to the health and
comfort of its residents. Historic bdildings were replaced
by badly constructed modern commercial buildings unfit for
the existing environment.
Conservation policies and restoration of historic buildings
and monuments have become part of many countries urban
development programmes. Projects have been carried out to
restore historic centres in many countries in the Middle
East. In Jordan the city of Salt had been declared a
heritage city. The government with the Salt Development
Corporation embarked on a comprehensive scheme for the
conservation of the city and its historic buildings (Master
Plan for the Conservation of Salt, 1989). In Israel
projects such as the renewal of the historic city of Jaffa
and the restoration of the old quarters in West Jerusalem
have been carried out with Israeli government support.
On the other hand, efforts by local residents in Nablus to
form a committee in 1988, to look at ways of protecting the
historic core, were obstructed and the committee was banned
by the Israeli authorities (source names withheld). The
move was in response to the increase in the number of
houses demolished by the IDF during the Intifada (Al Haq
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records 1987-1992), and therefore the motive was considered
to be political. Various attempts by local residents to
involve the Cultural Heritage Section of UNESCO to protect
the historic core of Nablus as part of the World Heritage
failed. Although UNESCO officials appreciated the city's
value and the danger of the Israeli actions, they could not
act, according to their rules, unless an application came
from a recognized government acting on behalf of the city
(Bushnaqi 1991, Touqan, 1992).
Neither the Israeli Military government in the OPT nor its
Civilian Administration made any attempt to extend their
conservation policies to Palestinian historic centres. More
importantly, they allowed their army and settlers to carry
out operations which resulted in the demolition of valuable
historic buildings and monuments and subsequent structural
damage to others as was witnessed in Hebron, Jerusalem and
Nablus. Furthermore it obstructed any attempt by local
residents to protect their heritage on political and
security grounds.
In conclusion, buildings and services in the historic core
in Nablus suffered from long years of neglect, lack of
maintenance, misguided restoration, illegal extensions and
violations. The situation was exasperated by the IDF
actions such as demolition and sealing of property and
financial restrictions imposed by the Israeli
Administration. The absence of central, local and community
initiatives to improve the situation and halt the
deterioration resulted in the loss of valuable buildings
and the deterioration in the urban fabric of the old city.
Conclusion:
The deterioration in the physical condition of buildings
and neighbourhoods, in Nablus and other urban centres, did
not only result from the policies and practices of the
occupation authorities and the subsequent obstacles they
created to urban development. The Israeli authorities who
controlled the territories for over 27 years took the
liberty to act as the central government and changed
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legislation and legislative structures, which only suited
their own political and security needs. Moreover, they
failed to issue and implement policies to protect civilians
under their control, their property and environment as
required by international law. They also either contributed
to the deterioration or restricted, directly or indirectly,
the peoples' ability to protect their environment and
heritage or to receive outside help.
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CHAPTER VIII
The Implication of the Israeli military practices and
security measures on the built environment and the
Palestinians ability to develop their towns and improve
their living conditions
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Introduction:
Israeli authorities policies and practices in the OPT have
had an adverse effect on the public and private sectors
with regard to urban development and construction.
Various reports and studies conducted on development issues
dealt with various aspects affecting the urban environment
such as the financial sector (Chapter VI, Section II
above), legal constraints, availability and condition of
public utilities, roads and infrastructure and adequacy of
social services, (Chapter II & V above). As most of these
studies encountered difficulties in obtaining reliable and
accurate data, they based their findings on rough
estimates, observations, and views and accounts of various
professionals and academics and private voluntary
organisations working in the field of development.
However, two main issues remained unexplored in this field
namely; 1. the physical condition of buildings, amenities
and public spaces and to what extent they have been
affected by the military conflict and the obstacles created
by the Israeli Administration policies to development
activities, and; 2. the local Palestinians perception of
the quality of their built environment and the extent to
which the Israeli policies have contributed to its decline.
Previous chapters examined the Israeli military orders
which changed the laws and administrative structures in the
West Bank and demonstrated how these orders created a
network of legislative tools to enable the Israeli
authorities to exercise full control over the OPT. These
tools facilitated control of land and natural resources,
planning, regulatory policies and administrative
structures, fiscal policies and the financial sector, and
every facet of urban and economic development in the
Palestinian territories.
This chapter explores how these policies, together with
various Israeli practices during the occupation, affected
the ordinary Palestinian "man in the street" level and his
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ability to act. Thus it will examine:
- Israeli punitive measures taken against the local
Palestinians under the pretext of "security
provision".
- Palestinians views on these policies and measures and
their implication for the built environment and the
ability to improve it.
SECTION 1: Security Provisions and Israeli Practices
Background:
The declaration of the assumption of authority by the
Israeli Military Force, over the Palestinian territories on
the first day of occupation (Military Proclamation 1, 7
June 1967) signalled the beginning of one of the longest
military occupations of modern times. Various other
declarations and orders followed which dealt with various
aspects of civilian life as well as security issues.
The Israeli authorities defence of their punitive measures
against the civilians was that they were in accordance with
the British Mandate Defence (Emergency) Regulation of 1945.
This regulation empowered the Miliary Area Commander of any
area to use any method of punishment based upon Regulation
119 of the above. This included deportation, administrative
detention, house demolitions and part or complete sealing
of houses. However, since the Mandatory Defence Regulations
were abolished under Jordanian rule and were superseded by
Jordanian law (Shehadeh, 1988, xiv), Israeli claims to the
legality of their actions were invalid particularly in
relation to international law, (Fourth Geneva Convention,
1949, Sec.I, Art. 27, 29, 31, 32 & 33, Sec.III, Art. 47).
Nevertheless, it was military order 378 (20.4.1970) which
provided the comprehensive legislative document concerning
security provisions in the OPT (JMCC, 1993, Appendix II).
The order provided the legal basis for setting up military
courts and subsequent "legal" procedures, sentencing and
punitive measures (Section Two). It defined what the
military authority regarded as "Offenses" (Section Three).
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Section 4 empowered soldiers to arrest, search, seize any
person and forfeit any article or goods if they had reason
to believe these were connected with a security offence. It
authorised any soldier to;
"enter any place, vehicle, ship or aircraft, he has
reason to suspect, is being used or has been used for
any purpose prejudicial to public safety, the security
of Israeli Defence Force or its soldiers, the
maintenance of public order.. .etc." (M.O.378, Article
81)
Moreover, the order extended the soldier/officer
jurisdiction to "arrest, seize, forfeit, search, conduct
body search, and stop vehicles...etc", to cover any
offenses against security provisions, or any other law in
effect in the area or in any other territory occupied by
the IDF (Article 84). Section 6 of the Order dealt with
restrictions, and empowered the Military Commander or any
person acting under his authority to:
1. Restrict transport, traffic and movement:
"prohibit, restrict or regulate the use of certain
roads or set routes to be followed by vehicles,
animals and persons and to prohibit, restrict and
regulate the movement of people in general" (Article
88/A)
2. Issue curfew orders (Article 89)
3. Declare closed areas (Article 90)
4. Open and close premises:
"A Military Commander may issue an order under the
following circumstances:
If it appears to him to be necessary, in the interests
of maintaining essential services, he may require any
person who is in possession of business premises, an
institute of learning, or any other place which is
visited by the public or part of, to open the place
and carry out business as usual, or to keep it closed
for such a period as is specified in the order
(Article 91(A))."
The Order defines "Business premises" to include any
workshop, factory, commercial premises, shop, restaurant,
buffet bar, pharmacy, bakery, laundry and any business
which manufactures or sells goods and provides service for
the public" (Article 91(B)).
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1.1 House demolition and sealing of property:
House demolition was used as a form of collective
punishment from the beginning of the occupation. However,
until 1985, it was used under the pretext of "security"
reasons. Houses were normally sealed or demolished before
the accused had been found guilty in court and in many
instances the accused was later charged with relatively
light offence (Shehadeh, 1988, p.229). In later years,
demolition took place following an accusation that a stone
was thrown by a member of a particular family (ibid,p.154).
In its 1968 annual Report, the International Coimnittee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) wrote that;
"the international committee delegates in Israel
repeatedly petitioned the Israeli civilian and
military authorities to ceased these practices which
are contrary to the articles 33 & 53 of the IV Geneva
Convention and ask for the reconstruction of the
damaged houses or for financial compensation to be
paid" (ibid)
Article 33 of the Geneva Convention states that;
No protected person may be punished of an offence he
or she has not personally committed. Collective
penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or
of terrorism are prohibited".
Article 53 as interpreted by the director of the ICRC,
states the following:
"Any destruction of an occupying power of real or
personal property belonging individually or
collectively to private persons, or to the state, or
to other public authorities, or to social
cooperative organisations is prohibited except where
such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary for
military operations".
The above interpretation cited by Shehadeh also includes:
"In the opinion of the ICRC, the expression "Military
operations" must be construed to mean movements, inanoeuvres
and other actions taken by the armed forces in view of
fighting. Destruction of property as mentioned in Article
53 cannot be justified under the terms of that article
unless such destruction is absolutely necessary for the
armed	 forces	 to	 make	 way	 for	 them.
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This exception to the prohibition cannot justify
destruction as a punishment and a deterrent, since to
preclude this type of destruction is an essential aim of
the article." (ibid).
1.1.1 Demolition for security reasons:
House demolition and sealing of houses were some of the
collective punitive measures used by the Israelis from the
beginning of occupation. The practice usually intensified
during more troubled periods as it was used as a punishment
and a deterrent (Al Haq, 1987, B'Tselem, 1990-1991, p.45).
The process of house demolition was administrative and was
carried out without trial and without the suspects ability
to defend himself. The demolition or sealing of property
was carried out in addition to other punishment decided
later by military courts. It could be used on suspected
individuals, their families, neighbours and families of
individuals who were already killed. In certain cases,
rented houses were demolished regardless of the fact that
their owners were not connected with the case (B'Tselem,
1990-1991)
Demolition did not only affect the single house where the
suspect or his family lived, but on many occasions resulted
in the destruction of a number of nearby houses. In 1987,
the demolition of a suspect' house in Al-1assr Street in
the old city of Nablus resulted in the destruction of seven
residences in the same compound and rendered their families
homeless for many years, (Safadi, 1993 & plates 33-37).
The owner of the house, whose son was accused of a security
offence, pleaded with the IDF, who usually carried out the
demolition, to spare his neighbours homes, to no avail,
(Al-Haq records and Affidavit 1989).
On the same day an historic (500 year old) palace was
partially demolished as the accused was suspected of having
thrown a stone from its roof, although his own house was
hundreds of yards away, (Touqan, Nainish, 1993, Al Haq
records)
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Human Rights organisations noted a sharp increase in the
number of houses demolished after the Intifada, (Table 16)
In its report on "Violations of Human Rights in the
Occupied Territories" 1990-1991, B'Tseleni described the
demolition operation thus;
"on the day of the demolition, the area around the
house is usually placed under curfew, the family is
given a short time to remove its belongings
(approximately an hour), and the house is demolished
by a bulldozer or by dynamite. More than once,
neighbouring houses have been damaged, usually when
demolition was carried out by explosives"(ibid,p.34)
Sealing of houses was used as a "milder" form of collective
punishment as the family of the accused was banned from
entering and using its home as long as the accused was in
prison (Survey, Zone "A", 1993). This practice also made
many innocent victims homeless for many years (Al Haq
Records, B'Tselexn,1991).
1.1.2 Demolition for planning reasons:
Restrictions imposed on land use and the difficulties
Palestinians faced in obtaining building permits, in
addition to the severe shortage in housing, forced many to
build their homes without a permit, (Diagram 3). This
practice made them vulnerable to the Israeli authorities'
continuous threat to demolish the "illegal" buildings on
"legal" grounds. Like demolition for security reasons, this
often took place as a form of collective punishment. There
was an increase in the number of houses demolished under
this pretext after 1985 and the process escalated after the
Intifada (Al Haq, records, 1987-1993, B'Tselem, 1991, Coon,
1992, Table 16).
There was an increase in the demolition of houses during
the early years of Intifada as shown on Table 16 below as
this practice was used as a collective punishment. The
decline in later years was due to the slump in building
activities during the uprising.
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Table (16)
DEMOLITION OF BUILDINGS BY THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES
Number Demolished for "Planning' Reasons	 Number
Demolished for
Security" Reasons
Israeli
Year	 Mimsterof	 EAFORD2	 CE?.3	 AI-Haq'	 J.P.'
Defence'	 (minima)	 (minima)	 (minimum)
1970-1984	 1,265
1985	 24 (+31)
1986	 197	 12 (+36)
1987	 196	 5 (^ 32)
1988	 505	 301	 255	 173 (+?)
1989	 280	 100 (+128)
1990	 96'
Yitzhak Rabin, Israeli Ministerol Defence in the Knesset.July 13,1989. Quoted in Denioht ion and Sealing
of Houses: B'Tselem, 1989. Data u for West Bank and Gaza, excluding East Jerusalem. The values for
West Bank including East Jerusalem would be slightly more than this.
The Demolition of Palestinian Homes and Oilier Structurea by Israeli Authontiea: International Association
for the Elimination ol all Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1989.
Centre for Engineering arid Planning Data Base, Ramallah
Al Haq Data Base, Ramallah. The figures quoted are buildings "totallydemolished." Shown in brack-
ets is the additional number of buildings either partly demolished, or totally sealed lie, doors and
windows welded shut), or partly sealed.
Jerusalem Post 23/11//SI, quoting "official Israeli figures" of buildings"blown up". Figure excludes
East Jerusalem. and excludes villages destroyed following the 1967 war.
1/1/9Oto 12/7/90
Note: Blanks mean that data is not available.
Building Demolition
Source: Coon, 1992
Most of the buildings demolished for "planning reasons"
were outside "recognised" municipal boundaries and the vast
majority were houses (Coon, 1992, P. 140 and Table 18).
Coon considers that security demolitions were not caused by
problems of town planning but were relevant to it for two
reasons;
"(a) they contribute to housing problems and the
impoverishment of the community, and, (b) the
demolition of houses for alleged planning reasons
often takes place as a form of collective punishment
for Intifada activity".
Coon notes that;
"In fact the military authorities have no problem in
coordinating the "security" and "planning" demolition
of Palestinian property: the four man sub-committee
which confirms demolition for security reasons is
identical to that for demolition for planning reasons,
and it is understood that decisions on both are taken
at the same meeting" (Coon, 1992, p.140).
1.2 Curfews, area closure and control of circulation:
Isolating Palestinians and restricting their movement were
some of the most severe collective punishments imposed by
the occupation authorities.
At the beginning of the occupation, curfews rarely lasted
more than 24 hours. However, after 1983, the use of curfews
increased and drastically escalated following the eruption
of the Intifada. The duration of curfews varied according
to the severity of troubles and the subsequent punishment
the Area Commander found suitable for the offence which
could last up to 40 days as was the case in February 1988
at the town of Qabatia (B'Tselem, 1991).
During the Gulf War, the whole of the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip were placed under a total curfew for three
consecutive weeks. It was gradually lifted after the three
weeks from certain areas, but in Nablus it continued for
six weeks.
In later years, curfews were used for various reasons; to
establish law and order following riots, to search for
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persons suspected of security offenses, during demolition
of houses, to facilitate tax collection and in anticipation
of troubles after certain actions by IDF members or
settlers
During curfews, residents (Palestinians not Jewish
settlers), of a certain area, town, district or refugee
camp, were confined to their homes. All shops, businesses,
schools and colleges and other institutions were closed.
Although the Area Coirtmander did allow, on certain
occasions, a few hours for residents to re-stock, this was
left to his discretion, and in cases of severe troubles and
in cases of "problem" areas, residents were frequently left
without provisions for many days.
The disruption of orderly civil life during curfews had
adverse effects on social and economic activities in the
OPT. While Palestinians were denied access to food water
and medical supplies, they were also deprived from
education, medical care and relief operations. The violence
that normally accompanied curfews also deterred
international agencies from operating even if they had
permits to move.
Restricted area closures had the same effect on the
residents of the street or neighbourhood in question.
Although they were allowed to move within their area, they
were not allowed to move to other areas or to receive
people from outside. The situation was aggravated by
selective shops and market closures for extended periods of
time in response to incidents such as "stone throwing" in
their general vicinity. In addition to economic damage
suffered by owners of the shop or business, such actions,
usually declared instantly,caused safety and health hazards
In February 1994, following the massacre, in Hebron,
of 29 Palestinian worshippers by an extreme Jewish
settler, Palestinian towns including Hebron were
placed under curfew for many days. However, Jewish
settlements, including the settlement where the
murderer lived, were allowed to carry on with their
normal lives.
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as food and other materials were left unattended within the
closed premises for weeks (Shehadeh, 1990, p. 418).
In addition to being prevented from obtaining vital
supplies, Palestinian business owners had no access to
their businesses during curfews as they were confined to
their homes. This had a serious effect on businesses and
trade not only during the periods of curfews but all
through the occupation. Furthermore, the introduction of
"Security Gates" as mentioned earlier, obstructed
circulation and had adverse social and economic effects on
the population, (Chapt.IV Sect 1, item 1.2, Map 7, Tables
17 & 18, & Plates 39-42).
Although Palestinians learned, over the long years of
occupation, to cope, live and work within the limitations
of frequent curfews and closures, there was no recognisable
pattern to anticipate when a curfew or closure would be
imposed and for how long.
This contributed to the atmosphere of uncertainty that
prevailed in the OPT, which had social, economic and
psychological consequences for the civilian population
(Shehadeh, 1990, p.365-391). Therefore the effects of these
practices extended beyond the actual duration of curfews
and closures. Conversations with business owners during the
survey revealed that businessmen were discouraged from
making long term arrangements or from pre-ordering certain
goods as they could not anticipate when the next curfew
might occur. Thus, most business owners and potential
investors were reluctant to improve or upgrade their
businesses or to start new ventures, (Tables 17 &18).
1.3 Taxation Policies and Collection Procedures:
Further to the unfair treatment of Palestinians with regard
to tax laws and assessment (Chapt.VI, Sect 2 item 2.4), tax
collection procedures caused serious concern amongst human
rights and international organisations.
According to B'Tselem, the harassment of Palestinians and
confiscation of their ID cards in order to force them to
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pay tax became routine in the OPT after the Intifada
(B'Tselem, 1991, p.166). As demonstrated above, M.O. 1262,
made the issue of a license or permit to any Palestinian
conditional on providing proof that he had paid tax owed by
him at the time. B'Tselem argue that in some cases the
authorities went even beyond the extensive powers accrued
under this order by making the issuing of additional
official documents also conditional on payment of tax.
After the Palestinian uprising, the Israeli authorities
were confronted by a wide spread "tax revolt". Local
residents all over the OPT refused to pay the exorbitant
"occupation" tax to their occupier while suffering social
and economic hardship as a result of various policies and
practices.
In response, the authorities intensified their harsh tax
collection campaign by increasing tax raids on towns and
declaring areas closed military zone to facilitate the
collection of tax (Stephen, 1990).
Tax raids became a normal collection procedure after 1987
and were characterised by:
- Intimidation, as the appointed tax collecting officer
was authorised to "to overcome all resistance" and to
break into buildings and property "by force" (Article
4 of Instructions Concerning Collection of Government
Monies, 1988, cited in Stephen, 1990, Appendix I).
- Pressure on Third Parties: according to respondents
and human rights organisation records, the authorities
penalised third parties for non-payment of taxes by
their relatives, friends, employers (Al-Haq records &
affidavits, Stephen, 1990, p.104, Survey, 1993)
- Confiscation of ID cards: Although there was no legal
authority permitting confiscation of ID cards, this
became a common practice after the uprising. Every
resident above the age of 16 in the OPT was obliged to
carry an ID card or else he would be committing a
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criminal offence under Article 21 of M.O. 297 which
made him liable to one year imprisonment. This harsh,
usually arbitrary, practice worsened the feeling of
vulnerability and insecurity amongst shopkeepers and
business owners.
In conclusion, taxes, their assessment and methods of their
collection caused grave concern to the Palestinian
population particularly within the business sector. The
survey results showed that after violence and military
fighting, tax was considered to be the most serious
obstacle that prevented respondents from improving or
expanding their business/property and which they considered
to have restricted prospects for the development of their
city, (Tables 17 & 18)
SECTION 2: The impact of Israeli practices on the
Palestinian population
The details and consequences of the Military Orders and the
subsequent changes to legislation might not have been
directly perceived by most local Palestinians unless they
encountered a specific legal situation. Nevertheless, they
experienced their effects on most aspects of their daily
life during the years of occupation.
Arrests, imprisonment, curfews, selective area closures,
restrictions on movements and circulation, house demolition
and sealing of property were every day events in one part
of the territories or another. Blanket curfews that lasted
for weeks, precautionary curfews and their consequences on
business, education, health care and other basic needs
became expected events. Over the years, and particularly
after 1987, local residents endured such practices and
learned to shape their lives and carry out their businesses
accordingly, despite the difficulties, ( Tables 17-18 &
App. A, Section 2).
Although Palestinians adapted to their difficult life
style, restrictions and obstacles, imposed on them,
hampered their efforts to carry out new projects, upgrade
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or expand their businesses or engage in any development
activity to improve their towns and standard of living.
Thus, the policies and practices of the authorities created
an atmosphere of insecurity and uncertainty with regard to
their future prospects and discouraged them and their
families outside the OPT from investment there.
The data collection phase (1992-1993) came more than five
years after the beginning of the Intifada, during which the
occupation authorities strictly implemented all the
restrictive and punitive measures included in their
military enactments. This consisted of those that were
issued before 1987 and further orders issued, since, in an
attempt to quell the uprising.
The deterioration and decay in the built environment,
although showing visible scars of war damage and fighting
of more recent years, was clearly the cumulative result of
over twenty six years of continuous neglect and
deprivation.
Interviews with professionals and politicians, together
with author's observations supported the findings of
various studies and reports prepared by international and
local professional institutions and human rights
organisations. However, the survey aimed to obtain the
views of local residents, property and business owners,
tenants and users as to what they considered to be the
obstacles that led to the condition of their buildings,
neighbourhoods and city.
The most conclusive evidence of the adverse effect of the
Israeli Administration of the OPT came from the results of
qualitative and quantitative data obtained from the
response to the questionnaire and from informal discussions
with respondents.
Respondents were asked what they considered to be obstacles
to their ability to improve and/or expand their businesses
409
and property, and to the development of Nablus city centre
in general. The obstacles were divided into three
categories; political, legal, and financial obstacles
(Appendix A & B). The choice of obstacles was based on the
results of documentary evidence obtained from various
reports and from the results of the pilot survey in 1992.
Respondents were asked to assess the degree of the effect
they believed each obstacle had. This was graded as;
serious, bad, small and no effect. In the evaluation of
their response to a particular variable, only the answers
serioust and "bad" were considered to have had an effect
on their plans for improving or upgrading and on the
deterioration of the built environment in the city.
Accordingly, seven out of thirteen variables proposed in
the questionnaire were considered by all respondents to
have affected the condition of their building/business and
development of the city, ( Tables 17-18 & App. A) -
Although the vast majority of respondents considered the
political situation to be the main obstacle to development,
the issue of taxation policy and methods used to collect
tax was regarded by all respondents as the second most
obstructive factor.
The most serious obstacle to development was considered to
be violence, military clashes and actions of the Israeli
army and Jewish settlers (56 out of 57 respondents said it
had a serious effect and only one said it had a bad
effect). Similar results were given to the evaluation of
the effect of taxation policy as 54 out of 57 respondents
considered it serious and two said it had a bad effect. The
issue of tax, its evaluation and the collection methods,
was the most common complaint raised by local residents
during informal conversations all through the field visit.
Political obstacles such as uncertainty and security
concerning the political situation and future prospects of
the territories, curfews and area closures, breakdown in
law and order and civil crimes, and demolition and sealing
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of property were considered as serious obstacles to
development by the majority of respondents. The absence of
municipal council also had a serious effect according to
most respondents, (ibid).
Whereas the majority of respondents considered that
planning laws created obstacles to development, only ten
out of 50 respondents thought the effect to be serious and
24 said it was bad (total of 34 out of 50). While this
represented 68% of the total response, it was still,
relatively, the least worrying to them. This could be due
to the fact that most of them were not aware of the drastic
changes to the laws and their consequences and therefore
could not relate them to their immediate difficulties. This
could also explain the fact that ten respondents did not
give an answer to this particular question.
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1. Historic palace partially demolished by the Israeli
army, the historic Bawabat El Beyq suffered from the
use dynamite.
2. Use of dynamite in the demolition affected the
stability of other structures in the palace complex
and near by buildings.
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2.
Israeli Practices
1. Remains of demolished house in Jerzim mountain.
2. Jewish colony built on confiscated Arab land on the
top of Jerzim mountain.
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Security Measures
(Nablus City Centre- Al Hussain Main Square)
View from the square showing the southern part of the old
city, 1989. The trees in the foreground were uprooted by
the IDF as a security measure.
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Security Measures:
Security gates created obstacles to movement and
circulation in most parts of the city centre.
1.	 Blocked access to the old city from Hitteen street.
.	 -:-.•-:	 .	 -
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2. Gate at top of Hitten street obstructing circulation
and traffic between the centre and the north parts of
Nablus and blocking access to the main road to
Jerusalem.
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Security Measures:
1. Security Gate between the old city and the main city
square.	 -
2. Security gate obstructing circulation and movement
between Hitteen street and other parts of the city.
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Security Measures:
Sealed property : Openings closed by the use of concrete
blocked as a form of collective punishment to the families
of suspects or convicts of security offenses. Occupants are
banned from using their homes until the end of the prison
term.
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TABLE (17)
Evaluation of the effects of various
obstacles on development
No**	 Category	 Obstacle	 Result
1	 Political	 Violence	 57/All
fighting
2	 Financial	 Tax	 56/All
3	 Political	 Political	 57/All
uncertainty
4	 Political	 Curfews,	 58/All
closures
5	 Political	 Law & Order	 56/All
6	 Legal	 Absence of
	 55/58
Municipality
7	 Political	 Demolition	 57/58
Sealing..
8	 Legal	 Rent Control	 50/57
9	 Financial	 Bank Closure	 53/All
10	 Financial	 Lack of	 50/52
Financ. inst
11	 Financial	 Lack of
	 53/All
Investment
12	 Legal	 Ownership	 44/55
13	 Legal	 Planning Laws
	 34/50
* Results show only the number of respondents who
considered that the obstacles have had a serious or
bad effect on development.
** Numbering based on the frequency of respondents who
considered the obstacle's effect to be serious (see
table B)
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TABLE (18)
Evaluation of the Effect of Obstacles
Frequency Results
No	 Obstacle	 Evaluation of Effect
1 (P) Violence	 No
2 (F) Tax
	 No
3 (P) Uncertainty No
4 (P) Curfews/Cbs. No
5 (P) Law & Order No
6 (L) Municipality No
7 (P) Demolition, 	 No
Sealing..
8 (F) Banks	 No
9 (L) Rent Control No
%
10(F) Finan. Inst. No
%
11(F) Investment	 No
%
12(L) Ownership	 No
13(L) Planning Law No
Key:
F: Financial Obstacle
L: Legal Obstacle
P: Political Obstacle
56	 1	 0	 0	 57
98.4	 1.6
54	 2	 0	 0	 56
96.4	 3.6
53	 4	 0	 0	 57
93	 7
52	 6	 0	 0	 58
89.7% 10.3
43	 13	 0	 0	 56
74.1	 22.9
42	 13	 2	 1	 58
72.4	 22.4	 3.4	 1.7
39	 18	 1	 0	 58
67.2	 31	 1.7
31	 22	 0	 0	 53
58.5	 41.5
34	 16	 5	 2	 57
59.6	 28.1	 8.8 3.5
24	 26	 2	 0	 52
46.2	 50	 3.8
24	 29	 0	 0	 53
45.3	 54.7
19	 25	 9	 2	 55
31.1	 41	 14.8	 3.3
10	 24	 10	 6	 50
20	 48	 20	 12
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Conclusion:
The previous three chapters demonstrated how did the
legislative and administrative changes, introduced by the
Israeli Administration, ensure its control over all
natural, human and financial resources in the OPT during
the years of occupation. The consequences of such changes
had had serious and direct effect on rural development.
This study has shown that urban development had also been
affected, indirectly through certain policies and practices
of military occupation.
The loss of Palestinian land and control over its use in
rural areas also increased the pressure on towns and
cities, thus aggravating the condition of its overcrowded
centres and buildings, overloaded services, and its already
fragile environment.
The implication of these changes affected both; the
Palestinian "public" sector, including local authorities
and public institutions, as well as the "private" sector
(formal and informal) including private investors,
financial institutions and local business owners, as well
as voluntary organisations. These can be summarised as:
1.	 Prospects for, and the process of, urban development
were constrained by;
-	 land policies including; confiscation, restrictions on
its use, registration and subdivision;
- changes in planning laws and administrative structures
which excluded the local authorities and the public
from participating at any level concerning urban
development;
-	 obstacles imposed on building permits and construction
activities and the use of water and	 other natural
resources and restrictions on municipal boundaries;
-	 full control of the Israeli authorities of the
financial sector in the OPT including closure of all
Arab and foreign banks, restrictions imposed on
local residents to invest or receive outside
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investment and on the ability of international
and Arab organisations to fund and carry out
development projects;
-	 Severe taxation policies including higher taxes, and
harsh assessment and collection procedures.
2. Palestinian local authorities and public institutions
have been unable to play an effective role as:
- Municipal and local councils have been weakened and
marginalised by the occupation, and were therefore
unable to fulfil their responsibilities and serve
their constituencies. Some towns like Nablus remained
without a council for many years. Local authority
personnel were deprived of any central government
financial or technical support and training
facilities. Consequently they lacked the technical and
managerial expertise to carry out their work.
-	 Professional and academic institutions and private
voluntary organisations' work were restricted by the
Israeli policies and practices. They lacked the
technical and financial resources to carry out
research and training programmes to enable them to
fulfil their functions.
3. The Palestinian local residents in the OPT and their
ability to contribute to the urban development of their
towns, have suffered;
-	 directly from the effect of the military occupation
and the subsequent security measures implemented by
the authorities and the army which included, physical
violence, arrest, detention, curfews and area
closures, demolition and sealing of houses and tax
raids;
indirectly from restrictions imposed on building
and business permits, import and export and external
technical and financial assistance, closure of banks
and absence of financial institutions to guide
investment and facilitate credit and saving
427
facilities and other obstacles to urban and economic
development.
Furthermore, the Israeli policies and practices created an
atmosphere of uncertainty and instability which discouraged
local Palestinians from upgrading, improving or expanding
their business/property or from carrying out any form of
investment over a sustained period of time.
Consequently, the Palestinian public sector (local
authorities and public institutions) was unable to
contribute to the urban development in Palestinian towns
which worsened the overcrowding of towns, the inadequacy
and overloading of public utilities and services and the
deterioration of environmental conditions. The private
sector was also unable to invest and contribute to
development activities and therefore did not invest in
maintaining, renewing or upgrading existing buildings and
amenities nor did it risk investment in new projects.
In conclusion, without constructive policies and programmes
from a national government and with the new regulations and
restrictions imposed by the occupation authorities on the
Palestinian public and private sector, Palestinian towns
had no effective plans for future development or support to
improve their deteriorating conditions during the Israeli
Administration.
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War Damage:
Zone "A"; Rivoli Cinema in Ghernata Street,
Severely damaged by fighting.
EL\ ,
:
k,1 111tSP#tIMI"
430
•	 •
• ;•	 -	
'•)	 -.	 •tIc;,	
r	
-. i*.
	
I	
-
1
---J.
if ;11' tL1i'
______ I
-	
i..	 -. -	 -
War Damage:
Zone "B", damaged facades and abandoned offices
Plate (47)
431
CHAPTER IX
Summary and Conclusions
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Summary and Conclusions:
"There will be no development (in the occupied
territories), initiated by the Israeli Government, and no
permits will be given for expanding agriculture and
industry (there), which may compete with the state of
Israel.", (Yitzhak Rabin, February 1985) •56
Background:
In the three years it took to complete this research, it
was not possible to compare conditions that prevailed in
the occupied Palestinian territories with a similar
situation which existed in any other country. Nor was it
possible to relate the information to previous colonial
experiences. The circumstances which surrounded the
political conditions in the OPT are unique. A whole nation
was kept in an illegal "semi-temporary" conditions for over
a quarter of a century, ruled by a foreign military
occupier, whose political objectives were in conflict with
its own interests. While the international community and
international organisations continued to issue
declarations, resolutions and call for the withdrawal of
Israel from the occupied territories, Palestinians lived in
a state of suspense, waiting for a political solution that
could end their ordeal.
By considering this situation temporary and calling for its
end, the international community represented by the UN and
the Security Council waited, while some two million
civilians were living without protection or proper
provision for their safety and welfare, for that end.
Meanwhile, the actions and practices of the authority in
charge of the territories made permanent changes on
geographic and demographic characteristics of the
territories it occupied, while the Palestinians watched
56	 Responding to a request from the Israeli Citizen's
Rights Movement for the relaxation of restrictions on
development in the occupied territories, the, then,
Defence Minister of Israel (Prime Minister 1992-),
quoted in the Jerusalem Post, 15.2.1985, cited by
Shadid, Israeli Policy towards Economic Development in
the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 1988 and UNCTAD, 1989,
p.148.
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their land, natural and financial resources gradually and
systematically being depleted.
Indicators for the deterioration in the physical condition
of the built environment and problems in urban development
in the OPT are generally shared with many Third World
countries. However, it is evident that the most significant
difference lies in the reasons that contributed to this
state of affairs.
In normal circumstances, the failure of urban development
programmes is attributed to factors such as; inadequate
policies, lack of funds, and professional and technical
skills, mismanagement, or corruption. However, regardless
of the reasons, most governments attempt to mobilise their
resources and benefit from available international aid
agencies to improve prospects for development in their
countries, albeit, with modest success rates.
In many countries, governments encourage the role of
private voluntary organisations and often consider them as
major actors in the field of development. Many countries
today rely on a multiple partnership approach in urban
development:
i. the public sector, in the form of the central
government and local authorities have representatives
from local professional and academic bodies and
frequently with considerable amount of public
participation. It tries to promote programmes for
development, subsidise them, and seek the necessary
resources to implement them. Whether such programmes
are successful or not, most countries attempt to
protect their human and natural resources particularly
land and water, and try to maximise their utilisation;
ii. the private sector, formal and informal, contributes
to investment in public projects such as housing and
provision of services and infrastructure. Its
involvement in commercial and industrial activities,
helps in creating jobs, reducing unemployment and in
improving living standards in general.
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Nowhere do governments deliberately obstruct such
programmes, neglect to prepare or declare any development
plans and policies, object to international aid programmes,
create obstacles for outside investment and ban local
private investment. Indeed no government official had
before declared that his government had no intention to
initiate development in a territory under his and his
government's control when this development concerned the
welfare of a people for whom they had responsibility.
Summary:
1)	 What was the condition of the built environment in
Nablus?
The evidence presented in this study strongly indicates
serious problems in the physical condition of buildings,
amenities and urban spaces in the centre of Nablus. Results
of the social survey demonstrate peoples unwillingness and
inability to maintain or invest in their property and
businesses.
In general, the physical survey results might look as a
standard inspection report describing the state of many
towns in developing countries with the usual urban decay
symptoms. The symptoms list included: lack of maintenance
of existing buildings; evidence of dampness; water
penetration; roof and plumbing leakage; resulting in
stains; mould and plant growth; failure of finishes and
inadequate quality of construction. Additionally,
environmental problems, traffic problems, inadequate public
services are also familiar characteristics of the built
environment in many developing countries, in spite of
government declared programmes and attempts to improve
these conditions.
The physical survey in Nablus city centre provided evidence
of many indicators of deterioration in physical condition
of buildings, services, amenities, and infrastructure in
this major urban centre.
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The results of the questionnaire survey clearly indicate
the users dissatisfaction with the condition of their
buildings and surroundings, the condition of the city
centre and the environmental conditions in general.
However, what soon became evident was the absence of any
real action to improve these conditions either by the
public or the private sector.
Additional support for the findings of the questionnaire
and the physical survey came from information obtained from
municipality officials and professionals with regard to
problems they faced in their attempt to improve the
situation. These problems included their inability to
improve the level of services and provision of public
utilities which would involve obtaining permits from the
Israeli administration.
Such permits were required for a wide range of activities
from digging new water wells to improve the water shortage
problem, to importing spare parts for their dilapidated
electric generators and any other machinery. Permits were
also required to receive financial or technical aid from
outside the territories. Inability to travel freely or to
invite experts for training and technical assistance were
also major obstacles faced by the municipal staff in
particular and the whole population in general.
According to these officials, not only were they unable to
make plans or obtain support and funds for the future
development of their town from the Israeli Civilian
Administration, they were also incapable of maintaining the
limited level of services they provided nor to halt their
deterioration.
The survey results also show changing trends in activities
in the centre particularly in the historic core. Although
such changes may be considered normal in other towns, a
strong link was noted in the study between the political
condition and the closure of many businesses, the
phenomenon of shopkeepers exodus from the old city to the
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main square to work as street vendors, closure of cineinas,
coffee houses and restaurants.
The questionnaire results clearly demonstrate the adverse
effect of security measures such as; curfews, demolition
and sealing of homes and property, the introduction of
security gates in the centre on businesses, financial
restrictions such as high taxes and methods of their
collection. All these factors were considered by building
users to be major obstacles to development. The atmosphere
of uncertainty and insecurity, resulting from such
measures, affected their willingness and ability to invest
and improve the physical condition of their property!
business.
Interviews with various Palestinian officials, present and
past, supported by documentary evidence, bravely made
available, corroborated data obtained in the survey.
Additional evidence in support of the questionnaire survey
and interviews was obtained from various international and
local (Israeli and Palestinian) human rights reports,
records and affidavits that were also made available to the
author.
As mentioned above, there are many factors that can
contribute to the failure of urban development policies.
Therefore, the research objective after examining the
nature and extent of the problems in the built environment
in the OPT and prospects for its development, was to
examine the relevant prevailing policies and practices that
may have contributed to these conditions. Another objective
was to examine how these policies developed and who was
responsible for their issue and implementation, in order to
establish whether there was a link between the two.
2) What were the Israeli Administration policies for
urban development of Palestinian towns?
During the course of this study, it was difficult to find
any evidence to indicate that the Israeli authorities,
responsible for the administration of the OPT, have ever
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prepared plans or formulated programmes for the development
of Palestinian towns. This study reviewed and analyzed some
of the vast number of military orders which were published
and implemented to deal with issues relevant to
development. Nevertheless, the study found no officially
declared or published development policies for the
territories and many attempts to obtain such information
from officials in the Civilian Administration failed.
An examination of the military enactments which revised and
replaced the original Jordanian laws showed that no
provision was made to protect civilians and their property,
to plan for the development of their urban and rural areas
or to improve their living conditions. Consequently, in
the absence of such information, it could be assumed that
the lack of such policies and programmes may provide
sufficient explanation for the lack of investment and
development and the deteriorating conditions in the built
environment.
However, careful examination of the Israeli Military Orders
provides a more interesting explanation, as it becomes
evident that it was not only the policies, which the
Israeli Administration failed to plan and implement, but
rather the policies it carefully planned and strictly
implemented which had effectively obstructed development.
This research found that the main problem that faced Nablus
and other Palestinian towns was twofold; on the one hand
the existing built environment was deteriorating and no
measures were taken to halt that deterioration. On the
other hand, prospects for future urban development seemed
unfeasible.
It is difficult to imagine how urban development of any
dimension could have been achieved without its main
ingredients including: land, plans, permits, finance and
authority. All these have been examined and analyzed in
this study and can therefore be summarised thus:
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1. Land: Palestinians suffered from drastic reduction in
their land to 20% of that they had before the occupation.
Control of what goes over what was left of that land had
also been removed from them.
2. Development plans and programmes: None was initiated or
prepared by the Israeli Administration for the OPT. Plans
prepared by Palestinians were not approved.
3. Permits for development: Severe restrictions were
imposed on Palestinian local councils and individuals for
obtaining building permits, construction activities and use
of their own water and other natural resources on what
remained of their land.
4. Finance: Israeli control of the Palestinian financial
sector was characterized by the absence of a national
budget, and of any Palestinian banking system or financial
institutions; obstacles to outside and local investment;
and obstruction of international aid agencies efforts. The
situation was exasperated by an unfair taxation system.
5. Authority : Normally, the responsibility for the
provision and interaction between these ingredients is
shared by both the public and private sectors, each
involving a number of actors. By examining the ability of
any potential actor that could have an active role in the
urban development of the town, the study found that:
1. The private sector's ability, including potential
investors, business and property owners, to contribute was
crippled by the atmosphere of uncertainty and insecurity
created by security measures implemented by the military
authority. This aggravated the impact of restrictions
imposed on natural and financial resources.
2. Local and international voluntary organisations' efforts
were also obstructed by the authorities actions and
constraints.
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3. Local academic and professional institutions were also
unable to play an active role due to political, legal and
financial restrictions imposed on their activities.
4. Local councils and chambers of commerce abilities were
limited as they were weakened and excluded from any
decision making role. They were also deprived of funds, and
training facilities and were short of human and technical
resources.
5. Central Authority (represented by the Military Authority
and its Civilian Administration mainly staffed by Israelis)
made no plans or programmes for the development of
Palestinian urban and rural areas. Most importantly it
created and implemented laws and regulations which
restricted the ability of local councils, institution and
the population from helping themselves or receiving outside
help.
Conclusion and Contribution:
The research objectives were to examine the Israeli
Administration policies in the occupied Palestinian
territories and their implication for the prospects for
urban development. However, all through the course of the
research, it was difficult to define strategies followed by
the Israeli administration and relate them to any existing
and similar planning and development strategies including
those Israel employs within its own legal boundaries, and
within its illegally established settlements in the OPT.
The research found that the political and professional
objectives of the Israeli administration were closely
linked and fed on each other. The resultant planning and
regulatory policies are a clear expression of those inter-
connected goals. However, such policies could only be
implemented by extreme centralisation of power and full
control by the occupation authorities of all tools relevant
to urban development, thus excluding the legitimate local
population from participating in the decision making
process.
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Israeli Administration policies were carried out and
sustained by military force and severe military practices.
The long harsh years of the occupation, and subsequent
restrictions, created an atmosphere of uncertainty and
hopelessness within the Palestinian community which
prevented them from developing their towns and improving
their living conditions.
Consequently, the physical condition of the built
environment and prospects for urban development in
Palestinian towns were adversely affected by the Israeli
Administration.
The research contribution is that it has investigated the
nature and extent of the problems with the physical
condition of the built environment in Nablus and
developmental trends in the occupied territories, thus
providing additional information originally missing from
previous research. The research also explored the
connection between the deteriorating condition of the built
environment and inadequacy of urban development in
Palestinian towns and between the policies and practices of
the Israeli administration and established that there was
a causal link between the two. Furthermore, the study
provided evidence of the adverse impact of such policies
and practices, directly and indirectly, on peoples ability
to develop their towns and improve their living conditions.
The research findings have thus validated the hypothesis
and demonstrated that;
"the Israeli administration of the OPT between 1967-1994
had been a major cause of the deterioration in the built
environment in the centre of Nablus. ".
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DATA ANALYSIS
The data analysed in this appendix is that obtained from
both parts of the questionnaire survey conducted in the
centre of Nablus between Nay and July, 1993, (Questionnaire
form is included in App. "C" below).
Respondents Characteristics:
A total number of 60 questionnaires were completed during
the field survey and are considered in this analysis. The
respondents relation to the building/unit inspected were 12
owners (10 owner/ occupier and 2 owners letting their
property), 48 of the respondents were tenants.
1. Owners: Out of the ten owner/occupiers, seven had owned
the property for over 40 years and two for over 25 years,
and one for over ten years. One of the two owners
interviewed had let the property for over 40 years and the
other for over 25 years.
There was no strong indication that satisfaction with the
building use and condition among owner/occupiers had any
bearing on the owners plans to change the building use or
to expand and upgrade. One owner-occupier refused to
comment on questions related to obstacles to change or
improvement of building. All the nine respondents
considered the political condition and the occupation
authority's practices as the main obstacles. Financial and
legal obstacles were also considered serious by six
respondents as opposed to three. The absence of municipal
council and provision of institutional services did not
seem critical in the view of five out of the nine
respondents.
Of the two other owners whose properties were let, neither
was satisfied with the rent, the building use nor the
building condition. Neither had ever maintained the
building and both had plans to change the building use and
expand, but sited the legal conditions, namely rent
control, as the main obstacle to their plans.
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Tenants: A total number of 48 tenants were interviewed, the
length of their tenure varied from between over 40
years and less than a year.
The vast majority of tenants stated that the rent had never
been reviewed (41 respondents out of 47, who agreed to
answer the question, representing over 87% of this
category) and six had not had their rent reviewed for over
ten years. Almost half of the tenants agreed that the
amount of rent they paid was not fair to the owner,
although two of them regarded it as too high for the amount
of care and service they get from the owner.
Frequency of Maintenance:
Maintenance was defined as the work routinely carried out
by the user (owners and tenants) to improve the unit!
building internally such as repairing or replacing damaged
items such as floor or ceiling tiles etc., wall and ceiling
re-paint, cleaning and re-decorating if needed. External
maintenance is defined as work needed to the external
walls, ie. cleaning and re-pointing of brick or stone
facades, replacing faulty doors and windows, applying and
repairing roof protection elements, repair and prevention
of water leaks resulting from faulty drains, pipes, gaps
between windows/doors and walls, clearing drains, gutters
etc., repair of external lighting, lifts and the like. This
work is normally carried out by building owners or by
tenants at owners expense. The following are the results of
the frequency test:
- Of the twelve owners interviewed, only one maintained
his property every year and another owner/occupier
every 2-3 years, two others stated that they maintain
it at more than five years intervals and four said
they only maintain when there is need (author's
observation/notes indicate serious need for
maintenance in three of the four). Four respondents
who owned the property in question said they never
maintained it (two owner/occupier and two owners)
representing one third of all owners.
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-	 Also one third of tenants (16 respondents) stated they
had never maintained the unit they rent, while
twelve said they had not maintained it for over ten
years. It was also observed that five out of the seven
units inspected, where tenants said the frequency of
maintenance varies, were in bad physical condition and
had not been maintained for many years (observation
notes).
Most tenants did not consider that the landlord was
doing enough to maintain the building, 34 out of 48
tenants (70%). Only 3(%) were satisfied that the
landlord is doing enough.
- Most of tenants interviewed had no plans to move, 36
respondents said no (75%), while only 5 had plans to
move (less than 10%). Only one tenant said he had some
plans to upgrade his unit, (23%) of respondents didn't
know, while 24 (50%) said they had no plans to do so.
Most tenants considered the political condition as the
main constraint to their future plans (43 Respondents,
80%), financial constraints were also considered to
have serious effect (41 Respondents, 85%). Less
respondents referred to legal constraints as a serious
obstacles (30 Respondents, 62%), and only 21 (44%)
considered absence of a municipal council as a serious
obstacle to their future plans and their ability to
improve or upgrade the property or business.
To simplify the analysis, frequency of maintenance for all
respondents (59 out of 60) were summarized, (Table No 19
below). The figures show that more than 57% of buildings
inspected had not been maintained for over 10 years
according to respondents, and that one third of total
respondents never maintained the building! unit. A worse
picture could be concluded from this author's observation,
which adds at least another 8 units which had not been
maintained for a long time (evidently longer than ten
years). This was more evident in buildings where
respondents said frequency of maintenance varied which
makes the figure more than 71% of the total.
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Table (19)
Frequency of maintenance
Maintenance	 Frequency	 Valid %
Never	 20	 33.9
Over 10 years	 14	 23.7
Every 5-10 years	 4	 6.8
Every 2-5 years	 4	 6.8
Every year
	 6	 10.2
Varies	 11	 18.6
Total	 59	 100
The Survey Components:
The two main components of the hypothesis; the physical
condition of the built environment (the dependent variable)
and the Israeli administration, defined as obstacles to
development, (independent variable), were tested and are
analyzed as follows:
(1) The Physical Condition of the Built Environment
Introduction:
The physical condition of buildings, their services and the
environment in which they are located was measured
according to answers obtained in both parts of the
questionnaire. User's views of the condition and problems
of both the buildings and the area, which were collected in
the first part of the survey are presented in item 1.1
below. The physical survey included questions on the
availability and condition of specific items and services
in both the building and its immediate environment. A lot
of data was collected on the construction materials
internally and externally, the occurrence of alterations to
buildings and other information. However, during the
analysis stage some of the data was not considered to be
relevant to the outcome of the research and therefore were
not included in the analysis. The results of this part of
the survey are presented in item 1.2 below.
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It was only necessary to subject the data within the
physical survey to the frequency test to enable
establishing the availability and condition of the basic
facilities in order to evaluate the physical condition of
the buildings and their immediate environment. However, to
enable a comparison between the seriousness of a certain
problem in one zone and another, cross tabulation test was
used and the following assessment is based on both tests.
Definitions:
a- Physical Problem
The problems in the physical condition of the building and
its immediate surroundings were defined as follows:
i. Physical condition of buildings:
Only five variables were selected for analysis from the
original 11 in Question 35. The selection was based on what
was considered by users and the author to be the most
serious problems in the building, which were;
Pollution: Fumes and smoke affecting the surfaces of the
building, the quality of air inside the building (odour
from rubbish and fumes from tear gas). An attempt was made
to examine the extent of the problem in relation to the
location and age of the building.
Dampness: Both externally and internally, affecting floors,
walls and ceilings.
Water Penetration: This was defined as water leaking
through the building from the roof, a faulty drain or a gap
between the wall and any opening or from any other cause.
Building utilities: Availability and quality of utilities
within the building such as sanitation, water and power
supply etc.
Maintenance: This refers to general condition of the
building and level of maintenance kept by owners and
tenants.
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ii. Physical condition of surrounding area:
Traffic: This refers to traffic immediately affecting the
building in terms of noise, pollution etc.
Parking: This refers to parking facilities available for
building users and the effect of parking practices on the
buildings (blocking entrance, difficult access for users,
customers, emergency services).
Street Vendors: Presence of street vendors, although an old
tradition in Palestinian towns, got out of control
following the Intifada. Their number have dramatically
increased since, for reasons that will be analyzed in other
chapters. According to most respondents and own
observations, they obstructed access to buildings and
movement of drivers and pedestrians, and add to the hygiene
problem by leaving rubbish in front of buildings and in the
streets. Users also complained that they represent cheap
competition and take their business away.
Pollution: Refers to quality of air and environment in the
area where the building is located. Most common problems
discussed were fumes and smoke from gun-fire and tear gas
used by the Israeli army, burning of tyres by the
Palestinian "Intifada", and the accumulation of rubbish for
weeks in the streets and smoke resulting from the burning
of rubbish by residents. Fumes from cars and congested
traffic were also contributing to the deterioration in the
quality of air. There were also complaints of water
contamination in reservoirs and as a result of sewage
seepage into water pipes affecting both drinking and
irrigation water.
Hygiene: Refers to cleanliness level of streets and
external facades, rubbish collection facilities and
services.
Services: Refers to municipal services in terms of ensuring
continuous supply of power, water and other utilities in
the area, carrying out emergency repairs and maintenance,
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providing emergency facilities such as fire fighting, and
regular rubbish collection and cleaning of streets. It also
includes road construction and provision of pavements
street lighting etc.
Access and Pedestrian Safety: Refers to safety and easiness
(directness) of access to and from a particular area for
business owners, employees and customers. It also refers to
availability of safe areas for pedestrians from traffic,
pedestrian crossings and traffic lights etc. neither of
which exists in any of the three zones inspected at the
time of the survey.
Open Areas: Also includes spaces between buildings and
refers to available spaces in the area/street which could
be used in the future for public amenities and recreation
facilities.
Security: Refers to acts of violence, fighting etc. To
compare the intensity of this problem in the three areas
and how it affected people living or working in them,
respondents were asked about level of violence and military
clashes in their street/area.
Law and Order: Refers to vandalism, robbery and burglaries
and civil offenses.
Amenities: This includes public parks, hard and soft
landscaped areas, public toilets, seating facilities and
lighting etc.
b- Views of Building users:
To measure the value of peoples' views of the condition of
buildings, their local area, and the city centre. They were
asked to evaluate the problem as serious, bad, acceptable,
or no problem for each item. The answers were not always
consistent, some were unsure whether a problemwas serious
or just bad. The interviewer asked whether they thought
that the problem caused major inconvenience to them,
affected business to a great extent, was getting worse
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and/or could cause other problems. It was also evaluated on
the basis of whether they believed it should be treated as
a matter of priority, if there was the possibility, the
funds, the technical expertise to improve the situation. A
brief definition of each value was given to respondents
such as:
Serious: Unbearable problem, causing great trouble to
business and building/unit users and possibly obstructing
work or daily life, the problem had worsened over a period
of time and could get worse if not tackled, may create or
lead to other problems and was considered a priority for
immediate attention.
Bad : A problem recognized by the respondent, in spite of
causing inconvenience, it did not greatly affect
business/daily life. Although respondents said they wanted
the problem resolved, he/she did not consider it a
priority.
Acceptable : This value was given when the respondent notes
the problem but did not feel that it was affecting his
business/life directly. Although he/she would prefer it be
solved but can still live with it compared to other
problems.
No problem : Respondent had no problem with this particular
item.
Although most respondents had clear ideas and strong views
with regard to certain problems, some hesitated between
serious and bad on certain items and frequently changed
their mind between the two. This proved to be time
consuming, as respondents might not have had the time to
read the questions and consider their answers on their own.
However, the fact that the questionnaire was administered
by the author had the advantage of being able to explain
and clarify their queries and ensure better understanding
and more reliable answers.
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1.1 Social Survey results:
Methods used to analyse data are described in Chapter III,
Section 5 above.
a) Frequency test:
i. Users evaluation of building condition
1. General satisfaction: The majority of respondents were
dissatisfied with the physical condition of the building
and stated that they had serious problems (76.7%)
2. Access: Most respondents considered that traffic and
access to buildings to be a problem. (77% of respondents of
which 50% said that the traffic was a serious problem and
27% bad, while 41% thought access to building was a serious
problem and 35% thought it was bad).
3. Water penetration-dampness: considered to be main
problems by the majority of respondents (71.7% in both
cases, of which 51.7% said water penetration was serious
and 56.7% said dampness was a serious problem).
4. Utilities: The availability and the standard of
utilities also caused concern (73% of respondents
considered it a problem, while 50% of the total, thought it
was serious). The level of maintenance and overall
evaluation of the physical condition of the buildings were
also causing concern to the majority of those interviewed
(66.7%). Pollution was also causing worry to many
respondents (57%), while less people considered they had a
problem with noise (36.7%), drafts (32.2%), ventilation
(15%), and less than 5% thought they had a problem with
natural light in the building.
ii. Users views on condition of surroundin g area
The second category investigated was the immediate
environment where the building is located to establish
peoples views on whether there were serious problems in
their street/area, the type of problems they considered to
be serious or bad and needed urgent attention.
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1. General satisfaction: The vast majority of respondents
stated that they had serious problems in their area. Only
one respondent was satisfied with the area, and another did
not respond, while 58 (96.7%) considered the general
conditions in the area as serious. The majority of
respondents considered eleven out of the twelve variables,
selected to measure the satisfaction with the area, to be
problems in the three zones. All respondents cited
fighting, violence and the military conditions as the most
serious problem they faced which affected their lives and
businesses.
2. Maintenance: the highest proportion of the respondents
complained of the level of maintenance in the area and its
general physical condition, 96% thought it was a problem,
82.8% (48 respondents) considered it a serious problem and
13.8% (8 resp.) considered it bad.
3. Traffic and parking: both were considered by respondents
to be serious problems. Traffic was considered a problem by
93.3% of the respondents (75% serious and 18.3% bad), while
86.7% stated that parking was one of the main problems the
area suffers from (66.7% serious and 20% bad).
4. Pollution: was considered by a high percentage of
respondents pollution, together with hygiene, in their area
to be serious problems. With 95% complaining of the lack of
hygiene and cleanliness (61.7% serious and 33.3% bad),
while 88.1% complained of the level of pollution (49.2%
serious and 39% bad). None of the respondents said
they did not consider them to be problems.
5. Access: access to the area, street vendors and
pedestrian safety were also considered to be main problems
in the area although less people felt they were as serious
as others. Access was judged by 88.3% of respondents as
aproblem (40% serious and 48.3% bad), 78% complained of
street vendors ( 55.9% serious, and 22.1% bad), and 72% of
the safety of pedestrians (8.5% serious and 64% bad).
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6. Amenities and services: the availability and condition
of amenities and services in the area were also considered
as problems, although less respondents thought they were
serious. Amenities were cited by 87.9% of respondents (31%
serious and 56.9% bad), and services by 80% (35% serious
and 45% bad).
iii) Problems with the city centre:
1. General: almost all respondents considered that they had
serious problems in the city centre (98.3%), with only one
respondent declining to comment. There was a higher
percentage of respondents considering problems in the
centre as a whole were worse than the problems in their
immediate localities.
2. Traffic: was considered a serious problem by 98.2% of
all respondents, while the same proportion considered they
had a problem with parking facilities and practices of
which 91.2% judging it as serious and 7% as bad.
3. Pollution and hygiene: all respondents considered they
had a problem with hygiene conditions in the centre (66.1%
serious and 33.9% bad). Pollution was also considered a
problem by 94% of respondents (61 %serious and 33.3% bad).
4. Street vendors: all respondents cited the presence of
street vendors in the city centre as a problem (86% serious
and 14% bad). While 86% cited access to various parts of
the centre, half of the respondents thought it serious and
the other half thought it was a bad problem. Pedestrian
safety in the centre was mentioned by 79.3% of respondents
as a problem, although most of them 63.8% considered it
serious and only 15.5% considered it bad.
5. General condition and maintenance: the general physical
condition and level of maintenance in the city centre was
considered a problem by 98% of respondents. The fact that
less people thought it to be serious than
462
in their own areas (59.6% as opposed to 82.8%) may be due
to the fact that people either expect or consider other
areas in better condition than theirs, or that certain
things do not directly affect them. Although more people
complained of the level and condition of services in the
city centre to that in their immediate areas (94.8% of
which 39.7% thought it serious and 55.2% bad).
Less people seemed to think that the level of maintenance
and the general condition of the city centre was a problem
compared to their response to the same question in their
own area (71.5% as opposed to 87.9%). Of this percentage
also less people thought it as serious in the centre as in
their own areas (16.1% against 31% serious and 55.4%
against 56.9% bad). Again this might reflect that people
were less concerned with these issues in the centre as
whole as compared to having these facilities closer to
them. It could also be explained by the fact that they
considered other problems as more serious and should be
treated as a priority in the centre.
6. Views on restoration: although 96.5% of respondent
judged the lack of protection and restoration of historic
buildings and monuments as a problem, only 35% thought it
was serious and should be considered as a priority for
development, while 61% rated it as a bad problem.
b- Cross-tabulation test:
This test was carried out, as mentioned in Chapter III, to
examine a combination of variables (a pair or more), and
whether some sort of statistical relationship couldbe
established that could lead to more understanding of the
phenomenon.
i. Problems with buildings
The cross tabulation method provided a comparison between
various problems with buildings in relation to their age or
to the area where they are located. Five variables were
selected as they were considered most serious by the
majority of respondents.
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1. Pollution :
It is evident that users of buildings in Zone "C", the new
area, suffered from more pollution than the other two zones
with Zone "A" the historic core having the least problem.
As 78.6% of Zone "C" users said pollution was a problem
(35.7% serious and 42.9% bad). The majority of Zone "B"
users (60%) said they had a problem of whom, more than half
(32%) said it was serious. Only 40% of the old city users
complained of pollution affecting the physical condition of
the building, of those 15% only thought it was serious.
Similar results emerged from measuring the extent of the
problem in relation to the building age. The highest
proportion of people complaining of pollution were 87.5% of
the users of buildings constructed after the occupation
(37.5% serious and 50% bad), second was those built during
the Jordanian rule (65%) of which 30% said it was serious,
and 50% of users in buildings built under
the British Mandate said they had a pollution problem,
again 30% said it was serious. The least affected were
users of the historic buildings as only 42.8% identified it
as a problem with only 19% considered it to be serious.
2. Dampness :
Most buildings in the old city Zone "A" were suffering from
some form of dampness with at least 76.2% of users
considering it a serious problem. Zone "C" or the new area
also had an extensive dampness problem, as 71.4% of
respondents said it was a problem with 64.3% considered it
serious. Although more than half of buildings/units in the
second sample area Zone "B" said they had a dampness
problem (56%), the problem seem to be less severe then the
other two areas as only 36% considered it to be serious.
When the same measure was applied to examine the extent of
the problem in relation to building age, the historic
buildings ( 21 out of the 22 are in the historic core)
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maintained the same proportion of 90.9% , with 77.3%
considering the problem serious or severe. The next three
categories were distributed between zone "B" & "C",
therefore some of the proportions changed. A similar
proportion existed between the frequency of the problem in
buildings of the Jordanian rule 65%, (45% serious and 20%
bad) and the British Mandate 60%, (40% serious and 20%
bad). While 50% of the those built under the occupation had
a dampness problem, all serious.
3. Water penetration:
The extent of the water penetration problem and the area
were it was most severe, can be clearly corroborated with
the problem of dampness. Buildings located in Zone "A", the
historic core, seemed the worst affected as 85.75
identified it as a problem (66.7% as serious). The new
area Zone "C" was also badly affected as a total of 78.6%
saying it was a problem (64.3% serious, and 14.3% bad).
Zone "B" again seemed to be the least affected, although
56% said it was a problem (32% serious and 24% bad).
The same results emerged when the problem was related to
building age, as 86.2% of the users of historic buildings
said it was a problem (68.2% serious). A similar proportion
to that of dampness was present in those built under
Jordanian rule (65%) and under British Mandate (60%), with
the percentage of the new buildings slightly higher at 67%
(50% serious).
4. Building utilities :
There seemed to be a same proportion of users in the three
zones who identif led this as a problem. With 76.2% in Zone
"A" (42.9% serious), and 72% in Zone "B" (48% serious),
while the new area, Zone "C" at 71.4%, although higher
proportion 64.3% considering it serious.
A similar result emerged from examining the effect of the
building age on the satisfaction with utilities. In
historic buildings, 77.3% of respondents identified it as
a problem, 80% in the buildings of the British Mandate
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period, 70% in those built under the Jordanian rule and
62.5% in the most recently built area (post 1967).
5. Maintenance :
Users in Zone "C" were more concerned than the others with
regard to the general condition of the buildings and the
extent and level to which it was maintained, as 78.6% said
they had a problem, of which 64.3% thought it was serious.
The majority of users in Zone "B" 68% also said they had
a problem (36 serious and 32 bad). Over half of the
respondents in "Zone A" (68.1%), of which 33.3% considred
it serious. Although this indicates that users in "Zone A"
were less concerned about condition and maintenance level
of the building/unit they were using, difference may not
all be a result of better condition. Part of the reason for
the difference between response in this zone and in others
could be related to the fact that people expected less in
the old city because buildings are very old. When
maintenance was measured in relation to building age, users
of old buildings were also less concerned than others,
(59.1%) said they had problems, of which 31.8% considered
it serious. Users of buildings built under Jordanian rule
(75%), said they had problems of which 45% said it was
serious.
A similar proportion (70%) in units built under the British
Mandate had problems, with more of them, 60% considering it
serious. Five users out of the eight (62.5%) interviewed in
buildings constructed after the occupation had problems,
37.5% considered it to be serious.
ii. Problems with surroundin g area :
The cross tabulation method provided also a comparison
between the extent of problems in the area where the
building is located as identified by building users.
1. Traffic :
Although more users in Zone "B" (96%) complained of traffic
(96%), it was evident that a high proportion of users in
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all zones considered it a problem (93.2% in Zone "C", 90.5%
in Zone "A"). A higher proportion in Zone B" said it was
serious (84%), while 78.6% in Zone "C". Less people in Zone
"A" considered it serious (61.9%).
2. Parking :
All users in Zone "B" said they had problems in parking
practices and available facilities, of which 88% said it
was a serious problem, while 92.9% in Zone "C" considered
parking a problem with 64.3% serious. Although parking
facilities were not expected in the old city, more than
half the respondents (65.7%) complained of parking in the
old city, with 42.9% considering it to be serious.
The same proportion can be found in the results when itis
measured related to the building age, as all respondents
using buildings constructed in both the British and
Jordanian rules said it was a problem, 90% in both
categories said it was serious. The vast majority of users
of new buildings also had parking problems 87.5%, of which
37.5% said it was serious.
3. Street vendors:
The majority of respondents in the three zones complained
of the presence of street vendors as a main problem, 88% in
Zone "B", the majority 76% stating it was serious, 71% in
Zone "C" of which 57% said it was serious, while 70% in
Zone "A" considered it a problem with only 30% saying it
was serious. A similar picture emerged when the problem was
measured against building age, with all users of buildings
constructed during the British Mandate considering it a
problem (80% serious). It was observed that less street
vendors sell their merchandise in Zone "C", which was
confirmed by the decrease in the proportion of users in the
new area who considered it a problem while half of the
population thought it serious.
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4. Pollution:
Residents of the new area, Zone "C", seemed to be greatly
concerned about pollution in their area as all respondents
identified it as a problem, with 78.6% stating it was a
severe problem. This was confirmed by observation of
accumulating rubbish in large empty sites and in excavated
construction sites, with residents complaining of rats,
mice and various insects. Although this area was less
affected by fighting and traffic, it had the least
developed streets and services.
Pollution in Zone "B" was also causing concern to building
users, as 92% described it as a problem, 52%saying it was
serious. Most of the pollution according to respondents and
observation notes was a result of fighting, fires, traffic
congestion in the main square and on main roads (Ghernata
and the Commercial street) and deterioration in services
i.e. inability to collect the accumulated rubbish
regularly, which was exasperated by street vendors.
Blocked drains, burst pipes and open sewers were also cited
as environmental hazards by respondents, observation and
supported by interviews with officials. The majority of
users in Zone "A" were also concerned about the level of
pollution 75% of respondents, although less proportion
considered the problem serious compared to other areas
(25%). A similar picture emerged when the problem was
measured against age of the building, with all users of new
buildings and 90% of medium age buildings complaining of
the problem. only 67.8% of historic building users
considered it a problem with only 20% saying it was
serious.
5. Hygiene :
The same pattern emerged from the data as that of
pollution, with 100% of respondents in the new area, Zone
"C", stating it was a problem, the majority 78.6%considered
it serious. Almost all users in Zone "B" were also
concerned (98%), of which 64% saying it is serious.
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In the historic core hygiene was also a major problem
according to 90.5% of respondents, with 47.6% considering
it as serious. No significant difference was noted when
this variable was measured against building age.
6. Services :
All respondents in Zone "C" were dissatisfied with service
provision, with 57.1% describing the problem as serious. In
Zone "B", 84% complained of services with 28% only saying
it was serious. In Zone "A", 61.9 were unhappy with
services and 28% considered the problem serious.
A similar pattern emerged when this was measured against
building age, as less users were dissatisfied 63% in Zone
"A" than in other areas. All users of new buildings
identified it as problem compared to 90% in British Mandate
built properties and 85% in Jordanian built properties.
7. Access and Pedestrian Safety:
Most users of Zone "B" considered access to their area as
a problem (92%), of which more than half said it was
serious (52%), the same proportion emerged in Zone "C" as
92.6% said this was a problem, with fewer users considering
it serious (14.3%). A high proportion of users in Zone "A"
have also complained of difficulty of access to the
historic core (81%), more than half of these said it was
serious (42.9%).
The majority of respondents in the three zones were
concerned about pedestrian safety (84% in Zone "B", 70% in
Zone "A" and 57% in Zone "C"). However no one in the new
area "C" considered it to be serious and only 10%, in the
old city "A" and 12% in the middle area "B" thought it was
serious.
8. Open Areas:
Most people were not concerned with this issue with only
6.8% of the total number of respondents considering it a
serious problem and 52.5% said it was bad. None of the
respondents in the new area Zone "C" thought it a serious
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problem while 50% said it was bad. Less people were
concerned in Zone "A" as 40% agreed it was a problem with
only 10% of respondents who said it was serious. Although
72% of users in Zone "B" considered this a bad problem,
only 8% of theni thought it serious.
9. Security:
All respondents in all zones said it was a severe problem.
10. Law and Order :
The response to this problem was very high with all
respondents in Zone "C" complaining of increased incidence
of crime, of which 92.9% said it was serious. A high
proportion of respondents in the other two zones considered
it a problem, as 96% in Zone "B", of which 76% said it was
serious, and 94.4% in Zone "A" with 84.2% considering it as
serious.
11. Amenities:
Although a high proportion of respondents stated that the
lack of amenities or maintenance of the existing facilities
was a problem, the response varies from area to area. In
Zone "C", 92.3% of respondents said this was a problem with
64.3% considering it serious, while only 36.8% of
respondents in Zone "A" said it was a serious problem out
of 89.4% of the total who considered it a problem.
The middle area Zone "B" is where the main city square is
located which was landscaped between 1986 and 1987. In
spite of the serious damage resulting from intensive
fighting in the centre since the Intifada, and lack of
maintenance since the council resigned in 1988, some
landscape, planting and fountains survived, albeit in
badcondition. Most of the street lights were broken and the
only bus stop in the main square, was severely war damaged.
Consequently less respondents in this Zone, only 8%, said
lack of amenities was a serious problem, although 76%
considered it bad.
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1.2 The Physical survey results
A) Buildings :
Internal
- Most of the units (72.8%) either had a sink or a wash
basin and some had both, while 27.2% did not have any.
It was found that 29 units out of the 58 answers
available (50%) had a wash basin, while 30 (51.7%) had
and/or a sink. Most of the twelve units that had both
were residential.
- Less than half the units had internal toilet
facilities (48.3%) although most of those without the
facilities (76%) had access to others mainly at
neighbours premises since public toilets were almost
non-existent in the centre.
- There was evidence of both dampness and water
penetration in many of the units. Most of the units,
fifty one out of sixty (85%) suffered from some form
of dampness. Thirty four of these units (56.7%) had
severe dampness problems, while nine (15%) had less
severe but could still be considered bad dampness
problem. Evidence of water penetration through
windows, drains or roof leaks was more or less
similar. With 85% of units suffering from water
penetration, of which 51% were severe cases and 20%
bad.
- Other problems such as noise were causing concern in
36.7% of the units (23% serious and 13.7% bad), and
draft in 32.2% of the units of which only 10.2%
constituting a serious or worrying problem.
Ventilation and light in units do not seem to be a
major problem in most of the units with only 15% found
to be suffering from ventilation problem (3.3%
serious). There seemed to be reasonable natural light
in most of the units inspected (95%).
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External :
Roofs: The type of roof construction and finish were
included in the assessment of the external physical
condition of the buildings. Although it was difficult, for,
security reasons to inspect the roof condition from the
top, respondents were asked about the availability of roof
protection or any form of damp proofing.
Most of the buildings inspected (forty out of sixty or
66.6%), either did not have any protection, or the original
protection layer (mainly special gypsum mixture or animal
grease in old buildings) was damaged (53.3% unavailable and
15% damaged), while in eleven cases (18.3%) the respondents
did not know the answer and it was unsafe to inspect at the
time of the survey. In conclusion, only 15% of the
buildings inspected had available roof protection, although
it was not clear how well it was applied and maintained.
Access: Building access was viewed as a problem by 76.7%
respondents of which 50% said it was a serious problem as
was detailed above. Access from the building/unit to open
areas was considered reasonable in 23 (53%) of the units,
all buildings (35%) had difficulty and in five cases
(11.6%) access was considered dangerous, while 16 shared
access and were, for the purpose of this analysis,
excluded.
Emergency access: (for fire or ambulance services) was
available in 55.7% of the units, while 42.3% had no
facilities.
Loading
 and unloadin g : facilities were only available in
31.1% of the cases, although most of those who answered
yes, were using any available space on the main road which
usually added to the traffic problems.
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B) Services :
Water:
Forty five (75%) of the sixty inspected units had water
connection. Of these only six had hot water (10% of the
total).
Electricity:
While the vast majority of buildings inspected were
connected to the electricity network (96.3%), only 56.75 of
them were satisfied with the connection. All those
connected experience power cuts, 28.3% daily, 30% twice a
week, 11.7% once a week, 8.3% once a month. Most of those
who said it varied, confirmed that sometimes it was
frequent. According to the majority of respondents (63.3%),
the power cut lasted for over four hours at a time, while
5% said it lasted over six hours and 6.7% said it lasted
over two hours. Again 16.7% of respondents said it varied.
Almost two thirds (60%) of respondents complained that
power cuts affected their business, half of them (30%)
stated that power cuts always affected their business,
while the other half said they affected it sometimes, 16.7%
said it rarely affected the business and 18.3% had no
problem while 3.3% did not know.
Most of the electrical wiring in units inspected was either
covered or partly covered in 38 cases (64.4%), while the
rest of the 21 cases (35.6%) had exposed wiring. Only in 13
cases was the wiring inside the unit tangled and in bad
condition, of which seven cases looked
very dangerous.
Heating:
The majority of units (57.6%) had some form of heating
facility mainly mobile gas or electric fire, open coal-
stoves were mostly used in the old buildings, and there was
only one unit which had central heating installed by the
tenant (photography lab). The rest of the units (42.4%) had
no means of heating their units. Only a small minority said
they had excellent heating facilities (6.9%), while the
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majority 55.2% were satisfied with the heating and 29.3%
considered it unsatisfactory while 5.2% said it was bad.
Drainage:
Most buildings were connected to main drains (96.7%),
although less than half respondents were clearly satisfied
with the service (48.3%), a small proportion said they were
not satisfied (15%) while the rest (35 %) did not know.
Telephone:
Two thirds of the units inspected had a telephone line
(66. 6%)
C) Environmental conditions:
To evaluate the condition of the environment where each of
the inspected units was located, a number of questions were
asked in the physical survey with regard to available
amenities and services. This was combined with respondents
answers to questions about the problems in their area to
complete the evaluation.
Open spaces:
More than half the units inspected had no green/public
areas close to the building (58.3%), the spaces available
to most of the rest (40%) were in bad condition. There were
no, or only narrow, spaces left between buildings (98.3%),
73.3% with no space and 25% with only narrow space. This
was examined to give a rough indication of the density of
the built area in each zone and the possibility of
providing some kind of public amenity such as a small
playground or seating area in the future.
Parking:
Except in one case, there were no parking facilities forany
of the buildings or units inspected, which supports the
result of the social survey, where 86.7% of the respondents
complained of the parking problems.
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Pedestrian circulation:
It was difficult to determine the portion of pavement in
front of a building that could be related to a certain
unit, the figures obtained therefore relate to the number
of units that enjoyed a pavement in front of the building.
Over half of the units had a wide pavement (52.3%), while
36.7% had no pavement and 9.8% had narrow pavements. It
should be noted that it is unusual to find pavements in the
old part of the city. Where pavements were found, their
condition was inspected to determine their fitness for use.
Less than half the pavements inspected were in good
condition (44.4%), the majority had damaged finishes
(55.6%).
Amenities:
There were no available public toilets, seating or rubbish
bins in any of the zones inspected.
Landscape:
There was also very little landscape in the three areas,
although the main square had planting and hard landscaping,
which was provided in 1986, these were neglected during the
Intifada. Only 9.8% of the units inspected enjoyed
landscaping facilities albeit badly maintained. A total of
87.9% of respondents considered the lack of these amenities
in their immediate environment as a problem (31% serious
and 56.9% bad).
Environmental problems:
Hygiene, traffic, pollution and parking were some of the
main environmental concerns of the residents (95%, 93.3%,
88.1% and 86.7% respectively).
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(2) Obstacles to Development
This evaluation of peoples views on what constituted an
obstacle to development is a summary of the results of the
frequency test based on data obtained from the completed
questionnaires. As described above, the obstacles were
grouped into three categories; political including five
variables, legal including four variables and financial
including four variables1
2.1 Political Obstacles:
Violence, fighting: all respondents stated that violence,
fighting and military clashes had very serious effect on
the development of Nablus. With only one respondent judging
it as bad (1.6% against 98.2%).
Curfews, selective area closures, etc.: all respondents
considered that curfews and long (partial or full) closures
of the city centre to have had a serious effect (89.7%
serious and 10.3% bad).
Uncertainty: all respondents referred to the uncertainty of
the political future of the territories and their own
personal future as an obstacle to development and the
chance to improve the physical condition of the city centre
(93% serious and 7% bad).
Demolition, sealing of property, etc.: demolition of
houses, sealing of property related to political issues,
and confiscation of land was considered to have had serious
effect on development by 67.2% of respondents, while 31% of
them considered it had a bad effect and 1.7% a small
effect.
Law and order: all respondents agreed that the increase in
the level of crime such as burglaries and vandalism due to
breakdown in law and order in the city had affected the
development prospects and peoples willingness to improve
1	 For the summary results refer to Chapter VIII, Tables
1 & 2.
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their property. Of these, 74% thought this had a serious
effect, 22.4%, a bad effect and 3.4% a small effect.,
2.2 Legal Obstacles:
Municipal council: the absence of mayor and a municipal
council in Nablus was believed, by 94.8% of the
respondents, to have contributed to the inability to
develop the city and to improve its physical environment.
Of these, 72.4% considered it to has had a serious effect,
22.4% bad effect, while only 3.4% thought the absence of
the council had a small effect on development.
Rent control: Rent control had also contributed to the lack
of development according to 87% of the respondents, 59.6%
considered it had a serious effect, 28.1% a bad effect and
8.8% a small effect.
Security of tenure: ownership status and security of tenure
was also believed to have had an effect on the development
prospects in the city by 86.4% of respondents, (34.5%
serious effect, 45.5% bad effect and 16.4% a small effect).
Planning laws: although the majority of respondents (68.4%)
stated that planning laws had affected the development in
the city, only 20% believed it had a serious effect, 48% a
bad effect and 20% said it had a small effect.
2.3 Financial Obstacles:
Taxes: High taxes and the method in which it was collected
was one of the most frequently mentioned problems by all
those interviewed. It was a major complaint as soon as the
purpose of the study was explained and before the questions
were asked. All respondents stated that high taxes had
affected the development of the city with 96.4% describing
its effect as serious and 3.6% as bad.
Closure of banks: all respondents believed that the closure
of the Arab banks and the restricted services available
from the only recently opened bank had contributed to the
current situation in the city. More than half of them 58.5%
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thought it had a serious effect and 41.5% said it had a bad
effect.
Lack of investment: all respondents also considered that
the lack of investment from the local residents as a result
of the prevailing conditions, and from outside the
territory as a result of the Israeli restrictions on
receiving funds, have affected the development in the city.
Of these 45.3% considered it had a serious effect and 54.7%
a bad effect.
Lack of financial institutions: lack of financial
institutions (public and private), was also considered by
the vast majority to be an obstacle to development by most
respondents (96.2% of whom 46.2% said it had a serious
effect and 50% a bad effect).
Summary:
The highest proportion of respondents referred to the
political issues as creating the most serious obstacles to
development. This is only relative as values of other
variables such as legal and financial were also very high,
with the exception of tax which ranked as high as the
political problems.
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Cross Tabulation Results:
I- Evaluation of Problems in buildin gs according to zone:
Table (20)
Pollution/Zone
(ZONE)
Count	 "A"	 "B"	 "C"	 Row
Row Col%	 Old	 Medium	 New	 Total
Total%	 ______________________________________________
Serious No	 3	 8	 5	 16
	
18.8	 50.0	 31.3	 27.1
	
15.0	 32.0	 35.7
	
5.1	 13.6	 8.5
Bad	 No	 5	 7	 6	 18
	
27.8	 38.9	 33.3	 30.5
	
25.0	 28.0	 42.9
	
8.5	 11.9	 10.2
Accept.	 No	 8	 8	 1	 17
	
47.1	 47.1	 5.9	 28.8
	
40.0	 32.0	 7.1
	
13.6	 13.6	 1.7
No Problem No	 4	 2	 2	 2
	
50.0	 25.0	 25.0	 13.6
	
20.0	 8.0	 8.0
______________	 6.8	 3.4	 3.4
	
Total/col. No	 20	 25	 14	 59
33.9	 42.4	 23.7	 100.0
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Table (21)
Dampness! Zone
(ZONE)
Count
Row%	 "A"	 "B"	 "C"	 Row
Col%	 Old	 Medium	 New	 Total
Tot%	 __________
Serious No	 16	 9	 9	 34
%	 47.1	 26.5	 26.5	 56.7
	
76.2	 36.0	 64.3
_________	 26.7	 15.0	 15.0	 __________
Bad	 No	 3	 5	 1	 9
	
33.3	 55.6	 11.1	 15.0
	
14.3	 20.0	 7.1
	
5.0	 8.3	 1.7 _________
Accept No	 1	 5	 2	 8
	
12.5	 62.5	 25.0	 13.3
	
4.8	 20.0	 14.3
_________	 1.7	 8.3	 3.3 __________
No	 No	 1	 6	 2	 9
Problem %
	 11.1	 66.7	 22.2	 15.0
	
4.8	 24.0	 14.3
_________	 1.7	 10.0	 3.3 __________
Col	 No	 21	 25	 14	 60
Total	 %	 35.0	 41.7	 23.3	 100.0
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Table (22)
Water Penetration/Zone
(ZONE)
Count
Row%	 "A"	 "B"	 "C"	 Row
Col%	 Old	 Medium	 New	 Total
Tot%	 __________
	
Serious No	 14	 w	 8	 9	 31
	
45.2	 25.8	 29.0	 51.7
	
66.7	 32.0	 64.3
	
23.3	 13.3	 15.0 __________
Bad	 No	 4	 6	 2	 12
	
33.3	 50.0	 16.7	 20.0
	
19.0	 24.0	 14.3
	
6.7	 10.0	 3.3	 __________
	
Accept. No
	
2	 5	 1	 8
	
25.0	 62.5	 12.5	 13.3
	
9.5	 20.0	 7.1
	
3.3	 8.3	 1.7 _________
No	 No	 1	 6	 2	 9
Problem %
	
11.1	 66.7	 22.2	 15.0
	
4.8	 24.0	 14.3
_________	 1.7	 10.0	 3.3 __________
Column	 No	 21	 25	 14	 60
Total	 35.0	 41.7	 23.3	 100.0
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Table (23)
Building Utilities Provision/Zone
(ZONE)
Count	 Row
Row%	 "A"	 "B"	 "C"	 Total
Col%	 Old	 Medium	 New
Tot%	 _________
Serious	 9	 12	 9	 30
	
30.0	 40.0	 30.0	 50.0
	
42.9	 w.O	 64.3
_________	 15.0	 20.0	 15.0	 _________
Bad	 7	 6	 1	 14
	
50.0	 42.9	 7.1	 23.3
	
33.3	 24.0	 7.1
	
11.7	 10.0	 1.7	 _________
Accept	 3	 7	 4	 14
	
21.4	 50.0	 28.6	 23.3
	
14.3	 28.0	 28.6
	
5 .0	 11.7	 6.7	 _________
No	 2	 0	 0	 2
Problem	 100.0	 0	 0	 3.3
	
9.5	 0	 0
	
3.3	 0	 0
Col	 21	 25	 14	 60
Total	 35.0	 41.7	 23.3	 100.0
482
Table (24)
Level of Building Maintenance/Zone
(ZONE)
Count	 Row
Row%	 "A"	 "B"	 "C"	 Total
Col%	 Old	 Medium	 New
Tot%	 _________
	
Serious	 7	 9	 9	 25
	
28.0	 36.0	 36.0	 41.7
	
33.3	 36.0	 64.3
	
_________	 11.7	 15.0	 15.0	 _________
Bad	 5	 8	 2	 15
	
33.3	 53.3	 13.3	 25.0
	
23.8	 32.0	 3.3
	
_________	 8.3	 13.3	 3.3	 _________
Accept	 7	 7	 2	 16
	
43.8	 43.8	 12.5	 26.7
	
33.3	 28.0	 14.3
	
11.7	 11.7	 3.3
No	 2	 1	 1	 4
	
Problem	 50.0	 25.0	 25.0	 6.7
	
9.5	 4.0	 7.1
_________	 3.3	 1.7	 1.7	 _________
Column	 21	 25	 14	 60
Total	 35.0	 41.7	 23.3	 100.0
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Zone "A"
Zone "B"
Zone "C"
II- Evaluation of Problems in Each Zone:
Table (25)
Traffic/Zone
(ZONE)
	Count	 "A"	 "B"	 "C"	 Row
Row%
	
Col%	 Old	 Medium New	 Total
	
Tot%	 ________________________________
Serious	 13	 21	 11	 45
28.9	 46.7	 24.4	 75.0
61.9	 84.0	 78.6
21.7	 35.0	 18.3
Bad	 6	 3	 2	 11
54.5	 27.3	 18.2	 18.3
28.6	 12.0	 14.3
___________	 10.0	 5.0	 3.3
	
Accept.	 2	 1	 1	 4
50.0	 25.0	 25.0	 6.7
9.5	 4.0	 7.1
__________	 3.3	 1.7	 1.7
No	 0	 0	 0	 0
Problem
	Column	 21	 25	 14	 60
	
Total	 35.0	 41.7 23.3	 100
Summary: (based on serious and bad evaluation)
Serious
61.9
84 . 0
78. 6
Bad
28.6
12 . 0
14. 3
Total(%) Worst
Zone
	
90.5	 (3)
	
96.0	 (1)
	
92.9	 (2)
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Table (26)
Parking/Zone
(ZONE)
	
Count	 "A"	 "B"	 "C"	 Row
	
Row%	 Old	 Medium	 New	 Total
Co 1%
	
Tot%	 _________
Serious	 9	 22	 9	 40
	
22.5	 55.0	 22.5	 66.7
	
42.9	 88.0	 64.3
__________	 15.0	 36.0	 15.0	 _________
Bad	 5	 3	 4	 12
	
41.7	 25.0	 33.3	 20.0
	
23.8	 12.0	 28.6
_________	 8.3	 5.0	 6.7	 _________
	
Accept	 3	 0	 1	 4
	
75.0	 0	 25.0	 6.7
	
14.3	 0	 7.1
_________	 5.0	 0	 1.7 ________
No	 4	 0	 0	 4
Problem	 100.0	 0	 0	 6.7
	
19.0	 0	 0
_________	 6.7	 0	 0
	
Column	 21	 25	 14	 60
	
Total	 35.0	 41.7	 23.3
Summary: (Based on serious and bad evaluation)
Serious	 Bad	 Total (%)
Zone "A"
	
42.9	 23.8	 66.7 (3)
Zone "B"	 88. 0	 12. 0	 100.0 (1)
Zone "C"	 64 . 3	 28.6	 92.9 (2)
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Zone "A"
Zone "B"
Zone "C"
Table (27)
Street Vendors
(ZONE)
	
Count	 "A"	 "B"	 "C"	 Row
	
Row%	 Old	 Medium	 New	 Total
Col%
	
Tot%	 _________
Serious	 6	 19	 8	 33
18.2	 57.6	 24.2	 55.9
30.0	 76.0	 57.1
__________	 10.2	 32.2	 13.6 __________
Bad	 8	 3	 2	 13
61.5	 23.1	 15.4	 22.0
40.0	 12.0	 14.3
13.6	 5.1	 3.4	 _________
	
Accept	 4	 2	 4	 10
40.0	 20.0	 40.0	 16.9
20.0	 12.0	 14.3
_________	 6.8	 3.4	 6.8 _________
No	 2	 1	 0	 3
Problem	 66.7	 33.3	 0	 5.1
10.0	 4.0	 0
_________	 3.4	 1.7	 0
	
Column	 20	 25	 14	 59
	
Total	 33.9	 42.4	 23.7	 100.0
Summary :
Serious	 Bad
	30.0	 40.0
	
76.0	 12.0
57.].	 14.3
Total(%) Worst
Zone
	
70.0	 (3)
	
88.0	 (1)
71.4	 (2)
486
Zone "A"
Zone "B"
Zone "C"
Table (28)
Pollution/Zone
_________	 (ZONE)	 __________
Count	 "A"	 "B"	 "C"	 Row
Row%	 Old	 Medium	 New	 Total
Col%
Tot%	 __________
Serious	 5	 13	 11	 29
17.2	 44.8	 37.9	 49.2
25.0	 52.0	 78.6
8.5	 22.0	 18.6 __________
Bad	 10	 10	 3	 23
43.5	 43.5	 13.0	 39.0
50.0	 40.0	 21.4
16.9	 16.9	 5.1 _________
Accept	 5	 2	 0	 7
71.4	 28.6	 0	 11.9
50.0	 8.0	 0
8.5	 3.4	 0	 _________
Column	 20	 25	 14	 59
Total	 33.9	 42.4	 23.7	 100.0
Summary:
Serious	 Bad
	25.0	 50
	
52.0	 40.0
78.6	 21.4
Total(%) Worst
Zone
75	 (3)
92.0	 (2)
100.0	 (1)
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Table (29)
Hygiene/Zone
(Zone)
Count	 "A"	 "B"	 "C"	 Row
Row%	 Old	 Medium	 New	 Total
Co 1%
Tot%	 __________
Serious	 10	 16	 11	 37
	
27.0	 43.2	 29.7	 61.7
	
47.6	 64.0	 78.6
_________	 16.7	 26.7	 18.3	 _________
Bad	 9	 8	 3	 20
	
45.0	 40.0	 15.0	 33.3
	
42.9	 32.0	 21.4
	
15.0	 13.3	 5.0	 _________
Accept	 2	 1	 0	 3
	66.7	 33.3	 0	 5.0
	
9.5	 4.0	 0
	
3.3	 1.7	 0
No	 0	 0	 0	 0
Problem
Column	 20	 25	 14	 60
Total	 35.0	 41.7	 23.3	 100.0
Summary: (based on serious and bad evaluation)
Serious Bad	 Total(%)	 Worst
Zone
Zone "A" : 47.6% + 42.9% 	 90.9%	 (3)
Zone "B" : 64.5% + 32.0% =	 98.0%	 (2)
Zone "C" : 78.6% + 21.4%	 100.0%	 (1)
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Zone "A"
Zone "B"
Zone "C"
Table (30)
Service Provision/Zone
(Zone)
	
Count	 "A"	 "B"	 "C"	 Row
	
Row%	 Old	 Medium	 New	 Total
Co 1%
	
Tot%	 _________
Serious	 6	 7	 8	 21
	
28.6	 33.3	 38.1	 35.0
	
28.6	 28.0	 57.1
_________	 10.0	 11.7	 13.3
Bad	 7	 14	 6	 27
	
25.9	 51.9	 22.2	 45.0
	
33.3	 56.0	 42.9
__________	 11.7	 23.3	 10.0
	
Accept	 8	 4	 0	 12
	
66.7	 33.3	 0	 20.0
	
38.1	 16.0	 0
_________	 13.3	 6.7	 0
	
Column	 21	 25	 14	 60
	
Total	 35.0	 41.7	 23.3	 100.0
Summary:
Serious
28.6
28.0
57. 1
Bad
33.3
56. 0
42.9
Total(%)	 Worst
Zone
	
61.9	 (3)
	
84.0	 (2)
100.0	 (1)
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Table (31)
Pedestrian Safety
(Zone)
Count	 Row
Row%	 "A"	 "B"	 "C"	 Total
Col%	 Old	 Medium	 New
Tot%	 __________
Serious	 2	 3	 0	 5
	40.0	 60.0	 0	 8.5
	
10.0	 12.0	 0
_________	 3.4	 5.1	 0	 _________
Bad	 12	 18	 8	 38
	
31.6	 47.4	 21.1	 64.4
	
60.0	 72.0	 57.1
__________	 20.3	 30.5	 13.6	 __________
Accept	 5	 4	 5	 14
	
35.7	 28.6	 35.7	 23.7
	
25.0	 16.0	 35.0
_________	 8.5	 6.8	 8.5	 _________
No	 1	 0	 1	 2
Problem	 50.0	 0	 50.0	 3.4
	
5.0	 0	 7.1
_________	 1.7	 0	 1.7	 _________
Colunin	 20	 25	 14	 59
Total	 33.9	 42.4	 23.7	 100.0
Summary:
Serious	 Bad	 Total(%)	 Worst
Zone
Zone "A"	 10. 0	 60.0	 70.0	 (2)
Zone "B"
	 12. 0	 72.0	 84.0	 (1)
Zone "C"	 0	 57.1	 57. 1	 (3)
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Zone "A"
Zone "B"
Zone "C"
38.1
40.0
78.6
Table (32)
Access to Area/Zone
_________	 (Zone)	 _________
Count	 Row
Row%	 "A"	 "B"	 "C"	 Total
Col%	 Old	 Medium	 New
Tot%	 _________
Serious	 9	 13	 2	 24
	
37.5	 54.2	 8.3	 40.0
	
42.9	 52.0	 14.3
__________	 15.0	 21.7	 3.3	 _________
Bad	 8	 10	 11	 29
	
27.6	 34.5	 37.9	 48.3
	
38.1	 40.0	 78.6
	
13.3	 16.7	 18.3	 _________
Accept	 2	 2	 1	 5
	
40.0	 40.0	 20.0	 8.3
	
9.5	 8.0	 7.1
_________	 3.3	 3.3	 1.7	 _________
No	 2	 0	 0	 2
Problem	 100.0	 3.3
9.5
__________	 3.3	 __________
Column	 21	 25	 14	 60
Total	 35.0	 41.7	 23.3	 100.0
Summary:
Serious	 Bad
42.9
52 . 0
14 . 3
Total(%) Worst
Zone
	
81.0	 (3)
	
92.0	 (1)*
	
92.6	 (2)
* Zone "B" considered worst as a much higher percentage of
respondents considered access a serious problem.
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Table (33)
Open Spaces
(Zone)
	
Count	 Row
	
Row%	 "A"	 "B"	 "C"	 Total
	
Col%	 Old	 Medium	 New
Tot%
Serious	 2	 2	 0	 4
50.0	 50.0	 10.0	 6.8
8.0	 3.4	 3.4
Bad	 6	 18	 7	 31
19.4	 58.1	 22.6	 52.5
30.0	 72.0	 50.0
__________	 10.2	 30.5	 11.9
	
Accept	 10	 4	 7	 21
47.6	 19.0	 33.3	 35.6
50.0	 16.0	 50.0
_________	 16.9	 6.8	 11.9
No	 2	 1	 0	 3
Problem	 66.7	 33.3	 5.1
10.0	 4.0
_________	 3.4	 1.7
	
Column	 20	 25	 14	 59
	
Total	 33.9	 42.4	 23.7	 100.0
Summary:
Serious	 Bad	 Total(%)	 Worst
Zone
Zone "A"	 10. 0	 30.0	 40.0	 (3)
Zone "B"	 8.0	 72 . 0	 80.0	 (1)
Zone "C"	 0	 50.0	 50.0	 (2)
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Table (34)
Security/Zone
Zone)
Count
	 Row
Row%	 "A"
	
"B"	 "C"	 Total
Col%	 Old	 Medium	 New
Tot% ___________
Serious	 19	 25	 14	 58
32.8	 43.1	 24.1	 100.0
100.0	 100.0	 100.0
32.8	 43.1	 24.1	 _______
Column	 19	 25	 14	 58
Total	 32.8	 43.1	 24.1	 100.0
Summary: All respondents, in all three zones, who answered
the question considered this problem to be serious in their
area.
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Zone "A"
Zone "B"
Zone "C"
Table (35)
General Maintenance Level/Zone
(Zone)
Count	 Row
Row%	 "A"	 "B"	 "C"	 Total
Col%	 Old	 Medium	 New
Tot%	 _________
Serious	 16	 19	 13	 48
33.3	 39.6	 27.1	 82.8
84.2	 76.0	 92.9
27.6	 32.8	 22.4	 __________
Bad	 2	 5	 1	 8
25.0	 62.5	 12.5	 13.8
10.5	 20.0	 7.1
3.4	 8.6	 1.7	 _________
Accept	 1	 1	 0	 2
50.0	 50.0	 3.4
5.3	 4.0
1.7	 1.7	 _________
Column	 19	 25	 14	 58
Total	 32.8	 43.1	 24.1	 100.0
Summary:
Serious
84.2
76.0
92.9
Bad	 Total (%)
	
Worst
Zone
10.5	 94.9	 (3)
20.1	 96.0	 (2)
7.1	 100.0	 (1)
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Zone "A"
Zone "B"
Zone "C"
Table (36)
Amenities/Zone
__________	 (Zone)	 __________
Count	 Row
Row%	 "A"	 "B"	 "C"	 Total
Col%	 Old	 Medium	 New
Tot%
Serious	 7	 2	 9	 18
38.9	 11.1	 50.0	 31%
36.8	 8.0	 64.3
_________	 12.1	 3.4	 15.5	 __________
Bad	 10	 19	 4	 33
30.3	 57.6	 12.1	 56.9
52.6	 76.0	 28.6
__________	 17.2	 32.8	 6.9	 ___________
Accept	 2	 4	 1	 7
28.6	 57.1	 14.3	 12.1
10.5	 16.0	 7.1
_________	 3.4	 6.9	 1.7
Column	 19	 25	 14	 58
Total	 32.8	 43.1	 24.1	 100.0
Summary:
Serious
36.8
8.0
64 . 0
Bad
52 . 6
76.0
28.6
Total (%)
	
Worst
Area
	
89.4	 (2)
	
84.0	 (3)
92.3	 (1)
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Table (37)
Problem evaluation and comparison between the three zones
Evaluation: (%) Based on "Serious" and "Bad" evaluation
(Gr) Grading based on area with worst problem
(Problem)
Traffi Parkin street Pollut Hygein Service
Zone	 Vendor -ion
"A" 90.5	 66.7	 70	 75	 100	 61.9
	
Gr	 (3)	 (3)	 (3)	 (3)	 (])	 (3)
"B" 96.0	 100	 88	 92	 95	 84
	
Gr	 (1)	 (1)	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (2)
"C" %	 93.2	 92.9	 71.4	 100	 100	 100
	
_____ Gr
	 (2)	 (2)	 (2)	 (1)	 (1)	 (1)
Pedest Access Open Securi Maint- Amenit-
Zone	 Safety ________ Spaces	 ty	 enance	 ies
"A" 70	 81	 40	 100	 94.9	 89.4
	
Gr	 (2)	 (3)	 (3)	 (eq)	 (3)	 (2)
"B" 84	 92	 80	 100	 96	 84
	
Gr	 (1)	 (2)	 (1)	 (eq)	 (2)	 (3)
"C" 57	 92.9	 50	 100	 100	 92.3
	
_____ Gr	 (3)	 (1)	 (2)	 (eg)	 (1)	 (1)
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APPENDIX "B"
Physical Inspection Analysis
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Indicators of physical problems:
The analysis of the physical condition of the built
environment in Nablus centre and assessment of indicators
for its deterioration are based on results of Part "B" of
the questionnaire survey of 60 units, authors detailed
inspection of 12 buildings and observation
Zone A :-
The physical condition of buildings in the old city was
generally very bad according to the results of the physical
survey and the views of users (Appendix A). It was evident
that little maintenance work or upgrading of services had
taken place for many years. In spite of some individual
efforts to improve buildings or residential units, these
were limited and confined to private individual initiatives
rather than an overall trend. The physical condition of the
buildings and spaces inspected and visited in zone "A"
could be considered representative of the physical
condition of the buildings and spaces all-over the old
city. A total of twelve buildings were inspected some were
included in the standard survey.
A- External
External walls are mainly built from local natural stone
ranging from 50 to 100 cm in thickness. New additions of
concrete or brick walls can be found particularly in recent
vertical and horizontal extensions to existing buildings.
New buildings constructed on the outskirts of the old city
or to replace demolished or collapsed buildings in the
middle of the old town are also built with the use of
modern material. No visible effort had been made to build
in harmony with the existing architectural styles or to
preserve the traditional atmosphere of the existing urban
fabric.
Stone:The stone walls suffered from erosion, spalling and
discolouring of the surface. The walls frequently showed
signs of bulging, cracking, leaning and settlement and were
covered with mould and plant growth which were damaging to
the surface and the mortar joints. Severe dampness and
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water penetration had resulted in staining of surfaces and
consequently dampness in internal walls (re photographs)
mortar : Erosion and cracking of mortar was found to be
extensive in stone walls. Re-pointing had been carried out
over the years in many buildings with the use of cement
mortar which was quickly damaged and cracked due to the
inappropriate application, and the unsuitable physical
characteristics. The new mortar was also unsuitable
visually because of its dark "cement" colour, and the
inappropriate thickness of the joints relative to the
colour and thickness of the original mortar. The overall
visual appearance was exasperated by the cracks and stains
Concrete : most concrete walls used in the construction of
extensions and additional floors to existing buildings, had
evidence of erosion of surfaces, and cracking. In certain
cases spalling was evident which indicate the corrosion of
the steel.
Cladding and Render: there was often failure of finishes
where concrete walls were rendered or have cladding. The
finishes were either detached from the structure, or showed
evidence of severe dampness, staining of the surfacee and
rot in case of timber cladding.
Lintels and Arches : cracking was often found in stone
lintels and arches, with evidence of bulging and excessive
load. This was evident in old buildings which remained un-
as well as those with new extensions and additions.
Windows and Doors: where original timber doors and windows
still existed, rot was evident in timber frames and in the
leaf itself. Steel frames were rusty and there was
generally poor quality of finishes and lack of maintenance.
Thresholds were in poor condition and often unsafe. It was
unusual in the old city to find any mastic or beading
around openings. Metal doors and windows, whether original
or a replacement, suffer from corrosion, peeled paint and
general failure of finishes.
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The main problems can be summarized as:
-	
Incorrect fixing of door and window frames into
openings and gaps around frames
-	 rot in wooden frames
-	
rusting in metal frames and general failure of
finishes
-	
staining, mould growth and wooden rot
-	
absence of dpc in general around windows,and below
sills
Balconies and Canopies : The traditional timber balconies
and inashrabiyah's were still existing in the old city
although, a large proportion of the original elements had
disappeared (Abdul-Haq, Arafat, Kalbouneh, & Touqan, 1993).
Those left were in very bad condition structurally and
visually. Boards were missing, others broken, and there was
evidence of extensive rot in most timber structures with
hardly any finishes left. Steel cantilevers supporting
balconies suffered from rust and corrosion. Floor boards
were detached from the frames and seem generally unsafe.
Many of these were no longer used, either because the
buildings had been abandoned or sealed of f by the military.
In the cases where the premises were still occupied, they
had been repaired by adding extra boards or replaced by
concrete or metal structures which were not suitable to the
existing structure of the building and unsafe to carry the
load (Abdul Haq 1993).
Heights of handrails and spacing between balusters, where
original work had been replaced, did not follow any safety
standards, with no kerbs at the end of balconies. There was
also no provision of drainage facilities, slopes and
rainwater goods.
cantilevered Structures : Brackets were incorrectly fixed
to walls, and did not have sufficient strength to carry the
loads, there was often corrosion of the steel brackets and
general deterioration of the structural cantilevered members.
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Flashing and Damp proofing : None was found in any of the
buildings inspected in the sample area or in the streets
visited in the whole of the old city. Some owners described
old methods of waterproofing roofs and walls in the past by
using animal grease or special gypsum/lime plaster
(qasrinill), but most of those interviewed, confirmed that
none was applied for over thirty years.
Roofs : Most buildings in the old city have domed or cross-
vaulted roofs, or a combination of flat and domed, or flat
and vaulted roofs. The original structures were still in
good condition in spite of adverse weather conditions, some
of the original water proofing was still in place. Users of
old buildings complained more of water penetration and
dampness due to the failure of roof finishes than those in
zone "B" and "C".
No thermal insulation, waterproofing, flashing, overflow
pipes seemed to have been used in any of the buildings
inspected. There was frequent occurrence of loose and
cracked render and mortar, mould and plant growth and wood
rot when timber was used
Although the physical inspection showed evidence of
condensation due to inadequate ventilation, although few
respondents complained of this problem.
Flat roofs in newly built extensions or buildings in the
old city did not have the adequate slopes or overflow pipes
to get rid of excess water. They also had no insulation or
waterproofing systems and cracks were already evident on
walls around balconies and openings in the new extensions.
B- Internal :
Ceilings : Mainly plaster or plaster! paint finish,
although many had no finish at all, Very few had been
redecorated in over twenty years. Ceilings in the
buildings, and units inspected suffered generally from the
following :
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-	 evidence of condensation
-	 dampness, staining and mould growth
-	 roof and/or plumbing leaks and water penetration
-	 plaster failure where it exists, and uneven, bulging
and often peeling paint where it is applied
-	 incorrect wall/roof connections
-	 in certain cases unsuitable materials (such as
asbestos and foamed plastics) had been used to
replace the original or to provide a division between
spaces vertically (ie to create storage space).
Walls : Internally, walls were either exposed stone, or had
plaster or plaster/paint finish. The following had been
recorded in all the buildings inspected within this zone:
-	 evidence of condensation
-	 evidence of water penetration due to rain, plumbing or
roof leaks.
-	 damaged or blocked down pipes and gutters leading to
water penetration
-	 incorrect connection between walls
-	 incorrect fixing of door frames
-	 plaster and paint failure where applied
-	 uneven paint and plaster surface
-	 wood rot in internal joinery (door frames,timber
lintels, window frames, built in timber
Floors : The floors were either built from natural stone,
or concrete. Generally the condition of concrete floors was
worse than that of original stone floors. Stone floors were
mainly worn out as a result of long use, they often had an
uneven surface, and some showed signs of subsidence, but
generally remained in much better condition than new
concrete floors. In some cases, concrete floors, screed or
tiles on screed had been laid on top of the original stone
floors. The existing concrete floors were characterized by;
-	 cracked or damaged surface finish (screed or tiles)
-	 cracking of slab in absence of finish and indentation
of screed in absence of tiling
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-	 overloading of floors and evidence of subsidence.
-	 evidence of water penetration through walls at lower
levels
-	 down pipe damage at floor/wall level
-	 absence of dpm or dpc
-	 cracking,sloping and uneven flooring
-	 missing and broken tiles
-	 cracking of screed and lifting of tiles
-	 evidence of condensation
C) Stairways
As is the case in most old cities, stairways were mainly
constructed of natural stone. The width and height of steps
usually depended on the space available, and whether they
could be fitted in between buildings, floors, or various
street levels. The steep topography in Nablus, required
extensive provision of stairways to facilitate circulation
within the city.
The stairways varied in width and in the height of risers,
there were often no handrails. Doors very often opened
directly into flights, and there was not sufficient
headroom above pitch lines in many cases. However, the
danger and inconvenience mainly due to the physical
condition of these stairs rather than their design and
technical specifications. The long use of the steps
resulted in damaged and worn out treads and broken nosing.
Steps were in some cases broken and partially removed.
Zone B:
A- External
Stone: Most building facades in this area were made of
stone, often as a cladding material rather than structural
element. Quality of stone was good in spite of lack of
maintenance, graffiti on walls and some staining around
openings and near roof parapets. This wasa result of the
penetration of rain water or in some cases burst pipes and
lack of repair for long periods, (Interviews, 1993).
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Mortar : there was evidence of mortar failure and cracking
in many buildings, which did not seem to have had any
serious effect on the buildings. There was evidence of
internal dampness and staining as a result of bad pointing,
which might only needed standard maintenance and re-
pointing. There were, however, cases were spalling and
staining of stone was evident, but as it was not extensive
it could not be considered serious, nor did it require the
replacement of the affected stone.
Concrete : There were signs of serious problems, where
concrete walls were used without stone cladding, such as
erosion of surfaces and spalling indicating steel
corrosion. In the case of the three buildings on the main
square (Anabtawi, Alloul and Qamhawi), exposed concrete had
severe problems of staining, dampness, spalling and
erosion. The remains of old render work made it visually
worse. In addition to the war damage and fighting from
which these buildings suffered, lack of maintenance of
burst or leaking pipes, and water penetration to poorly
fitted openings, resulted in serious structural, health,
environmental as well as visual problems.
Cladding and Render : With the exception of stone cladding
(described above), most cladding work was badly applied and
poorly maintained. Layers of render and sporadic cladding
work had been stuck on concrete walls, to hide defects in
the original structure rather than to improve the visual
appearance of the building. Soon after the cladding was
applied, the same defects reappear in a worse condition.
An example of misguided renovation was demonstrated in the
extension, addition to two buildings at the entrance of the
old city on the city square (Alloul and Al Nimr) both
carried out by tenants without the consent of owners, or
permission from the municipality. Plastic coated metal
cladding, and badly painted timber cladding (re. Quest
no.16 & photographs) had either replaced the original stone
walls or covered the existing deteriorating concrete walls.
Both suffered severe dampness, staining, the metal was already
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rusting around the joints and openings. Visually, the
facade provided a poor introduction to the rich
architectural heritage in the historic core behind it.
Windows and Doors : these were a mixture of timber and
metal windows, and doors although unlike the old city, the
majority windows were metal (aluminum or plastic coated
steel). Most doors were either originally metal or had been
replaced by metal doors and metal security doors and
grills. A large number of the metal doors had rusted and
were in need of repainting, while many had evidence of war
damage such as bullets or twisted bars. Windows,
particularly around the main square had broken glass or
boarded up openings.
Balconies and Canopies : In the main spine of the city
centre, Ghernata, Commercial and Hitteen Street, the old
traditional balconies usually built on first and second
floors, continued to look elegant and in good shape. Some
had evidence of water penetration and staining, but as most
have facing stone, probably only needed minor repair work
to the stone and re-pointing. As with almost all
construction, would require the application of
waterproofing materials and improvement of available
drainage.
Canopies were mainly of light weight structures, many were
damaged and need replacement. It was noted during the
survey that a number of shopkeepers had started carrying
out repair and replacement work at their shops. However,
concrete and metal canopies showed evidence of more serious
problems of staining, water penetration and corrosion.
cantilevered Structures: The more recent additions had
evidence of structural problems, brackets were incorrectly
fixed to walls and did not have sufficient strength to
carry the loads. Steel brackets were corroded, and in many
cases there was evidence of serious deterioration of the
cant ilevered members.
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Flashing and water-proofing : There was no signs of any
application of waterproofing systems or flashing anywhere
in this zone. Although it was difficult to inspect the
roofs of buildings in this area during discussions with the
building users (owners and tenants), almost all confirmed
that there was none on roof tops. The absence of dpm/dpc
was evident around windows and window sills in all
buildings inspected.
Roofs, mostly flat in this part of the city centre,
however, as mentioned above, none was inspected, the
information was obtained during interviews and
questionnaires with the users and through observation of
the upper walls of buildings. The inspection of the ceiling
and internal walls produced strong evidence of occurrence
of dampness and water penetration through roofs in many
buildings particularly those around the main square. Many
upper floors in buildings on the square were deserted.
According to the owners of the old soap factory in the
square, roof maintenance used to be carried out every year
by applying the traditional waterproofing to the domed and
flat roof of the factory. However, they were not able to do
so for over 20 years due to the continuous security
problems in and around the square. They also had no access
to their own roof since 1987 (A. Touqan, 1993). The stair
to the roof had been damaged and closed for many years, and
soldiers very often follow suspects to roof tops where
heavy fighting takes place frequently. There was evidence
of severe dampness on the first floor ceiling, and on the
top part of the walls.
B) Internal
Ceilings : Many buildings inspected had their original
ceilings renewed and new type of suspended tiles added. The
quality of construction of the old and new ceilings was
generally inadequate. Physical inspection showed that this
was often due to bad workmanship and lack of maintenance
rather than, from serious dampness problems (with exception
of quest. l,6,&60, which were severely war damaged).
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Cineinas, offices and shops used a variety of suspended
ceiling types, such as plastic, fibre glass, and timber.
Asbestos tiles had also been found in some buildings which
were installed recently. Most interviewees did not seem
aware of the health hazards caused by the use of certain
building materials. No building codes or standard
specifications were enforced in the West Bank. (Hashem,
1993, Hanbali 1992, Abdul Hadi 1993). Buildings close to
the main square, except those recently renovated, suffered
from:
-	 condensation,dampness, staining and mould growth
-	 roof and/or plumbing leaks and water penetration
-	 plaster failure and uneven, bulging and often peeling
paint where it is applied
-	 incorrect wall/roof connections
These defects were more frequently found in older buildings
such as the soap factory, buildings at the edge of the old
city, (Quest Nos 16, 17, 36, 37 & 58), also buildings
suffering the worst of fighting and thus abandoned by
owners (No. 1, 6 & 60). The two buildings inspected in
Hitteen street had also signs of staining, dampness and
water penetration, mainly due to evident lack of
maintenance to services and absence of any form of
waterproofing (No. 22 & 41).
Most of the buildings which were inspected in Ghernata
street and in the Commercial street were generally inbetter
condition. Seven out 11 units inspected in Ghernata street
had ceilings in good condition, including two shops in
Ghernata cinema complex. The cinema itself and the owners
offices were in a dilapidated condition and owners had
plans to demolish the building and to replace it by a new
modern shopping and office centre. (Shakka' Interview 1993)
Walls: Similar to the condition of ceilings in this zone,
the internal walls, where unit/building had been recently
renovated, were still in good shape.
507
This was also more characteristic in the buildings in the
area around Ghernata street and the Commercial street, than
it was in the buildings in the area around Al-Hussain
square and Hitteen street. The latter had suffered more
fighting and security problems than the former. Thus owners
and users were either unable to, or discouraged from,
carrying out any improvements on their premises.
The most common wall finish was plaster and paint, although
wall paper and other wall cladding materials were used in
some units. The workmanship was generally poor, even in
cases where renovation work had just been completed.
Evidence of water penetration and dampness was limited to
buildings that had not been renovated.
Walls in older buildings and in units had not been
maintained for a long time and generally suffered from the
following;
-	 evidence of condensation
-	 evidence of water penetration due to rain, plumbing or
roof leaks.
-	
damaged or blocked down pipes and gutters leading to
water penetration
-	 incorrect connection between walls
-	 incorrect fixing of door frames
-	 failure of plaster and paint failure where applied
-	 uneven paint and plaster surface
-	 wood rot in internal joinery(door frames,timber
lintels, window frames, built in timber
(Physical survey to buildings nos. 1, 3, 6, 16, 17, 22, 36,
37, 41, 47, 58, 58 & 60)
Windows and Doors : Most of the buildings in this zone were
for retail and office use, in addition to public buildings.
Many units, particularly those on the ground floor have
installed additional security doors and grills to ensure
its safety, most of which were in good condition. The
original metal doors had evidence of corrosion.
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Internal windows and partitions such as those in banks,
money changers offices, pharmacies supermarkets etc. were
mainly made of timber or of aluminum and glass. The cases
where asbestos, pressed wood and other types of partitions
were used, had evidence of dampness and cracks. Internal
screens in shops were made of glass and aluminum and were
generally in good condition.
Like external windows and doors, the workmanship and
maintenance level of these units were inadequate, the
fixing between door and window frames and the opening were
usually incorrect leaving gaps around frames. There was
evidence of rot in the timber elements, and rust in the
metal elements.
Floors : Most buildings in this zone have terrazzo or PVC
tiles floor finish, older buildings still had floors
without finish or with screed only, mainly in storage
areas, workshops, and back rooms. The quality of floor
finish seemed to vary according to the type of finish
although buildings with terrazzo tiling were generally in
better condition. There was more evidence of damage to
floor finish in units with plastic flooring than in units
with terrazzo or stone flooring. The main problems with
flooring in this zone can be summarised as:
-	 cracked or damaged surface finish (screed or tiles)
-	 cracking of slab in the absence of finish and
indentation of screed in the absence of tiling
-	 overloading of floors and evidence of subsidence.
-	 evidence of water penetration at lower levels of
walls.
-	 down pipe damage at floor/wall level
-	 absence of dpm or dpc
-	 cracking, sloping and uneven flooring
-	 missing and broken tiles
-	 cracking of screed and lifting of tiles
-	 evidence of condensation.
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C) Stairways :The physical condition of the stairs in this
area also varied according to the location of the building.
The stairs in the buildings close to the main square had
also suffered neglect and lack of maintenance over the
years. The stairs in buildings 1, 6& 63 were in very bad
condition. Many treads were chipped and the nosing was
broken, the handrails missing or broken and there were no
lights on any of the landings. Lights in stairs and landing
were either; missing, broken or were out of order. The
windows on the landings were badly fitted allowing rain and
water penetration which caused dampness and wall staining.
There were no lifts in any of the three high rise buildings
inspected on the main square, although these exceeded six
floors in height. According to Jordanian building laws,
buildings above four floors, should be provided with lifts.
Although lift shafts are provided, there were no lift cars
and lift machines had been removed a long time ago. Tenants
who were interviewed in these buildings, estimated that
lifts had been out of order for over twenty years. With six
floors above ground level and two basement floors, total
height of the building was eight stories.
This case was common in most high rise buildings in the
centre, whether these were built before or after 1967. It
was common practice for owners to provide the shaft of the
lift for planning permission purposes and not to fit the
lift car and machines once the construction was finished
(Hanbali, 1992). This was evident in a quick survey of high
rise* buildings in the centre as 9 out of 12 buildings
inspected either did not have lift facilities or the lift
has been out of order for many years.
Zone C :-
Design problems in this zone also involved services,
traffic and circulation. Most new buildings in this area
were high rise and exceed the six floors height allowed
under Jordanian law for this zone. Many owners who
originally built within the allowed height, had recently
added floors to their buildings.
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During discussions with engineers at the municipality and
those in private practice, it became evident that this was
done without proper checking whether the added load could
be carried by the foundations. (Nabulsi 1993). Although
these addition were legally acceptable to the municipality,
the Chief Engineer, stated that he sometimes gave the
approval under duress due to the absence of a proper legal
system and the breakdown in law and order (ibid).
The number of violations increased, particularly in terms
of heights and setbacks, according to the municipality
engineer and the last mayor of Nablus, who estimated that
there were 3000 violations between 1990 and 1993, (Hanbali,
1992, H. Touqan, 1993).
The quality of construction in this zone was poor, and the
physical condition of buildings between twenty to two years
old was deteriorating fast as was observed during the
authors visits to Nablus in the last two years. It was
noted that no precautions were taken for safety on the
sites of buildings under construction. Excavations were
under way on a large scale in this area and someexcavateci
sites were abandoned for weeks for various reasons. The
deep site excavations which sometimes exceeded twenty
meters in depth were not protected by fencing, bollards, or
caution signs. Municipal work in this area, to extend
services or carry out repair and emergency work, was also
carried out without safety precautions. The municipality
had no power or authority to ensure that building sites are
protected during the works.
Many of the abandoned excavation sites became large rubbish
tips in the middle of town, with mosquitos and insects.
This generated bad smell, especially when nearby residents
burn the rubbish to get rid of the insects and the foul
smells and consequently increase the pollution. Most
importantly, the buildings were constructed without
following the existing building regulations related to
setbacks, right of way and heights, and without provision
of parking spaces as required by the law. Thus, increasing
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pressure on streets which were already overcrowded with
illegally parked cars, and on services which were already
overloaded.
A- External
General :
During discussions with engineers who worked in this area,
they complained of the poor quality of construction which
in their opinion, was due to lack of experience of local
contractors and workers. With the absence of any form of
local authority control or supervision, of building and
safety codes, and the absence of liability laws for the
protection of Palestinian civilians, the owners and
contractors were free to carry out their work without being
accountable to anyone. Clients were also not prepared to
pay consultants supervision fees which meant that they had
no power to issue instructions to contractors who usually
dealt directly with the clients (Al Mughani 1993). Clients
who employed engineers for the supervision of their
buildings were often inclined todeal with the contractor
without referring to the engineers who complained of the
difficulty of making the contractor follow their site
instructions. However, supervision and contract
administration according to international practices were
limited and relatively new in the OPT at the time of the
survey (Abdul Hadi 1993).
Masonry :
Stone: Stone used for cladding had less thickness than that
used in older buildings. During the inspection of buildings
and discussions with users, it was evident that the stone
fixing was inadequate. Although it was not possible to
check the availability, and proper fixing, of wall ties,
the cladding according to tenants and residents, often fell
on passers-by causing injury and alarm (Dweak, Nabulsi &
Swedan 1993). There were no similar complaints of such
problems in other parts of the city.
Mortar: Mortar was generally of bad quality and
inappropriate application. Residents complained of water
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penetration and cracking of mortar, and of lack of
maintenance from the building owners which was evident
during the inspection of buildings.
Concrete: Most exposed concrete walls, even if they had
been rendered, suffered from severe staining and dampness,
erosion of surfaces, and cracking. Spalling was evident
where corrosion of steel exists. (Quest Nos 10, 11, 12, 13,
26, 27,& 28)
Windows and Doors: Many buildings particularly those close
to the main square (Nos. above) suffered the same problems
found on the main square in terms of quality of
construction and lack of maintenance. These can be
summarised as:
-	 excessive gaps around frames and inadequate fixing of
frame to opening
-	 degraded finishes
-	 rusting in metal frames
-	 rot in timber frames
-	 staining, mould growth, and wood rot
-	 absence of dpc around windows and doors and also under
sills
Balconies and Canopies : these had evidence of common
problems such as, spalling of concrete and corrosion of
steel support and inadequate fixing. There was also
evidence of ponding due to inadequate falls, damaged and
leaking rain goods, and no sign of flashing or water-
proofing at roof levels. The brackets in the cantilevered
structures had insufficient strength and were incorrectly
fixed and in many cases there was evidence of corrosion.
Flashing and Water-proof ing : No application of
waterproofing systems or flashing was found anywhere in
this zone either. It was also difficult to inspect the
roofs of buildings in this area particularly those close to
the main square (Nos.lO, 11, 12, 13), because of their
proximity to the Israeli Military point. Discussions with
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the building users confirmed that no waterproof or rain
goods had been applied or maintained on the roofs of these
buildings. The inspection also proved that no dpc had been
applied around windows and below window sills.
Roofs, All the buildings in this zone had flat roofs, and
there was evidence of severe dampness and water penetration
through roofs in many buildings particularly around the
main square. This was demonstrated by the staining, water
penetration and dampness of the walls internally and
externally on the walls particularly the upper parts. The
tenants and users confirmed that no work had been done to
solve leakage problems on roofs, from which they suffered
for a long time. The units that were recently renovated,
seemed to be in better condition.
Although tenants in Kalbouneh building complained of
similar problems, the owner of the building, who lived in
a roof terrace apartment in the building, refused to allow
access to inspect it. There was evidence of stains and
water dripping on the external walls which confirmed that
there was a major problem with the finish and the drainage
system. It was not possible to determine whether there was
any damp-proofing or insulation on the roof and how the
water was drained.
There was no access either to the roof of the fourth
buildings in this sample area. There was no evidence of any
problems the upper floors and no sign of water, stains or
dampness internally or externally..
B) Internal
Ceilings : The ceilings in the two buildings close to the
main square, Karsoue' building and Suq Al-Akhdar shopping
centre (also the oldest of the four inspected), were in
very bad condition. Apart from two units which had been
recently redecorated (No.s 10 & 11), there was clear
evidence of severe dampness, water penetration, damage to
tiles, cracked plaster and peeling paint( No.s 12, 13, 26,
27, & 28).
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In Xarsoue' building the ceiling to the main entrance lobby
and the stair on every floor of the building had extensive
damage to the finish and signs of corrosion to steel in
exposed concrete areas. In the entrance lobby to the
offices inspected on the fourth floor, the water
penetration and water dripping was very close to the
exposed live wiring which had not been repaired for years
according to the tenants. Both tenants ( No. 12 & 13)
confirmed that the owner of the building did not carry out
any maintenance work on the building since they moved in
the early 1970s (Dweak, Swedan 1993).
Although the condition of the ceiling inside their offices
seemed reasonable, the condition of the under slab of the
balconies in these offices was serious. Exposed rusty steel
and broken concrete cantilevers, and evidence of severe
dampness and water ponding were common in most of the
balconies in this building.
Ceilings to entrances, stairs and the majority of shops and
offices in Suq Al Akhdar were in very bad condition. The
same problems of dampness, water penetration, plaster
damage and cracks, paint peeling and exposed tangled
wiring. Many lights were out of order and according to
tenants and users had been out of order for many years.
Many buildings inspected had renewed the original ceiling
and some added suspended ceiling tiles. The quality of
construction was generally inadequate in old and new
ceilings, but that may be more because of bad workmanship
and maintenance than from serious dampness problems.
Except for recently decorated buildings around the main
square there was evidence of:
-	 condensation,dampness, staining and mould growth
-	 roof and/or plumbing leaks and water penetration
-	 plaster failure and uneven, bulging and often peeling
paint where it is applied
-	 incorrect wall/roof connections
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Walls: The condition of internal walls in this zone were
similar to the ceiling. Most units inspected in Karsoue'
and the suq Al-Akhdar suffered from failure of finishes,
damage to the plaster, paint and severe staining and
dampness. The worst cases occurred in entrance lobbies and
staircases. The walls in the most of the units inspected,
were in bad condition. This was due to bad workmanship and
detailing, lack of proper technical specification, or
supervision and absence of maintenance.
Many buildings in this zone suffered from the following;
-	 evidence of severe condensation
-	 evidence of water penetration due to rain, plumbing or
roof leaks.
-	 damaged or blocked down pipes and gutters leading to
water penetration
-	 damage to wall paper or wall cladding
-	 incorrect connection between walls
-	 incorrect fixing of door frames
-	 cracks in plaster and paint failure where applied
-	 uneven paint and plaster surface
- wood rot in internal joinery(door frames,timber
lintels, window frames, built in timber (Quest. Nos
10-14 & 26- 28)
The quality of construction and finishes of one building
was reasonable (No.s 51 & 52). The inspection of the stairs
on all floors, the main entrance lobby, the basement and a
number of units, proved the building to be in better
condition than the others. Tenants and users had no
complaints with regard to the physical condition of the
building.
Floors : Most buildings in this zone had terrazzo tiling or
PVC tile finish. The quality of floor finish seemed
adequate by comparison to other finishes. The units where
plastic flooring had been used showed more evidence of
damage to the floor and to being worn out. Al Suq A1-Akhdar
seemed to be in a worse condition than any of the other
three. The quality of the floor finish in both Karsoue' and
Kalbouneh buildings was reasonable. The floor finish in Al-
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Shunnar building was of good quality. Some of the most
common problems were:
-	 cracked or damaged surface finish (screed or tiles)
-	 evidence of water penetration through walls at lower
levels
-	 down pipe damage at floor/wall level
-	 absence of dpm or dpc
-	 cracking,sloping and uneven flooring
-	 missing and broken tiles
-	 cracking of screed and lifting of tiles
-	 evidence of condensation
C) Stairways : Except in Al-Shunnar building, the physical
condition of the stairs in this zone was bad and considered
to be a safety hazard. The worse were Karsoue' building and
Al Suq Al-Akhdar centre. Although the design of the stairs
in terms of width and the dimension of the step was
adequate, the quality of finish and the physical condition
of the stairs were very bad and made it dangerous to use.
The walls ceilings, landings etc, suffered from severe
damage, dampness, water penetration, stains, graffiti,
exposed wiring, and broken lights. Many treads were chipped
and the nosing was broken, handrails missing or broken.
Most lights were either missing, damaged or out of order.
Windows on landings were badly fitted which allowed rain
and water penetration causing staining and dampness to
internal walls. Although lifts in two out of the three high
rise buildings inspected were in good working condition,
upon inspecting another four high rise buildings in the
same area, none had any working lifts, two had the shaft
provided with no lifts installed.
During discussions with engineers in Nablus, almost all
agreed that in 80% of cases, high rise buildings had no
working lifts. Tenants and building users estimated that
some lifts had been out of order for over twenty years.
(Assali, 1993, Nabulsi, 1993, Hanbali, 1992, & Quest.
No.12,13, 14)
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Summary:
There was strong evidence of serious dampness and water
penetration problems. These problems were demonstrated,
internally and externally by general failure of finishes,
deteriorating surface condition, rust in metal and rot in
timber elements, mould and plant growth and condensation,
and more seriously rising damp in many floors and lower
walls. In addition to lack of maintenance and neglect, the
problems are strongly associated with bad quality
construction, particularly in new buildings and extension
to existing buildings. Inadequate fixing of door and window
frames, lack of water proofing and rain goods in most roofs
and around openings were obvious reasons.
Indicators of more serious problems were evident in new
extensions (horizontal and vertical). Additional floors
built on top of old buildings, balconies and cantilevers
showing signs of cracking and sagging floors, looked
structurally unsafe. This observation was collaborated by
engineers' and users' confirmation that it was carried out
without professional or official supervision or approval.
The following tables are based on authors' own evaluation
based on all the information available when inspection was
carried out, including the data obtained from the
questionnaire and recorded in field notes and sketches.
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Physical Survey Results
Table (38)
Evaluation of Buildings Physical Condition
1.
Sample No
	 Zone	 Build. Use
	 User	 Evaluation
1	 B	 Commercial	 Tenant	 (1)
2	 B	 Cinema Cmx
	 Owner	 (4)
3	 B	 Cinema	 Owner	 (1)
4	 B	 Mixed Use	 Tenant	 (3)
5	 B	 =	 Tenant	 (3)
6	 B	 Commercial	 =	 (1)
7	 C	 =	 Owner	 (1)
8	 A	 Factory	 Employee	 (1)
9	 A	 Workshop	 Tenant	 (1)
10	 C	 Shop.Ctre	 Tenant	 (2)
11	 C	 =	 =	 (2)
12	 C	 Commercial	 Tenant	 (1)
13	 C	 =	 =	 (1)
14	 C	 Comin/Resid	 =	 (3)
15	 C	 =	 Owner	 (3)
16	 B	 Commercial	 Tenant	 (2)
17	 B	 =	 =	 (2)
18	 A	 Mixed Use	 Tenant	 (2)
19	 A	 Resident.	 Tenant	 (2)
20	 A	 Conun/Resid	 Tenant	 (3)
Evaluation Index:
Dilapidated condition = (1)
Bad condition	 = (2)
Medium condition	 = (3)
Good Condition	 = (4)
Excellent condition = (5)
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Table (38)
2.
Sample No	 Zone	 Build Use	 User	 Evaluation
21	 A	 Factory	 Owner	 (2)
22	 B	 Mixed Use	 Tenant	 (3)
23	 A	 Mixed Use	 Tenant	 (3)
24	 A	 =	 Tenant	 (3)
25	 A	 =	 Tenant	 (4)
26	 C	 Commercial	 Tenant	 (1)
27	 C	 =	 Tenant	 (1)
28	 C	 =	 Tenant	 (1)
29	 A	 Resident.	 Owner	 (1)
30	 B	 Mixed Use	 Tenant	 (3)
31	 A	 Factory	 Owner	 (2)
32	 A	 Mixed Use	 Tenant	 (2)
33	 B	 Coxnm/Resid	 Owner	 (4)
34	 B	 =	 Tenant	 (2)
35	 B	 Commercial	 Tenant	 (2)
36	 B	 =	 Tenant	 (3)
37	 B	 Commercial	 Tenant	 (3)
38	 A	 =	 Tenant	 (2)
39	 A	 =	 Tenant	 (3)
40	 B	 Commercial	 Tenant	 (4)
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Table (38)
Sample No	 Zone	 Build Use	 User	 Evaluation
41	 B	 Commercial	 Tenant	 (4)
42	 C	 Commercial	 Tenant	 (2)
43	 C	 Comm/Resid	 Owner	 (4)
44	 B	 Commercial	 Tenant	 (2)
45	 B	 Mixed Use	 Tenant	 (4)
46	 B	 =	 Tenant	 (3)
47	 B	 Comm/Resid	 Owner	 (1)
48	 B	 =	 Tenant	 (3)
49	 A	 Resident.	 Owner	 (2)
50	 A	 Mixed Use	 Tenant	 (3)
51	 C	 Commercial	 Tenant	 (4)
52	 C	 =	 Tenant	 (4)
53	 A	 Mixed Use	 Tenant	 (2)
54	 A	 Resident.	 squatter	 (2)
55	 A	 =	 Owner	 (2)
56	 A	 Comxn/Resid	 Tenant	 (3)
57	 A	 Mixed Use	 Owner	 (5)
58	 B	 Factory	 Owner	 (3)
59	 B	 Commercial	 Owner	 (4)
60	 B	 Commercial	 Owner	 (1)
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Table (39)
Evaluation of Physical Condition of buildings/zone:
(including general maintenance level, condition and
provision of internal utilities, physical problems such as
water penetration, danipness, quality of finishes
(ext./int),
(ZONE)
	
Count	 Zone "A"	 Zone"B"	 Zone"C"	 Row
	
Row%	 Old	 Medium	 New	 Total
Co 1%
	
Tot%	 ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________
Dilapidat.	 3	 5	 6	 14
	
Cond.	 21.4	 35.7	 42.9	 23.3
14.3	 20.0	 42.9
___________	 5.0	 8.3	 10.0	 ___________
	
Bad	 10	 5	 3	 18
	
Cond.	 55.6	 27.8	 16.7	 30.0
47.6	 20.0	 21.4
___________	 16.7	 8.3	 5.0	 ___________
	
Medium	 6	 9	 2	 17
	
Cond.	 35.3	 52.9	 11.8	 28.3
28.6	 36.0	 14.3
___________	 10.0	 15.0	 3.3 ___________
	
Good	 1	 6	 3	 10
	
Cond.	 10.0	 60.0	 30.0	 16.7
4.8	 24.0	 21.4
___________	 1.7	 10.0	 5.0	 ___________
	
Excell.	 1	 0	 0	 1
	
Cond.	 100.0	 1.7
4.8
____________	 1.7
	
Column	 21	 25	 14	 60
	
Total	 35.0	 41.7	 23.3	 100.0
Summary:
(based on buildings graded as in dilapidated and bad
condition)
Zone "A": 13 out of 21 buildings in less than medium
condition (61.9%)
Zone "B": 10 out of 25 buildings in less than medium
condition (40.0%)
Zone "C": 9 out of 14 buildings in less than medium
condition (64.3%)
Total : 32 out of 60 (53.3%) were in bad or
dilapidated condition
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Table (40)
Evaluation of Architectural Quality of building/zone:
(based on architectural style, details and special
features, relation to surrounding, quality of
construction/finishing material and any special aesthetic
value)
Count
Row%	 "A"	 "B"	 "C"	 Row
Col%	 Old	 Medium	 New	 Total
Tot%	 ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________
VeryBad	 0	 3	 6	 9
33.3	 66.7	 15.0
12.0	 42.9
5.0	 10.0	 ___________
Bad	 0	 9	 2	 11
81.8	 18.2	 18.3
36.0	 14.3
___________	 15.0	 3.3	 ___________
Medium	 4	 9	 4	 17
23.5	 52.9	 23.5	 28.3
19.0	 36.0	 28.6
6.7	 15.0	 6.7	 __________
Good	 12	 3	 2	 17
70.6	 17.6	 11.8	 28.3
57.1	 12.0	 14.3
20.0	 5.0	 3.3	 ___________
Excellent	 5	 1	 0	 6
83.3	 16.7	 10.0
23.8	 4.0
8.3	 1.7	 ___________ ___________
Column	 21	 25	 14	 60
Total	 35.0	 41.7	 23.3	 100.0
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Table (41)
Evaluation of general quality of building/zone*:
(including general physical condition, architectural
quality, and condition of the surrounding area such as:
access, traffic, parking facilities, environmental
conditions, amenities, open spaces, & utilities provision
Count
Row%	 "A"	 "B"	 "C"	 Row
Col%	 Old	 Medium	 New	 Total
Tot%	 ___________ ___________ ___________ ____________
Grade (D)	 0	 4	 7	 11
36.4	 63.6	 18.3
16.0	 50.0
____________ ____________	 6.7	 11.7	 ____________
Grade (C)	 6	 10	 4	 20
30.0	 50.0	 20.0	 33.3
28.6	 40.0	 28.6
____________	 10.0	 16.7	 6.7	 ____________
Grade (B)	 13	 9	 3	 25
52.0	 36.0	 12.0	 41.7
61.9	 36.0	 21.4
____________	 21.7	 15.0	 5.0
Grade(A)	 2	 2	 0	 4
50.0	 50.0	 6.7
9.5	 8.0
____________	 3.3	 3.3
Column	 21	 25	 14	 60
Total	 35.0	 41.7	 23.3	 100.0
Grade A: Generally good or very good, building and
surrounding.
Grade B: Medium to good condition of building and
surrounding with good architectural value
of building design.
Grade C: Medium condition of building and surrounding with
medium architectural value.
Grade D: Dilapidated physical condition, bad surrounding
and no architectural value.
* Authors own evaluation based on field notes and
information available at the time the questionnaire
and inspection were carried out.
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Table (42)
Physical condition by Building Age:
Count	 New	 New	 Old	 Old	 Row
Row%	 Occupat Jordan.	 British Historic	 Total
Col%	 Mandate
Tot% __________ _________ __________ __________ __________
Dilap	 0	 8	 3	 3	 14
Cond.	 57.1	 21.4	 21.4	 23.3
	
40.0	 30.0	 13.6
	
13.3	 5.0	 5.0	 _________
Bad	 3	 2	 3	 10	 18
Cond.	 16.7	 11.1	 16.7	 55.6	 30.0
37.5	 10.0	 30.0	 45.5
5.0	 3.3	 5.0	 16.7	 _________
Medium	 2	 6	 2	 7	 17
Cond.	 11.8	 35.3	 11.8	 41.2	 28.3
25.0	 30.0	 20.0	 31.8
3.3	 10.0	 3.3	 11.7	 _________
Good	 3	 4	 2	 1	 10
Cond.	 30.0	 40.0	 20.0	 10.0	 16.7
37.5	 20.0	 20.0	 4.5
5.0	 6.7	 3.3	 1.7	 _________
Excell.	 0	 0	 0	 1	 1
Cond.	 100.0	 1.7
4.5
	
1.7	 _________
Column	 8	 20	 10	 22	 60
Total	 13.3	 33.3	 16.7	 36.7	 100.0
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APPENDIX "C"
Questionnaire, Inspection Schedule and
Code Book
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Nabi us Survey: -
Questionnaire carried out between May and July 1993
The Survey carried out in three sample area in the Centre
of Nablus, the areas were chosen according to the periods
they were built, the survey was carried in what is
considered to be the spine of each zone. The questionnaire
presented below is the original form used during the
survey. Although answers were obtained for all the
questions, a number of the questions were not considered
for the data analysis, (Map No.4 & 6).
Sample (1)
Zone A: (Al Qasaba)
1. The main spine: Al-Khader Street/Al-Nasser Street
2. buildings in small streets branching of the main spine
Sample (2)
Zone B: (the business district)
1. Ghernata Street (from the Ottoman Bank to the main
square)
2. The main square (AL Hussain)
3. The Commercial Street up to Hitteen Street north
Sample (3)
Zone C: (Al Basateen)
This area had no clear focal point or centre, the existing
streets (mainly dirt tracks ) seem to follow a some grid
plan.
The main streets are Al-Adel Street (behind the square) and
Suff Ian Street to the west. Buildings were selected
randomly between these two streets.
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(A) QUESTIONNAWE (Social Survey)
Date :
Sample Number :
Sample Area :
Interviewer
Street Name :
Building Name :
Building Use :
[ I Retail	 [ 3 Offices
I Industrial	 [ 3 Residential
[ 3 Mixed	 [ 3 Public
Building Age :
[ 3 Historic	 [ 3 Old
( 3 Medium	 f 3 New
Building Description :
[ 3 Old single hse [ 3 Old multi storey
[ 3 Mod low-rise	 [ ) Mod multi-storey
[ 3 Mod high rise
Physical Condition :
[ 3 Excellent	 [ I Good
[]Bad	 [3 Dilapidated
Architectural Quality :
[ ) Excellent	 [ 3 Good
Bad
General Evaluation :
[ 3 Grade A	 [ 3 Grade B
[ 3 Grade C	 [ 3 Grade D
3 Ret./Off.
[ 3 Recreational
[ 3 Other
[ 3 Medium
[ 3 Medium
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(I) OUEBTIONS TO OWNERS
A- OWNER/OCCUPIER
Qi- What is your relationship to the building?
Al- [ ] Sole owner	 [ ] Partner
Q2- How long have you owned it?
	
A2- [ ] Over 40 yrs	 [ ] Over 25 yrs
	
[ ] Over 15 yrs	 [ ] 10-5 yrs
[]5-2yrs	 [] less
Q3- Was the property built for the present use?
A3- a)Yes[]	 b)No[]
c) Don't know [ J
Q4- (if A3/b) What was it originally built for?
A4 -
Q5- Did the change of use require alterations ?
AS- a) Yes	 [ ]	 b) No ( )
c) Don't know [ )
(if A5/a)
Q6- What were the changes ?
A6 -
Q7- When were these carried out ?
A7 -
Q8- How did you become an owner ?
A8- a) Inherited [
b) Bought it from previous owner [ J
C) First owner [ ]
Q9- (if A8/a) How long has it been with the family ?
A9- [ ] Over 40 yrs	 ( ) Over 25 yrs	 [ ] over 15 yrs
10-5 yrs	 5-2 yrs	 [ ] less
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QlO- How often do you maintain the building ?
AlO- ( ] Every yr	 [ ) 2-3 yrs	 [ ] 5 yrs
( ) More	 { ] When it needs	 [ ] Never
Qi.l- Are you satisfied with the present use of the
building?
All- a) Yes [ ]
	
b) No [ )
	
c) Don't know [ I
Q12- Are you satisfied with the present condition of the
building?
Al2- a) Yes ( )
	
b) No [ ]
	
c) Don't know [ )
if either All or Al2 is b or c ;
Q13- Do you have any plans to:
A13- 1- change use of the building ?
a) Yes [ ]
	
b) No [ J
	
c) Don't know [ J
2- Upgrade! expand
a) Yes [ )
	
b) No [ ]
	
c) Don't know [ ]
Q14- (if answer is b or c to both)
What are the obstacles to change?
A14- a) Security (financial):
( J credit facilities	 [ J High tax
b) Uncertainty (political):
[ ] Violence	 I ] Ownership	 ( ) Planning laws
c) Municipal :
[ ] Services	 [ ] Traffic/park
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(B) OWNER LETTING PROPERTY:
Q15- How long have the property been let ?
A15- [ ] Over 40 yrs	 [ ) Over 25 yrs
[ I Over 15 yrs	 [ ] 10-5 yrs
(]5-2yrs	 [)Less
Q16- Is this the first tenant you had ?
A16- a) Yes [ ]
	
b) No [ ]
	
c) Don't know [ )
if 1416/b
Q17- How long did you have the present tenant?
Al?- [ ) Over 40 yrs	 [ ] Over 25 yrs
[ ] Over 15 yrs	 [ ] 10-5 yrs
[]5-2yrs	 []Less
Ql8- When was the
	
last time the rent was
reviewed/increased?
A18- [ ) 1-2 yrs	 [ ] 2-5 yrs
[ ] Over 10 yrs	 [ ) More	 [ ) Never
Q19- Are you satisfied with the present rent ?
A19-[]Yes	 []No
[ ] Don't know
Q20- How often do you maintain the building ?
A20- [ ] Every yr
	 [ J 2-3 yrs
(]5yrs	 []More
[ J When it needs	 [ ] Never
Q2l- Are you satisfied with the present use of the
building?
All- a) Yes [ 3	 b) No ( 3
C) Don't know [ 3
Q22- Are you satisfied with the present condition of the
building?
A22- a) Yes [ 3	 b) No [ 3	 c) Don't know ( 3
if either 1421 or A22 is b or c ;
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Q23- Do you have any plans to:
A23- 1- Change use of the building ?
a) Yes [ ]
	
b) No [ ]
	
c) Don't know ( }
2- Upgrade/ expand ?
a) Yes [ )
	
b) No [ ]
	
c) Don't know [ ]
Q24- (if answer is b or c to both)
What are the obstacles to change?
A24- a) Security (financial):
[ ] Credit facilities	 [ ) High tax
b) Uncertainty (political):
[ J Violence	 [ I Ownership
[ ] Planning laws
c) Municipal :
[ ) Services	 [ ] Traffic/parking
d) Rent control
[ J Low rent	 [ J Obligation to tenants
[ ] Both
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(II) QUESTIONS TO TENANTS
Q25- How long have you been a tenant ?
	
A25- [ ) Over 4oyrs	 ( ) Over 25yrs
	
( ] Over l5yrs	 [ ] 10-5 yrs
5-2yrs	 ( ]Less
Q26- How often is the rent reviewed ?
	
A26- [ ) Every year	 ( ) 2-5yrs
	
( ] 5-10 years	 [ ] more	 ( J never
Q27- When was the last time your rent was reviewed?
	
A27- [ ] 0-12 mnths 	 [ ) 1-5yrs
( ) 5-10 yrs	 ( ] Before	 ( ) don't know
Q28- Do you believe that the amount of rent you pay is fair
relative to the value of the property today?
A28- [ ) Yes	 [ ] No	 [ J Don't know
Q29- How often you maintain the property?
A29- [ ] Every year	 [ ) 2-5 yrs	 ( ] 5-10 yrs
[ ] More	 ( ] Never
Q30- Do you think the landlord is doing enough to improve
the property?
A30- [ ] Yes	 ( ) No	 [ ] Don't know
Q3i- Do you have plans to move ?
A31- ( ] Yes	 [ ] No	 [ ) Don't Know
Q32- Do you have plans to expand! upgrade the business
(or improve the property if tenant)
A32- a) Yes [ ]
	
b) No I )	 C) Don't know [ ]
if A32/b or c
Q33- What are the constraints ?
A33- a) Political: [ ] Uncertainty	 [ ] Violence
( ) Closure (curfews/strikes)
b) Financial:	 [ ] High taxes	 [ ) Credit fac.
Investment opp.
c) Regulatory:	 ( ] Rent control	 [ ] Planning laws
[ ) Avail Services 	 [ ] Traffic/park
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III) QUESTIONS TO ALL:
Q34- Do you consider that you have serious problems in
the building?
A34- a) Yes [ ]
	
b) No [ ]
	
c) Don't know [ ]
if A34/a
Q35- How do you grade the seriousness of the following
problems if you have any in the building ?
A35- a)Noise
( ] serious	 [ ] bad	 [ ] accept
no problem
b)Pollution
[ J serious	 [ ] bad
[ ] no problem
c)Ventilation
[ ] serious	 [ J bad
[ ) no problem
d)Light
[ ] serious	 [ ) bad
[ ] no problem
e)Draft (wind)
[ ] serious	 [ ] bad
[ ] no problem
f)Water Penetration
[ j serious	 [ ] bad
[ ] no problem
g)Dampness
( ] serious	 [ ] bad
[ ] no problem
h)Access
[ ] serious	 [ ] bad
[ ] no problem
I ) Traffic
[ ] serious	 [ j bad
( ) no problem
[ ] accept
[ 3 accept
[ 3 accept
[ ] accept
[ 3 accept
[ 3 accept
( ] accept
[ 3 accept
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bad	 I ] accept
k)Utilities
[ ] serious
[ ) no problem
1) Maintenance
[ ] serious
[ ] no problem
bad	 I J accept
Q36- Do you consider that you have serious problems in
the area/street?
A36- a) Yes [ ]
	
b) No [ 3	 C) Don't know [ 3
if A36/a
Q37- How do you grade the seriousness of the following
problems if you have any in the area/street ?
a)Traffic
[ 3 serious	 [ 3 bad
[ 3 no problem
b)Parking facilities
[ 3 serious	 [ 3 bad
( 3 no problem
c)Street Vendors
[ 3 serious	 [ 3 bad
[ ] no problem
d) Pollution
[ 3 serious	 [ 3 bad
[ ] no problem
e)Hygiene
[ 3 serious	 [ 3 bad
[ 3 no problem
f)Services
{ 3 serious	 [ 3 bad
[ 3 no problem
g)Pedestrian Safety
[ 3 serious	 [ 3 bad
( 3 no problem
I 3 accept
[ ] accept
[ 3 accept
I 3 accept
I ] accept
I 3 accept
[ 3 accept
h)Access to buildings
I 3 serious	 ( 3 bad
	
1 3 accept
( 3 no problem
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j )Open Spaces (lack of)
[ ) serious	 [ ) bad	 [ ] accept
[ ] no problem
k)Security (Street fighting/ Army battles)
[ ] serious	 [ ) bad	 I ] accept
no problem
l)Security ( Vandalism! burglary)
[ 3 serious	 [ 3 bad	 [ 3 accept
L 3 no problem
m)Amenities (lack of: parks, seats, pub. toilets)
I ] serious	 [ ] bad	 [ 3 accept
[ 3 no problem
Q37- Are you satisfied generally with the condition of
the city centre (buildings, spaces, services etc)?
A37- a) Yes [ 3	 b) No [ ]
	
c) Don't know [ ]
(if A37/b)
Q38- Do you consider that you have serious problems in the
city centre (inc. historic core) ,which are obstructing
the development and improvement of the built
environment?
A38- a) Yes [ 3	 b) No [ 3	 c) Don't know [ 3
if A38/a
Q39- How do you grade the seriousness of the following
problems if you have any in the city centre?
A39- a)Traffic
[ 3 serious	 [ 3 bad
[ ] no problem
b) Parking facilities
[ 3 serious	 [ 3 bad
I 3 no problem
C) Street vendors:
[ 3 serious	 [ 3 bad
I 3 no problem
d) Pollution
[ 3 serious	 [ 3 bad
I J no problem
[ 3 accept
( 3 accept
[ 3 accept
[ 3 accept
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e) Hygiene
[ ) serious	 [ ) bad	 [ ] accept
no problem
f)Services
[ ) serious	 [ ) bad	 [ ] accept
no problem
g)Pedestrian safety
[ ] serious	 [ ) bad	 I ] accept
( ) no problem
h)Access to buildings
( ) serious	 ( ] bad	 ( ] accept
no problem
1)Open spaces (lack of)
[ ] serious	 [ ) bad	 ( ] accept
[ ] no problem
k)Amenities (lack of: parks, seats, pub. toilets)
[ ] serious	 [ ) bad	 [ ) accept
[ ] no problem
l)Lack of maintenance:
[ ] serious	 [ ] bad	 [ ] accept
[ ] no problem
m)Restorat jon/protect jon of historic buildings
[ ] serious	 ( ) bad	 [ ) accept
( 3 no problem
Q40- What effect do you consider did the following factors
had on the present condition of the city centre, and
are obstructing development and investment?
A40- Political factors:-
a)Security (Street fighting/ Army battles)
[ 3 serious	 [ 3 bad	 [ 3 accept
[ 3 no effect
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b)Security ( Vandalism/ burglary)
[ J serious	 { ) bad	 { 3 accept
no problem
c)Prolonged forced closure
[ ] serious	 [ ) bad	 [ ] accept
[ 3 no problem
d)Demolition/sealjng off Property
[ 3 serious	 [ ] bad	 [ 3 accept
no problem
e)Uncertainty (political future)
[ 3 serious	 [ 3 bad	 3 accept
[ 3 no problem
LeTal factors
f)Absence of municipal council
[ 3 serious	 [ 3 bad	 [ ) accept
[ 3 no problem
g)PlannincT laws
[ 3 serious	 [ 3 bad	 [ 3 accept
[ 3 no problem
h) Ownership status
(absentees laws! residency permits)
[ 3 serious	 [ 3 bad	 [ 3 accept
[ I no problem
1)Rent control
[ ) serious	 [ 3 bad	 [ 3 accept
[ 3 no problem
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Financial factors
k)Lack of investment
[ ] serious	 [ ] bad	 [ I accept
J no problem
l)Lack of financial institutions (credit,saving)
I J serious	 [ ] bad	 [ J accept
[ ] no problem
m)Closure of Arab banks (restrictions on credit)
[ ) serious	 [ J bad	 [ ) accept
[ ] no problem
n)High taxes! raids
[ ) serious	 [ J bad	 [ J accept
[ ) no problem
539
Dr./dent.
[ 3 workshop
[ 3 recreation
[ 3 other
(B) PhYSICAL CONDITION SURVEY (Building Inspection)
(I) General Information
(a) Location :-
Qi- Give details
Al- Sample No	 Sample Area :
Street Name :	 Building Name :
(b) Date of Construction :-
Q2-Give date of construction
A2-
1) [ ) Known	 [ ) Estimate	 [ j Don't know
2) [ ] (list) before 1900	 [ ] (Mand) before 1950
[ 3 (Jord) before 1967	 [ 3 (Occup) 1967-1987
[ ] (Occ./Intifada) after 1987
(c) Use :-
Q3- What is the present building use?
A3- [ 3 retail	 [ 3 offices	 3 ret./off.
[ 3 industrial	 [ ] recreational	 [ 3 residential
[ 3 mixed (spec) [ 3 public	 3 other(spec)
Q4- Has it changed from its original use?
A4- a) same [ 3	 b) changed [ )	 c) Don't know [ 3
(if A4/b):
Q5- What was it used for previously?
A5- [ 3 retail	 [ I offices
[ 3 industrial	 [ 3 recreational
[ 3 mixed (spec) [ 3 public
Q6- What is the present unit use?
A6- [ 3 shop	 [ 3 shop/serv.
[ 3 rest/cafe	 [ 3 office
[ 3 factory	 [ 3 public
[ 3 flat
	
[ 3 house
3 ret./off.
[ ] residential
3 other(spec)
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Q7- Has it changed from its original use?
A7- a) same [ J
	
b) changed [ ]
	
c) Don't know [ ]
(if A7/b)
Q8- What was the previous use ?
A8- [ ] shop	 [ J shop/serv.	 [ ] Dr./dent.
[ ] rest/cafe	 [ ] office	 ( ] workshop
[ ] factory	 [ ) public	 [ ) recreation
[ ] flat	 [ ] house	 [ j other
retail
(d) Building Description:
A- External :-
1- Elevations
1/1 WALLS
Q9- Construction material
A9- [ ] Stone	 [ ] Concrete
[ 3 Conc Blck	 [ 3 Other
Q1O- Finishes
AlO- [ ) Stone	 [ 3 Paint/render
[ ] Cladding	 [ ] No finish
(met. plastic)
( 3 Other
1/2 DOORS
Q11- Are these the original doors ?
All- [ 3 Yes	 [ 3 No	 [ 3 Don't know
Q12- Material
Al2- ( ] Timber	 [ 3 Metal	 ( 3 Other
1/3 WINDOWS
Q13- Are these the original windows ?
A13- [ 3 Yes	 3 No	 [ 3 Don't know
Q14- Material
A14- [ 3 Timber	 [ 3 Metal	 [ 3 Other
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1/4 ROOF
Q15- Is this the original roof ?
A15- ( ] Yes	 [ ] No	 [ J Don't know
Q16- Roof construction
A16- [ J Dome	 [ ] Flat	 [ ) Pitched/tiled
Q17- Roof finish/dpm
A17- [ ] Avail.	 [ ] Unavail	 [ ] Damaged
1/5 STAIRS
Q18- Construction material
A18- [ ] Stone	 [ ] Concrete [ J Metal
[ ] Other
Q19- Finishes
A19- [ ] Stone	 I ] Screed	 [ ] Tiled
[ ] Other
1/6 BALCONIES
Q20- Construction Material
A20 [ ] Concrete	 [ ] Timber	 [ ] Metal
[ ] Other
Q21- Finishes
A21- [ ) Plaster	 [ 3 Paint	 3 No finish
Q22- Balustrade / Handrails
A22- [ 3 Timber	 f 3 Metal	 [ 3 Other
1/7 Access to building
Q23- Describe
A23- a) Direct [ )
	
b) Indirect [ 3
Q24- if A63/a
A24- [ ] from street	 [ 3 from stairs
Q25- if A63/b
A25- [ 3 from open space [ 3 from courtyard
[ 3 from alley	 I 3 from stairs
Q26- Did you make any alterations! additions to the
building ?
A26- a) Yes ( )
	
b) No [
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if A26/a
Q27- Describe the alterations
A27- a) Vertical
[ ] Extra floors 	 [ ) Add. roof
[ J Parapet	 [ ] Stair	 ( ] Other
b) Horizontal
[ ) Projection: front
back
side
[ ] Balcony (new)
[ ] Glazed/covered balcony
(to use as room)
[ ] Wall cladding (specify)
( ) Toilet facilities
[ J Kitchen
[ ] Store
Q28- Did you obtain municipal permit to carry alterations?
A28- ( ] Yes	 [ ] No	 [ ] Not req.
if tenant
Q29- Did you obtain owner approval to carry alterations?
A29- [ ) Yes	 [ ] No	 [ ] Not req.
2- External/open space
Q30- Access
A30- a) [ ] direct
b) [ ] difficult
c) [ J covered
[ ) uncovered
[ ] indirect
[ J dangerous
[ ) semi-covered
Q31- Emergency access (ambulance/fire eng.)
A31- [ ) available	 [ ] not-available
Q32- Loading/unloading facilities
A32- [ ] available	 [ ] not- available
Q33- Steps/stairs condition
A33- [ ] good	 I ) fair
[ ] chipped	 [ ] broken/dangerous i: ] n/a
543
Q34- Space between buildings
A34- [ ] wide	 [ ] narrow
Q35- Open/green space close to bldg
A35- [ J avail	 [ ] not-avail
Q36- Parking facility
A36- [ ) Available	 [ ] Not available
Q37- Pavement
A37- a) [ ] wide	 [ ] narrow
[ ] no space
bad maint.
[ ] no pavement
b) [ ] good cond [ ] damag.f in
[ ] broken/danger
Q38- Seating facilities
A38- [ ] available 	 [ ] not available
Q39- Landscape
A39- ( ) available	 [ ] not available
Q40- Rubbish bins
A40- ( ] available	 [ ) not available
Q41- Toilet facilities (public)
A41- [ ] available	 [ ] not available
3- Public Utilities:
3/1 Sanitary - water
Q42- Is any of the following utilities available in this
unit for the sole use of its occupants ?
A42- [ ] w.basin	 [ ] sink
[ ] toilet	 [ ] bath/shower
Q43- If none is available; can the occupants use other
facilities?
A43-[]Yes	 []No
Q44- if yes; location and distance from the building
A44- ( ] location
[ ] distance
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3/2 Electrical supply
Q45- Is the building connected to elec. network ?
A45-[)Yes	 [JNo
Q46- Are you satisfied with the connection 7
A46- [ ] Yes	 ( ] No	 [ ] Don't know
Q47- Do experience power cuts ?
A47-[]Yes	 []No
Q48- if yes; How often ?
A48- [ ] every day	 ( ] twice/week	 [ ] once/week
[ ) once/month	 [ ] less	 [ ] varies
Q49- How long does it last ?
A49- [ ] more than 6hrs 	 [ ] more than 4hrs
[ ] more than 2 hrs	 ( ] less	 [ ] varies
Q50-	 Does the power cut	 affect your business!
product ion?
A50- [ ] always	 [ ] sometimes	 [ J rarely
[ ] no problem	 [ ) don't know
Q51- Describe electrical wiring 7
Q51- [ ] Covered 	 [ ] part exposed
[ ) exposed	 [ ] exposed/tangled
[ ] dangerous
3/3 Heating
Q52-
	
	
Is heating facilities available in the building/
unit 7
A52- ( ] Yes	 [ ) No
Q53- if yes; describe the heating system ?
A53- [ ] central heating	 [ ] mobile gas unit
[ ) mobile electric 	 [ ] stove
Q54- Are you satisfied with the heating in the unit 7
A54- [ ] excellent	 [ ] satisfactory
[ ) not-satisf.	 [ ] bad	 [ ] don't know
545
3/4 Drainage / sewerage connections
Q55- Is the building connected ?
A55-(]Yes	 [)No
Q56- Are you satisfied with the connection/ service ?
A56- [ ] Yes	 [ ) No
[ ] Don't know
4- Internal! finishes
4/1 FLOORS
finish :
[ ] concrete	 [ ] screed	 [ ) terr. tiles
[ ] ceramic tiles	 [ J plastic	 [ ] timber
[ ] other
4/2 CEILING
[ ] no finish	 [ ) plaster	 [ ] plast/ paint
[ ) susp ceil	 [ ] other
4/3 WAllS
[ ] no finish	 [ ] plaster	 [ ] plast/ paint
[ ) tiles	 [ ] wall cover	 [ ] other
4/4 DOORS & FRAMES
[ ] timber	 [ ] metal	 [ ) other
4/5 WINDOWS & FRAMES
[ J timber	 [ ] metal	 [ ] other
4/6 PARTITIONS
[ ] concrete	 [ ) brick	 [ ) timber
[ ) other
4/7 ALTERATIONS
[ ] additions	 [ ) demolitions	 [ ] other
walls	 [ ]
floor	 [ ]
ceiling	 [ ]
door/frame	 ]
window frame	 [ ]
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5- AVAILABLE SERVICES (within the unit)
5/1 Water connection
	
[ ) available	 [ ] not-available
i. cold water
	
[ ] available	 [ ) not-available
ii. hot water
	
[ ] available	 [ ] not-available
iii. wash basin
	
[ ] available	 [ ] not-available
iv. sink
	
[ 3 available	 [ ] not- available
v. toilet
	
[ I available	 [ 3 not-available
vi. bath/shower
	
3 available	 ( 3 not-available
5/2 drainage/sewerage connections
	
[ 3 available	 ( 3 not available
5/3 electricity
	
[ 3 available	 [ 3 not-available
5/4 heating
	
[ 3 available	 [ 3 not-available
5/5 telephone
	
( 3 available	 [ 3 not-available
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Physical Survey :
Scope of the Survey
A careful inspection of the exterior and the interior of
buildings was carried out in the three sample areas to
assess the present condition of buildings. The buildings
that were inspected were purposively selected.
Externally the inspection covered roofs, external walls,
rain water disposal, type and condition of building
materials, and availability and condition of waterproofing
(if used). It also covered doors and windows, access and
visual appearance. Internally, the survey aimed to evaluate
the condition of building features such as staircase,
internal walls, doors, ceilings, floors, plaster and paint,
and general decorative order
External
1. Roofs' main problems of weathering and maintenance
such as:
- shape and form;
- nature of roof covering;
- rainwater disposal arrangement;
- roof construction beneath covering.
2. Present condition of roof covering:
- lack of water proofing;
- water tightness;
- cracks in roof finish; broken tiles;
- level of maintenance if any
3. Gutters and down pipes
4. Walls and structural stability:
Age of building; building material; rising damp; water
penetration; joint rendering; overloading due to
additional weight/overcrowding.
5. Floors and ceilings:
Surface finish; screeds, tiles, joints (cracks,
dampness, general appearance
6. Staircases:
width, stability, construction, handrails safety
7. Balconies:
construction, projection, safety, handrails
8. Alterations, additions, restoration work : Structural
stability; construction quality; maintenance
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Architectural factors/variables that were examined
included:
1. Architectural quality ; quality of exterior graded
into 4 categories indicating style, quality of detail
and materials, scale, access, relation to other
buildings:
excellent	 good	 fair	 bad
2. Overall visual appearance : finish, maintenance,
colour, openings, exposed services, projections
(canopies), signs, graffiti , also graded into 4 cat.
excellent	 good	 fair	 bad
3. Modern additions to old buildings
vertical extensions
horizontal extensions
% increase
defacement
4. Townscape value; in terms of historical interest,
landmark, part of an important group of buildings
forming urban spaces or creating special features
high	 medium	 reasonable	 low
5. Use of building
commercial
residential
mixed
others (specify) i.e. mosque, public bath, workshop
6. Building type/style
House
modern/low rise (2-3 floors)
old/low rise (2-3 floors)
Modern/multi story ( more than three, specify)
public building
7. Age of building
date of construction
estimated age (guesstimate)
8. Condition/ state of decay ( maintenance, structure)
Good	 fair	 poor	 derelict
9. Overall classification : total number of points each
building scored, then dividing them into four grades
Grade A Grade B Grade C Grade D
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Data Analysis
Code-Rook
11
Var No
	 Var. lab
	 Values	 Val Lab
	 Miss Val
	 Variable
(A- Social Survey)
1.	 ZONE	 1	 Old	 99	 Samole Area
2
3
	
2.	 RU
	
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
A
9
	
3.	 BA
	
4
3
2
1
	
4.	 RD
	
1
2
3
4
5
6
	
5.	 PHYS CON
	
5
4
3
2
1
	
6.	 ARO
	
5
4
3
2
1
	
7.	 GENEV
	
4
3
2
1
	
8.	 REB
	
1
2
3
Med
New
Retail	 99	 Building
Office	 Use
Ret/Of f
Tndust.
Resid.
Recreat
Mixed
Public
Other
Historic 99
	 Building
Old	 Age
Medium
New
Sing Hse 99
	 Building
Old Multi	 Description
Mod low
Mod Multi
Mod High
Other
Fxcell.	 99	 Physical
Good	 Condition
Medium
Bad
Di lapid.
Excell.	 99	 Architectural
Good	 Ouality
Medium
Bad
V. Bad
Grade A
	 99	 General
Grade B
	 Evaluation
Grade C
Grade 0
Own/Occ	 99	 Relation to
Own/lett	 Building -
Tenant
2Var No
	 Var. Lab	 Values	 Val Lab	 Miss Val	 Variable
(If owner/Occupier)
9.	 LOWN	 1	 SoleOwner 99	 Type of
2	 Partner	 Ownership
10.	 MFRO	 1	 Evry yr	 99	 Mainten.
2	 2-5 yrs	 Frequency
3	 5-10 yrs
4	 more
5	 varies
6	 Never
7	 N/A
11.	 SATUSE	 1	 Yes	 99	 Satisfact
2	 No	 with build
3	 Don't Kn	 use
4	 N/A
12.	 SATCON	 1	 Yes	 99	 Satisfact
2	 No	 with Rldg
3	 Don't Kn	 Condition
4	 N/A
13.	 PLCHNGI	 1	 Yes	 99	 Plans to
2	 No	 change
3	 Don't Kn	 build use
4	 N/A
14.	 PLCHNG2	 1	 Yes	 99	 Plans to
2	 No	 expand/
3	 Don't Kn	 upgrade
4	 N/A
15.	 OBSCHNG1	 1	 Yes	 99	 Obstacles/
2	 No	 Finance ie
3	 N/A	 Credlt,tax
16.	 OBSCHNG2	 1	 Yes	 99	 Obstacles!
2	 No	 Political;
3	 N/A	 Viol,curfew
17.	 ORSCHN3	 I	 Yes	 99	 Obstacles/
2	 No	 Legal,plang
3	 N/A	 ownership,
rent contri
18.	 OBSCHN4	 1	 Yes	 99	 Obstacles/
2	 No	 Municipal,
3	 N/A	 Serv,Traff
etc
3Var No
	
Var. Lab	 Values	 Val Lab	 Miss Val	 Variable
(If Owner letting Property)
19.	 PRLET	 I	 > 4Oyrs	 99	 How Long
2	 > 25yrs	 property
3	 > iSyrs	 been let?
4	 10-Syrs
5	 5- yrs
6	 less
7	 N/A
20.	 RENTREV	 1	 1-2 yrs	 99	 Last time
2	 2-5 yrs	 rent was
3	 Over lOyrs	 reviwed/
4	 More	 increased
5	 Never
6	 N/A
21.	 SATRENT	 1	 Yes	 99	 Satisfact
2	 No	 with rent
3	 Don't Know
4	 N/A
22.	 SATUSF	 1	 Yes	 99	 Satisf act
2	 No	 with Bldg
3	 Don't Know	 use
4	 N/A
23.	 SATCOND	 1	 Yes	 99	 Satisfact
2	 No	 with Bld
3	 Don't Know	 Condition?
4	 N/A
24.	 FROMAIN	 1	 Every yr	 99	 Frequency
2	 2-5 yrs	 of mainten
3	 5-10 yrs
4	 More
5	 varies
6	 Never
7	 N/A
25.	 PLNCHGI	 I	 Yes	 99	 Plans to
2	 No	 change
3	 Don't Know	 build. use
4	 N/A
26.	 PLNCHG2	 1	 Yes	 99	 Plans to
2	 No	 expand!
3	 Don't Know	 upgrade
4	 N/A
4Var No
	 Var. Lab	 Values	 Val Lab	 Miss Val	 Variable
27.	 OBST1	 1	 Yes	 99	 Obstacles:
2	 No	 financial
3	 Don't Know
4	 N/A
28.	 OBST2	 1	 Yes	 99	 Obstacles:
2	 No	 political
3	 Don't Know
4	 N/A
29.	 ORST3	 1	 Yes	 99	 Obstacles:
2	 No	 legal
3	 Don't Know
4	 N/A
30.	 OBST4	 1	 Yes	 99	 Obstacles:
2	 No	 municipal
3	 Don't Know
4	 N/A
(If Tenant)
31.	 LGTEN	 1	 > 4oyrs	 99	 Length of
2	 > 25yrs	 tenancy
3	 >l5yrs
4	 10- Syrs
5	 5-2yrs
6	 Less
7	 N/A
32.	 RFVRENT	 I	 Every yr	 99	 Frequency
2	 2-Syrs	 of rent
3	 5-lOyrs	 review
4	 More
5	 Never
6	 N/A
33.	 FAIRRENT	 1	 Yes	 99	 Fair rent
2	 No	 value
3	 Don't Know
4	 N/A
34.	 MAFREO	 1	 Fvery yr	 99	 Frequency
2	 2-5 yrs	 of
3	 5-lOyrs	 Maintenance
4	 More
5	 Never
6	 Varies
7	 N/A	 -
5Var No
	 Var. Lab	 Values	 Val Lab	 Miss Val	 Variable
35.	 LANDIMP	 1	 Yes	 99	 Landlord
2	 No	 improve!
3	 Don't Know	 maintain
4	 N/A	 building
36.	 MOVPLAN	 1	 Yes	 99	 Plans to
2	 No	 move
3	 Don't Know
4	 N/A
37.	 EXPLAN	 I	 Yes	 99	 Plans to
2	 No	 upgrade!
3	 Don't Know	 expand
4	 N/A	 business
3.	 CONSTR1	 1	 Yes	 99	 Constraints
2	 No	 political
3	 N/A
39.	 CONSTR2	 1	 Yes	 99	 Constraints
2	 No	 financial
3	 N/A
40.	 CONSTR3	 1	 Yes	 99	 Constraints
2	 No	 legal
3	 N/A
41.	 CONSTR4	 1	 Yes	 99	 Constraints
2	 No	 municipal
6Var No
	 Var. Lab	 Values	 Val Lab
	 Miss Val
	 Variable
(Questions to all! asse.csment to problem with built environment)
BUILDING
42.	 PROBLI)	 I	 Yes	 99	 Building
2	 No	 Problems
43.	 PROBI	 1	 Serious	 Noise
2	 Bad
3	 Acceptable
4	 No problem
44.	 PROF32	 1	 Serious	 Pollution
2	 Bad
3	 Acceptable
4	 No problem
45.	 PROB3	 1	 Serious	 Ventilation
2	 Bad
3	 Acceptable
4	 No problem
46.	 PROB4	 1	 Serious	 Light
2	 Bad
3	 Acceptable
4	 No Problem
47.	 PROB5	 I	 Serious	 Draft
2	 Bad
3	 Acceptable
4	 No Problem
4R.	 PROB6	 I	 Serious	 Water
2	 Bad	 Penetration
3	 Acceptable
4	 No Problem
49.	 PROB7	 1	 Serious	 Dampness
2	 Bad
3	 Acceptable
4	 No Problem
50.	 PROB8	 1	 Serious	 Access
2	 Bad
3	 Acceptable
4	 No Problem
51.	 PROB9	 1	 Serious	 Traffic
2	 Bad
3	 Acceptable
4	 No Problem
7Var No
	 Var. lab	 Values	 Val Lab	 Miss Val	 Variable
52	 PROBIO	 1	 Serious	 99	 Utilities
2	 Red
3	 Acceptable
4	 No Problem
53.	 PROB11	 1	 Serious	 Maintenanc
2	 Bad
3	 Acceptable
4	 No Problem
AJF1EA/ ZON
	54.	 PRORAR
	
1
2
	
55.	 PRORAR1
	
I
2
a
4
	56.	 PROBAR2
	
1
2
3
4
	57.	 PROBAR3
	
I
2
3
4
	58.	 PROBAR4
	
I
2
3
4
	59.	 PROBAR5
	
1
2
a
4
	60.	 PROBAR 6
	
I
2
a
4
	
61.	 PROBAR7
	
I
2
3
4
Yes
No
Ser i otis
Bad
Accept.
No problem
Serious
Bad
Acceptable
No problem
Se r i ous
Bad
Acceptable
No problem
Serious
Bad
Acceptable
No Problem
Serious
Bad
Acceptable
No Problem
Serious
Bad
Acceptable
No Problem
Serious
Bad
Acceptable
No Problem
Area/Zone
Problems
Traffic
Parking
St reet
Vendors
Pollution
Hygiene
Services
Pedest ri an
Safety
City Ctre
Problems
Traffic
Parking
St reet
Vendors
Pollution
Hygiene
A
Var No
	 Var. Lab	 Values	 Val Lab	 Miss Val
	 Variable
62.	 PROBARC	 1	 Serious	 Access
2	 Bad
3	 Acceptable
4	 No Problem
63.	 PROBAR1O	 1	 Serious	 Security!
2	 Bad	 fighting,
3	 Acceptable	 Violence
4	 No Problem
64.	 PROBAR11	 1	 Serious	 Security/
2	 Bad	 Vandalism
3	 Acceptable	 Burglary
4	 No Problem
65.	 PRORAR12	 I	 Serious	 Amenities
2	 Bad	 Parks,Pub
3	 Acceptable	 Toilets,
4	 No Problem	 Seating
CITY CFNTRE
	
66.	 PROBCT
	
I
2
	
67.	 PROBCT1
	
1
2
3
4
	68.	 PROBCT2
	
1
2
3
4
	
69.	 PROBCT3
	
I
2
3
4
	70.	 PROBCT4
	
I
2
3
4
	
71.	 PROBCT5
	
1
2
3
4
Yes
No
Serious
Bad
Accept.
No problem
Serious
Bad
Acceptable
No problem
Serious
Bad
Acceptable
No problem
Serious	 0
Bad
Acceptable
No Problem
Serious
Bad
Acceptable
No Problem
9Var No
	 Var. Lab	 Values	 Val Lab	 Miss Val	 Variable
72.	 PRORCT6	 1	 Serious	 99	 Services
2	 Bad
3	 Acceptable
4	 No Problem
73.	 PROBCT7	 1	 Serious	 Pedestrian
2	 Bad	 Safety
3	 Acceptable
4	 No Problem
74.	 PROBCT8
	
I
	
Serious	 Access
2
	
Bad
3
	
Acceptable
4
	
No Problem
75.	 PROBCT1 0
	
1
	
Se rio us	 Amen i t i es
Bad
3
	
Acceptable
4
	
No Problem
	
76.	 PROBCTI 1
	
Serious	 General
2
	
Bad
	
lack of
3
	
Accept abl
4
	
No Probltm
	
77.	 PROBCTI2
	
1
	
Ser thus	 Restorat .1
Bad
	
Prot ec .of
:3
	
Acceptable	 hi storic
4
	
No Problem	 buildings
OBSDEV2
OBSDEV3
OBSDEV4
ORSDEV5
80.
81.
82.
79.
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
I
2
3
4
LEGAL OBSTACLES
	
83.	 OBSDFV6
	
1
2
3
4
	
84.	 OBSDEV7
	
1
2
3
4
	
85.	 OBSDEVS
	
1
2
3
4
	
86.	 OBSDFV9
	
1
2
3
4
10
Var No
	 Var. Lab	 Values	 Val Lab Miss Val	 Variable
Obstacles to Development (Political)
POLITICAL OBSTACLES
78.	 ORSDEV1	 1	 Serious Eff	 99	 Security!
Bad Effect
Small Effect
No Effect
Serious Eff
Bad Effect
Small Fffect
No Problem
Serious Eff
Bad Effect
Small Effect
No Effect
Serious Eff
Bad Eff
Small Eff
No Effect
Serious Fff
Bad Effect
Small Eff
No Effect
Serious Eff
Bad Effect
Small Eff
No Effect
Serious Eff
Bad Effect
Small Eff
No Effect
Serious Fff
Bad Effect
Small Eff
No Effect
Serious Eff
Bad Effect
Small Effect
No Effect
fighting, -
Violence,
Army Act.
Security/
Burglary,
Vandalism
Prolonged
Cl o cii r e /
Cur fews
Demolition
Sealing
Property
Uncertainty
Pout .Futur
Absence of
Muni ci pal
Council
Planning
1 aws
Ownership
Status
Rent control
88. OBSDEVI I
89 OBSDEV1 2
90. OBSDEV1 3
Tnvestm.
Lack of
Financial
Inst itut
Banking
High Taxi
Raids
11
Var No
	 Var. lab	 Values	 Val Lab	 Miss Val	 Variable
Ohstaclns to Development
EL ANCIAL OBSTACLES
87.	 OflSDFV1O	 I	 Serious Fff 99	 Lack of
2	 Bad Effect
3	 Small Effect
4	 No Effect
1	 Serious Eff
2	 Bad Effect
3	 Small Effect
4	 No Problem
1	 Serious Fff
2	 Bad Effect
3	 Small Fffect
4	 No Fffect
I	 Serious Eff
2	 Bad Eff
3	 Small Eff
4	 No Effect
12
PART II / PHYSICAL SURVFY
Var No	 Var. Lab	 Values	 Val Lab	 Miss Val	 Variable
90(1)	 ROCONS	 1	 Dome	 99	 Roof
2	 Flat	 Construct
3	 PItched
4	 Other
91.(2)	 ROFTN	 1	 Avail.	 Available
2	 Unavail	 roof finish
3	 Damaged	 DPM/prot act
4	 Unknown
92.(3)	 ACCOP2	 1	 Difficult	 Access
2	 Dangerous	 description
3	 Reasonable
1
2
1
2
1
2
a
4
5
I
2
3
I
2
1
2
3
I
2
3
I
2
I
93. (4)
94. (5)
95. (6)
96. (7)
97. (8)
ga. (9)
g9.(10)
100(11)
101(12)
FMACC
ODFAC
STACOND
GRSP
PKFAC
PAV I
PAV2
STFAC
1DSC
Available
LJnavai labia
Available
Unavai labia
Good
Fair
Chipped
Brk/Danger
N/A
Available! OK
Badly Maint.
Unavailable
Avai labia
Unavai labia
Wide
War row
No Pavement
Good
Damag. Fin
Rrk/Danger.
Aval labia
(Jnavai labia
Avai labia
Iinavai labia
Fme rgency
Access
Load Ing/
Unloading
Faci lit ies
Stai rs/
Steps
Condition
C rae 11
Space Cis
to Bldg
Parking
Facility
Pavement
Description
Pavement
Condit ion
Stat I ng
Faci lit ias
Landscape
13
Var No
	 Var. tab	 Values	 Val Lab	 Mics Val	 Variable
102(13)	 BIN	 1	 Available	 99	 Rubbish
2	 Unavailable	 Bins
103(14)	 TLFAC	 1	 Available	 Public toil
2	 Unavailable	 facilities
104(15)	 SANT4	 I	 Yes	 Able to use
2	 No	 other Sent.
facilities
105(16)	 SANTS	 1	 Cloce	 Facilities
2	 Far	 Location
Building Services
	
106(17)	 ELCSUP	 1
2
	
107(18)	 SATCON	 1
2
3
	
108(19)	 PWCUT	 I
2
	
109(20)
	
FROCUT
	
1
2
3
4
5
6
	
110(21)
	
LGCUT
	
I
2
3
4
5
	
111(22)
	
AFF BUS
	
1
2
3
4
5
	
112(23)
	
WIRDES
	
I
2
3
4
5
Yes
No
Yes
No
Dont Know
Yes
No
Ev.Day
Tw/Week
Onc/Week
Onc/Mnt h
Less
Varies
> 6hrs
> 4hrs
> 2hrs
Less
Varies
Always
Sometime
Rarely
No Problem
Dont Know
Covered
Prt Coy
Exposed/OK
Expos/Tang 1
Expoc/Danger.
Elect rical
supply
Satisfied
with
serviCe
Fxperi ence
Power Cuts
F requency
of Cuts
How long
the cut
lasts?
Effect on
business
Wiring
descript ion
14
Var No	 Var. Lab	 Values Val Lab Miss Val	 Variable
113(24)	 HTFAC	 1	 Yes	 99	 Heating
2	 No	 facilities
114(25)	 HTSAT	 1	 Fxcellent	 Satisfact
2	 Satisfact.	 with Heating
3	 Not Satis
4	 Rad
5	 font Know
115(26)	 DRSW	 I	 Yes	 Drain.sewgre
2	 No	 connection
Sat i sfact
with service
Water
connect Ion
Cold Water
Hot Water
Wash flasin
Sink
Toilet
Telephone
	
116(27)	 ORSAT	 1	 Yes
2	 No
3	 font Know
Avalalbie Services (within unit)
	
117(28)	 WRCON	 1	 Yes
2	 No
	
118(29)	 CWAT	 I	 Yes
2	 No
	
119(30)	 HWAT	 1	 Yes
2	 No
	
120(31)	 RAS	 1	 Yes
2	 No
	
121(32)	 SK	 I	 Yes
2	 No
	
122(33)	 IL	 1	 Yes
2	 No
	123(34)	 TLPH	 I	 Yes
2	 No
LONDI!.
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